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From: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
To: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: "kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu" <kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] arm: KVM: force execution of HCPTR access on VM exit
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2015 15:35:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150409133540.GO4715@cbox> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55256282.40606@arm.com>

On Wed, Apr 08, 2015 at 06:16:50PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 08/04/15 12:40, Christoffer Dall wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 10:59:43AM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> >> On VM entry, we disable access to the VFP registers in order to
> >> perform a lazy save/restore of these registers.
> >>
> >> On VM exit, we restore access, test if we did enable them before,
> >> and save/restore the guest/host registers if necessary. In this
> >> sequence, the FPEXC register is always accessed, irrespective
> >> of the trapping configuration.
> >>
> >> If the guest didn't touch the VFP registers, then the HCPTR access
> >> has now enabled such access, but we're missing a barrier to ensure
> >> architectural execution of the new HCPTR configuration. If the HCPTR
> >> access has been delayed/reordered, the subsequent access to FPEXC
> >> will cause a trap, which we aren't prepared to handle at all.
> >>
> >> The fix is to introduce a barrier that only takes place if the
> >> guest hasn't accessed its view of the VFP registers, making
> >> the access to FPEXC safe.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> >> ---
> >>  arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S | 7 +++++--
> >>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S b/arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S
> >> index 79caf79..3ac7aca 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S
> >> +++ b/arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S
> >> @@ -175,10 +175,13 @@ __kvm_vcpu_return:
> >>  #ifdef CONFIG_VFPv3
> >>  	@ Save floating point registers we if let guest use them.
> >>  	tst	r2, #(HCPTR_TCP(10) | HCPTR_TCP(11))
> >> -	bne	after_vfp_restore
> >> +	beq	1f
> >> +
> >> +	isb	@ Force execution of HCPTR if we've just reenabled VFP access
> >> +	b	after_vfp_restore
> >>  
> >>  	@ Switch VFP/NEON hardware state to the host's
> >> -	add	r7, vcpu, #VCPU_VFP_GUEST
> >> +1:	add	r7, vcpu, #VCPU_VFP_GUEST
> >>  	store_vfp_state r7
> >>  	add	r7, vcpu, #VCPU_VFP_HOST
> >>  	ldr	r7, [r7]
> >> -- 
> >> 2.1.4
> >>
> > 
> > Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
> 
> Thanks (I must admit I completely forgot the existence of this patch...).
> 
> I guess we can queue that for -rc1, with a Cc to stable...
> 
yes, I tested it on TC2 (both A15 and A7) and it works like a charm.

-Christoffer

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: christoffer.dall@linaro.org (Christoffer Dall)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH] arm: KVM: force execution of HCPTR access on VM exit
Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2015 15:35:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150409133540.GO4715@cbox> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55256282.40606@arm.com>

On Wed, Apr 08, 2015 at 06:16:50PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On 08/04/15 12:40, Christoffer Dall wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 16, 2015 at 10:59:43AM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> >> On VM entry, we disable access to the VFP registers in order to
> >> perform a lazy save/restore of these registers.
> >>
> >> On VM exit, we restore access, test if we did enable them before,
> >> and save/restore the guest/host registers if necessary. In this
> >> sequence, the FPEXC register is always accessed, irrespective
> >> of the trapping configuration.
> >>
> >> If the guest didn't touch the VFP registers, then the HCPTR access
> >> has now enabled such access, but we're missing a barrier to ensure
> >> architectural execution of the new HCPTR configuration. If the HCPTR
> >> access has been delayed/reordered, the subsequent access to FPEXC
> >> will cause a trap, which we aren't prepared to handle at all.
> >>
> >> The fix is to introduce a barrier that only takes place if the
> >> guest hasn't accessed its view of the VFP registers, making
> >> the access to FPEXC safe.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> >> ---
> >>  arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S | 7 +++++--
> >>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S b/arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S
> >> index 79caf79..3ac7aca 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S
> >> +++ b/arch/arm/kvm/interrupts.S
> >> @@ -175,10 +175,13 @@ __kvm_vcpu_return:
> >>  #ifdef CONFIG_VFPv3
> >>  	@ Save floating point registers we if let guest use them.
> >>  	tst	r2, #(HCPTR_TCP(10) | HCPTR_TCP(11))
> >> -	bne	after_vfp_restore
> >> +	beq	1f
> >> +
> >> +	isb	@ Force execution of HCPTR if we've just reenabled VFP access
> >> +	b	after_vfp_restore
> >>  
> >>  	@ Switch VFP/NEON hardware state to the host's
> >> -	add	r7, vcpu, #VCPU_VFP_GUEST
> >> +1:	add	r7, vcpu, #VCPU_VFP_GUEST
> >>  	store_vfp_state r7
> >>  	add	r7, vcpu, #VCPU_VFP_HOST
> >>  	ldr	r7, [r7]
> >> -- 
> >> 2.1.4
> >>
> > 
> > Reviewed-by: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
> 
> Thanks (I must admit I completely forgot the existence of this patch...).
> 
> I guess we can queue that for -rc1, with a Cc to stable...
> 
yes, I tested it on TC2 (both A15 and A7) and it works like a charm.

-Christoffer

  reply	other threads:[~2015-04-09 13:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-16 10:59 [PATCH] arm: KVM: force execution of HCPTR access on VM exit Marc Zyngier
2015-03-16 10:59 ` Marc Zyngier
2015-04-08 11:40 ` Christoffer Dall
2015-04-08 11:40   ` Christoffer Dall
2015-04-08 17:16   ` Marc Zyngier
2015-04-08 17:16     ` Marc Zyngier
2015-04-09 13:35     ` Christoffer Dall [this message]
2015-04-09 13:35       ` Christoffer Dall

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