From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, mark.rutland@arm.com,
alex.popov@linux.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 12:16:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <165169181293.405194.8374667346806721563.b4-ty@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220427173128.2603085-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
On Wed, 27 Apr 2022 18:31:15 +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> This is the vs I promised. Since Alexander wanted to look at this in
> more detail (and since this is subtle and needs review), I'm assuming
> that Kees will pick this up some time next week after that's happened,
> if all goes well. :)
>
> This series reworks the stackleak code and the associated LKDTM test.
> The first patch fixes some latent issues on arm64, and the subsequent
> patches improve the code to improve clarity and permit better code
> generation. Patches 8-10 address some latent issues in the LKDTM test
> and add more diagnostic output.
>
> [...]
I fixed some small commit log typos, but otherwise this looks great. If
anything new comes up we can adjust it.
Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
[01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack()
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/4c849d27b729
[02/13] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/e98a7c56d73c
[03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/e45d9f71deea
[04/13] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/cbe7edb47d3c
[05/13] stackleak: clarify variable names
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/e9da2241ed85
[06/13] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/cfef4372a4b7
[07/13] stackleak: rework poison scanning
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/ff5f6d37e5bc
[08/13] lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/23fd893fa0d7
[09/13] lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/f4cfacd92972
[10/13] lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/c393c0b98d75
[11/13] lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/b6bf5a354eca
[12/13] stackleak: add on/off stack variants
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/96c59349a56c
[13/13] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack()
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/d46ac904fd35
--
Kees Cook
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, mark.rutland@arm.com,
alex.popov@linux.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, will@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework
Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 12:16:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <165169181293.405194.8374667346806721563.b4-ty@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220427173128.2603085-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>
On Wed, 27 Apr 2022 18:31:15 +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> This is the vs I promised. Since Alexander wanted to look at this in
> more detail (and since this is subtle and needs review), I'm assuming
> that Kees will pick this up some time next week after that's happened,
> if all goes well. :)
>
> This series reworks the stackleak code and the associated LKDTM test.
> The first patch fixes some latent issues on arm64, and the subsequent
> patches improve the code to improve clarity and permit better code
> generation. Patches 8-10 address some latent issues in the LKDTM test
> and add more diagnostic output.
>
> [...]
I fixed some small commit log typos, but otherwise this looks great. If
anything new comes up we can adjust it.
Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
[01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack()
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/4c849d27b729
[02/13] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/e98a7c56d73c
[03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/e45d9f71deea
[04/13] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/cbe7edb47d3c
[05/13] stackleak: clarify variable names
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/e9da2241ed85
[06/13] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/cfef4372a4b7
[07/13] stackleak: rework poison scanning
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/ff5f6d37e5bc
[08/13] lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/23fd893fa0d7
[09/13] lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/f4cfacd92972
[10/13] lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/c393c0b98d75
[11/13] lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/b6bf5a354eca
[12/13] stackleak: add on/off stack variants
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/96c59349a56c
[13/13] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack()
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/d46ac904fd35
--
Kees Cook
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-04 19:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 94+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-27 17:31 [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] arm64: stackleak: fix current_top_of_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 16:41 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:55 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:55 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-05 8:25 ` Will Deacon
2022-05-05 8:25 ` Will Deacon
2022-05-08 17:24 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 17:24 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:36 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 11:36 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] stackleak: move skip_erasing() check earlier Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 17:44 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 17:44 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:40 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 11:40 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] stackleak: remove redundant check Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 18:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 18:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:46 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 11:46 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 3:00 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 3:00 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 8:02 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 8:02 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-12 9:14 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-12 9:14 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-15 16:17 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 10:03 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-24 10:03 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 22:09 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-26 22:09 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] stackleak: rework stack low bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] stackleak: clarify variable names Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 20:49 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 20:49 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:01 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 13:01 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-11 3:05 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-11 3:05 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] stackleak: rework stack high bound handling Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-08 21:27 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-08 21:27 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 11:22 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 11:22 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 16:32 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-15 16:32 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] stackleak: rework poison scanning Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-09 13:51 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-09 13:51 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-10 13:13 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-10 13:13 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-15 17:33 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-15 17:33 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-24 13:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-24 13:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-26 23:25 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-26 23:25 ` Alexander Popov
2022-05-31 18:13 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-31 18:13 ` Kees Cook
2022-06-03 16:55 ` Alexander Popov
2022-06-03 16:55 ` Alexander Popov
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 08/13] lkdtm/stackleak: avoid spurious failure Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] lkdtm/stackleak: rework boundary management Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2022-05-04 19:07 ` Kees Cook
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] lkdtm/stackleak: prevent unexpected stack usage Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] lkdtm/stackleak: check stack boundaries Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] stackleak: add on/off stack variants Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] arm64: entry: use stackleak_erase_on_task_stack() Mark Rutland
2022-04-27 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2022-05-04 16:42 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 16:42 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-05-04 19:16 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-05-04 19:16 ` [PATCH v2 00/13] stackleak: fixes and rework Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=165169181293.405194.8374667346806721563.b4-ty@chromium.org \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=alex.popov@linux.com \
--cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=will@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.