All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-11 11:44 ` Alex Dewar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 11:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: Alex Dewar, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is
used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
memzero_explicit. Fix this.

Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
---
 security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 691347dea3c1..d17e5f09eeb8 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		*path = file->f_path;
 		path_get(path);
 		fput(file);
-		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-		kvfree(buf);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
 		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 err_enckey:
 	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
 error:
-	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-	kvfree(buf);
+	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
 err_fput:
 		fput(file);
 error:
-		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-		kvfree(buf);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		ret = datalen;
 		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
-- 
2.28.0

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-11 11:44 ` Alex Dewar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 11:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: Alex Dewar, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is
used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
memzero_explicit. Fix this.

Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
---
 security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 691347dea3c1..d17e5f09eeb8 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		*path = file->f_path;
 		path_get(path);
 		fput(file);
-		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-		kvfree(buf);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
 		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 err_enckey:
 	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
 error:
-	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-	kvfree(buf);
+	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
 err_fput:
 		fput(file);
 error:
-		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-		kvfree(buf);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		ret = datalen;
 		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
-- 
2.28.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
  2020-09-11 11:44 ` Alex Dewar
@ 2020-09-11 15:04   ` James Bottomley
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2020-09-11 15:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Dewar
  Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

On Fri, 2020-09-11 at 12:44 +0100, Alex Dewar wrote:
> In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree
> is used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
> readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
> memzero_explicit. Fix this.

That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide memzero_explicit ...
that's why it has the explicit suffix.

The original problem was a lot of people do memset(.., 0, ..); kfree()
which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out
of scope.  Or the even more problematic memset(..., 0, ...) on a stack
variable before it goes out of scope.

We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.

James

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-11 15:04   ` James Bottomley
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2020-09-11 15:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Dewar
  Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

On Fri, 2020-09-11 at 12:44 +0100, Alex Dewar wrote:
> In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree
> is used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
> readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
> memzero_explicit. Fix this.

That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide memzero_explicit ...
that's why it has the explicit suffix.

The original problem was a lot of people do memset(.., 0, ..); kfree()
which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out
of scope.  Or the even more problematic memset(..., 0, ...) on a stack
variable before it goes out of scope.

We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.

James


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
  2020-09-11 15:04   ` James Bottomley
@ 2020-09-11 16:00     ` Alex Dewar
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 16:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Bottomley
  Cc: Alex Dewar, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 08:04:24AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2020-09-11 at 12:44 +0100, Alex Dewar wrote:
> > In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree
> > is used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
> > readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
> > memzero_explicit. Fix this.
> 
> That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide memzero_explicit ...
> that's why it has the explicit suffix.
> 
> The original problem was a lot of people do memset(.., 0, ..); kfree()
> which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out
> of scope.  Or the even more problematic memset(..., 0, ...) on a stack
> variable before it goes out of scope.
> 
> We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.

Ahh, my mistake. Thanks for the explanation.

I'll send a v2 with an updated commit message. I think it would still
make sense to use kfree_sensitive here as on next-20200911 this is the
last use of kzfree in the tree and it would be nice to excise it
altogether.

Best,
Alex

> 
> James
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-11 16:00     ` Alex Dewar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 16:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Bottomley
  Cc: Alex Dewar, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 08:04:24AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Fri, 2020-09-11 at 12:44 +0100, Alex Dewar wrote:
> > In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree
> > is used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
> > readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
> > memzero_explicit. Fix this.
> 
> That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide memzero_explicit ...
> that's why it has the explicit suffix.
> 
> The original problem was a lot of people do memset(.., 0, ..); kfree()
> which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out
> of scope.  Or the even more problematic memset(..., 0, ...) on a stack
> variable before it goes out of scope.
> 
> We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.

Ahh, my mistake. Thanks for the explanation.

I'll send a v2 with an updated commit message. I think it would still
make sense to use kfree_sensitive here as on next-20200911 this is the
last use of kzfree in the tree and it would be nice to excise it
altogether.

Best,
Alex

> 
> James
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
  2020-09-11 16:00     ` Alex Dewar
@ 2020-09-11 16:03       ` Alex Dewar
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 16:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Dewar
  Cc: James Bottomley, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 05:00:09PM +0100, Alex Dewar wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 08:04:24AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2020-09-11 at 12:44 +0100, Alex Dewar wrote:
> > > In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree
> > > is used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
> > > readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
> > > memzero_explicit. Fix this.
> > 
> > That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide memzero_explicit ...
> > that's why it has the explicit suffix.
> > 
> > The original problem was a lot of people do memset(.., 0, ..); kfree()
> > which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out
> > of scope.  Or the even more problematic memset(..., 0, ...) on a stack
> > variable before it goes out of scope.
> > 
> > We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.
> 
> Ahh, my mistake. Thanks for the explanation.
> 
> I'll send a v2 with an updated commit message. I think it would still
> make sense to use kfree_sensitive here as on next-20200911 this is the
> last use of kzfree in the tree and it would be nice to excise it
> altogether.

Ignore this! I thought we were talking about a different patch :-/

I'll send a respin with a better commit message anyways.

Cheers :-)

> 
> Best,
> Alex
> 
> > 
> > James
> > 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-11 16:03       ` Alex Dewar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 16:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Dewar
  Cc: James Bottomley, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 05:00:09PM +0100, Alex Dewar wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 08:04:24AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Fri, 2020-09-11 at 12:44 +0100, Alex Dewar wrote:
> > > In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree
> > > is used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
> > > readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
> > > memzero_explicit. Fix this.
> > 
> > That last bit is untrue: the compiler can't elide memzero_explicit ...
> > that's why it has the explicit suffix.
> > 
> > The original problem was a lot of people do memset(.., 0, ..); kfree()
> > which the compiler can elide if it understands the memory is going out
> > of scope.  Or the even more problematic memset(..., 0, ...) on a stack
> > variable before it goes out of scope.
> > 
> > We can argue about readability but there's no secret leak here.
> 
> Ahh, my mistake. Thanks for the explanation.
> 
> I'll send a v2 with an updated commit message. I think it would still
> make sense to use kfree_sensitive here as on next-20200911 this is the
> last use of kzfree in the tree and it would be nice to excise it
> altogether.

Ignore this! I thought we were talking about a different patch :-/

I'll send a respin with a better commit message anyways.

Cheers :-)

> 
> Best,
> Alex
> 
> > 
> > James
> > 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
  2020-09-11 11:44 ` Alex Dewar
@ 2020-09-11 16:05   ` Denis Efremov
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Denis Efremov @ 2020-09-11 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Dewar
  Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

Hi,

same patch

https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168

Thanks,
Denis

On 9/11/20 2:44 PM, Alex Dewar wrote:
> In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is
> used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
> readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
> memzero_explicit. Fix this.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
> ---
>  security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
> index 691347dea3c1..d17e5f09eeb8 100644
> --- a/security/keys/big_key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
> @@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  		*path = file->f_path;
>  		path_get(path);
>  		fput(file);
> -		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
> -		kvfree(buf);
> +		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>  	} else {
>  		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
>  		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  err_enckey:
>  	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
>  error:
> -	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
> -	kvfree(buf);
> +	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> @@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
>  err_fput:
>  		fput(file);
>  error:
> -		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
> -		kvfree(buf);
> +		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>  	} else {
>  		ret = datalen;
>  		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-11 16:05   ` Denis Efremov
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Denis Efremov @ 2020-09-11 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Alex Dewar
  Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

Hi,

same patch

https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168

Thanks,
Denis

On 9/11/20 2:44 PM, Alex Dewar wrote:
> In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is
> used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
> readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
> memzero_explicit. Fix this.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
> ---
>  security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
> index 691347dea3c1..d17e5f09eeb8 100644
> --- a/security/keys/big_key.c
> +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
> @@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  		*path = file->f_path;
>  		path_get(path);
>  		fput(file);
> -		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
> -		kvfree(buf);
> +		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>  	} else {
>  		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
>  		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>  err_enckey:
>  	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
>  error:
> -	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
> -	kvfree(buf);
> +	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>  	return ret;
>  }
>  
> @@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
>  err_fput:
>  		fput(file);
>  error:
> -		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
> -		kvfree(buf);
> +		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>  	} else {
>  		ret = datalen;
>  		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
  2020-09-11 16:00     ` Alex Dewar
@ 2020-09-11 16:06       ` Alex Dewar
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 16:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: Alex Dewar, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is
used. Replace these with a single call to kvfree_sensitive, to make the
code more readable.

Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
---
v2 - Update commit message as per James Bottomley's suggestion

 security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 691347dea3c1..d17e5f09eeb8 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		*path = file->f_path;
 		path_get(path);
 		fput(file);
-		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-		kvfree(buf);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
 		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 err_enckey:
 	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
 error:
-	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-	kvfree(buf);
+	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
 err_fput:
 		fput(file);
 error:
-		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-		kvfree(buf);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		ret = datalen;
 		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
-- 
2.28.0

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-11 16:06       ` Alex Dewar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 16:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: Alex Dewar, David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris,
	Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is
used. Replace these with a single call to kvfree_sensitive, to make the
code more readable.

Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
---
v2 - Update commit message as per James Bottomley's suggestion

 security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 691347dea3c1..d17e5f09eeb8 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		*path = file->f_path;
 		path_get(path);
 		fput(file);
-		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-		kvfree(buf);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
 		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 err_enckey:
 	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
 error:
-	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-	kvfree(buf);
+	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
 err_fput:
 		fput(file);
 error:
-		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
-		kvfree(buf);
+		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
 	} else {
 		ret = datalen;
 		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
-- 
2.28.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
  2020-09-11 16:05   ` Denis Efremov
@ 2020-09-11 16:09     ` Alex Dewar
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: efremov
  Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

On 2020-09-11 17:05, Denis Efremov wrote:
> Hi,
>
> same patch
>
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168
>
> Thanks,
> Denis
Ah ok. Sorry for the noise!
>
> On 9/11/20 2:44 PM, Alex Dewar wrote:
>> In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is
>> used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
>> readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
>> memzero_explicit. Fix this.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
>> ---
>>   security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------
>>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
>> index 691347dea3c1..d17e5f09eeb8 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/big_key.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
>> @@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>   		*path = file->f_path;
>>   		path_get(path);
>>   		fput(file);
>> -		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
>> -		kvfree(buf);
>> +		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>>   	} else {
>>   		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
>>   		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
>> @@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>   err_enckey:
>>   	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
>>   error:
>> -	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
>> -	kvfree(buf);
>> +	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>>   	return ret;
>>   }
>>   
>> @@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
>>   err_fput:
>>   		fput(file);
>>   error:
>> -		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
>> -		kvfree(buf);
>> +		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>>   	} else {
>>   		ret = datalen;
>>   		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
>>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-11 16:09     ` Alex Dewar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Alex Dewar @ 2020-09-11 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: efremov
  Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

On 2020-09-11 17:05, Denis Efremov wrote:
> Hi,
>
> same patch
>
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168
>
> Thanks,
> Denis
Ah ok. Sorry for the noise!
>
> On 9/11/20 2:44 PM, Alex Dewar wrote:
>> In big_key.c, there are a few places where memzero_explicit + kvfree is
>> used. It is better to use kvfree_sensitive instead, which is more
>> readable and also prevents the compiler from eliding the call to
>> memzero_explicit. Fix this.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alex Dewar <alex.dewar90@gmail.com>
>> ---
>>   security/keys/big_key.c | 9 +++------
>>   1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
>> index 691347dea3c1..d17e5f09eeb8 100644
>> --- a/security/keys/big_key.c
>> +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
>> @@ -121,8 +121,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>   		*path = file->f_path;
>>   		path_get(path);
>>   		fput(file);
>> -		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
>> -		kvfree(buf);
>> +		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>>   	} else {
>>   		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
>>   		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
>> @@ -140,8 +139,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>   err_enckey:
>>   	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
>>   error:
>> -	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
>> -	kvfree(buf);
>> +	kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>>   	return ret;
>>   }
>>   
>> @@ -273,8 +271,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
>>   err_fput:
>>   		fput(file);
>>   error:
>> -		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
>> -		kvfree(buf);
>> +		kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
>>   	} else {
>>   		ret = datalen;
>>   		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
>>


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
  2020-09-11 16:05   ` Denis Efremov
@ 2020-09-14 18:05     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-09-14 18:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Denis Efremov, David Howells
  Cc: Alex Dewar, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, keyrings,
	linux-security-module, linux-kernel

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 07:05:16PM +0300, Denis Efremov wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> same patch
> 
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168
> 
> Thanks,
> Denis

David, can you pick this up?

/Jarkko

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places
@ 2020-09-14 18:05     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2020-09-14 18:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Denis Efremov, David Howells
  Cc: Alex Dewar, David Howells, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn,
	keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel

On Fri, Sep 11, 2020 at 07:05:16PM +0300, Denis Efremov wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> same patch
> 
> https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/8/27/168
> 
> Thanks,
> Denis

David, can you pick this up?

/Jarkko

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2020-09-14 18:05 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-09-11 11:44 [PATCH] security: keys: Use kvfree_sensitive in a few places Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 11:44 ` Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 15:04 ` James Bottomley
2020-09-11 15:04   ` James Bottomley
2020-09-11 16:00   ` Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 16:00     ` Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 16:03     ` Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 16:03       ` Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 16:06     ` [PATCH v2] " Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 16:06       ` Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 16:05 ` [PATCH] " Denis Efremov
2020-09-11 16:05   ` Denis Efremov
2020-09-11 16:09   ` Alex Dewar
2020-09-11 16:09     ` Alex Dewar
2020-09-14 18:05   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-14 18:05     ` Jarkko Sakkinen

This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.