* [PATCH v5 0/2] Enhance TEE kernel client interface
@ 2020-03-26 7:23 Sumit Garg
2020-03-26 7:23 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg
2020-03-26 7:23 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sumit Garg @ 2020-03-26 7:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jens.wiklander
Cc: tee-dev, linux-kernel, stuart.yoder, daniel.thompson, Sumit Garg
Earlier this patch-set was part of TEE Trusted keys patch-set [1]. But
since these are completely independent enhancements for TEE kernel
client interface which can be merged separately while TEE Trusted keys
discussions are ongoing.
Patch #1 enables support for registered kernel shared memory with TEE.
Patch #2 enables support for private kernel login method required for
cases like trusted keys where we don't wan't user-space to directly
access TEE service.
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/10/31/430
Changes in v5:
- Misc. renaming of variables.
Sumit Garg (2):
tee: enable support to register kernel memory
tee: add private login method for kernel clients
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 ++++++
drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 ++++++++
4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 1/2] tee: enable support to register kernel memory
2020-03-26 7:23 [PATCH v5 0/2] Enhance TEE kernel client interface Sumit Garg
@ 2020-03-26 7:23 ` Sumit Garg
2020-03-26 7:23 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sumit Garg @ 2020-03-26 7:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jens.wiklander
Cc: tee-dev, linux-kernel, stuart.yoder, daniel.thompson, Sumit Garg
Enable support to register kernel memory reference with TEE. This change
will allow TEE bus drivers to register memory references.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
---
drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 1 +
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
index 937ac5a..a6c75a4 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/tee_drv.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
#include "tee_private.h"
static void tee_shm_release(struct tee_shm *shm)
@@ -217,14 +218,15 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr,
size_t length, u32 flags)
{
struct tee_device *teedev = ctx->teedev;
- const u32 req_flags = TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED;
+ const u32 req_user_flags = TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED;
+ const u32 req_kernel_flags = TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF | TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED;
struct tee_shm *shm;
void *ret;
int rc;
int num_pages;
unsigned long start;
- if (flags != req_flags)
+ if (flags != req_user_flags && flags != req_kernel_flags)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSUPP);
if (!tee_device_get(teedev))
@@ -259,7 +261,27 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr,
goto err;
}
- rc = get_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE, shm->pages);
+ if (flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) {
+ rc = get_user_pages_fast(start, num_pages, FOLL_WRITE,
+ shm->pages);
+ } else {
+ struct kvec *kiov;
+ int i;
+
+ kiov = kcalloc(num_pages, sizeof(*kiov), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!kiov) {
+ ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++) {
+ kiov[i].iov_base = (void *)(start + i * PAGE_SIZE);
+ kiov[i].iov_len = PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ rc = get_kernel_pages(kiov, num_pages, 0, shm->pages);
+ kfree(kiov);
+ }
if (rc > 0)
shm->num_pages = rc;
if (rc != num_pages) {
diff --git a/include/linux/tee_drv.h b/include/linux/tee_drv.h
index 7a03f68..dedf8fa 100644
--- a/include/linux/tee_drv.h
+++ b/include/linux/tee_drv.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#define TEE_SHM_REGISTER BIT(3) /* Memory registered in secure world */
#define TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED BIT(4) /* Memory mapped in user space */
#define TEE_SHM_POOL BIT(5) /* Memory allocated from pool */
+#define TEE_SHM_KERNEL_MAPPED BIT(6) /* Memory mapped in kernel space */
struct device;
struct tee_device;
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v5 2/2] tee: add private login method for kernel clients
2020-03-26 7:23 [PATCH v5 0/2] Enhance TEE kernel client interface Sumit Garg
2020-03-26 7:23 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg
@ 2020-03-26 7:23 ` Sumit Garg
[not found] ` <CAA-cTWZWPFtq-9MOrr6YDV4SGyo_JNaNsFJc=pjaWBrWHMid1A@mail.gmail.com>
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sumit Garg @ 2020-03-26 7:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jens.wiklander
Cc: tee-dev, linux-kernel, stuart.yoder, daniel.thompson, Sumit Garg
There are use-cases where user-space shouldn't be allowed to communicate
directly with a TEE device which is dedicated to provide a specific
service for a kernel client. So add a private login method for kernel
clients and disallow user-space to open-session using GP implementation
defined login method range: (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF).
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
---
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 ++++++
include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
index 37d22e3..533e7a8 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
@@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx,
goto out;
}
+ if (arg.clnt_login & TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK) {
+ pr_debug("login method not allowed for user-space client\n");
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
rc = ctx->teedev->desc->ops->open_session(ctx, &arg, params);
if (rc)
goto out;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
index 6596f3a..19172a2 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
@@ -173,6 +173,14 @@ struct tee_ioctl_buf_data {
#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_APPLICATION 4
#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION 5
#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION 6
+/*
+ * Disallow user-space to use GP implementation specific login
+ * method range (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF). This range is rather
+ * being reserved for REE kernel clients or TEE implementation.
+ */
+#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK 0x80000000
+/* Private login method for REE kernel clients */
+#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL 0x80000000
/**
* struct tee_ioctl_param - parameter
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Tee-dev] [PATCH v5 2/2] tee: add private login method for kernel clients
[not found] ` <CAA-cTWZWPFtq-9MOrr6YDV4SGyo_JNaNsFJc=pjaWBrWHMid1A@mail.gmail.com>
@ 2020-03-26 9:07 ` Sumit Garg
2020-03-26 9:23 ` Jerome Forissier
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sumit Garg @ 2020-03-26 9:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jérôme Forissier
Cc: Jens Wiklander, tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org, Daniel Thompson,
Linux Kernel Mailing List
On Thu, 26 Mar 2020 at 14:05, Jérôme Forissier <jerome@forissier.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 8:24 AM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
>>
>> There are use-cases where user-space shouldn't be allowed to communicate
>> directly with a TEE device which is dedicated to provide a specific
>> service for a kernel client. So add a private login method for kernel
>> clients
>
>
> OK
>
>> and disallow user-space to open-session using GP implementation
>> defined login method range: (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF).
>
>
> I'm not sure this is correct, because it would prevent the client library or the TEE supplicant from using such values, although they are part of the TEE implementation; and further, nothing mandates that an implementation-defined method should not be used directly by client applications.
>
Initial implementation of this patch only put restriction for single
implementation-defined login method (TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL) only.
But after discussion with Jens here [1], I have changed that to
restrict complete implementation-defined range. If we think to further
partition this range considering API stability then I am open to that
too.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1088062/
-Sumit
> --
> Jerome
>
>>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
>> ---
>> drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 ++++++
>> include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 ++++++++
>> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
>> index 37d22e3..533e7a8 100644
>> --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
>> +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
>> @@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx,
>> goto out;
>> }
>>
>> + if (arg.clnt_login & TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK) {
>> + pr_debug("login method not allowed for user-space client\n");
>> + rc = -EPERM;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> rc = ctx->teedev->desc->ops->open_session(ctx, &arg, params);
>> if (rc)
>> goto out;
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
>> index 6596f3a..19172a2 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
>> @@ -173,6 +173,14 @@ struct tee_ioctl_buf_data {
>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_APPLICATION 4
>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION 5
>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION 6
>> +/*
>> + * Disallow user-space to use GP implementation specific login
>> + * method range (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF). This range is rather
>> + * being reserved for REE kernel clients or TEE implementation.
>> + */
>> +#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK 0x80000000
>> +/* Private login method for REE kernel clients */
>> +#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL 0x80000000
>>
>> /**
>> * struct tee_ioctl_param - parameter
>> --
>> 2.7.4
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Tee-dev mailing list
>> Tee-dev@lists.linaro.org
>> https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/tee-dev
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Tee-dev] [PATCH v5 2/2] tee: add private login method for kernel clients
2020-03-26 9:07 ` [Tee-dev] " Sumit Garg
@ 2020-03-26 9:23 ` Jerome Forissier
2020-03-26 9:39 ` Sumit Garg
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Jerome Forissier @ 2020-03-26 9:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sumit Garg
Cc: Jens Wiklander, tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org, Daniel Thompson,
Linux Kernel Mailing List
On 3/26/20 10:07 AM, Sumit Garg wrote:
> On Thu, 26 Mar 2020 at 14:05, Jérôme Forissier <jerome@forissier.org> wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 8:24 AM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> There are use-cases where user-space shouldn't be allowed to communicate
>>> directly with a TEE device which is dedicated to provide a specific
>>> service for a kernel client. So add a private login method for kernel
>>> clients
>>
>>
>> OK
>>
>>> and disallow user-space to open-session using GP implementation
>>> defined login method range: (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF).
>>
>>
>> I'm not sure this is correct, because it would prevent the client library or the TEE supplicant from using such values, although they are part of the TEE implementation; and further, nothing mandates that an implementation-defined method should not be used directly by client applications.
>>
>
> Initial implementation of this patch only put restriction for single
> implementation-defined login method (TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL) only.
> But after discussion with Jens here [1], I have changed that to
> restrict complete implementation-defined range. If we think to further
> partition this range considering API stability then I am open to that
> too.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1088062/
In the end he proposed to reserve half the range for user space and half
for kernel space.
(BTW sorry for my previous HTML reply)
--
Jerome
>
> -Sumit
>
>> --
>> Jerome
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
>>> ---
>>> drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 ++++++
>>> include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 ++++++++
>>> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
>>> index 37d22e3..533e7a8 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
>>> +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
>>> @@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx,
>>> goto out;
>>> }
>>>
>>> + if (arg.clnt_login & TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK) {
>>> + pr_debug("login method not allowed for user-space client\n");
>>> + rc = -EPERM;
>>> + goto out;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> rc = ctx->teedev->desc->ops->open_session(ctx, &arg, params);
>>> if (rc)
>>> goto out;
>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
>>> index 6596f3a..19172a2 100644
>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
>>> @@ -173,6 +173,14 @@ struct tee_ioctl_buf_data {
>>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_APPLICATION 4
>>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION 5
>>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION 6
>>> +/*
>>> + * Disallow user-space to use GP implementation specific login
>>> + * method range (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF). This range is rather
>>> + * being reserved for REE kernel clients or TEE implementation.
>>> + */
>>> +#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK 0x80000000
>>> +/* Private login method for REE kernel clients */
>>> +#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL 0x80000000
>>>
>>> /**
>>> * struct tee_ioctl_param - parameter
>>> --
>>> 2.7.4
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> Tee-dev mailing list
>>> Tee-dev@lists.linaro.org
>>> https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/tee-dev
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [Tee-dev] [PATCH v5 2/2] tee: add private login method for kernel clients
2020-03-26 9:23 ` Jerome Forissier
@ 2020-03-26 9:39 ` Sumit Garg
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Sumit Garg @ 2020-03-26 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jerome Forissier
Cc: Jens Wiklander, tee-dev @ lists . linaro . org, Daniel Thompson,
Linux Kernel Mailing List
On Thu, 26 Mar 2020 at 14:53, Jerome Forissier <jerome@forissier.org> wrote:
>
> On 3/26/20 10:07 AM, Sumit Garg wrote:
> > On Thu, 26 Mar 2020 at 14:05, Jérôme Forissier <jerome@forissier.org> wrote:
> >>
> >> On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 8:24 AM Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> There are use-cases where user-space shouldn't be allowed to communicate
> >>> directly with a TEE device which is dedicated to provide a specific
> >>> service for a kernel client. So add a private login method for kernel
> >>> clients
> >>
> >>
> >> OK
> >>
> >>> and disallow user-space to open-session using GP implementation
> >>> defined login method range: (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF).
> >>
> >>
> >> I'm not sure this is correct, because it would prevent the client library or the TEE supplicant from using such values, although they are part of the TEE implementation; and further, nothing mandates that an implementation-defined method should not be used directly by client applications.
> >>
> >
> > Initial implementation of this patch only put restriction for single
> > implementation-defined login method (TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL) only.
> > But after discussion with Jens here [1], I have changed that to
> > restrict complete implementation-defined range. If we think to further
> > partition this range considering API stability then I am open to that
> > too.
> >
> > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1088062/
>
> In the end he proposed to reserve half the range for user space and half
> for kernel space.
It seems I probably misunderstood his proposal. So let me reserve
(0x80000000 - 0xBFFFFFFF) range for kernel space.
>
> (BTW sorry for my previous HTML reply)
>
No worries.
-Sumit
> --
> Jerome
> >
> > -Sumit
> >
> >> --
> >> Jerome
> >>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org>
> >>> ---
> >>> drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 6 ++++++
> >>> include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 8 ++++++++
> >>> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
> >>> index 37d22e3..533e7a8 100644
> >>> --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
> >>> +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c
> >>> @@ -334,6 +334,12 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx,
> >>> goto out;
> >>> }
> >>>
> >>> + if (arg.clnt_login & TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK) {
> >>> + pr_debug("login method not allowed for user-space client\n");
> >>> + rc = -EPERM;
> >>> + goto out;
> >>> + }
> >>> +
> >>> rc = ctx->teedev->desc->ops->open_session(ctx, &arg, params);
> >>> if (rc)
> >>> goto out;
> >>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
> >>> index 6596f3a..19172a2 100644
> >>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
> >>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h
> >>> @@ -173,6 +173,14 @@ struct tee_ioctl_buf_data {
> >>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_APPLICATION 4
> >>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION 5
> >>> #define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION 6
> >>> +/*
> >>> + * Disallow user-space to use GP implementation specific login
> >>> + * method range (0x80000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF). This range is rather
> >>> + * being reserved for REE kernel clients or TEE implementation.
> >>> + */
> >>> +#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_MASK 0x80000000
> >>> +/* Private login method for REE kernel clients */
> >>> +#define TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL 0x80000000
> >>>
> >>> /**
> >>> * struct tee_ioctl_param - parameter
> >>> --
> >>> 2.7.4
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> Tee-dev mailing list
> >>> Tee-dev@lists.linaro.org
> >>> https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/tee-dev
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-03-26 9:39 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-03-26 7:23 [PATCH v5 0/2] Enhance TEE kernel client interface Sumit Garg
2020-03-26 7:23 ` [PATCH v5 1/2] tee: enable support to register kernel memory Sumit Garg
2020-03-26 7:23 ` [PATCH v5 2/2] tee: add private login method for kernel clients Sumit Garg
[not found] ` <CAA-cTWZWPFtq-9MOrr6YDV4SGyo_JNaNsFJc=pjaWBrWHMid1A@mail.gmail.com>
2020-03-26 9:07 ` [Tee-dev] " Sumit Garg
2020-03-26 9:23 ` Jerome Forissier
2020-03-26 9:39 ` Sumit Garg
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