FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

FAILED: patch "[PATCH] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well" failed to apply to 4.4-stable tree

[gregkh]

The patch below does not apply to the 4.4-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 7e44a0b597f04e67eee8cdcbe7ee706c6f5de38b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 11 May 2021 20:02:49 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well

Similar to the issues fixed in previous patches, TKIP and WEP
should be protected even if for TKIP we have the Michael MIC
protecting it, and WEP is broken anyway.

However, this also somewhat protects potential other algorithms
that drivers might implement.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.430e8c202313.Ia37e4e5b6b3eaab1a5ae050e015f6c92859dbe27@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c
index b619c47e1d12..4454ec47283f 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/rx.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c
@@ -2274,6 +2274,7 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 			 * next fragment has a sequential PN value.
 			 */
 			entry->check_sequential_pn = true;
+			entry->is_protected = true;
 			entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
 			memcpy(entry->last_pn,
 			       rx->key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
@@ -2286,6 +2287,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 				     sizeof(rx->key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue]));
 			BUILD_BUG_ON(IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN !=
 				     IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		} else if (rx->key && ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) {
+			entry->is_protected = true;
+			entry->key_color = rx->key->color;
 		}
 		return RX_QUEUED;
 	}
@@ -2327,6 +2331,14 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_defragment(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
 		if (memcmp(pn, rpn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN))
 			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 		memcpy(entry->last_pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+	} else if (entry->is_protected &&
+		   (!rx->key || !ieee80211_has_protected(fc) ||
+		    rx->key->color != entry->key_color)) {
+		/* Drop this as a mixed key or fragment cache attack, even
+		 * if for TKIP Michael MIC should protect us, and WEP is a
+		 * lost cause anyway.
+		 */
+		return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
 	}
 
 	skb_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc));
diff --git a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
index 5c56d29a619e..0333072ebd98 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
+++ b/net/mac80211/sta_info.h
@@ -455,7 +455,8 @@ struct ieee80211_fragment_entry {
 	u16 extra_len;
 	u16 last_frag;
 	u8 rx_queue;
-	bool check_sequential_pn; /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+	u8 check_sequential_pn:1, /* needed for CCMP/GCMP */
+	   is_protected:1;
 	u8 last_pn[6]; /* PN of the last fragment if CCMP was used */
 	unsigned int key_color;
 };