All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:48:02 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151571808286.27429.10595818963597903281.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151571798296.27429.7166552848688034184.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

Static analysis reports that 'queue' may be a user controlled value that
is used as a data dependency to read 'txq_params' from the
'priv->tx_queue_params.params' array.  In order to avoid potential leaks
of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'txq_params'.
In this case 'txq_params' is referenced later in the function.

Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.

Cc: Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c |   11 +++++++----
 drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h |    4 +---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
index 38678e9a0562..7521077e50a4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/firmware.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include "cw1200.h"
 #include "sta.h"
@@ -612,18 +613,20 @@ int cw1200_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
 		   u16 queue, const struct ieee80211_tx_queue_params *params)
 {
 	struct cw1200_common *priv = dev->priv;
+	struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *txq_params;
 	int ret = 0;
 	/* To prevent re-applying PM request OID again and again*/
 	bool old_uapsd_flags;
 
 	mutex_lock(&priv->conf_mutex);
 
-	if (queue < dev->queues) {
+	txq_params = array_ptr(priv->tx_queue_params.params, queue,
+			dev->queues);
+	if (txq_params) {
 		old_uapsd_flags = le16_to_cpu(priv->uapsd_info.uapsd_flags);
 
-		WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(&priv->tx_queue_params, queue, 0, 0, 0);
-		ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv,
-					      &priv->tx_queue_params.params[queue], queue);
+		WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(txq_params, 0, 0, 0);
+		ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv, txq_params, queue);
 		if (ret) {
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h
index 48086e849515..8c8d9191e233 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h
@@ -1099,10 +1099,8 @@ struct wsm_tx_queue_params {
 };
 
 
-#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(queue_params, queue, ack_policy, allowed_time,\
-		max_life_time)	\
+#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(p, ack_policy, allowed_time, max_life_time)	\
 do {							\
-	struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *p = &(queue_params)->params[queue]; \
 	p->ackPolicy = (ack_policy);				\
 	p->allowedMediumTime = (allowed_time);				\
 	p->maxTransmitLifetime = (max_life_time);			\

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:48:02 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151571808286.27429.10595818963597903281.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151571798296.27429.7166552848688034184.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

Static analysis reports that 'queue' may be a user controlled value that
is used as a data dependency to read 'txq_params' from the
'priv->tx_queue_params.params' array.  In order to avoid potential leaks
of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction
stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'txq_params'.
In this case 'txq_params' is referenced later in the function.

Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.

Cc: Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c |   11 +++++++----
 drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h |    4 +---
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
index 38678e9a0562..7521077e50a4 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/firmware.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 #include "cw1200.h"
 #include "sta.h"
@@ -612,18 +613,20 @@ int cw1200_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, struct ieee80211_vif *vif,
 		   u16 queue, const struct ieee80211_tx_queue_params *params)
 {
 	struct cw1200_common *priv = dev->priv;
+	struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *txq_params;
 	int ret = 0;
 	/* To prevent re-applying PM request OID again and again*/
 	bool old_uapsd_flags;
 
 	mutex_lock(&priv->conf_mutex);
 
-	if (queue < dev->queues) {
+	txq_params = array_ptr(priv->tx_queue_params.params, queue,
+			dev->queues);
+	if (txq_params) {
 		old_uapsd_flags = le16_to_cpu(priv->uapsd_info.uapsd_flags);
 
-		WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(&priv->tx_queue_params, queue, 0, 0, 0);
-		ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv,
-					      &priv->tx_queue_params.params[queue], queue);
+		WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(txq_params, 0, 0, 0);
+		ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv, txq_params, queue);
 		if (ret) {
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h
index 48086e849515..8c8d9191e233 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h
@@ -1099,10 +1099,8 @@ struct wsm_tx_queue_params {
 };
 
 
-#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(queue_params, queue, ack_policy, allowed_time,\
-		max_life_time)	\
+#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(p, ack_policy, allowed_time, max_life_time)	\
 do {							\
-	struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *p = &(queue_params)->params[queue]; \
 	p->ackPolicy = (ack_policy);				\
 	p->allowedMediumTime = (allowed_time);				\
 	p->maxTransmitLifetime = (max_life_time);			\

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-12  0:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 139+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-12  0:46 [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 10:38   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-12 10:38     ` [kernel-hardening] " Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-12 10:38     ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-16 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-16 21:01     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  2:27   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  2:27     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  3:39     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  3:39       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  2:42   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  2:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  9:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12  9:12     ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-13  0:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-13  0:41       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-15  8:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-15  8:46         ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 17:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 17:51     ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:21     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:21       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:58       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:58         ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 19:26         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 19:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:01             ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:41             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 20:41               ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:11   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:11     ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:14     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:14       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  7:59   ` Greg KH
2018-01-12  7:59     ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2018-01-12 18:47     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:47       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-13  8:56       ` Greg KH
2018-01-13  8:56         ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-15 10:32   ` Jan Kara
2018-01-15 10:32     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jan Kara
2018-01-15 17:49     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15 17:49       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-08-06 21:40   ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 14:42   ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 14:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 18:39     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:39       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01       ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 20:01         ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 23:05         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 23:05           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:19   ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12  1:19     ` [kernel-hardening] " James Bottomley
2018-01-12  5:38     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  5:38       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  6:05       ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12  6:05         ` [kernel-hardening] " James Bottomley
2018-01-12  0:48 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-12  0:48   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:48 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:48   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:19   ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:19   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:41   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:41     ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 13:18     ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18       ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 16:58       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 16:58         ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-18 16:58         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 16:58         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 17:05         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 17:05           ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2018-01-18 17:05           ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 17:05           ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 21:41           ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41             ` [kernel-hardening] " Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41             ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41             ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41             ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-13  0:15   ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13  0:15     ` [kernel-hardening] " Tony Luck
2018-01-13  0:15     ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 18:51     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-13 18:51       ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-13 18:51       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-16 19:21       ` Tony Luck
2018-01-16 19:21         ` [kernel-hardening] " Tony Luck
2018-01-16 19:21         ` Tony Luck
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-12 10:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-12 10:02   ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-12 10:02   ` Russell King - ARM Linux

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=151571808286.27429.10595818963597903281.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com \
    --to=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=kvalo@codeaurora.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pizza@shaftnet.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.