Secure boot for BMC

Secure boot for BMC

[Brad Bishop]

Hi everyone

Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.

thx - brad

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Teddy Reed]

Hi Brad,

We added a verified-boot implementation to Facebook's flavor a few
years ago, based on U-boot's and Chromium's designs. It is not well
documented publically but you can see the unit and cont-build test
harnesses here:
https://github.com/facebook/openbmc/tree/helium/tests/verified-boot

I'm happy to collaborate on future designs. At the very least I could
provide lessons learned and potential improvements. Amithash and Sai
could provide valuable input too.
-Teddy


On Tue, Feb 5, 2019 at 9:14 AM Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com> wrote:
>
> Hi everyone
>
> Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
> OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
> all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
>
> thx - brad



--
Teddy Reed V

RE: Secure boot for BMC

[Supreeth Venkatesh]

Brad,

We (Daniil and me from Arm) are happy to collaborate on Secure BMC Boot Design/Implementation.

Thanks,
Supreeth

-----Original Message-----
From: openbmc <openbmc-bounces+supreeth.venkatesh=arm.com@lists.ozlabs.org> On Behalf Of Brad Bishop
Sent: Tuesday, February 5, 2019 8:14 AM
To: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Secure boot for BMC

Hi everyone

Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.

thx - brad
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Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Joel Stanley]

On Wed, 6 Feb 2019 at 00:44, Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com> wrote:
>
> Hi everyone
>
> Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
> OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
> all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.

I am interested in working on this.

Cheers,

Joel

RE: Secure boot for BMC

[Ryan Chen]

Hello Brad,
	I would like join this.  

Cheers,

Ryan

-----Original Message-----
From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-bounces+ryan_chen=aspeedtech.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of Brad Bishop
Sent: Tuesday, February 5, 2019 10:14 PM
To: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org
Subject: Secure boot for BMC

Hi everyone

Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.

thx - brad

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Vijay Khemka]

I would also like to contribute to this effort.

Regards
-Vijay

On 2/6/19, 6:05 PM, "openbmc on behalf of Ryan Chen" <openbmc-bounces+vijaykhemka=fb.com@lists.ozlabs.org on behalf of ryan_chen@aspeedtech.com> wrote:

    Hello Brad,
    	I would like join this.  
    
    Cheers,
    
    Ryan
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-bounces+ryan_chen=aspeedtech.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of Brad Bishop
    Sent: Tuesday, February 5, 2019 10:14 PM
    To: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org
    Subject: Secure boot for BMC
    
    Hi everyone
    
    Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
    
    thx - brad
    

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Luke Chen]

Hi Brad
ASPEED team wants to join this development.

Thanks.

從我的 iPhone 傳送

> Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com> 於 2019年2月5日 22:14 寫道：
> 
> Hi everyone
> 
> Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
> OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
> all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
> 
> thx - brad

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Vernon Mauery]

On 05-Feb-2019 09:14 AM, Brad Bishop wrote:
>Hi everyone
>
>Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
>OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
>all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.

I would like to collaborate as well. I can share the ideas that we are 
working on for a two-flash secure boot model.

--Vernon

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Andrew Jeffery]

On Wed, 6 Feb 2019, at 00:44, Brad Bishop wrote:
> Hi everyone
> 
> Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
> OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
> all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
> 
> thx - brad

I'm interested in secureboot discussions.

Andrew

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Nancy Yuen]

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We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google HW
root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.
----------
Nancy


On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 8:57 PM Andrew Jeffery <andrew@aj.id.au> wrote:

> On Wed, 6 Feb 2019, at 00:44, Brad Bishop wrote:
> > Hi everyone
> >
> > Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
> > OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
> > all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
> >
> > thx - brad
>
> I'm interested in secureboot discussions.
>
> Andrew
>

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Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Andrew Jeffery]

On Tue, 12 Feb 2019, at 11:00, Nancy Yuen wrote:
> We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google HW
> root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.

I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the project
can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It may also
help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware.

Andrew

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Joseph Reynolds]

On 2019-02-12 17:13, Andrew Jeffery wrote:
> On Tue, 12 Feb 2019, at 11:00, Nancy Yuen wrote:
>> We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google 
>> HW
>> root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.
> 
> I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the 
> project
> can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It 
> may also
> help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware.

The OpenBMC security working group has discussed various "root of trust" 
ideas.  The way I understand it, OpenBMC community members are looking 
into different solutions including
"Secure Boot" and "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM) solutions, including 
Google's OpenTitan chip.  See the meeting minutes for details:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI

My understanding of the "Secure Boot" concept is that some chip 
validates the boot loader's digital signature after loading it and 
before jumping into it.  Then the boot loader would validate the code it 
loads before jumping into it.  Etc.  A validation failure could either 
(a) cause the BMC to fail to boot, or (b) boot the BMC in failsafe mode 
where it could not write to its flash or talk to its host.  OpenBMC may 
also need some way to talk to the chip.

My understanding of TPMs is much more limited.  So we are waiting for 
proposals.

- Joseph

> Andrew

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Andrew Jeffery]

On Thu, 14 Feb 2019, at 11:04, Joseph Reynolds wrote:
> On 2019-02-12 17:13, Andrew Jeffery wrote:
> > On Tue, 12 Feb 2019, at 11:00, Nancy Yuen wrote:
> >> We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google 
> >> HW
> >> root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.
> > 
> > I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the 
> > project
> > can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It 
> > may also
> > help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware.
> 
> The OpenBMC security working group has discussed various "root of trust" 
> ideas.  The way I understand it, OpenBMC community members are looking 
> into different solutions including
> "Secure Boot" and "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM) solutions, including 
> Google's OpenTitan chip.  See the meeting minutes for details:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI
> 
> My understanding of the "Secure Boot" concept is that some chip 
> validates the boot loader's digital signature after loading it and 
> before jumping into it.  Then the boot loader would validate the code it 
> loads before jumping into it.  Etc.  A validation failure could either 
> (a) cause the BMC to fail to boot, or (b) boot the BMC in failsafe mode 
> where it could not write to its flash or talk to its host.  OpenBMC may 
> also need some way to talk to the chip.
> 
> My understanding of TPMs is much more limited.  So we are waiting for 
> proposals.

On OpenPOWER systems I think we need the TPM approach, as we can't
restrict our customers by burning e.g. IBM keys into the ASPEED OTP key
slots (... in the 2600).

Andrew

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Avi Fishman]

Hi Joseph, Brad and all,

We (Nuvoton) followed the Secure Boot thread discussion and want to
contribute from our experience with NPCM7xx (Poleg) BMC security.
Joseph, we believe your secure boot view is fully supported by our
Poleg and is already used in mass production.

The Poleg BMC implements Root Of Trust (RoT) in its on-chip ROM code
which is the anchor to start a Chain Of Trust (CoT) to boot up a
secure system.
The CoT starts from ROM that authenticates and boots the other parts
of the system e.g. Boot block -> UBOOT -> Linux .

The RoT  framework has up to 3 x RSA keys maintained in a protected
OTP storage which are used by the ROM code to authenticate the next
stage of the boot.
The ROM code implements recovery options and configurable security
policies for un-authenticated boot scenarios  (e.g. limitted
operational mode or full halt mode).
The RoT allows SW development of various security schemes such as NIST 800-193.

We have uploaded our Security generation tools  to the GitHub
https://github.com/Nuvoton-Israel/igps
The tools are OpenSSL based and are capable to take a Private Key +
Image Binary and create a signed image.
An XML description flies are used to describe the layout of the flash
and the OTP, and Python scripts generates the images based on the XML
files.

We are open to discuss about BMC Secure Boot in the next Hackathon if
this is of an interest to the group.

Thanks,
Avi

On Thu, Feb 14, 2019 at 2:27 AM Joseph Reynolds <jrey@linux.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> On 2019-02-12 17:13, Andrew Jeffery wrote:
> > On Tue, 12 Feb 2019, at 11:00, Nancy Yuen wrote:
> >> We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google
> >> HW
> >> root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions.
> >
> > I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the
> > project
> > can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It
> > may also
> > help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware.
>
> The OpenBMC security working group has discussed various "root of trust"
> ideas.  The way I understand it, OpenBMC community members are looking
> into different solutions including
> "Secure Boot" and "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM) solutions, including
> Google's OpenTitan chip.  See the meeting minutes for details:
> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI
>
> My understanding of the "Secure Boot" concept is that some chip
> validates the boot loader's digital signature after loading it and
> before jumping into it.  Then the boot loader would validate the code it
> loads before jumping into it.  Etc.  A validation failure could either
> (a) cause the BMC to fail to boot, or (b) boot the BMC in failsafe mode
> where it could not write to its flash or talk to its host.  OpenBMC may
> also need some way to talk to the chip.
>
> My understanding of TPMs is much more limited.  So we are waiting for
> proposals.
>
> - Joseph
>
> > Andrew
>


-- 
Regards,
Avi

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Ratan Gupta]

I am also interested in secure boot discussion for BMC.

Ratan

On 11/02/19 10:27 AM, Andrew Jeffery wrote:
> On Wed, 6 Feb 2019, at 00:44, Brad Bishop wrote:
>> Hi everyone
>>
>> Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
>> OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
>> all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
>>
>> thx - brad
> I'm interested in secureboot discussions.
>
> Andrew
>

Re: Secure boot for BMC

[George Keishing]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 553 bytes --]

From:   Brad Bishop <bradleyb@fuzziesquirrel.com>
To:     openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org
Date:   02/05/2019 07:44 PM
Subject:        Secure boot for BMC
Sent by:        "openbmc" 
<openbmc-bounces+gkeishin=in.ibm.com@lists.ozlabs.org>



Hi everyone

Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to
OpenBMC in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who
all wants to collaborate on this before I submit a design template.

thx - brad



> I'm interested in secureboot discussion.

> Thnx- George


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Re: Secure boot for BMC

[Brad Bishop]

On Tue, Feb 05, 2019 at 09:14:03AM -0500, Brad Bishop wrote:
>Hi everyone
>
>Does anyone have plans to provide a secure BMC boot implementation to OpenBMC
>in the 2.7 or 2.8 timeframe?  Just trying to get a feel for who all wants to
>collaborate on this before I submit a design template.
>
>thx - brad

I just wanted to quick say thanks to the many that have responded to this.

It is likely someone besides me at IBM will be carrying this forward for us.  I
don't have anything to offer at this point other than suggesting you keep
sharing your ideas for secure BMC boot in this thread.

thx - brad