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From: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
To: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Cc: systemd Mailing List <systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	SELinux-NSA <SELinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [systemd-devel] [PATCH] selinux: Only attempt to load policy exactly once, in the real root
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2014 18:47:49 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140220185250.6F0E0680112@frontend2.nyi.mail.srv.osa> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140220183643.GB24876@tango.0pointer.de>

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On Thu, Feb 20, 2014 at 1:36 PM, Lennart Poettering 
<lennart@poettering.net> wrote:
> On Thu, 20.02.14 18:17, Colin Walters (walters@verbum.org) wrote:
> 
> Hmm, maybe a simple check access("/etc/selinux/", F_OK) would be 
> enough?
> There's no point in trying to initialized SELinux if that dir does not
> exist, right? Then we could simply bypass the whole thing...
> 

Beyond what Eric said, I also think that libselinux should continue to 
contain all of the key logic for whether or not SELinux is enabled and 
how to behave.

The current *API* seems OK in having the two return values of an error 
code and an enforcing flag.

The only thing libselinux can't know is:
1) Whether we're inside an initramfs right now
2) Whether or not the OS vendor expects policy to be found in the real 
root or the initramfs

So those bits of logic make sense to me in systemd, although there is 
an argument for #2 living in libselinux.




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  reply	other threads:[~2014-02-20 18:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-02-20 15:42 [PATCH] selinux: Only attempt to load policy exactly once, in the real root Colin Walters
2014-02-20 18:06 ` Stephen Smalley
2014-02-20 18:17   ` Colin Walters
2014-02-20 18:36     ` [systemd-devel] " Lennart Poettering
2014-02-20 18:47       ` Colin Walters [this message]
2014-02-20 18:50       ` Eric Paris
2014-02-20 19:26         ` Lennart Poettering
2014-02-20 19:27           ` Eric Paris
2014-02-20 19:45             ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-02-20 20:52               ` Colin Walters
2014-02-20 21:10                 ` Eric Paris
2014-02-20 21:21                   ` Colin Walters
2014-02-20 23:44                     ` Colin Walters
2014-02-21  2:33                       ` Lennart Poettering
2014-02-20 18:51     ` Stephen Smalley

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