[PATCH v4] ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes

[PATCH v4] ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes

[Janne Karhunen]

Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear
invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm
policy load. However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM
labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in"
policy rules to a custom IMA policy.

Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes
some prints a bit more human readable.

Changelog:
v4:
- Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules.
v3:
- Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs
v2:
- Fix log prints

Fixes: b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Konsta Karsisto <konsta.karsisto@gmail.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index a4dde9d575b2..76dc9b3dd0fc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
-	int i, result;
+	int i;
 
 	nentry = kmalloc(sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!nentry)
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	memset(nentry->lsm, 0, FIELD_SIZEOF(struct ima_rule_entry, lsm));
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-		if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
+		if (!entry->lsm[i].args_p)
 			continue;
 
 		nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
@@ -288,13 +288,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		if (!nentry->lsm[i].args_p)
 			goto out_err;
 
-		result = security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
-						   Audit_equal,
-						   nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
-						   &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
-		if (result == -EINVAL)
-			pr_warn("ima: rule for LSM \'%d\' is undefined\n",
-				entry->lsm[i].type);
+		security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
+					  Audit_equal,
+					  nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
+					  &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
+			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
+				(char *)entry->lsm[i].args_p);
 	}
 	return nentry;
 
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
 		needs_update = 0;
 		for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
-			if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+			if (entry->lsm[i].args_p) {
 				needs_update = 1;
 				break;
 			}
@@ -341,8 +341,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
 
 		result = ima_lsm_update_rule(entry);
 		if (result) {
-			pr_err("ima: lsm rule update error %d\n",
-				result);
+			pr_err("lsm rule update error %d\n", result);
 			return;
 		}
 	}
@@ -403,7 +402,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 }
 
 /**
- * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
+ * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the policy rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
  * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
@@ -466,9 +465,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 		int rc = 0;
 		u32 osid;
 
-		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
-			continue;
-
+		if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) {
+			if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
+				continue;
+			else
+				return false;
+		}
 		switch (i) {
 		case LSM_OBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
@@ -880,8 +882,14 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 					   entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
 					   &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
 	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
-		kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
-		return -EINVAL;
+		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
+			(char *)entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+
+		if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) {
+			kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
+			result = -EINVAL;
+		} else
+			result = 0;
 	}
 
 	return result;
-- 
2.17.1

Re: [PATCH v4] ima: ima/lsm policy rule loading logic bug fixes

[Mimi Zohar]

On Wed, 2020-01-15 at 17:42 +0200, Janne Karhunen wrote:
> Keep the ima policy rules around from the beginning even if they appear
> invalid at the time of loading, as they may become active after an lsm
> policy load. However, loading a custom IMA policy with unknown LSM
> labels is only safe after we have transitioned from the "built-in"
> policy rules to a custom IMA policy.
> 
> Patch also fixes the rule re-use during the lsm policy reload and makes
> some prints a bit more human readable.
> 
> Changelog:
> v4:
> - Do not allow the initial policy load refer to non-existing lsm rules.
> v3:
> - Fix too wide policy rule matching for non-initialized LSMs
> v2:
> - Fix log prints
> 
> Fixes: b16942455193 ("ima: use the lsm policy update notifier")
> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Reported-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Janne Karhunen <janne.karhunen@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Konsta Karsisto <konsta.karsisto@gmail.com>

Thanks, the updated patch is now queued in next-integrity-testing.

Mimi