From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/8] x86/boot: Adjust .text/.rodata/etc permissions in one place
Date: Thu, 2 Dec 2021 13:15:00 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cb5bede2-365f-2c7d-196f-b624621ff4ae@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211130100445.31156-7-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
On 30.11.2021 11:04, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> At the moment, we have two locations selecting restricted permissions, not
> very far apart on boot, dependent on opposite answers from using_2M_mapping().
> The later location however can shatter superpages if needed, while the former
> cannot.
>
> Collect together all the permission adjustments at the slightly later point in
> boot, as we're may need to shatter a superpage to support __ro_after_init.
>
> No functional change.
>
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Again with the understanding that this doesn't really depend on patch 4:
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Jan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-02 12:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-30 10:04 [PATCH 0/8] x86: Support for __ro_after_init Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 1/8] x86/boot: Drop incorrect mapping at l2_xenmap[0] Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:33 ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 11:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 11:22 ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 12:39 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/boot: Better describe the pagetable relocation loops Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:43 ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 3/8] x86/boot: Fix data placement around __high_start() Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:49 ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-02 14:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 4/8] x86/mm: Drop bogus cacheability logic in update_xen_mappings() Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 13:11 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 14:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 5/8] x86/boot: Drop xen_virt_end Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 11:56 ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-02 14:07 ` Andrew Cooper
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 6/8] x86/boot: Adjust .text/.rodata/etc permissions in one place Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 12:15 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86/boot: Support __ro_after_init Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 13:10 ` Jan Beulich
2021-11-30 10:04 ` [PATCH RFC 8/8] x86/boot: Check that permission restrictions have taken effect Andrew Cooper
2021-12-02 13:33 ` Jan Beulich
2021-12-06 18:12 ` Andrew Cooper
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