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From: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
To: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>,
	Guohanjun <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next v4 3/4] arm64: mm: add support for page table check
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 10:35:53 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <16a2620e-986a-6a8f-24eb-d0f7e9c91f24@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+CK2bCPrQ=F0jNRxcVZ9f18Rm-kAATO3xFE79TZDoWQ99GC4Q@mail.gmail.com>



On 4/19/22 18:49, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 6:22 AM Anshuman Khandual
> <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4/18/22 09:14, Tong Tiangen wrote:
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK
>>> +static inline bool pte_user_accessible_page(pte_t pte)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pte_present(pte) && (pte_user(pte) || pte_user_exec(pte));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool pmd_user_accessible_page(pmd_t pmd)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pmd_present(pmd) && (pmd_user(pmd) || pmd_user_exec(pmd));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool pud_user_accessible_page(pud_t pud)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pud_present(pud) && pud_user(pud);
>>> +}
>>> +#endif
>> Wondering why check for these page table entry states when init_mm
>> has already being excluded ? Should not user page tables be checked
>> for in entirety for all updates ? what is the rationale for filtering
>> out only pxx_user_access_page entries ?
> 
> The point is to prevent false sharing and memory corruption issues.
> The idea of PTC to be simple and relatively independent  from the MM
> state machine that catches invalid page sharing. I.e. if an R/W anon

Right, this mechanism here is truly interdependent validation, which is
orthogonal to other MM states. Although I was curious, if mm_struct is
not 'init_mm', what percentage of its total page table mapped entries
will be user accessible ? These new helpers only filter out entries that
could potentially create false sharing leading upto memory corruption ?

I am wondering if there is any other way such filtering could have been
applied without adding all these new page table helpers just for page
table check purpose.

> page is accessible by user land, that page can never be mapped into
> another process (internally shared anons are treated as named
> mappings).

Right.

> 
> Therefore, we try not to rely on MM states, and ensure that when a
> page-table entry is accessible by user it meets the required
> assumptions: no false sharing, etc.

Right, filtering reduces the page table entries that needs interception
during update (set/clear), but was just curious is there another way of
doing it, without adding page table check specific helpers on platforms
subscribing PAGE_TABLE_CHECK ?

> 
> For example, one bug that was caught with PTC was where a driver on an
> unload would put memory on a freelist but memory is still mapped in
> user page table.

Should not page's refcount (that it is being used else where) prevented
releases into free list ? But page table check here might just detect
such scenarios even before page gets released.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
To: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>,
	Guohanjun <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next v4 3/4] arm64: mm: add support for page table check
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 10:35:53 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <16a2620e-986a-6a8f-24eb-d0f7e9c91f24@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+CK2bCPrQ=F0jNRxcVZ9f18Rm-kAATO3xFE79TZDoWQ99GC4Q@mail.gmail.com>



On 4/19/22 18:49, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 6:22 AM Anshuman Khandual
> <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4/18/22 09:14, Tong Tiangen wrote:
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK
>>> +static inline bool pte_user_accessible_page(pte_t pte)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pte_present(pte) && (pte_user(pte) || pte_user_exec(pte));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool pmd_user_accessible_page(pmd_t pmd)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pmd_present(pmd) && (pmd_user(pmd) || pmd_user_exec(pmd));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool pud_user_accessible_page(pud_t pud)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pud_present(pud) && pud_user(pud);
>>> +}
>>> +#endif
>> Wondering why check for these page table entry states when init_mm
>> has already being excluded ? Should not user page tables be checked
>> for in entirety for all updates ? what is the rationale for filtering
>> out only pxx_user_access_page entries ?
> 
> The point is to prevent false sharing and memory corruption issues.
> The idea of PTC to be simple and relatively independent  from the MM
> state machine that catches invalid page sharing. I.e. if an R/W anon

Right, this mechanism here is truly interdependent validation, which is
orthogonal to other MM states. Although I was curious, if mm_struct is
not 'init_mm', what percentage of its total page table mapped entries
will be user accessible ? These new helpers only filter out entries that
could potentially create false sharing leading upto memory corruption ?

I am wondering if there is any other way such filtering could have been
applied without adding all these new page table helpers just for page
table check purpose.

> page is accessible by user land, that page can never be mapped into
> another process (internally shared anons are treated as named
> mappings).

Right.

> 
> Therefore, we try not to rely on MM states, and ensure that when a
> page-table entry is accessible by user it meets the required
> assumptions: no false sharing, etc.

Right, filtering reduces the page table entries that needs interception
during update (set/clear), but was just curious is there another way of
doing it, without adding page table check specific helpers on platforms
subscribing PAGE_TABLE_CHECK ?

> 
> For example, one bug that was caught with PTC was where a driver on an
> unload would put memory on a freelist but memory is still mapped in
> user page table.

Should not page's refcount (that it is being used else where) prevented
releases into free list ? But page table check here might just detect
such scenarios even before page gets released.

_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
To: Pasha Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com>
Cc: Tong Tiangen <tongtiangen@huawei.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"maintainer:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)"
	<x86@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Linux ARM <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>,
	Guohanjun <guohanjun@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next v4 3/4] arm64: mm: add support for page table check
Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2022 10:35:53 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <16a2620e-986a-6a8f-24eb-d0f7e9c91f24@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+CK2bCPrQ=F0jNRxcVZ9f18Rm-kAATO3xFE79TZDoWQ99GC4Q@mail.gmail.com>



On 4/19/22 18:49, Pasha Tatashin wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 19, 2022 at 6:22 AM Anshuman Khandual
> <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4/18/22 09:14, Tong Tiangen wrote:
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK
>>> +static inline bool pte_user_accessible_page(pte_t pte)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pte_present(pte) && (pte_user(pte) || pte_user_exec(pte));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool pmd_user_accessible_page(pmd_t pmd)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pmd_present(pmd) && (pmd_user(pmd) || pmd_user_exec(pmd));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static inline bool pud_user_accessible_page(pud_t pud)
>>> +{
>>> +     return pud_present(pud) && pud_user(pud);
>>> +}
>>> +#endif
>> Wondering why check for these page table entry states when init_mm
>> has already being excluded ? Should not user page tables be checked
>> for in entirety for all updates ? what is the rationale for filtering
>> out only pxx_user_access_page entries ?
> 
> The point is to prevent false sharing and memory corruption issues.
> The idea of PTC to be simple and relatively independent  from the MM
> state machine that catches invalid page sharing. I.e. if an R/W anon

Right, this mechanism here is truly interdependent validation, which is
orthogonal to other MM states. Although I was curious, if mm_struct is
not 'init_mm', what percentage of its total page table mapped entries
will be user accessible ? These new helpers only filter out entries that
could potentially create false sharing leading upto memory corruption ?

I am wondering if there is any other way such filtering could have been
applied without adding all these new page table helpers just for page
table check purpose.

> page is accessible by user land, that page can never be mapped into
> another process (internally shared anons are treated as named
> mappings).

Right.

> 
> Therefore, we try not to rely on MM states, and ensure that when a
> page-table entry is accessible by user it meets the required
> assumptions: no false sharing, etc.

Right, filtering reduces the page table entries that needs interception
during update (set/clear), but was just curious is there another way of
doing it, without adding page table check specific helpers on platforms
subscribing PAGE_TABLE_CHECK ?

> 
> For example, one bug that was caught with PTC was where a driver on an
> unload would put memory on a freelist but memory is still mapped in
> user page table.

Should not page's refcount (that it is being used else where) prevented
releases into free list ? But page table check here might just detect
such scenarios even before page gets released.

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-20  5:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-18  3:44 [PATCH -next v4 0/4]mm: page_table_check: add support on arm64 and riscv Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44 ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44 ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44 ` [PATCH -next v4 1/4] mm: page_table_check: move pxx_user_accessible_page into x86 Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-19  9:29   ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19  9:29     ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19  9:29     ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-20  6:44     ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-20  6:44       ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-20  6:44       ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-20 16:44       ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-20 16:44         ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-20 16:44         ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-21  3:05         ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-21  3:05           ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-21  3:05           ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-21  3:44           ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-21  3:44             ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-21  3:44             ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-21  6:27             ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-21  6:27               ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-21  6:27               ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44 ` [PATCH -next v4 2/4] mm: page_table_check: add hooks to public helpers Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44 ` [PATCH -next v4 3/4] arm64: mm: add support for page table check Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  9:28   ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-18  9:28     ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-18  9:28     ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-18 15:47     ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18 15:47       ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18 15:47       ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18 16:20       ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-18 16:20         ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-18 16:20         ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-19  7:25         ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19  7:25           ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19  7:25           ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19  7:10       ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19  7:10         ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19  7:10         ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19  8:52         ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-19  8:52           ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-19  8:52           ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-19 10:22   ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19 10:22     ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19 10:22     ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-19 13:19     ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-19 13:19       ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-19 13:19       ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-20  5:05       ` Anshuman Khandual [this message]
2022-04-20  5:05         ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-20  5:05         ` Anshuman Khandual
2022-04-20 17:08         ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-20 17:08           ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-20 17:08           ` Pasha Tatashin
2022-04-18  3:44 ` [PATCH -next v4 4/4] riscv: " Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  3:44   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  6:12 ` [PATCH -next v4 0/4]mm: page_table_check: add support on arm64 and riscv Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  6:12   ` Tong Tiangen
2022-04-18  6:12   ` Tong Tiangen

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