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From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	kuba@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, ast@kernel.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, kernel-team@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Abhishek Sagar <sagar.abhishek@gmail.com>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH -tip v6 11/13] x86/unwind: Recover kretprobe trampoline entry
Date: Wed, 26 May 2021 17:04:03 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <162201624347.278331.4677822345434037169.stgit@devnote2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <162201612941.278331.5293566981784464165.stgit@devnote2>

Since the kretprobe replaces the function return address with
the kretprobe_trampoline on the stack, x86 unwinders can not
continue the stack unwinding at that point, or record
kretprobe_trampoline instead of correct return address.

To fix this issue, find the correct return address from task's
kretprobe_instances as like as function-graph tracer does.

With this fix, the unwinder can correctly unwind the stack
from kretprobe event on x86, as below.

           <...>-135     [003] ...1     6.722338: r_full_proxy_read_0: (vfs_read+0xab/0x1a0 <- full_proxy_read)
           <...>-135     [003] ...1     6.722377: <stack trace>
 => kretprobe_trace_func+0x209/0x2f0
 => kretprobe_dispatcher+0x4a/0x70
 => __kretprobe_trampoline_handler+0xca/0x150
 => trampoline_handler+0x44/0x70
 => kretprobe_trampoline+0x2a/0x50
 => vfs_read+0xab/0x1a0
 => ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
 => do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 => entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae


Reported-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
  Changes in v5:
   - Fix the case of interrupt happens on kretprobe_trampoline+0.
  Changes in v3:
   - Split out the kretprobe side patch
   - Fix build error when CONFIG_KRETPROBES=n.
  Changes in v2:
   - Remove kretprobe wrapper functions from unwind_orc.c
   - Do not fixup state->ip when unwinding with regs because
     kretprobe fixup instruction pointer before calling handler.
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h  |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c |    3 +--
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c   |   19 +++++++++++++++----
 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
index 70fc159ebe69..36d3971c0a2c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ struct unwind_state {
 	unsigned long stack_mask;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	int graph_idx;
+	struct llist_node *kr_cur;
 	bool error;
 #if defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)
 	bool signal, full_regs;
@@ -99,6 +101,27 @@ void unwind_module_init(struct module *mod, void *orc_ip, size_t orc_ip_size,
 			void *orc, size_t orc_size) {}
 #endif
 
+static inline
+unsigned long unwind_recover_kretprobe(struct unwind_state *state,
+				       unsigned long addr, unsigned long *addr_p)
+{
+	return is_kretprobe_trampoline(addr) ?
+		kretprobe_find_ret_addr(state->task, addr_p, &state->kr_cur) :
+		addr;
+}
+
+/* Recover the return address modified by instrumentation (e.g. kretprobe) */
+static inline
+unsigned long unwind_recover_ret_addr(struct unwind_state *state,
+				     unsigned long addr, unsigned long *addr_p)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+
+	ret = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
+				    addr, addr_p);
+	return unwind_recover_kretprobe(state, ret, addr_p);
+}
+
 /*
  * This disables KASAN checking when reading a value from another task's stack,
  * since the other task could be running on another CPU and could have poisoned
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
index d7c44b257f7f..24e33b44b2be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/bitops.h>
@@ -240,8 +241,7 @@ static bool update_stack_state(struct unwind_state *state,
 	else {
 		addr_p = unwind_get_return_address_ptr(state);
 		addr = READ_ONCE_TASK_STACK(state->task, *addr_p);
-		state->ip = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
-						  addr, addr_p);
+		state->ip = unwind_recover_ret_addr(state, addr, addr_p);
 	}
 
 	/* Save the original stack pointer for unwind_dump(): */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c
index c49f10ffd8cd..884d68a6e714 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ unsigned long unwind_get_return_address(struct unwind_state *state)
 
 	addr = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*state->sp);
 
-	return ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
-				     addr, state->sp);
+	return unwind_recover_ret_addr(state, addr, state->sp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unwind_get_return_address);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
index a1202536fc57..c70dfeea4552 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/objtool.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/sort.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
@@ -534,9 +535,8 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
 		if (!deref_stack_reg(state, ip_p, &state->ip))
 			goto err;
 
-		state->ip = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
-						  state->ip, (void *)ip_p);
-
+		state->ip = unwind_recover_ret_addr(state, state->ip,
+						    (unsigned long *)ip_p);
 		state->sp = sp;
 		state->regs = NULL;
 		state->prev_regs = NULL;
@@ -549,7 +549,15 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
 					 (void *)orig_ip);
 			goto err;
 		}
-
+		/*
+		 * There is a small chance to interrupt at the entry of
+		 * kretprobe_trampoline where the ORC info doesn't exist.
+		 * That point is right after the RET to kretprobe_trampoline
+		 * which was modified return address. So the @addr_p must
+		 * be right before the regs->sp.
+		 */
+		state->ip = unwind_recover_kretprobe(state, state->ip,
+				(unsigned long *)(state->sp - sizeof(long)));
 		state->regs = (struct pt_regs *)sp;
 		state->prev_regs = NULL;
 		state->full_regs = true;
@@ -562,6 +570,9 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
 					 (void *)orig_ip);
 			goto err;
 		}
+		/* See UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS case comment. */
+		state->ip = unwind_recover_kretprobe(state, state->ip,
+				(unsigned long *)(state->sp - sizeof(long)));
 
 		if (state->full_regs)
 			state->prev_regs = state->regs;


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
To: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	kuba@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com, ast@kernel.org,
	tglx@linutronix.de, kernel-team@fb.com, yhs@fb.com,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	Abhishek Sagar <sagar.abhishek@gmail.com>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH -tip v6 11/13] x86/unwind: Recover kretprobe trampoline entry
Date: Wed, 26 May 2021 08:04:03 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <162201624347.278331.4677822345434037169.stgit@devnote2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <162201612941.278331.5293566981784464165.stgit@devnote2>

Since the kretprobe replaces the function return address with
the kretprobe_trampoline on the stack, x86 unwinders can not
continue the stack unwinding at that point, or record
kretprobe_trampoline instead of correct return address.

To fix this issue, find the correct return address from task's
kretprobe_instances as like as function-graph tracer does.

With this fix, the unwinder can correctly unwind the stack
from kretprobe event on x86, as below.

           <...>-135     [003] ...1     6.722338: r_full_proxy_read_0: (vfs_read+0xab/0x1a0 <- full_proxy_read)
           <...>-135     [003] ...1     6.722377: <stack trace>
 => kretprobe_trace_func+0x209/0x2f0
 => kretprobe_dispatcher+0x4a/0x70
 => __kretprobe_trampoline_handler+0xca/0x150
 => trampoline_handler+0x44/0x70
 => kretprobe_trampoline+0x2a/0x50
 => vfs_read+0xab/0x1a0
 => ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
 => do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
 => entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae


Reported-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
  Changes in v5:
   - Fix the case of interrupt happens on kretprobe_trampoline+0.
  Changes in v3:
   - Split out the kretprobe side patch
   - Fix build error when CONFIG_KRETPROBES=n.
  Changes in v2:
   - Remove kretprobe wrapper functions from unwind_orc.c
   - Do not fixup state->ip when unwinding with regs because
     kretprobe fixup instruction pointer before calling handler.
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h  |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c |    3 +--
 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c   |   19 +++++++++++++++----
 4 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
index 70fc159ebe69..36d3971c0a2c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/unwind.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 
@@ -15,6 +16,7 @@ struct unwind_state {
 	unsigned long stack_mask;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	int graph_idx;
+	struct llist_node *kr_cur;
 	bool error;
 #if defined(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC)
 	bool signal, full_regs;
@@ -99,6 +101,27 @@ void unwind_module_init(struct module *mod, void *orc_ip, size_t orc_ip_size,
 			void *orc, size_t orc_size) {}
 #endif
 
+static inline
+unsigned long unwind_recover_kretprobe(struct unwind_state *state,
+				       unsigned long addr, unsigned long *addr_p)
+{
+	return is_kretprobe_trampoline(addr) ?
+		kretprobe_find_ret_addr(state->task, addr_p, &state->kr_cur) :
+		addr;
+}
+
+/* Recover the return address modified by instrumentation (e.g. kretprobe) */
+static inline
+unsigned long unwind_recover_ret_addr(struct unwind_state *state,
+				     unsigned long addr, unsigned long *addr_p)
+{
+	unsigned long ret;
+
+	ret = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
+				    addr, addr_p);
+	return unwind_recover_kretprobe(state, ret, addr_p);
+}
+
 /*
  * This disables KASAN checking when reading a value from another task's stack,
  * since the other task could be running on another CPU and could have poisoned
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
index d7c44b257f7f..24e33b44b2be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_frame.c
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
 #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/bitops.h>
@@ -240,8 +241,7 @@ static bool update_stack_state(struct unwind_state *state,
 	else {
 		addr_p = unwind_get_return_address_ptr(state);
 		addr = READ_ONCE_TASK_STACK(state->task, *addr_p);
-		state->ip = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
-						  addr, addr_p);
+		state->ip = unwind_recover_ret_addr(state, addr, addr_p);
 	}
 
 	/* Save the original stack pointer for unwind_dump(): */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c
index c49f10ffd8cd..884d68a6e714 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_guess.c
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ unsigned long unwind_get_return_address(struct unwind_state *state)
 
 	addr = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(*state->sp);
 
-	return ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
-				     addr, state->sp);
+	return unwind_recover_ret_addr(state, addr, state->sp);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unwind_get_return_address);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
index a1202536fc57..c70dfeea4552 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #include <linux/objtool.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/sort.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/stacktrace.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
@@ -534,9 +535,8 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
 		if (!deref_stack_reg(state, ip_p, &state->ip))
 			goto err;
 
-		state->ip = ftrace_graph_ret_addr(state->task, &state->graph_idx,
-						  state->ip, (void *)ip_p);
-
+		state->ip = unwind_recover_ret_addr(state, state->ip,
+						    (unsigned long *)ip_p);
 		state->sp = sp;
 		state->regs = NULL;
 		state->prev_regs = NULL;
@@ -549,7 +549,15 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
 					 (void *)orig_ip);
 			goto err;
 		}
-
+		/*
+		 * There is a small chance to interrupt at the entry of
+		 * kretprobe_trampoline where the ORC info doesn't exist.
+		 * That point is right after the RET to kretprobe_trampoline
+		 * which was modified return address. So the @addr_p must
+		 * be right before the regs->sp.
+		 */
+		state->ip = unwind_recover_kretprobe(state, state->ip,
+				(unsigned long *)(state->sp - sizeof(long)));
 		state->regs = (struct pt_regs *)sp;
 		state->prev_regs = NULL;
 		state->full_regs = true;
@@ -562,6 +570,9 @@ bool unwind_next_frame(struct unwind_state *state)
 					 (void *)orig_ip);
 			goto err;
 		}
+		/* See UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS case comment. */
+		state->ip = unwind_recover_kretprobe(state, state->ip,
+				(unsigned long *)(state->sp - sizeof(long)));
 
 		if (state->full_regs)
 			state->prev_regs = state->regs;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-05-26  8:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-26  8:02 [PATCH -tip v6 00/13] kprobes: Fix stacktrace with kretprobes on x86 Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02 ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02 ` [PATCH -tip v6 01/13] ia64: kprobes: Fix to pass correct trampoline address to the handler Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02 ` [PATCH -tip v6 02/13] kprobes: treewide: Replace arch_deref_entry_point() with dereference_symbol_descriptor() Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02   ` [PATCH -tip v6 02/13] kprobes: treewide: Replace arch_deref_entry_point() with dereference_symbol_de Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02 ` [PATCH -tip v6 03/13] kprobes: treewide: Remove trampoline_address from kretprobe_trampoline_handler() Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02   ` [PATCH -tip v6 03/13] kprobes: treewide: Remove trampoline_address from kretprobe_trampoline_handler Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02 ` [PATCH -tip v6 04/13] kprobes: Add kretprobe_find_ret_addr() for searching return address Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:02   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03 ` [PATCH -tip v6 05/13] x86/kprobes: Add UNWIND_HINT_FUNC on kretprobe_trampoline code Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03 ` [PATCH -tip v6 06/13] ARC: Add instruction_pointer_set() API Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03 ` [PATCH -tip v6 07/13] ia64: " Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03 ` [PATCH -tip v6 08/13] arm: kprobes: Make a space for regs->ARM_pc at kretprobe_trampoline Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03 ` [PATCH -tip v6 09/13] kprobes: Setup instruction pointer in __kretprobe_trampoline_handler Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03 ` [PATCH -tip v6 10/13] x86/kprobes: Push a fake return address at kretprobe_trampoline Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:03   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:04 ` Masami Hiramatsu [this message]
2021-05-26  8:04   ` [PATCH -tip v6 11/13] x86/unwind: Recover kretprobe trampoline entry Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:04 ` [PATCH -tip v6 12/13] tracing: Show kretprobe unknown indicator only for kretprobe_trampoline Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:04   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:04 ` [PATCH -tip v6 13/13] x86/kprobes: Fixup return address in generic trampoline handler Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26  8:04   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-26 17:39 ` [PATCH -tip v6 00/13] kprobes: Fix stacktrace with kretprobes on x86 Andrii Nakryiko
2021-05-26 17:39   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2021-05-27  0:20   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2021-05-27  0:20     ` Masami Hiramatsu

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