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From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 16:48:48 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150715214848.GA24204@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1436989569-69582-4-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 02:46:04PM -0500, Seth Forshee wrote:
> Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the
> user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns
> and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining
> privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged.
> 
> Add a new helper function, in_user_ns(), to test whether a user
> namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace.
> Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set
> should be applied to the caps constructed during exec.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

I think it's an ok behavior, though let's just go over the
alternatives.

It might actually be ok to simply require that the user_ns be
equal.  If I unshare a new userns in which a different uid is
mapped to root, I may not want file capabilities to be granted
to tasks in that ns.  (On the other hand, I might be creating
a new user_ns specifically to not have a uid 0 mapped into it
at all, and only have file capabilities grant privilege)

Conversely, if I unshare one user_ns with a MS_SHARED mnt_ns, mount
an ext4fs, and then (from the parent shell) unshare another user_ns
with the same mapping, intending it to be a "peer" to the first one
I'd unshared and be able to use the ext4fs it mounted.  This won't
work here.  That's probably best - the appropriate thing to do was
to attach to the existing user_ns.  But it could end up being
limiting in some special cases, so I'm bringing it up here.

Again I think what you have here is the simplest and most sensible
choice, so ack.

> ---
>  include/linux/user_namespace.h |  8 ++++++++
>  kernel/user_namespace.c        | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  security/commoncap.c           |  2 ++
>  3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> index 8297e5b341d8..a43faa727124 100644
> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
>  extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
>  extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
>  extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
> +extern bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> +		      const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
>  #else
>  
>  static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
> @@ -100,6 +102,12 @@ static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
>  {
>  	return true;
>  }
> +
> +static inline bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> +			     const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
> +{
> +	return true;
> +}
>  #endif
>  
>  #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 4109f8320684..2b043876d5f0 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -944,6 +944,20 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
>  	return allowed;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Returns true if @ns is the same namespace as or a descendant of
> + * @target_ns.
> + */
> +bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> +	       const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
> +{
> +	for (; ns; ns = ns->parent) {
> +		if (ns == target_ns)
> +			return true;
> +	}
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>  static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
>  {
>  	return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index d103f5a4043d..175ab497e810 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -439,6 +439,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
>  
>  	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
>  		return 0;
> +	if (!in_userns(current_user_ns(), bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
> +		return 0;
>  
>  	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
>  	if (rc < 0) {
> -- 
> 1.9.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 16:48:48 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150715214848.GA24204@mail.hallyn.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1436989569-69582-4-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

On Wed, Jul 15, 2015 at 02:46:04PM -0500, Seth Forshee wrote:
> Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the
> user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns
> and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining
> privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged.
> 
> Add a new helper function, in_user_ns(), to test whether a user
> namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace.
> Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set
> should be applied to the caps constructed during exec.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

I think it's an ok behavior, though let's just go over the
alternatives.

It might actually be ok to simply require that the user_ns be
equal.  If I unshare a new userns in which a different uid is
mapped to root, I may not want file capabilities to be granted
to tasks in that ns.  (On the other hand, I might be creating
a new user_ns specifically to not have a uid 0 mapped into it
at all, and only have file capabilities grant privilege)

Conversely, if I unshare one user_ns with a MS_SHARED mnt_ns, mount
an ext4fs, and then (from the parent shell) unshare another user_ns
with the same mapping, intending it to be a "peer" to the first one
I'd unshared and be able to use the ext4fs it mounted.  This won't
work here.  That's probably best - the appropriate thing to do was
to attach to the existing user_ns.  But it could end up being
limiting in some special cases, so I'm bringing it up here.

Again I think what you have here is the simplest and most sensible
choice, so ack.

> ---
>  include/linux/user_namespace.h |  8 ++++++++
>  kernel/user_namespace.c        | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  security/commoncap.c           |  2 ++
>  3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> index 8297e5b341d8..a43faa727124 100644
> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
>  extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
>  extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
>  extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
> +extern bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> +		      const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
>  #else
>  
>  static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
> @@ -100,6 +102,12 @@ static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
>  {
>  	return true;
>  }
> +
> +static inline bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> +			     const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
> +{
> +	return true;
> +}
>  #endif
>  
>  #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 4109f8320684..2b043876d5f0 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -944,6 +944,20 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
>  	return allowed;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Returns true if @ns is the same namespace as or a descendant of
> + * @target_ns.
> + */
> +bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> +	       const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
> +{
> +	for (; ns; ns = ns->parent) {
> +		if (ns == target_ns)
> +			return true;
> +	}
> +	return false;
> +}
> +
>  static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
>  {
>  	return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index d103f5a4043d..175ab497e810 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -439,6 +439,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
>  
>  	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
>  		return 0;
> +	if (!in_userns(current_user_ns(), bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
> +		return 0;
>  
>  	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
>  	if (rc < 0) {
> -- 
> 1.9.1

  reply	other threads:[~2015-07-15 21:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 210+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-07-15 19:46 [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  2:47   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  2:47     ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-05 21:03     ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-05 21:03       ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-05 21:19       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-05 21:19         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-06 14:20         ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 14:20           ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 14:51           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-06 14:51             ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-06 15:44             ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 15:44               ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-06 16:11               ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-06 16:11                 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-08-07 14:16                 ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 14:16                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 14:32           ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 14:32             ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 18:35             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-07 18:35               ` Casey Schaufler
2015-08-07 18:57               ` Seth Forshee
2015-08-07 18:57                 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 2/7] userns: Simpilify MNT_NODEV handling Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 3/7] fs: Ignore file caps in mounts from other user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 21:48   ` Serge E. Hallyn [this message]
2015-07-15 21:48     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 21:50     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-15 21:50       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-15 22:35       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 22:35         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  1:14         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  1:14           ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  1:23           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  1:23             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 13:06             ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:06               ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16  1:19         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  1:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  4:23           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  4:23             ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  4:49             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  4:49               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  5:04               ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  5:04                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  5:15                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  5:15                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  5:44                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  5:44                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:13                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:13                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17  0:43                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  0:43                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-29 16:04                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-29 16:04                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-29 16:18                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-29 16:18                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17  6:46   ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-07-17  6:46     ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 5/7] security: Restrict security attribute updates for userns mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 6/7] selinux: Ignore security labels on user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:23   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:02     ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 16:14       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 16:14         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 20:25         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 20:25           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 20:40           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-22 20:40             ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 13:57             ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 13:57               ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 14:39               ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 14:39                 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 15:36                 ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 15:36                   ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-23 16:23                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 16:23                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-24 15:11                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-24 15:11                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 15:57                       ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-30 15:57                         ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-30 16:24                         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 16:24                           ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46 ` [PATCH 7/7] smack: Don't use security labels for " Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 19:46   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 20:43   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 20:43     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 20:36 ` [PATCH 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 20:36   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 21:06   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 21:06     ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 21:48     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 21:48       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-15 22:28       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-15 22:28         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  1:05         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  1:05           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  2:20           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  2:20             ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:12           ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-16 13:12             ` Stephen Smalley
2015-07-15 23:04       ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 23:04         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 22:39     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-15 22:39       ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16  1:08       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  1:08         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16  2:54         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16  2:54           ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16  4:47           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  4:47             ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  0:09             ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-17  0:09               ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-17  0:42               ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  0:42                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  2:47                 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-17  2:47                   ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-21 17:37                   ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-21 17:37                     ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22  7:56                     ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-22  7:56                       ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-22 14:09                       ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 14:09                         ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 16:52                         ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-07-22 16:52                           ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-07-22 17:41                           ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-22 17:41                             ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23  1:51                             ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-23  1:51                               ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-23 13:19                               ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 13:19                                 ` J. Bruce Fields
2015-07-23 23:48                                 ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-23 23:48                                   ` Dave Chinner
2015-07-18  0:07                 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-18  0:07                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-20 17:54             ` Colin Walters
2015-07-20 17:54               ` Colin Walters
2015-07-16 11:16     ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-16 11:16       ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-17  0:10       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17  0:10         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 10:13         ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-17 10:13           ` Lukasz Pawelczyk
2015-07-16  3:15 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16  3:15   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-16 13:59   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 13:59     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 15:09     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 15:09       ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 18:57       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 18:57         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 21:42         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 21:42           ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 22:27           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 22:27             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 23:08             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 23:08               ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 23:29               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-16 23:29                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17  0:45                 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-17  0:45                   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-17  0:59                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17  0:59                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-07-17 14:28                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-17 14:28                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-07-17 14:56                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 14:56                         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-21 20:35                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-21 20:35                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22  1:52                       ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22  1:52                         ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 15:56                         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 15:56                           ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 18:10                           ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 18:10                             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-22 19:32                             ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-22 19:32                               ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23  0:05                               ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-23  0:05                                 ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-23  0:15                                 ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-23  0:15                                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-23  5:15                                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23  5:15                                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-23 21:48                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-23 21:48                                     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-28 20:40                                 ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-28 20:40                                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 16:18                                   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 16:18                                     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-30 17:05                                     ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 17:05                                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 17:25                                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 17:25                                         ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-30 17:33                                         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-30 17:33                                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-07-17 13:21           ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 13:21             ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-17 17:14             ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-17 17:14               ` Casey Schaufler
2015-07-16 15:59     ` Seth Forshee
2015-07-16 15:59       ` Seth Forshee

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