[0/6] 2.6.33.18-longterm review

[0/6] 2.6.33.18-longterm review

[Greg KH]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.33.18 release.
There are 6 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let us know.  If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and
wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.

Responses should be made by Monday, August 15, 2011, 20:00:00 UTC.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-review/patch-2.6.33.19-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

 Makefile                                 |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c          |    6 +-
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c    |    2 +-
 crypto/md5.c                             |   92 +--------
 drivers/char/random.c                    |  334 +-----------------------------
 include/linux/cryptohash.h               |    5 +
 include/linux/random.h                   |   11 -
 include/net/secure_seq.h                 |   20 ++
 lib/Makefile                             |    2 +-
 lib/md5.c                                |   95 +++++++++
 net/core/Makefile                        |    2 +-
 net/core/secure_seq.c                    |  184 ++++++++++++++++
 net/dccp/ipv4.c                          |    1 +
 net/dccp/ipv6.c                          |    9 +-
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c               |    1 +
 net/ipv4/inetpeer.c                      |    1 +
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c |    1 +
 net/ipv4/route.c                         |    1 +
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c                      |    1 +
 net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c              |    1 +
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c                      |    1 +
 sound/core/timer.c                       |    2 +
 sound/usb/caiaq/input.c                  |    2 +-
 23 files changed, 333 insertions(+), 443 deletions(-)

[1/6] crypto: Move md5_transform to lib/md5.c

[Greg KH]

2.6.33-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

We are going to use this for TCP/IP sequence number and fragment ID
generation.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
 crypto/md5.c               |   92 -------------------------------------------
 include/linux/cryptohash.h |    5 ++
 lib/Makefile               |    2 
 lib/md5.c                  |   95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 92 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 lib/md5.c

--- a/crypto/md5.c
+++ b/crypto/md5.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 
 #define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE		16
@@ -27,103 +28,12 @@
 #define MD5_BLOCK_WORDS		16
 #define MD5_HASH_WORDS		4
 
-#define F1(x, y, z)	(z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
-#define F2(x, y, z)	F1(z, x, y)
-#define F3(x, y, z)	(x ^ y ^ z)
-#define F4(x, y, z)	(y ^ (x | ~z))
-
-#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
-	(w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
-
 struct md5_ctx {
 	u32 hash[MD5_HASH_WORDS];
 	u32 block[MD5_BLOCK_WORDS];
 	u64 byte_count;
 };
 
-static void md5_transform(u32 *hash, u32 const *in)
-{
-	u32 a, b, c, d;
-
-	a = hash[0];
-	b = hash[1];
-	c = hash[2];
-	d = hash[3];
-
-	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
-	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
-	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
-	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
-	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
-	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
-	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
-	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
-	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
-	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
-	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
-	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
-	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
-	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
-	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
-	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
-
-	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
-	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
-	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
-	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
-	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
-	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
-	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
-	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
-	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
-	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
-	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
-	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
-	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
-	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
-	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
-	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
-
-	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
-	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
-	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
-	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
-	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
-	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
-	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
-	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
-	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
-	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
-	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
-	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
-	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
-	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
-	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
-	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
-
-	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
-	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
-	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
-	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
-	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
-	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
-	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
-	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
-	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
-	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
-	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
-	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
-	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
-	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
-	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
-	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
-
-	hash[0] += a;
-	hash[1] += b;
-	hash[2] += c;
-	hash[3] += d;
-}
-
 /* XXX: this stuff can be optimized */
 static inline void le32_to_cpu_array(u32 *buf, unsigned int words)
 {
--- a/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+++ b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
@@ -8,6 +8,11 @@
 void sha_init(__u32 *buf);
 void sha_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *W);
 
+#define MD5_DIGEST_WORDS 4
+#define MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES 64
+
+void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in);
+
 __u32 half_md4_transform(__u32 buf[4], __u32 const in[8]);
 
 #endif
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ endif
 lib-y := ctype.o string.o vsprintf.o cmdline.o \
 	 rbtree.o radix-tree.o dump_stack.o \
 	 idr.o int_sqrt.o extable.o prio_tree.o \
-	 sha1.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
+	 sha1.o md5.o irq_regs.o reciprocal_div.o argv_split.o \
 	 proportions.o prio_heap.o ratelimit.o show_mem.o \
 	 is_single_threaded.o plist.o decompress.o flex_array.o
 
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+
+#define F1(x, y, z)	(z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z)	F1(z, x, y)
+#define F3(x, y, z)	(x ^ y ^ z)
+#define F4(x, y, z)	(y ^ (x | ~z))
+
+#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, in, s) \
+	(w += f(x, y, z) + in, w = (w<<s | w>>(32-s)) + x)
+
+void md5_transform(__u32 *hash, __u32 const *in)
+{
+	u32 a, b, c, d;
+
+	a = hash[0];
+	b = hash[1];
+	c = hash[2];
+	d = hash[3];
+
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478, 7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070db, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0faf, 7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8, 7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122, 7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
+
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562, 5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340, 9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105d, 5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453, 9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6, 5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6, 9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905, 5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8, 9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
+
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942, 4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44, 4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6, 4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039, 4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
+
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244, 6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3, 6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4f, 6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82, 6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
+
+	hash[0] += a;
+	hash[1] += b;
+	hash[2] += c;
+	hash[3] += d;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(md5_transform);

[2/6] net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.

[Greg KH]

2.6.33-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>

Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.

MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)

Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation.  So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed.  We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.

For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.

Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
---
 drivers/char/random.c                    |  334 -------------------------------
 include/linux/random.h                   |   11 -
 include/net/secure_seq.h                 |   20 +
 net/core/Makefile                        |    2 
 net/core/secure_seq.c                    |  184 +++++++++++++++++
 net/dccp/ipv4.c                          |    1 
 net/dccp/ipv6.c                          |    9 
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c               |    1 
 net/ipv4/inetpeer.c                      |    1 
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c |    1 
 net/ipv4/route.c                         |    1 
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c                      |    1 
 net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c              |    1 
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c                      |    1 
 14 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 345 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/net/secure_seq.h
 create mode 100644 net/core/secure_seq.c

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1295,330 +1295,14 @@ ctl_table random_table[] = {
 };
 #endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
 
-/********************************************************************
- *
- * Random functions for networking
- *
- ********************************************************************/
+static u32 random_int_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
 
-/*
- * TCP initial sequence number picking.  This uses the random number
- * generator to pick an initial secret value.  This value is hashed
- * along with the TCP endpoint information to provide a unique
- * starting point for each pair of TCP endpoints.  This defeats
- * attacks which rely on guessing the initial TCP sequence number.
- * This algorithm was suggested by Steve Bellovin.
- *
- * Using a very strong hash was taking an appreciable amount of the total
- * TCP connection establishment time, so this is a weaker hash,
- * compensated for by changing the secret periodically.
- */
-
-/* F, G and H are basic MD4 functions: selection, majority, parity */
-#define F(x, y, z) ((z) ^ ((x) & ((y) ^ (z))))
-#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) + (((x) ^ (y)) & (z)))
-#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
-
-/*
- * The generic round function.  The application is so specific that
- * we don't bother protecting all the arguments with parens, as is generally
- * good macro practice, in favor of extra legibility.
- * Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation
- */
-#define ROUND(f, a, b, c, d, x, s)	\
-	(a += f(b, c, d) + x, a = (a << s) | (a >> (32 - s)))
-#define K1 0
-#define K2 013240474631UL
-#define K3 015666365641UL
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-
-static __u32 twothirdsMD4Transform(__u32 const buf[4], __u32 const in[12])
+static int __init random_int_secret_init(void)
 {
-	__u32 a = buf[0], b = buf[1], c = buf[2], d = buf[3];
-
-	/* Round 1 */
-	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + K1,  3);
-	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + K1,  7);
-	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + K1, 11);
-	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + K1, 19);
-	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K1,  3);
-	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + K1,  7);
-	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + K1, 11);
-	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K1, 19);
-	ROUND(F, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + K1,  3);
-	ROUND(F, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + K1,  7);
-	ROUND(F, c, d, a, b, in[10] + K1, 11);
-	ROUND(F, b, c, d, a, in[11] + K1, 19);
-
-	/* Round 2 */
-	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + K2,  3);
-	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 3] + K2,  5);
-	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 5] + K2,  9);
-	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + K2, 13);
-	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K2,  3);
-	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[11] + K2,  5);
-	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 0] + K2,  9);
-	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K2, 13);
-	ROUND(G, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + K2,  3);
-	ROUND(G, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + K2,  5);
-	ROUND(G, c, d, a, b, in[ 8] + K2,  9);
-	ROUND(G, b, c, d, a, in[10] + K2, 13);
-
-	/* Round 3 */
-	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 3] + K3,  3);
-	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 7] + K3,  9);
-	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[11] + K3, 11);
-	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 2] + K3, 15);
-	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 6] + K3,  3);
-	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[10] + K3,  9);
-	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 1] + K3, 11);
-	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 5] + K3, 15);
-	ROUND(H, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + K3,  3);
-	ROUND(H, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + K3,  9);
-	ROUND(H, c, d, a, b, in[ 4] + K3, 11);
-	ROUND(H, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + K3, 15);
-
-	return buf[1] + b; /* "most hashed" word */
-	/* Alternative: return sum of all words? */
-}
-#endif
-
-#undef ROUND
-#undef F
-#undef G
-#undef H
-#undef K1
-#undef K2
-#undef K3
-
-/* This should not be decreased so low that ISNs wrap too fast. */
-#define REKEY_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
-/*
- * Bit layout of the tcp sequence numbers (before adding current time):
- * bit 24-31: increased after every key exchange
- * bit 0-23: hash(source,dest)
- *
- * The implementation is similar to the algorithm described
- * in the Appendix of RFC 1185, except that
- * - it uses a 1 MHz clock instead of a 250 kHz clock
- * - it performs a rekey every 5 minutes, which is equivalent
- * 	to a (source,dest) tulple dependent forward jump of the
- * 	clock by 0..2^(HASH_BITS+1)
- *
- * Thus the average ISN wraparound time is 68 minutes instead of
- * 4.55 hours.
- *
- * SMP cleanup and lock avoidance with poor man's RCU.
- * 			Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
- *
- */
-#define COUNT_BITS 8
-#define COUNT_MASK ((1 << COUNT_BITS) - 1)
-#define HASH_BITS 24
-#define HASH_MASK ((1 << HASH_BITS) - 1)
-
-static struct keydata {
-	__u32 count; /* already shifted to the final position */
-	__u32 secret[12];
-} ____cacheline_aligned ip_keydata[2];
-
-static unsigned int ip_cnt;
-
-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work);
-
-static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(rekey_work, rekey_seq_generator);
-
-/*
- * Lock avoidance:
- * The ISN generation runs lockless - it's just a hash over random data.
- * State changes happen every 5 minutes when the random key is replaced.
- * Synchronization is performed by having two copies of the hash function
- * state and rekey_seq_generator always updates the inactive copy.
- * The copy is then activated by updating ip_cnt.
- * The implementation breaks down if someone blocks the thread
- * that processes SYN requests for more than 5 minutes. Should never
- * happen, and even if that happens only a not perfectly compliant
- * ISN is generated, nothing fatal.
- */
-static void rekey_seq_generator(struct work_struct *work)
-{
-	struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[1 ^ (ip_cnt & 1)];
-
-	get_random_bytes(keyptr->secret, sizeof(keyptr->secret));
-	keyptr->count = (ip_cnt & COUNT_MASK) << HASH_BITS;
-	smp_wmb();
-	ip_cnt++;
-	schedule_delayed_work(&rekey_work,
-			      round_jiffies_relative(REKEY_INTERVAL));
-}
-
-static inline struct keydata *get_keyptr(void)
-{
-	struct keydata *keyptr = &ip_keydata[ip_cnt & 1];
-
-	smp_rmb();
-
-	return keyptr;
-}
-
-static __init int seqgen_init(void)
-{
-	rekey_seq_generator(NULL);
+	get_random_bytes(random_int_secret, sizeof(random_int_secret));
 	return 0;
 }
-late_initcall(seqgen_init);
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
-				   __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
-{
-	__u32 seq;
-	__u32 hash[12];
-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
-	/* The procedure is the same as for IPv4, but addresses are longer.
-	 * Thus we must use twothirdsMD4Transform.
-	 */
-
-	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
-	hash[4] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
-	memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
-
-	seq = twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash) & HASH_MASK;
-	seq += keyptr->count;
-
-	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
-
-	return seq;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
-#endif
-
-/*  The code below is shamelessly stolen from secure_tcp_sequence_number().
- *  All blames to Andrey V. Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>.
- */
-__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
-{
-	struct keydata *keyptr;
-	__u32 hash[4];
-
-	keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
-	/*
-	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each IP destination.
-	 *  The dest ip address is placed in the starting vector,
-	 *  which is then hashed with random data.
-	 */
-	hash[0] = (__force __u32)daddr;
-	hash[1] = keyptr->secret[9];
-	hash[2] = keyptr->secret[10];
-	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
-	return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_INET
-
-__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
-				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
-{
-	__u32 seq;
-	__u32 hash[4];
-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
-	/*
-	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each TCP connection endpoints
-	 *  (saddr, daddr, sport, dport).
-	 *  Note that the words are placed into the starting vector, which is
-	 *  then mixed with a partial MD4 over random data.
-	 */
-	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
-	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
-	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
-	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
-	seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret) & HASH_MASK;
-	seq += keyptr->count;
-	/*
-	 *	As close as possible to RFC 793, which
-	 *	suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
-	 *	Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
-	 *	For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
-	 *	For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
-	 *	we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
-	 *	overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
-	 *	Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
-	 */
-	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6;
-
-	return seq;
-}
-
-/* Generate secure starting point for ephemeral IPV4 transport port search */
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
-{
-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-	u32 hash[4];
-
-	/*
-	 *  Pick a unique starting offset for each ephemeral port search
-	 *  (saddr, daddr, dport) and 48bits of random data.
-	 */
-	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
-	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
-	hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ keyptr->secret[10];
-	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
-	return half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
-			       __be16 dport)
-{
-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-	u32 hash[12];
-
-	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
-	hash[4] = (__force u32)dport;
-	memcpy(&hash[5], keyptr->secret, sizeof(__u32) * 7);
-
-	return twothirdsMD4Transform((const __u32 *)daddr, hash);
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
-/* Similar to secure_tcp_sequence_number but generate a 48 bit value
- * bit's 32-47 increase every key exchange
- *       0-31  hash(source, dest)
- */
-u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
-				__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
-{
-	u64 seq;
-	__u32 hash[4];
-	struct keydata *keyptr = get_keyptr();
-
-	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
-	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
-	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
-	hash[3] = keyptr->secret[11];
-
-	seq = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
-	seq |= ((u64)keyptr->count) << (32 - HASH_BITS);
-
-	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
-	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
-
-	return seq;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
-#endif
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_INET */
-
+late_initcall(random_int_secret_init);
 
 /*
  * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
@@ -1626,17 +1310,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_numbe
  * value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
  * depleting entropy is too high
  */
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [4], get_random_int_hash);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
 unsigned int get_random_int(void)
 {
-	struct keydata *keyptr;
 	__u32 *hash = get_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
-	int ret;
+	unsigned int ret;
 
-	keyptr = get_keyptr();
 	hash[0] += current->pid + jiffies + get_cycles();
-
-	ret = half_md4_transform(hash, keyptr->secret);
+	md5_transform(hash, random_int_secret);
+	ret = hash[0];
 	put_cpu_var(get_random_int_hash);
 
 	return ret;
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -53,17 +53,6 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 void generate_random_uuid(unsigned char uuid_out[16]);
 
-extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
-extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
-extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
-				      __be16 dport);
-extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
-					__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
-extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
-					  __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
-extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
-				       __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
-
 #ifndef MODULE
 extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
 #endif
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#ifndef _NET_SECURE_SEQ
+#define _NET_SECURE_SEQ
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+extern __u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr);
+extern __u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4]);
+extern u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+extern u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+				      __be16 dport);
+extern __u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+					__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+extern __u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+					  __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+extern u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+				       __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+extern u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+					 __be16 sport, __be16 dport);
+
+#endif /* _NET_SECURE_SEQ */
--- a/net/core/Makefile
+++ b/net/core/Makefile
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-y := sock.o request_sock.o skbuff.o iovec.o datagram.o stream.o scm.o \
-	 gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o
+	 gen_stats.o gen_estimator.o net_namespace.o secure_seq.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl_net_core.o
 
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
+#include <linux/ktime.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
+
+static u32 net_secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4] ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+static int __init net_secret_init(void)
+{
+	get_random_bytes(net_secret, sizeof(net_secret));
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(net_secret_init);
+
+static u32 seq_scale(u32 seq)
+{
+	/*
+	 *	As close as possible to RFC 793, which
+	 *	suggests using a 250 kHz clock.
+	 *	Further reading shows this assumes 2 Mb/s networks.
+	 *	For 10 Mb/s Ethernet, a 1 MHz clock is appropriate.
+	 *	For 10 Gb/s Ethernet, a 1 GHz clock should be ok, but
+	 *	we also need to limit the resolution so that the u32 seq
+	 *	overlaps less than one time per MSL (2 minutes).
+	 *	Choosing a clock of 64 ns period is OK. (period of 274 s)
+	 */
+	return seq + (ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real()) >> 6);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+__u32 secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+				   __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
+	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+	u32 i;
+
+	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
+	secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
+		(((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
+	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
+		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
+
+	md5_transform(hash, secret);
+
+	return seq_scale(hash[0]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_sequence_number);
+
+u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+			       __be16 dport)
+{
+	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
+	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+	u32 i;
+
+	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + (__force u32) daddr[i];
+	secret[4] = net_secret[4] + (__force u32)dport;
+	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
+		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
+
+	md5_transform(hash, secret);
+
+	return hash[0];
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INET
+__u32 secure_ip_id(__be32 daddr)
+{
+	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+
+	hash[0] = (__force __u32) daddr;
+	hash[1] = net_secret[13];
+	hash[2] = net_secret[14];
+	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+
+	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+	return hash[0];
+}
+
+__u32 secure_ipv6_id(const __be32 daddr[4])
+{
+	__u32 hash[4];
+
+	memcpy(hash, daddr, 16);
+	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+	return hash[0];
+}
+
+__u32 secure_tcp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+				 __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+
+	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+
+	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+	return seq_scale(hash[0]);
+}
+
+u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+{
+	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+
+	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+	hash[2] = (__force u32)dport ^ net_secret[14];
+	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+
+	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+	return hash[0];
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP) || defined(CONFIG_IP_DCCP_MODULE)
+u64 secure_dccp_sequence_number(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
+				__be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+	u64 seq;
+
+	hash[0] = (__force u32)saddr;
+	hash[1] = (__force u32)daddr;
+	hash[2] = ((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport;
+	hash[3] = net_secret[15];
+
+	md5_transform(hash, net_secret);
+
+	seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
+	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
+
+	return seq;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccp_sequence_number);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+u64 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
+				  __be16 sport, __be16 dport)
+{
+	u32 secret[MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4];
+	u32 hash[MD5_DIGEST_WORDS];
+	u64 seq;
+	u32 i;
+
+	memcpy(hash, saddr, 16);
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		secret[i] = net_secret[i] + daddr[i];
+	secret[4] = net_secret[4] +
+		(((__force u16)sport << 16) + (__force u16)dport);
+	for (i = 5; i < MD5_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4; i++)
+		secret[i] = net_secret[i];
+
+	md5_transform(hash, secret);
+
+	seq = hash[0] | (((u64)hash[1]) << 32);
+	seq += ktime_to_ns(ktime_get_real());
+	seq &= (1ull << 48) - 1;
+
+	return seq;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_dccpv6_sequence_number);
+#endif
+#endif
--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
 #include <net/tcp_states.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 
 #include "ackvec.h"
 #include "ccid.h"
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <net/transp_v6.h>
 #include <net/ip6_checksum.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 
 #include "dccp.h"
 #include "ipv6.h"
@@ -69,13 +70,7 @@ static inline void dccp_v6_send_check(st
 	dh->dccph_checksum = dccp_v6_csum_finish(skb, &np->saddr, &np->daddr);
 }
 
-static inline __u32 secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(__be32 *saddr, __be32 *daddr,
-						  __be16 sport, __be16 dport   )
-{
-	return secure_tcpv6_sequence_number(saddr, daddr, sport, dport);
-}
-
-static inline __u32 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static inline __u64 dccp_v6_init_sequence(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return secure_dccpv6_sequence_number(ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32,
 					     ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32,
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
 #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 
 /*
--- a/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inetpeer.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/net.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 #include <net/inetpeer.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 
 /*
  *  Theory of operations.
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/ip.h>
 
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.h>
 #include <net/netfilter/nf_nat_rule.h>
--- a/net/ipv4/route.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/route.c
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #endif
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 
 #define RT_FL_TOS(oldflp) \
     ((u32)(oldflp->fl4_tos & (IPTOS_RT_MASK | RTO_ONLINK)))
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
 #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/netdma.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 
 #include <linux/inet.h>
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
 #include <net/inet_hashtables.h>
 #include <net/inet6_hashtables.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>
 
 int __inet6_hash(struct sock *sk, struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include <net/timewait_sock.h>
 #include <net/netdma.h>
 #include <net/inet_common.h>
+#include <net/secure_seq.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 

[3/6] ALSA: timer - Fix Oops at closing slave timer

[Greg KH]

2.6.33-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

commit 0584ffa548b6e59aceb027112f23a55f0133400e upstream.

A slave-timer instance has no timer reference, and this results in
NULL-dereference at stopping the timer, typically called at closing
the device.

Reference: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=40682

Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 sound/core/timer.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/sound/core/timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/timer.c
@@ -530,6 +530,8 @@ int snd_timer_stop(struct snd_timer_inst
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 	timer = timeri->timer;
+	if (!timer)
+		return -EINVAL;
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&timer->lock, flags);
 	timeri->cticks = timeri->ticks;
 	timeri->pticks = 0;

[4/6] ALSA: snd-usb-caiaq: Fix keymap for RigKontrol3

[Greg KH]

2.6.33-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>

commit f4389489b5cbe60b3441869c68bb4afe760969c4 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Renato <naretobh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 sound/usb/caiaq/input.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
+++ b/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static unsigned short keycode_ak1[] =  {
 static unsigned short keycode_rk2[] =  { KEY_1, KEY_2, KEY_3, KEY_4,
 					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7 };
 static unsigned short keycode_rk3[] =  { KEY_1, KEY_2, KEY_3, KEY_4,
-					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7, KEY_5, KEY_6 };
+					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7, KEY_8, KEY_9 };
 
 static unsigned short keycode_kore[] = {
 	KEY_FN_F1,      /* "menu"               */

[5/6] powerpc: Fix device tree claim code

[Greg KH]

2.6.33-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>

commit 966728dd88b4026ec58fee169ccceaeaf56ef120 upstream.

I have a box that fails in OF during boot with:

DEFAULT CATCH!, exception-handler=fff00400
at   %SRR0: 49424d2c4c6f6768   %SRR1: 800000004000b002

ie "IBM,Logh". OF got corrupted with a device tree string.

Looking at make_room and alloc_up, we claim the first chunk (1 MB)
but we never claim any more. mem_end is always set to alloc_top
which is the top of our available address space, guaranteeing we will
never call alloc_up and claim more memory.

Also alloc_up wasn't setting alloc_bottom to the bottom of the
available address space.

This doesn't help the box to boot, but we at least fail with
an obvious error. We could relocate the device tree in a future
patch.

Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ static unsigned long __init alloc_up(uns
 	}
 	if (addr == 0)
 		return 0;
-	RELOC(alloc_bottom) = addr;
+	RELOC(alloc_bottom) = addr + size;
 
 	prom_debug(" -> %x\n", addr);
 	prom_debug("  alloc_bottom : %x\n", RELOC(alloc_bottom));
@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ static void __init *make_room(unsigned l
 		chunk = alloc_up(room, 0);
 		if (chunk == 0)
 			prom_panic("No memory for flatten_device_tree (claim failed)");
-		*mem_end = RELOC(alloc_top);
+		*mem_end = chunk + room;
 	}
 
 	ret = (void *)*mem_start;
@@ -1923,7 +1923,7 @@ static void __init flatten_device_tree(v
 	mem_start = (unsigned long)alloc_up(room, PAGE_SIZE);
 	if (mem_start == 0)
 		prom_panic("Can't allocate initial device-tree chunk\n");
-	mem_end = RELOC(alloc_top);
+	mem_end = mem_start + room;
 
 	/* Get root of tree */
 	root = call_prom("peer", 1, 1, (phandle)0);

[6/6] powerpc: pseries: Fix kexec on machines with more than 4TB of RAM

[Greg KH]

2.6.33-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>

commit bed9a31527af8ff3dfbad62a1a42815cef4baab7 upstream.

On a box with 8TB of RAM the MMU hashtable is 64GB in size. That
means we have 4G PTEs. pSeries_lpar_hptab_clear was using a signed
int to store the index which will overflow at 2G.

Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Acked-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static void pSeries_lpar_hptab_clear(voi
 		unsigned long ptel;
 	} ptes[4];
 	long lpar_rc;
-	int i, j;
+	unsigned long i, j;
 
 	/* Read in batches of 4,
 	 * invalidate only valid entries not in the VRMA

Re: [0/6] 2.6.33.18-longterm review

[Thomas Backlund]

Greg KH skrev 13.8.2011 00:10:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.33.18 release.
> There are 6 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let us know.  If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and
> wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.
>
> Responses should be made by Monday, August 15, 2011, 20:00:00 UTC.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-review/patch-2.6.33.19-rc1.gz

URL is wrong (and patch version above is wrong too)...

Correct one is:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/longterm-review/patch-2.6.33.18-rc1.gz

--
Thomas

[0/6] 2.6.32.45-longterm review

[Greg KH]

This is the start of the longterm review cycle for the 2.6.32.45 release.
There are 6 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let us know.  If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and
wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.

Responses should be made by Monday, August 15, 2011, 20:00:00 UTC.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/longterm-review/patch-2.6.32.45-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

 Makefile                                 |    2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/prom_init.c          |    6 +-
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lpar.c    |    2 +-
 crypto/md5.c                             |   92 +--------
 drivers/char/random.c                    |  334 +-----------------------------
 include/linux/cryptohash.h               |    5 +
 include/linux/random.h                   |   11 -
 include/net/secure_seq.h                 |   20 ++
 lib/Makefile                             |    2 +-
 lib/md5.c                                |   95 +++++++++
 net/core/Makefile                        |    2 +-
 net/core/secure_seq.c                    |  184 ++++++++++++++++
 net/dccp/ipv4.c                          |    1 +
 net/dccp/ipv6.c                          |    9 +-
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c               |    1 +
 net/ipv4/inetpeer.c                      |    1 +
 net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c |    1 +
 net/ipv4/route.c                         |    1 +
 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c                      |    1 +
 net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c              |    1 +
 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c                      |    1 +
 sound/core/timer.c                       |    2 +
 sound/usb/caiaq/input.c                  |    2 +-
 23 files changed, 333 insertions(+), 443 deletions(-)

[4/6] ALSA: snd-usb-caiaq: Fix keymap for RigKontrol3

[Greg KH]

2.6.32-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let us know.

------------------

From: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>

commit f4389489b5cbe60b3441869c68bb4afe760969c4 upstream.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <zonque@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Renato <naretobh@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

---
 sound/usb/caiaq/input.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
+++ b/sound/usb/caiaq/input.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static unsigned short keycode_ak1[] =  {
 static unsigned short keycode_rk2[] =  { KEY_1, KEY_2, KEY_3, KEY_4,
 					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7 };
 static unsigned short keycode_rk3[] =  { KEY_1, KEY_2, KEY_3, KEY_4,
-					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7, KEY_5, KEY_6 };
+					 KEY_5, KEY_6, KEY_7, KEY_8, KEY_9 };
 
 static unsigned short keycode_kore[] = {
 	KEY_FN_F1,      /* "menu"               */