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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/8] x86/boot: Support __ro_after_init
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 14:10:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1628edef-ca52-31ec-6e46-6865694aa834@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211130100445.31156-8-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

On 30.11.2021 11:04, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> For security hardening reasons, it advantageous to make setup-once data
> immutable after boot.  Borrow __ro_after_init from Linux.
> 
> On x86, place .data.ro_after_init at the start of .rodata, excluding it from
> the early permission restrictions.  Re-apply RO restrictions to the whole of
> .rodata in init_done(), attempting to reform the superpage if possible.
> 
> For architectures which don't implement __ro_after_init explicitly, variables
> merges into .data.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>



  reply	other threads:[~2021-12-02 13:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-30 10:04 [PATCH 0/8] x86: Support for __ro_after_init Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86/boot: Drop incorrect mapping at l2_xenmap[0] Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:33   ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 11:14     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 11:22       ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 12:39         ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/boot: Better describe the pagetable relocation loops Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:43   ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 3/8] x86/boot: Fix data placement around __high_start() Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:49   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-02 14:06     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 4/8] x86/mm: Drop bogus cacheability logic in update_xen_mappings() Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 13:11   ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 14:56     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 5/8] x86/boot: Drop xen_virt_end Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:56   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-02 14:07     ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86/boot: Adjust .text/.rodata/etc permissions in one place Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 12:15   ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86/boot: Support __ro_after_init Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 13:10   ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH RFC 8/8] x86/boot: Check that permission restrictions have taken effect Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 13:33   ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-06 18:12     ` Andrew Cooper

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