[PATCH net 0/3] Netfilter fixes for net

[PATCH net 0/3] Netfilter fixes for net

[Pablo Neira Ayuso]

Hi,

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

1) refcount_inc_not_zero() is not semantically equivalent to
   atomic_int_not_zero(), from Florian Westphal. My understanding was
   that refcount_*() API provides a wrapper to easier debugging of
   reference count leaks, however, there are semantic differences
   between these two APIs, where refcount_inc_not_zero() needs a barrier.
   Reason for this subtle difference to me is unknown.

2) packet logging is not correct for ARP and IP packets, from the
   ARP family and netdev/egress respectively. Use skb_network_offset()
   to reach the headers accordingly.

3) set element extension length have been growing over time, replace
   a BUG_ON by EINVAL which might be triggerable from userspace.

Please, pull these changes from:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf.git

Thanks.

----------------------------------------------------------------

The following changes since commit 280e3a857d96f9ca8e24632788e1e7a0fec4e9f7:

  Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf (2022-07-03 12:29:18 +0100)

are available in the Git repository at:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf.git HEAD

for you to fetch changes up to c39ba4de6b0a843bec5d46c2b6f2064428dada5e:

  netfilter: nf_tables: replace BUG_ON by element length check (2022-07-09 16:25:09 +0200)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Florian Westphal (1):
      netfilter: conntrack: fix crash due to confirmed bit load reordering

Pablo Neira Ayuso (2):
      netfilter: nf_log: incorrect offset to network header
      netfilter: nf_tables: replace BUG_ON by element length check

 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h       | 14 ++++---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c       | 22 ++++++++++
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  1 +
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  3 ++
 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c           |  8 ++--
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c           | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 6 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

[PATCH net 1/3] netfilter: conntrack: fix crash due to confirmed bit load reordering

[Pablo Neira Ayuso]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

Kajetan Puchalski reports crash on ARM, with backtrace of:

__nf_ct_delete_from_lists
nf_ct_delete
early_drop
__nf_conntrack_alloc

Unlike atomic_inc_not_zero, refcount_inc_not_zero is not a full barrier.
conntrack uses SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, i.e. it is possible that a 'newly'
allocated object is still in use on another CPU:

CPU1						CPU2
						encounter 'ct' during hlist walk
 delete_from_lists
 refcount drops to 0
 kmem_cache_free(ct);
 __nf_conntrack_alloc() // returns same object
						refcount_inc_not_zero(ct); /* might fail */

						/* If set, ct is public/in the hash table */
						test_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &ct->status);

In case CPU1 already set refcount back to 1, refcount_inc_not_zero()
will succeed.

The expected possibilities for a CPU that obtained the object 'ct'
(but no reference so far) are:

1. refcount_inc_not_zero() fails.  CPU2 ignores the object and moves to
   the next entry in the list.  This happens for objects that are about
   to be free'd, that have been free'd, or that have been reallocated
   by __nf_conntrack_alloc(), but where the refcount has not been
   increased back to 1 yet.

2. refcount_inc_not_zero() succeeds. CPU2 checks the CONFIRMED bit
   in ct->status.  If set, the object is public/in the table.

   If not, the object must be skipped; CPU2 calls nf_ct_put() to
   un-do the refcount increment and moves to the next object.

Parallel deletion from the hlists is prevented by a
'test_and_set_bit(IPS_DYING_BIT, &ct->status);' check, i.e. only one
cpu will do the unlink, the other one will only drop its reference count.

Because refcount_inc_not_zero is not a full barrier, CPU2 may try to
delete an object that is not on any list:

1. refcount_inc_not_zero() successful (refcount inited to 1 on other CPU)
2. CONFIRMED test also successful (load was reordered or zeroing
   of ct->status not yet visible)
3. delete_from_lists unlinks entry not on the hlist, because
   IPS_DYING_BIT is 0 (already cleared).

2) is already wrong: CPU2 will handle a partially initited object
that is supposed to be private to CPU1.

Add needed barriers when refcount_inc_not_zero() is successful.

It also inserts a smp_wmb() before the refcount is set to 1 during
allocation.

Because other CPU might still see the object, refcount_set(1)
"resurrects" it, so we need to make sure that other CPUs will also observe
the right content.  In particular, the CONFIRMED bit test must only pass
once the object is fully initialised and either in the hash or about to be
inserted (with locks held to delay possible unlink from early_drop or
gc worker).

I did not change flow_offload_alloc(), as far as I can see it should call
refcount_inc(), not refcount_inc_not_zero(): the ct object is attached to
the skb so its refcount should be >= 1 in all cases.

v2: prefer smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep to smp_rmb (Will Deacon).
v3: keep smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep close to refcount_inc_not_zero call
    add comment in nf_conntrack_netlink, no control dependency there
    due to locks.

Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/Yr7WTfd6AVTQkLjI@e126311.manchester.arm.com/
Reported-by: Kajetan Puchalski <kajetan.puchalski@arm.com>
Diagnosed-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Fixes: 719774377622 ("netfilter: conntrack: convert to refcount_t api")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c       | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  1 +
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  3 +++
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
index 082a2fd8d85b..369aeabb94fe 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c
@@ -729,6 +729,9 @@ static void nf_ct_gc_expired(struct nf_conn *ct)
 	if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))
 		return;
 
+	/* load ->status after refcount increase */
+	smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep();
+
 	if (nf_ct_should_gc(ct))
 		nf_ct_kill(ct);
 
@@ -795,6 +798,9 @@ __nf_conntrack_find_get(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone,
 		 */
 		ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
 		if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))) {
+			/* re-check key after refcount */
+			smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep();
+
 			if (likely(nf_ct_key_equal(h, tuple, zone, net)))
 				goto found;
 
@@ -1387,6 +1393,9 @@ static unsigned int early_drop_list(struct net *net,
 		if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&tmp->ct_general.use))
 			continue;
 
+		/* load ->ct_net and ->status after refcount increase */
+		smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep();
+
 		/* kill only if still in same netns -- might have moved due to
 		 * SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU rules.
 		 *
@@ -1536,6 +1545,9 @@ static void gc_worker(struct work_struct *work)
 			if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&tmp->ct_general.use))
 				continue;
 
+			/* load ->status after refcount increase */
+			smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep();
+
 			if (gc_worker_skip_ct(tmp)) {
 				nf_ct_put(tmp);
 				continue;
@@ -1775,6 +1787,16 @@ init_conntrack(struct net *net, struct nf_conn *tmpl,
 	if (!exp)
 		__nf_ct_try_assign_helper(ct, tmpl, GFP_ATOMIC);
 
+	/* Other CPU might have obtained a pointer to this object before it was
+	 * released.  Because refcount is 0, refcount_inc_not_zero() will fail.
+	 *
+	 * After refcount_set(1) it will succeed; ensure that zeroing of
+	 * ct->status and the correct ct->net pointer are visible; else other
+	 * core might observe CONFIRMED bit which means the entry is valid and
+	 * in the hash table, but its not (anymore).
+	 */
+	smp_wmb();
+
 	/* Now it is going to be associated with an sk_buff, set refcount to 1. */
 	refcount_set(&ct->ct_general.use, 1);
 
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
index 722af5e309ba..f5905b5201a7 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c
@@ -1203,6 +1203,7 @@ ctnetlink_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
 					   hnnode) {
 			ct = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(h);
 			if (nf_ct_is_expired(ct)) {
+				/* need to defer nf_ct_kill() until lock is released */
 				if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(nf_ct_evict) &&
 				    refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use))
 					nf_ct_evict[i++] = ct;
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
index 6ad7bbc90d38..05895878610c 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c
@@ -306,6 +306,9 @@ static int ct_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
 	if (unlikely(!refcount_inc_not_zero(&ct->ct_general.use)))
 		return 0;
 
+	/* load ->status after refcount increase */
+	smp_acquire__after_ctrl_dep();
+
 	if (nf_ct_should_gc(ct)) {
 		nf_ct_kill(ct);
 		goto release;
-- 
2.30.2

Re: [PATCH net 1/3] netfilter: conntrack: fix crash due to confirmed bit load reordering

[patchwork-bot+netdevbpf]

Hello:

This series was applied to netdev/net.git (master)
by Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>:

On Mon, 11 Jul 2022 11:33:55 +0200 you wrote:
> From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
> 
> Kajetan Puchalski reports crash on ARM, with backtrace of:
> 
> __nf_ct_delete_from_lists
> nf_ct_delete
> early_drop
> __nf_conntrack_alloc
> 
> [...]

Here is the summary with links:
  - [net,1/3] netfilter: conntrack: fix crash due to confirmed bit load reordering
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/0ed8f619b412
  - [net,2/3] netfilter: nf_log: incorrect offset to network header
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/7a847c00eeba
  - [net,3/3] netfilter: nf_tables: replace BUG_ON by element length check
    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/c39ba4de6b0a

You are awesome, thank you!
-- 
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html

[PATCH net 2/3] netfilter: nf_log: incorrect offset to network header

[Pablo Neira Ayuso]

NFPROTO_ARP is expecting to find the ARP header at the network offset.

In the particular case of ARP, HTYPE= field shows the initial bytes of
the ethernet header destination MAC address.

 netdev out: IN= OUT=bridge0 MACSRC=c2:76:e5:71:e1:de MACDST=36:b0:4a:e2:72:ea MACPROTO=0806 ARP HTYPE=14000 PTYPE=0x4ae2 OPCODE=49782

NFPROTO_NETDEV egress hook is also expecting to find the IP headers at
the network offset.

Fixes: 35b9395104d5 ("netfilter: add generic ARP packet logger")
Reported-by: Tom Yan <tom.ty89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
 net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c b/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c
index 77bcb10fc586..cb894f0d63e9 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_log_syslog.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ dump_arp_packet(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 	unsigned int logflags;
 	struct arphdr _arph;
 
-	ah = skb_header_pointer(skb, 0, sizeof(_arph), &_arph);
+	ah = skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff, sizeof(_arph), &_arph);
 	if (!ah) {
 		nf_log_buf_add(m, "TRUNCATED");
 		return;
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ dump_arp_packet(struct nf_log_buf *m,
 	    ah->ar_pln != sizeof(__be32))
 		return;
 
-	ap = skb_header_pointer(skb, sizeof(_arph), sizeof(_arpp), &_arpp);
+	ap = skb_header_pointer(skb, nhoff + sizeof(_arph), sizeof(_arpp), &_arpp);
 	if (!ap) {
 		nf_log_buf_add(m, " INCOMPLETE [%zu bytes]",
 			       skb->len - sizeof(_arph));
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static void nf_log_arp_packet(struct net *net, u_int8_t pf,
 
 	nf_log_dump_packet_common(m, pf, hooknum, skb, in, out, loginfo,
 				  prefix);
-	dump_arp_packet(m, loginfo, skb, 0);
+	dump_arp_packet(m, loginfo, skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
 
 	nf_log_buf_close(m);
 }
@@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static void nf_log_ip_packet(struct net *net, u_int8_t pf,
 	if (in)
 		dump_mac_header(m, loginfo, skb);
 
-	dump_ipv4_packet(net, m, loginfo, skb, 0);
+	dump_ipv4_packet(net, m, loginfo, skb, skb_network_offset(skb));
 
 	nf_log_buf_close(m);
 }
-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH net 3/3] netfilter: nf_tables: replace BUG_ON by element length check

[Pablo Neira Ayuso]

BUG_ON can be triggered from userspace with an element with a large
userdata area. Replace it by length check and return EINVAL instead.
Over time extensions have been growing in size.

Pick a sufficiently old Fixes: tag to propagate this fix.

Fixes: 7d7402642eaf ("netfilter: nf_tables: variable sized set element keys / data")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
 include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 14 +++---
 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c     | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h
index 5c4e5a96a984..64cf655c818c 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h
@@ -657,18 +657,22 @@ static inline void nft_set_ext_prepare(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl)
 	tmpl->len = sizeof(struct nft_set_ext);
 }
 
-static inline void nft_set_ext_add_length(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl, u8 id,
-					  unsigned int len)
+static inline int nft_set_ext_add_length(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl, u8 id,
+					 unsigned int len)
 {
 	tmpl->len	 = ALIGN(tmpl->len, nft_set_ext_types[id].align);
-	BUG_ON(tmpl->len > U8_MAX);
+	if (tmpl->len > U8_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	tmpl->offset[id] = tmpl->len;
 	tmpl->len	+= nft_set_ext_types[id].len + len;
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void nft_set_ext_add(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl, u8 id)
+static inline int nft_set_ext_add(struct nft_set_ext_tmpl *tmpl, u8 id)
 {
-	nft_set_ext_add_length(tmpl, id, 0);
+	return nft_set_ext_add_length(tmpl, id, 0);
 }
 
 static inline void nft_set_ext_init(struct nft_set_ext *ext,
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index d6b59beab3a9..646d5fd53604 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -5833,8 +5833,11 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 	if (!nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY] && !(flags & NFT_SET_ELEM_CATCHALL))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (flags != 0)
-		nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS);
+	if (flags != 0) {
+		err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return err;
+	}
 
 	if (set->flags & NFT_SET_MAP) {
 		if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA] == NULL &&
@@ -5943,7 +5946,9 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto err_set_elem_expr;
 
-		nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY, set->klen);
+		err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY, set->klen);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto err_parse_key;
 	}
 
 	if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END]) {
@@ -5952,22 +5957,31 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto err_parse_key;
 
-		nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END, set->klen);
+		err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END, set->klen);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto err_parse_key_end;
 	}
 
 	if (timeout > 0) {
-		nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPIRATION);
-		if (timeout != set->timeout)
-			nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_TIMEOUT);
+		err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPIRATION);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto err_parse_key_end;
+
+		if (timeout != set->timeout) {
+			err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_TIMEOUT);
+			if (err < 0)
+				goto err_parse_key_end;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (num_exprs) {
 		for (i = 0; i < num_exprs; i++)
 			size += expr_array[i]->ops->size;
 
-		nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPRESSIONS,
-				       sizeof(struct nft_set_elem_expr) +
-				       size);
+		err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_EXPRESSIONS,
+					     sizeof(struct nft_set_elem_expr) + size);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto err_parse_key_end;
 	}
 
 	if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_OBJREF] != NULL) {
@@ -5982,7 +5996,9 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 			err = PTR_ERR(obj);
 			goto err_parse_key_end;
 		}
-		nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_OBJREF);
+		err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_OBJREF);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto err_parse_key_end;
 	}
 
 	if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_DATA] != NULL) {
@@ -6016,7 +6032,9 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 							  NFT_VALIDATE_NEED);
 		}
 
-		nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_DATA, desc.len);
+		err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_DATA, desc.len);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto err_parse_data;
 	}
 
 	/* The full maximum length of userdata can exceed the maximum
@@ -6026,9 +6044,12 @@ static int nft_add_set_elem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 	ulen = 0;
 	if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_USERDATA] != NULL) {
 		ulen = nla_len(nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_USERDATA]);
-		if (ulen > 0)
-			nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_USERDATA,
-					       ulen);
+		if (ulen > 0) {
+			err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_USERDATA,
+						     ulen);
+			if (err < 0)
+				goto err_parse_data;
+		}
 	}
 
 	err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -6256,8 +6277,11 @@ static int nft_del_setelem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 
 	nft_set_ext_prepare(&tmpl);
 
-	if (flags != 0)
-		nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS);
+	if (flags != 0) {
+		err = nft_set_ext_add(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_FLAGS);
+		if (err < 0)
+			return err;
+	}
 
 	if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY]) {
 		err = nft_setelem_parse_key(ctx, set, &elem.key.val,
@@ -6265,16 +6289,20 @@ static int nft_del_setelem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
 
-		nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY, set->klen);
+		err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY, set->klen);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto fail_elem;
 	}
 
 	if (nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END]) {
 		err = nft_setelem_parse_key(ctx, set, &elem.key_end.val,
 					    nla[NFTA_SET_ELEM_KEY_END]);
 		if (err < 0)
-			return err;
+			goto fail_elem;
 
-		nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END, set->klen);
+		err = nft_set_ext_add_length(&tmpl, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END, set->klen);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto fail_elem_key_end;
 	}
 
 	err = -ENOMEM;
@@ -6282,7 +6310,7 @@ static int nft_del_setelem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 				      elem.key_end.val.data, NULL, 0, 0,
 				      GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
 	if (elem.priv == NULL)
-		goto fail_elem;
+		goto fail_elem_key_end;
 
 	ext = nft_set_elem_ext(set, elem.priv);
 	if (flags)
@@ -6306,6 +6334,8 @@ static int nft_del_setelem(struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set,
 	kfree(trans);
 fail_trans:
 	kfree(elem.priv);
+fail_elem_key_end:
+	nft_data_release(&elem.key_end.val, NFT_DATA_VALUE);
 fail_elem:
 	nft_data_release(&elem.key.val, NFT_DATA_VALUE);
 	return err;
-- 
2.30.2