From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>, Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>, tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>, alan@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:48:02 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <151571808286.27429.10595818963597903281.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <151571798296.27429.7166552848688034184.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> Static analysis reports that 'queue' may be a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read 'txq_params' from the 'priv->tx_queue_params.params' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'txq_params'. In this case 'txq_params' is referenced later in the function. Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. Cc: Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c | 11 +++++++---- drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c index 38678e9a0562..7521077e50a4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/etherdevice.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "cw1200.h" #include "sta.h" @@ -612,18 +613,20 @@ int cw1200_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, struct ieee80211_vif *vif, u16 queue, const struct ieee80211_tx_queue_params *params) { struct cw1200_common *priv = dev->priv; + struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *txq_params; int ret = 0; /* To prevent re-applying PM request OID again and again*/ bool old_uapsd_flags; mutex_lock(&priv->conf_mutex); - if (queue < dev->queues) { + txq_params = array_ptr(priv->tx_queue_params.params, queue, + dev->queues); + if (txq_params) { old_uapsd_flags = le16_to_cpu(priv->uapsd_info.uapsd_flags); - WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(&priv->tx_queue_params, queue, 0, 0, 0); - ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv, - &priv->tx_queue_params.params[queue], queue); + WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(txq_params, 0, 0, 0); + ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv, txq_params, queue); if (ret) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h index 48086e849515..8c8d9191e233 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h @@ -1099,10 +1099,8 @@ struct wsm_tx_queue_params { }; -#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(queue_params, queue, ack_policy, allowed_time,\ - max_life_time) \ +#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(p, ack_policy, allowed_time, max_life_time) \ do { \ - struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *p = &(queue_params)->params[queue]; \ p->ackPolicy = (ack_policy); \ p->allowedMediumTime = (allowed_time); \ p->maxTransmitLifetime = (max_life_time); \
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>, Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org>, tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>, alan@linux.intel.com Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:48:02 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <151571808286.27429.10595818963597903281.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <151571798296.27429.7166552848688034184.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> Static analysis reports that 'queue' may be a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read 'txq_params' from the 'priv->tx_queue_params.params' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid value of 'txq_params'. In this case 'txq_params' is referenced later in the function. Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova. Cc: Solomon Peachy <pizza@shaftnet.org> Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c | 11 +++++++---- drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c index 38678e9a0562..7521077e50a4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/sta.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/etherdevice.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include "cw1200.h" #include "sta.h" @@ -612,18 +613,20 @@ int cw1200_conf_tx(struct ieee80211_hw *dev, struct ieee80211_vif *vif, u16 queue, const struct ieee80211_tx_queue_params *params) { struct cw1200_common *priv = dev->priv; + struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *txq_params; int ret = 0; /* To prevent re-applying PM request OID again and again*/ bool old_uapsd_flags; mutex_lock(&priv->conf_mutex); - if (queue < dev->queues) { + txq_params = array_ptr(priv->tx_queue_params.params, queue, + dev->queues); + if (txq_params) { old_uapsd_flags = le16_to_cpu(priv->uapsd_info.uapsd_flags); - WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(&priv->tx_queue_params, queue, 0, 0, 0); - ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv, - &priv->tx_queue_params.params[queue], queue); + WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(txq_params, 0, 0, 0); + ret = wsm_set_tx_queue_params(priv, txq_params, queue); if (ret) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h index 48086e849515..8c8d9191e233 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/wsm.h @@ -1099,10 +1099,8 @@ struct wsm_tx_queue_params { }; -#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(queue_params, queue, ack_policy, allowed_time,\ - max_life_time) \ +#define WSM_TX_QUEUE_SET(p, ack_policy, allowed_time, max_life_time) \ do { \ - struct wsm_set_tx_queue_params *p = &(queue_params)->params[queue]; \ p->ackPolicy = (ack_policy); \ p->allowedMediumTime = (allowed_time); \ p->maxTransmitLifetime = (max_life_time); \
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-12 0:56 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 139+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-01-12 0:46 [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 10:38 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2018-01-12 10:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Geert Uytterhoeven 2018-01-12 10:38 ` Geert Uytterhoeven 2018-01-16 21:01 ` Kees Cook 2018-01-16 21:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] arm: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 2:27 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-01-12 2:27 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman 2018-01-12 3:39 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 3:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 2:42 ` Eric W. Biederman 2018-01-12 2:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Eric W. Biederman 2018-01-12 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-12 9:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-13 0:41 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-13 0:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-15 8:46 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-15 8:46 ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 17:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2018-01-12 17:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf 2018-01-12 18:21 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 18:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 18:58 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2018-01-12 18:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf 2018-01-12 19:26 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 19:26 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 20:01 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-12 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2018-01-12 20:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2018-01-12 20:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Josh Poimboeuf 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 1:11 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-12 1:11 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2018-01-12 1:14 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 1:14 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 7:59 ` Greg KH 2018-01-12 7:59 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH 2018-01-12 18:47 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 18:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-13 8:56 ` Greg KH 2018-01-13 8:56 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] userns: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-15 10:32 ` Jan Kara 2018-01-15 10:32 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jan Kara 2018-01-15 17:49 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-15 17:49 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-08-06 21:40 ` Laurent Pinchart 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 14:42 ` Christian Lamparter 2018-01-12 14:42 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Lamparter 2018-01-12 18:39 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 18:39 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 20:01 ` Christian Lamparter 2018-01-12 20:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Christian Lamparter 2018-01-12 23:05 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 23:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] p54: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:47 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 1:19 ` James Bottomley 2018-01-12 1:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Bottomley 2018-01-12 5:38 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 5:38 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 6:05 ` James Bottomley 2018-01-12 6:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " James Bottomley 2018-01-12 0:48 ` Dan Williams [this message] 2018-01-12 0:48 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:48 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 0:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 1:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] " Linus Torvalds 2018-01-12 1:19 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2018-01-12 1:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-12 1:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-12 1:41 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 1:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-12 1:41 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-12 1:41 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-18 13:18 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon 2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-18 16:58 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-18 16:58 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams 2018-01-18 16:58 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-18 16:58 ` Dan Williams 2018-01-18 17:05 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-18 17:05 ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon 2018-01-18 17:05 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-18 17:05 ` Will Deacon 2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart 2018-01-18 21:41 ` [kernel-hardening] " Laurent Pinchart 2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart 2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart 2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart 2018-01-13 0:15 ` Tony Luck 2018-01-13 0:15 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tony Luck 2018-01-13 0:15 ` Tony Luck 2018-01-13 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-13 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds 2018-01-13 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds 2018-01-16 19:21 ` Tony Luck 2018-01-16 19:21 ` [kernel-hardening] " Tony Luck 2018-01-16 19:21 ` Tony Luck 2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux 2018-01-12 10:02 ` [kernel-hardening] " Russell King - ARM Linux 2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux 2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
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