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From: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	alan@linux.intel.com, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	linux-media@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2018 00:40:52 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1624792.F9dcxCXkCx@avalon> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151571806069.27429.6683179525235570687.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

Hi Dan,

Thank you for the patch.

On Friday, 12 January 2018 02:47:40 EEST Dan Williams wrote:
> Static analysis reports that 'index' may be a user controlled value that
> is used as a data dependency to read 'pin' from the
> 'selector->baSourceID' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of
> kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
> stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'pin'.
> 
> Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.
> 
> Laurent notes:
> 
>     "...as this is nowhere close to being a fast path, I think we can close
>     this potential hole as proposed in the patch"
> 
> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
> Cc: linux-media@vger.kernel.org
> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

What's the status of this series (and of this patch in particular) ?

> ---
>  drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c |    9 +++++++--
>  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
> b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c index 3e7e283a44a8..30ee200206ee 100644
> --- a/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
> +++ b/drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>  #include <linux/wait.h>
>  #include <linux/atomic.h>
> +#include <linux/nospec.h>
> 
>  #include <media/v4l2-common.h>
>  #include <media/v4l2-ctrls.h>
> @@ -809,8 +810,12 @@ static int uvc_ioctl_enum_input(struct file *file, void
> *fh, const struct uvc_entity *selector = chain->selector;
>  	struct uvc_entity *iterm = NULL;
>  	u32 index = input->index;
> +	__u8 *elem = NULL;
>  	int pin = 0;
> 
> +	if (selector)
> +		elem = array_ptr(selector->baSourceID, index,
> +				selector->bNrInPins);
>  	if (selector == NULL ||
>  	    (chain->dev->quirks & UVC_QUIRK_IGNORE_SELECTOR_UNIT)) {
>  		if (index != 0)
> @@ -820,8 +825,8 @@ static int uvc_ioctl_enum_input(struct file *file, void
> *fh, break;
>  		}
>  		pin = iterm->id;
> -	} else if (index < selector->bNrInPins) {
> -		pin = selector->baSourceID[index];
> +	} else if (elem) {
> +		pin = *elem;
>  		list_for_each_entry(iterm, &chain->entities, chain) {
>  			if (!UVC_ENTITY_IS_ITERM(iterm))
>  				continue;

-- 
Regards,

Laurent Pinchart




  reply	other threads:[~2018-08-06 21:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 139+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-12  0:46 [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 10:38   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-12 10:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-12 10:38     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-16 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-16 21:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  2:27   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  2:27     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  3:39     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  3:39       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  2:42   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  2:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  9:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12  9:12     ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-13  0:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-13  0:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-15  8:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-15  8:46         ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 17:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 17:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:21     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:21       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:58       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:58         ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 19:26         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 19:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:01             ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:41             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 20:41               ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:11   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:14     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:14       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  7:59   ` Greg KH
2018-01-12  7:59     ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2018-01-12 18:47     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:47       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-13  8:56       ` Greg KH
2018-01-13  8:56         ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-15 10:32   ` Jan Kara
2018-01-15 10:32     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jan Kara
2018-01-15 17:49     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15 17:49       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-08-06 21:40   ` Laurent Pinchart [this message]
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 14:42   ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 14:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 18:39     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:39       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01       ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 20:01         ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 23:05         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 23:05           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:19   ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12  1:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " James Bottomley
2018-01-12  5:38     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  5:38       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  6:05       ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12  6:05         ` [kernel-hardening] " James Bottomley
2018-01-12  0:48 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:48 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:19   ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:41   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:41     ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 13:18     ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 16:58       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 16:58         ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-18 16:58         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 16:58         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 17:05         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 17:05           ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2018-01-18 17:05           ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 17:05           ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 21:41           ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41             ` [kernel-hardening] " Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41             ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41             ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41             ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-13  0:15   ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13  0:15     ` [kernel-hardening] " Tony Luck
2018-01-13  0:15     ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 18:51     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-13 18:51       ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-13 18:51       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-16 19:21       ` Tony Luck
2018-01-16 19:21         ` [kernel-hardening] " Tony Luck
2018-01-16 19:21         ` Tony Luck
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-12 10:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-12 10:02   ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-12 10:02   ` Russell King - ARM Linux

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