* [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7]
@ 2015-08-05 13:43 David Howells
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 01/27] ASN.1: Add an ASN.1 compiler option to dump the element tree " David Howells
` (27 more replies)
0 siblings, 28 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Here's a set of patches that does the following:
(1) Extracts both parts of an X.509 AuthorityKeyIdentifier (AKID)
extension. We already extract the bit that can match the
subjectKeyIdentifier (SKID) of the parent X.509 cert, but we currently
ignore the bits that can match the issuer and serialNumber.
Looks up an X.509 cert by issuer and serialNumber if those are
provided in the AKID. If the keyIdentifier is also provided, checks
that the subjectKeyIdentifier of the cert found matches that also.
If no issuer and serialNumber are provided in the AKID, looks up an
X.509 cert by SKID using the AKID keyIdentifier.
This allows module signing to be done with certificates that don't
have an SKID by which they can be looked up.
(2) Makes use of the PKCS#7 facility to provide module signatures.
sign-file is replaced with a program that generates a PKCS#7 message
that has no X.509 certs embedded and that has detached data (the
module content) and adds it onto the message with magic string and
descriptor.
(3) The PKCS#7 message supplies all the information that is needed to
select the X.509 cert to be used to verify the signature by standard
means (including selection of digest algorithm and public key
algorithm). No kernel-specific magic values are required.
(4) Makes it possible to get sign-file to just write out a file containing
the PKCS#7 signature blob. This can be used for debugging and
potentially for firmware signing.
(5) Extracts the function that does PKCS#7 signature verification on a
blob from the module signing code and put it somewhere more general so
that other things, such as firmware signing, can make use of it
without depending on module config options.
(6) Adds support for CMS messages in place of PKCS#7 (they're very similar
ASN.1) and makes sign-file create CMS messages instead of PKCS#7.
This allows signatures to refer to the verifying key by X.509 cert
SKID instead of X.509 cert issuer and serial number.
(7) Provides support for providing a password/pin for an encrypted private
key to sign-file.
(8) Makes it possible to use PKCS#11 with sign-file, thus allowing the use
of cryptographic hardware.
(9) Overhauls the way the module signing key is handled. If the name in
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY is "signing_key.pem" then a key will be
automatically generated and placed in the build directory. If the
name is different, autogeneration is suppressed and the file is
presumed to be a PEM file containing both the private key and X.509
certificate.
(10) Overhauls the way auxiliary trusted keys are added to the kernel.
Files matching the pattern "*.x509" are no longer just gathered up and
cat'd together. Now CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS must be set to point
to a single PEM file containing a set of X.509 certs cat'd together if
this facility is desired.
(11) Severely restricts what authenticateAttributes are permitted in a PKCS#7
or CMS message and what content type may be used. This is selected by
the in-kernel user with the appropriate VERIFYING_*_SIGNATURE constant.
Note that the revised sign-file program no longer supports the "-s
<signature>" option to add an externally generated signature. This is
deprecated in favour of using PKCS#11. Note also that the format of the
signature file that would be passed to -s has changed.
David Woodhouse also has stated an intention to overhaul the makefile magic
he added to deal with quotes and quoting encountered when using CONFIG_*
option strings in the makefile.
The patches can be found here also:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=modsign-pkcs7
and are tagged with:
modsign-pkcs7-20150805
David
---
David Howells (17):
ASN.1: Add an ASN.1 compiler option to dump the element tree
ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler
X.509: Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier
X.509: Support X.509 lookup by Issuer+Serial form AuthorityKeyIdentifier
PKCS#7: Allow detached data to be supplied for signature checking purposes
MODSIGN: Provide a utility to append a PKCS#7 signature to a module
MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 messages as module signatures
system_keyring.c doesn't need to #include module-internal.h
MODSIGN: Extract the blob PKCS#7 signature verifier from module signing
PKCS#7: Check content type and versions
X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer
PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652]
sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7
PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder
PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes
KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7
PKCS#7: Restrict content type and authenticated attributes by purpose
David Woodhouse (9):
modsign: Abort modules_install when signing fails
modsign: Allow password to be specified for signing key
modsign: Allow signing key to be PKCS#11
modsign: Allow external signing key to be specified
modsign: Extract signing cert from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed
modsign: Use single PEM file for autogenerated key
modsign: Add explicit CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS option
extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file
modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
Luis R. Rodriguez (1):
sign-file: Add option to only create signature file
.gitignore | 1
Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt | 5
Documentation/module-signing.txt | 51 +++-
Makefile | 8 -
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 4
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 8 -
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 11 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 22 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 14 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 269 ++++++++++++++++++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 20 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 10 -
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 145 +++++++++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 1
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 7
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 | 35 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 231 +++++++++++-----
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 12 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 95 ++++---
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 13 +
include/crypto/public_key.h | 18 +
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 7
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 4
include/linux/verify_pefile.h | 6
init/Kconfig | 55 +++-
kernel/Makefile | 112 +++++---
kernel/module_signing.c | 213 +--------------
kernel/system_certificates.S | 3
kernel/system_keyring.c | 53 ++++
scripts/Makefile | 4
scripts/Makefile.modinst | 2
scripts/asn1_compiler.c | 229 ++++++++++------
scripts/extract-cert.c | 166 +++++++++++
scripts/sign-file | 421 -----------------------------
scripts/sign-file.c | 260 ++++++++++++++++++
35 files changed, 1587 insertions(+), 928 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1
create mode 100644 scripts/extract-cert.c
delete mode 100755 scripts/sign-file
create mode 100755 scripts/sign-file.c
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 01/27] ASN.1: Add an ASN.1 compiler option to dump the element tree [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:43 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler " David Howells
` (26 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Add an ASN.1 compiler option to dump the element tree to stdout.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
scripts/asn1_compiler.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
index 1c75e22b6385..6e4ba992a51f 100644
--- a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
+++ b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -311,9 +312,11 @@ struct token {
static struct token *token_list;
static unsigned nr_tokens;
-static _Bool verbose;
+static bool verbose_opt;
+static bool debug_opt;
-#define debug(fmt, ...) do { if (verbose) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+#define verbose(fmt, ...) do { if (verbose_opt) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+#define debug(fmt, ...) do { if (debug_opt) printf(fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
static int directive_compare(const void *_key, const void *_pdir)
{
@@ -518,7 +521,7 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
}
nr_tokens = tix;
- debug("Extracted %u tokens\n", nr_tokens);
+ verbose("Extracted %u tokens\n", nr_tokens);
#if 0
{
@@ -534,6 +537,7 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
static void build_type_list(void);
static void parse(void);
+static void dump_elements(void);
static void render(FILE *out, FILE *hdr);
/*
@@ -548,16 +552,27 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
char *kbuild_verbose;
int fd;
+ kbuild_verbose = getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE");
+ if (kbuild_verbose)
+ verbose_opt = atoi(kbuild_verbose);
+
+ while (argc > 4) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[1], "-v") == 0)
+ verbose_opt = true;
+ else if (strcmp(argv[1], "-d") == 0)
+ debug_opt = true;
+ else
+ break;
+ memmove(&argv[1], &argv[2], (argc - 2) * sizeof(char *));
+ argc--;
+ }
+
if (argc != 4) {
- fprintf(stderr, "Format: %s <grammar-file> <c-file> <hdr-file>\n",
+ fprintf(stderr, "Format: %s [-v] [-d] <grammar-file> <c-file> <hdr-file>\n",
argv[0]);
exit(2);
}
- kbuild_verbose = getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE");
- if (kbuild_verbose)
- verbose = atoi(kbuild_verbose);
-
filename = argv[1];
outputname = argv[2];
headername = argv[3];
@@ -608,6 +623,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
tokenise(buffer, buffer + readlen);
build_type_list();
parse();
+ dump_elements();
out = fopen(outputname, "w");
if (!out) {
@@ -756,7 +772,7 @@ static void build_type_list(void)
qsort(type_index, nr, sizeof(type_index[0]), type_index_compare);
- debug("Extracted %u types\n", nr_types);
+ verbose("Extracted %u types\n", nr_types);
#if 0
for (n = 0; n < nr_types; n++) {
struct type *type = type_index[n];
@@ -801,7 +817,7 @@ static void parse(void)
} while (type++, !(type->flags & TYPE_STOP_MARKER));
- debug("Extracted %u actions\n", nr_actions);
+ verbose("Extracted %u actions\n", nr_actions);
}
static struct element *element_list;
@@ -1192,6 +1208,54 @@ overrun_error:
exit(1);
}
+static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
+{
+ const struct element *c;
+ const struct type *t = e->type_def;
+ const char *name = e->name ? e->name->value : ".";
+ int nsize = e->name ? e->name->size : 1;
+ const char *tname = t && t->name ? t->name->value : ".";
+ int tnsize = t && t->name ? t->name->size : 1;
+ char tag[32];
+
+ if (e->class == 0 && e->method == 0 && e->tag == 0)
+ strcpy(tag, "<...>");
+ else if (e->class == ASN1_UNIV)
+ sprintf(tag, "%s %s %s",
+ asn1_classes[e->class],
+ asn1_methods[e->method],
+ asn1_universal_tags[e->tag]);
+ else
+ sprintf(tag, "%s %s %u",
+ asn1_classes[e->class],
+ asn1_methods[e->method],
+ e->tag);
+
+ printf("%c%c%c%c%c %c %*s[*] \e[33m%s\e[m %*.*s %*.*s \e[35m%s\e[m\n",
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_IMPLICIT ? 'I' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_EXPLICIT ? 'E' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED ? 'T' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_SKIPPABLE ? 'S' : '-',
+ e->flags & ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL ? 'C' : '-',
+ "-tTqQcaro"[e->compound],
+ level, "",
+ tag,
+ tnsize, tnsize, tname,
+ nsize, nsize, name,
+ e->action ? e->action->name : "");
+ if (e->compound == TYPE_REF)
+ dump_element(e->type->type->element, level + 3);
+ else
+ for (c = e->children; c; c = c->next)
+ dump_element(c, level + 3);
+}
+
+static void dump_elements(void)
+{
+ if (debug_opt)
+ dump_element(type_list[0].element, 0);
+}
+
static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag);
static void render_out_of_line_list(FILE *out);
@@ -1293,7 +1357,7 @@ static void render(FILE *out, FILE *hdr)
}
/* We do two passes - the first one calculates all the offsets */
- debug("Pass 1\n");
+ verbose("Pass 1\n");
nr_entries = 0;
root = &type_list[0];
render_element(NULL, root->element, NULL);
@@ -1304,7 +1368,7 @@ static void render(FILE *out, FILE *hdr)
e->flags &= ~ELEMENT_RENDERED;
/* And then we actually render */
- debug("Pass 2\n");
+ verbose("Pass 2\n");
fprintf(out, "\n");
fprintf(out, "static const unsigned char %s_machine[] = {\n",
grammar_name);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 01/27] ASN.1: Add an ASN.1 compiler option to dump the element tree " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:43 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 18:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2015-08-05 18:26 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 03/27] X.509: Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier " David Howells
` (25 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 2 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler rather than storing a pointer
into the source text. This means we don't have to use "%*.*s" all over the
place.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
scripts/asn1_compiler.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
index 6e4ba992a51f..e000f44e37b8 100644
--- a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
+++ b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
@@ -294,8 +294,8 @@ static const char *const directives[NR__DIRECTIVES] = {
struct action {
struct action *next;
+ char *name;
unsigned char index;
- char name[];
};
static struct action *action_list;
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ struct token {
enum token_type token_type : 8;
unsigned char size;
struct action *action;
- const char *value;
+ char *content;
struct type *type;
};
@@ -328,11 +328,9 @@ static int directive_compare(const void *_key, const void *_pdir)
dlen = strlen(dir);
clen = (dlen < token->size) ? dlen : token->size;
- //debug("cmp(%*.*s,%s) = ",
- // (int)token->size, (int)token->size, token->value,
- // dir);
+ //debug("cmp(%s,%s) = ", token->content, dir);
- val = memcmp(token->value, dir, clen);
+ val = memcmp(token->content, dir, clen);
if (val != 0) {
//debug("%d [cmp]\n", val);
return val;
@@ -352,7 +350,7 @@ static int directive_compare(const void *_key, const void *_pdir)
static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
{
struct token *tokens;
- char *line, *nl, *p, *q;
+ char *line, *nl, *start, *p, *q;
unsigned tix, lineno;
/* Assume we're going to have half as many tokens as we have
@@ -411,11 +409,11 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
break;
tokens[tix].line = lineno;
- tokens[tix].value = p;
+ start = p;
/* Handle string tokens */
if (isalpha(*p)) {
- const char **dir;
+ const char **dir, *start = p;
/* Can be a directive, type name or element
* name. Find the end of the name.
@@ -426,10 +424,18 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
tokens[tix].size = q - p;
p = q;
+ tokens[tix].content = malloc(tokens[tix].size + 1);
+ if (!tokens[tix].content) {
+ perror(NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ memcpy(tokens[tix].content, start, tokens[tix].size);
+ tokens[tix].content[tokens[tix].size] = 0;
+
/* If it begins with a lowercase letter then
* it's an element name
*/
- if (islower(tokens[tix].value[0])) {
+ if (islower(tokens[tix].content[0])) {
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME;
continue;
}
@@ -458,6 +464,13 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
q++;
tokens[tix].size = q - p;
p = q;
+ tokens[tix].content = malloc(tokens[tix].size + 1);
+ if (!tokens[tix].content) {
+ perror(NULL);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ memcpy(tokens[tix].content, start, tokens[tix].size);
+ tokens[tix].content[tokens[tix].size] = 0;
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_NUMBER;
continue;
}
@@ -466,6 +479,7 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
if (memcmp(p, "::=", 3) == 0) {
p += 3;
tokens[tix].size = 3;
+ tokens[tix].content = "::=";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT;
continue;
}
@@ -475,12 +489,14 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
if (memcmp(p, "({", 2) == 0) {
p += 2;
tokens[tix].size = 2;
+ tokens[tix].content = "({";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_ACTION;
continue;
}
if (memcmp(p, "})", 2) == 0) {
p += 2;
tokens[tix].size = 2;
+ tokens[tix].content = "})";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION;
continue;
}
@@ -491,22 +507,27 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
switch (*p) {
case '{':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "{";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY;
continue;
case '}':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "}";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY;
continue;
case '[':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "[";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_SQUARE;
continue;
case ']':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = "]";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE;
continue;
case ',':
p += 1;
+ tokens[tix].content = ",";
tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_COMMA;
continue;
default:
@@ -527,10 +548,7 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
{
int n;
for (n = 0; n < nr_tokens; n++)
- debug("Token %3u: '%*.*s'\n",
- n,
- (int)token_list[n].size, (int)token_list[n].size,
- token_list[n].value);
+ debug("Token %3u: '%s'\n", n, token_list[n].content);
}
#endif
}
@@ -709,7 +727,7 @@ static int type_index_compare(const void *_a, const void *_b)
if ((*a)->name->size != (*b)->name->size)
return (*a)->name->size - (*b)->name->size;
else
- return memcmp((*a)->name->value, (*b)->name->value,
+ return memcmp((*a)->name->content, (*b)->name->content,
(*a)->name->size);
}
@@ -722,7 +740,7 @@ static int type_finder(const void *_key, const void *_ti)
if (token->size != type->name->size)
return token->size - type->name->size;
else
- return memcmp(token->value, type->name->value,
+ return memcmp(token->content, type->name->content,
token->size);
}
@@ -776,10 +794,7 @@ static void build_type_list(void)
#if 0
for (n = 0; n < nr_types; n++) {
struct type *type = type_index[n];
- debug("- %*.*s\n",
- (int)type->name->size,
- (int)type->name->size,
- type->name->value);
+ debug("- %*.*s\n", type->name->content);
}
#endif
}
@@ -809,9 +824,8 @@ static void parse(void)
type->element->type_def = type;
if (cursor != type[1].name) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
@@ -878,34 +892,31 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
cursor++;
break;
default:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_NUMBER) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
element->tag &= ~0x1f;
- element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->value, &p, 10);
+ element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->content, &p, 10);
element->flags |= ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED;
- if (p - cursor->value != cursor->size)
+ if (p - cursor->content != cursor->size)
abort();
cursor++;
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
@@ -1005,9 +1016,8 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
ref = bsearch(cursor, type_index, nr_types, sizeof(type_index[0]),
type_finder);
if (!ref) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%*.*s' undefined\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%s' undefined\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor->type = *ref;
@@ -1056,9 +1066,8 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
break;
default:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' does not introduce a type\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%s' does not introduce a type\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
@@ -1075,20 +1084,18 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' is not an action function name\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%s' is not an action function name\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
- action = malloc(sizeof(struct action) + cursor->size + 1);
+ action = malloc(sizeof(struct action));
if (!action) {
perror(NULL);
exit(1);
}
action->index = 0;
- memcpy(action->name, cursor->value, cursor->size);
- action->name[cursor->size] = 0;
+ action->name = cursor->content;
for (ppaction = &action_list;
*ppaction;
@@ -1118,9 +1125,8 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
if (cursor >= end)
goto overrun_error;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
@@ -1130,9 +1136,8 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
return top;
parse_error:
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
overrun_error:
@@ -1150,9 +1155,8 @@ static struct element *parse_compound(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
struct token *cursor = *_cursor, *name;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
@@ -1193,9 +1197,8 @@ static struct element *parse_compound(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
children->flags &= ~ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL;
if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%*.*s'\n",
- filename, cursor->line,
- (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%s'\n",
+ filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
exit(1);
}
cursor++;
@@ -1212,10 +1215,8 @@ static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
{
const struct element *c;
const struct type *t = e->type_def;
- const char *name = e->name ? e->name->value : ".";
- int nsize = e->name ? e->name->size : 1;
- const char *tname = t && t->name ? t->name->value : ".";
- int tnsize = t && t->name ? t->name->size : 1;
+ const char *name = e->name ? e->name->content : ".";
+ const char *tname = t && t->name ? t->name->content : ".";
char tag[32];
if (e->class == 0 && e->method == 0 && e->tag == 0)
@@ -1231,7 +1232,7 @@ static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
asn1_methods[e->method],
e->tag);
- printf("%c%c%c%c%c %c %*s[*] \e[33m%s\e[m %*.*s %*.*s \e[35m%s\e[m\n",
+ printf("%c%c%c%c%c %c %*s[*] \e[33m%s\e[m %s %s \e[35m%s\e[m\n",
e->flags & ELEMENT_IMPLICIT ? 'I' : '-',
e->flags & ELEMENT_EXPLICIT ? 'E' : '-',
e->flags & ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED ? 'T' : '-',
@@ -1240,8 +1241,8 @@ static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
"-tTqQcaro"[e->compound],
level, "",
tag,
- tnsize, tnsize, tname,
- nsize, nsize, name,
+ tname,
+ name,
e->action ? e->action->name : "");
if (e->compound == TYPE_REF)
dump_element(e->type->type->element, level + 3);
@@ -1454,9 +1455,7 @@ static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag)
outofline = 1;
if (e->type_def && out) {
- render_more(out, "\t// %*.*s\n",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size, (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t// %s\n", e->type_def->name->content);
}
/* Render the operation */
@@ -1468,9 +1467,7 @@ static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag)
render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH_ANY%s%s,",
cond, act, skippable ? "_OR_SKIP" : "");
if (e->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s",
- (int)e->name->size, (int)e->name->size,
- e->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// %s", e->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
goto dont_render_tag;
@@ -1503,9 +1500,7 @@ static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag)
x = tag ?: e;
if (x->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s",
- (int)x->name->size, (int)x->name->size,
- x->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// %s", x->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
/* Render the tag */
@@ -1543,10 +1538,8 @@ dont_render_tag:
* skipability */
render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index);
if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %s",
+ e->type_def->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) {
e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED;
@@ -1571,10 +1564,8 @@ dont_render_tag:
* skipability */
render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index);
if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name)
- render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s",
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- (int)e->type_def->name->size,
- e->type_def->name->value);
+ render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %s",
+ e->type_def->name->content);
render_more(out, "\n");
if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) {
e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 03/27] X.509: Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 01/27] ASN.1: Add an ASN.1 compiler option to dump the element tree " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:43 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 04/27] X.509: Support X.509 lookup by Issuer+Serial form " David Howells
` (24 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier, not just the keyIdentifier,
as the second part can be used to match X.509 certificates by issuer and
serialNumber.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 8 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 4 -
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 12 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 | 35 +++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 5 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 8 +-
7 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index e47fcd9ac5e8..cd1406f9b14a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -15,15 +15,21 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) += x509_key_parser.o
x509_key_parser-y := \
x509-asn1.o \
+ x509_akid-asn1.o \
x509_rsakey-asn1.o \
x509_cert_parser.o \
x509_public_key.o
-$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.h $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
+$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: \
+ $(obj)/x509-asn1.h \
+ $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.h \
+ $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
$(obj)/x509-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.c $(obj)/x509-asn1.h
+$(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.h
$(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h
clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h
+clean-files += x509_akid-asn1.c x509_akid-asn1.h
clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h
#
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index 1d29376072da..0f6463b6692b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
* trusted keys.
*/
- if (last && last->authority) {
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority,
+ if (last && last->akid_skid) {
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->akid_skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
x509 = last;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index cd455450b069..a4d083f7e9e1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -187,11 +187,11 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
- if (x509->authority)
+ if (x509->akid_skid)
pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
- x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
+ x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
- if (!x509->authority ||
+ if (!x509->akid_skid ||
strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
* the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
@@ -216,13 +216,13 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* list to see if the next one is there.
*/
pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
- x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
+ x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
if (!p->skid)
continue;
pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
- if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid))
goto found_issuer;
}
@@ -338,8 +338,6 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
- n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
}
for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1a33231a75a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+-- X.509 AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+-- rfc5280 section 4.2.1.1
+
+AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ keyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL,
+ authorityCertIssuer [1] IMPLICIT GeneralNames OPTIONAL,
+ authorityCertSerialNumber [2] IMPLICIT CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL
+ }
+
+KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ x509_akid_note_kid })
+
+CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER ({ x509_akid_note_serial })
+
+GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE OF GeneralName
+
+GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
+ otherName [0] ANY,
+ rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
+ dNSName [2] IA5String,
+ x400Address [3] ANY,
+ directoryName [4] Name ({ x509_akid_note_name }),
+ ediPartyName [5] ANY,
+ uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
+ iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
+ registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER
+ }
+
+Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
+
+RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion
+
+AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE {
+ attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
+ attributeValue ANY ({ x509_extract_name_segment })
+ }
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index a668d90302d3..6c130dd56f35 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "public_key.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
#include "x509-asn1.h"
+#include "x509_akid-asn1.h"
#include "x509_rsakey-asn1.h"
struct x509_parse_context {
@@ -35,6 +36,10 @@ struct x509_parse_context {
u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
+ unsigned raw_akid_size;
+ const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
+ const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
+ unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;
};
/*
@@ -48,7 +53,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
kfree(cert->subject);
kfree(cert->id);
kfree(cert->skid);
- kfree(cert->authority);
+ kfree(cert->akid_id);
+ kfree(cert->akid_skid);
kfree(cert->sig.digest);
mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
kfree(cert);
@@ -85,6 +91,18 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
if (ret < 0)
goto error_decode;
+ /* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */
+ if (ctx->raw_akid) {
+ pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n",
+ ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid);
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx,
+ ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n");
+ goto error_decode;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Decode the public key */
ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_rsakey_decoder, ctx,
ctx->key, ctx->key_size);
@@ -422,7 +440,6 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
const unsigned char *v = value;
- int i;
pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
@@ -449,57 +466,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
/* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
- if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
- if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5)))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */
- if (unlikely(vlen == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH))
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- if (vlen < ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) {
- /* Short Form length */
- if (v[1] != vlen - 2 ||
- v[2] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
- v[3] > vlen - 4)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- vlen = v[3];
- v += 4;
- } else {
- /* Long Form length */
- size_t seq_len = 0;
- size_t sub = v[1] - ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH;
-
- if (sub > 2)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- /* calculate the length from subsequent octets */
- v += 2;
- for (i = 0; i < sub; i++) {
- seq_len <<= 8;
- seq_len |= v[i];
- }
-
- if (seq_len != vlen - 2 - sub ||
- v[sub] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID ||
- v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- vlen = v[sub + 1];
- v += (sub + 2);
- }
-
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
- ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size,
- v, vlen);
- if (IS_ERR(kid))
- return PTR_ERR(kid);
- pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
- ctx->cert->authority = kid;
+ ctx->raw_akid = v;
+ ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
@@ -569,3 +537,71 @@ int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
+
+/*
+ * Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ if (ctx->cert->akid_skid)
+ return 0;
+
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
+ ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size,
+ value, vlen);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+ ctx->cert->akid_skid = kid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value;
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+
+ pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value);
+
+ if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->akid_id)
+ return 0;
+
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value,
+ vlen,
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer,
+ ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(kid))
+ return PTR_ERR(kid);
+
+ pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
+ ctx->cert->akid_id = kid;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 3dfe6b5d6f0b..dcdb5c94f514 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -19,9 +19,10 @@ struct x509_certificate {
struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */
char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */
char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Serial number + issuer */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */
struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
- struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier (optional) */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_id; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->id (optional) */
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_skid; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->skid (optional) */
struct tm valid_from;
struct tm valid_to;
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 24f17e6c5904..bb55d6074d5f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -227,10 +227,10 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
if (!trust_keyring)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
+ if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->akid_skid, ca_keyid))
return -EPERM;
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority,
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->akid_skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
if (!use_builtin_keys
@@ -287,8 +287,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
- if (!cert->authority ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
+ if (!cert->akid_skid ||
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid)) {
ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_cert;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 04/27] X.509: Support X.509 lookup by Issuer+Serial form AuthorityKeyIdentifier [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 03/27] X.509: Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:44 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 05/27] PKCS#7: Allow detached data to be supplied for signature checking purposes " David Howells
` (23 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
If an X.509 certificate has an AuthorityKeyIdentifier extension that provides
an issuer and serialNumber, then make it so that these are used in preference
to the keyIdentifier field also held therein for searching for the signing
certificate.
If both the issuer+serialNumber and the keyIdentifier are supplied, then the
certificate is looked up by the former but the latter is checked as well. If
the latter doesn't match the subjectKeyIdentifier of the parent certificate,
EKEYREJECTED is returned.
This makes it possible to chain X.509 certificates based on the issuer and
serialNumber fields rather than on subjectKeyIdentifier. This is necessary as
we are having to deal with keys that are represented by X.509 certificates
that lack a subjectKeyIdentifier.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 10 +++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 47 +++++++++++++----
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
include/crypto/public_key.h | 3 +
4 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
index 0f6463b6692b..90d6d47965b0 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
* keys.
*/
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id,
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ x509->id, x509->skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
/* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
@@ -85,8 +86,10 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
* trusted keys.
*/
- if (last && last->akid_skid) {
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->akid_skid,
+ if (last && (last->akid_id || last->akid_skid)) {
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ last->akid_id,
+ last->akid_skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
x509 = last;
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
*/
key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
sinfo->signing_cert_id,
+ NULL,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index a4d083f7e9e1..42bfc9de0d79 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
{
struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
int ret;
kenter("");
@@ -187,11 +188,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
+ if (x509->akid_id)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
+ x509->akid_id->len, x509->akid_id->data);
if (x509->akid_skid)
- pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
- if (!x509->akid_skid ||
+ if ((!x509->akid_id && !x509->akid_skid) ||
strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
* the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
@@ -215,21 +219,42 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
* list to see if the next one is there.
*/
- pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
- x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
- for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
- if (!p->skid)
- continue;
- pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
- p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
- if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid))
- goto found_issuer;
+ auth = x509->akid_id;
+ if (auth) {
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->id->len, p->id->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
+ goto found_issuer_check_skid;
+ }
+ } else {
+ auth = x509->akid_skid;
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ if (!p->skid)
+ continue;
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, auth))
+ goto found_issuer;
+ }
}
/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
pr_debug("- top\n");
return 0;
+ found_issuer_check_skid:
+ /* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
+ * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
+ */
+ if (x509->akid_skid &&
+ !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid)) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
+ sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
found_issuer:
pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
if (p->seen) {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index bb55d6074d5f..6b060b290e77 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -65,23 +65,37 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
/**
* x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
* @keyring: The keys to search.
- * @kid: The key ID.
+ * @id: The issuer & serialNumber to look for or NULL.
+ * @skid: The subjectKeyIdentifier to look for or NULL.
* @partial: Use partial match if true, exact if false.
*
- * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID. These might,
- * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
- * certificate that needs to be verified.
+ * Find a key in the given keyring by identifier. The preferred identifier is
+ * the issuer + serialNumber and the fallback identifier is the
+ * subjectKeyIdentifier. If both are given, the lookup is by the former, but
+ * the latter must also match.
*/
struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
bool partial)
{
- key_ref_t key;
- char *id, *p;
-
+ struct key *key;
+ key_ref_t ref;
+ const char *lookup;
+ char *req, *p;
+ int len;
+
+ if (id) {
+ lookup = id->data;
+ len = id->len;
+ } else {
+ lookup = skid->data;
+ len = skid->len;
+ }
+
/* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
- p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!id)
+ p = req = kmalloc(2 + 1 + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (partial) {
@@ -92,32 +106,48 @@ struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
*p++ = 'x';
}
*p++ = ':';
- p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
+ p = bin2hex(p, lookup, len);
*p = 0;
- pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
+ pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", req);
- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", id, PTR_ERR(key));
- kfree(id);
+ ref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1),
+ &key_type_asymmetric, req);
+ if (IS_ERR(ref))
+ pr_debug("Request for key '%s' err %ld\n", req, PTR_ERR(ref));
+ kfree(req);
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
+ if (IS_ERR(ref)) {
+ switch (PTR_ERR(ref)) {
/* Hide some search errors */
case -EACCES:
case -ENOTDIR:
case -EAGAIN:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
default:
- return ERR_CAST(key);
+ return ERR_CAST(ref);
+ }
+ }
+
+ key = key_ref_to_ptr(ref);
+ if (id && skid) {
+ const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
+ if (!kids->id[1]) {
+ pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but expected SKID missing\n");
+ goto reject;
+ }
+ if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(skid, kids->id[1])) {
+ pr_debug("issuer+serial match, but SKID does not\n");
+ goto reject;
}
}
+
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key));
+ return key;
- pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__,
- key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
- return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+reject:
+ key_put(key);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREJECTED);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_request_asymmetric_key);
@@ -230,7 +260,8 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->akid_skid, ca_keyid))
return -EPERM;
- key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->akid_skid,
+ key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
+ cert->akid_id, cert->akid_skid,
false);
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
if (!use_builtin_keys
@@ -287,8 +318,9 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
/* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
- if (!cert->akid_skid ||
- asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid)) {
+ if ((!cert->akid_skid && !cert->akid_id) ||
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid) ||
+ asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->id, cert->akid_id)) {
ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free_cert;
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 54add2069901..b6f27a240856 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
struct asymmetric_key_id;
extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
- const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *id,
+ const struct asymmetric_key_id *skid,
bool partial);
#endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 05/27] PKCS#7: Allow detached data to be supplied for signature checking purposes [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 04/27] X.509: Support X.509 lookup by Issuer+Serial form " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:44 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 06/27] MODSIGN: Provide a utility to append a PKCS#7 signature to a module " David Howells
` (22 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
It is possible for a PKCS#7 message to have detached data. However, to verify
the signatures on a PKCS#7 message, we have to be able to digest the data.
Provide a function to supply that data. An error is given if the PKCS#7
message included embedded data.
This is used in a subsequent patch to supply the data to module signing where
the signature is in the form of a PKCS#7 message with detached data, whereby
the detached data is the module content that is signed.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 3 +++
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 42bfc9de0d79..404f89a0f852 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -382,3 +382,28 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
return enopkg;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_supply_detached_data - Supply the data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @datalen: The amount of data
+ *
+ * Supply the detached data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message. Note that no
+ * attempt to retain/pin the data is made. That is left to the caller. The
+ * data will not be modified by pkcs7_verify() and will not be freed when the
+ * PKCS#7 message is freed.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if data is already supplied in the message, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ if (pkcs7->data) {
+ pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pkcs7->data = data;
+ pkcs7->data_len = datalen;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index 691c79172a26..e235ab4957ee 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -34,3 +34,6 @@ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* pkcs7_verify.c
*/
extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+
+extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 06/27] MODSIGN: Provide a utility to append a PKCS#7 signature to a module [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 05/27] PKCS#7: Allow detached data to be supplied for signature checking purposes " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:44 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 07/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 messages as module signatures " David Howells
` (21 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Provide a utility that:
(1) Digests a module using the specified hash algorithm (typically sha256).
[The digest can be dumped into a file by passing the '-d' flag]
(2) Generates a PKCS#7 message that:
(a) Has detached data (ie. the module content).
(b) Is signed with the specified private key.
(c) Refers to the specified X.509 certificate.
(d) Has an empty X.509 certificate list.
[The PKCS#7 message can be dumped into a file by passing the '-p' flag]
(3) Generates a signed module by concatenating the old module, the PKCS#7
message, a descriptor and a magic string. The descriptor contains the
size of the PKCS#7 message and indicates the id_type as PKEY_ID_PKCS7.
(4) Either writes the signed module to the specified destination or renames
it over the source module.
This allows module signing to reuse the PKCS#7 handling code that was added
for PE file parsing for signed kexec.
Note that the utility is written in C and must be linked against the OpenSSL
crypto library.
Note further that I have temporarily dropped support for handling externally
created signatures until we can work out the best way to do those. Hopefully,
whoever creates the signature can give me a PKCS#7 certificate.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
include/crypto/public_key.h | 1
scripts/sign-file.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 206 insertions(+)
create mode 100755 scripts/sign-file.c
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index b6f27a240856..fda097e079a4 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ extern const struct public_key_algorithm *pkey_algo[PKEY_ALGO__LAST];
enum pkey_id_type {
PKEY_ID_PGP, /* OpenPGP generated key ID */
PKEY_ID_X509, /* X.509 arbitrary subjectKeyIdentifier */
+ PKEY_ID_PKCS7, /* Signature in PKCS#7 message */
PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST
};
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..5b8a6dda3235
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/* Sign a module file using the given key.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+struct module_signature {
+ uint8_t algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+ uint8_t hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
+ uint8_t id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+ uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
+ uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
+ uint8_t __pad[3];
+ uint32_t sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
+};
+
+#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+static char magic_number[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
+
+static __attribute__((noreturn))
+void format(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Usage: scripts/sign-file [-dp] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n");
+ exit(2);
+}
+
+static void display_openssl_errors(int l)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ char buf[120];
+ int e, line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ fprintf(stderr, "At main.c:%d:\n", l);
+
+ while ((e = ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line))) {
+ ERR_error_string(e, buf);
+ fprintf(stderr, "- SSL %s: %s:%d\n", buf, file, line);
+ }
+}
+
+static void drain_openssl_errors(void)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ int line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ while (ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line)) {}
+}
+
+#define ERR(cond, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ bool __cond = (cond); \
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__); \
+ if (__cond) { \
+ err(1, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ struct module_signature sig_info = { .id_type = PKEY_ID_PKCS7 };
+ char *hash_algo = NULL;
+ char *private_key_name, *x509_name, *module_name, *dest_name;
+ bool save_pkcs7 = false, replace_orig;
+ unsigned char buf[4096];
+ unsigned long module_size, pkcs7_size;
+ const EVP_MD *digest_algo;
+ EVP_PKEY *private_key;
+ PKCS7 *pkcs7;
+ X509 *x509;
+ BIO *b, *bd, *bm;
+ int opt, n;
+
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ do {
+ opt = getopt(argc, argv, "dp");
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'p': save_pkcs7 = true; break;
+ case -1: break;
+ default: format();
+ }
+ } while (opt != -1);
+
+ argc -= optind;
+ argv += optind;
+ if (argc < 4 || argc > 5)
+ format();
+
+ hash_algo = argv[0];
+ private_key_name = argv[1];
+ x509_name = argv[2];
+ module_name = argv[3];
+ if (argc == 5) {
+ dest_name = argv[4];
+ replace_orig = false;
+ } else {
+ ERR(asprintf(&dest_name, "%s.~signed~", module_name) < 0,
+ "asprintf");
+ replace_orig = true;
+ }
+
+ /* Read the private key and the X.509 cert the PKCS#7 message
+ * will point to.
+ */
+ b = BIO_new_file(private_key_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", private_key_name);
+ private_key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ BIO_free(b);
+
+ b = BIO_new_file(x509_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", x509_name);
+ x509 = d2i_X509_bio(b, NULL); /* Binary encoded X.509 */
+ if (!x509) {
+ BIO_reset(b);
+ x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL); /* PEM encoded X.509 */
+ if (x509)
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ }
+ BIO_free(b);
+ ERR(!x509, "%s", x509_name);
+
+ /* Open the destination file now so that we can shovel the module data
+ * across as we read it.
+ */
+ bd = BIO_new_file(dest_name, "wb");
+ ERR(!bd, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ /* Digest the module data. */
+ OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__);
+ digest_algo = EVP_get_digestbyname(hash_algo);
+ ERR(!digest_algo, "EVP_get_digestbyname");
+
+ bm = BIO_new_file(module_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!bm, "%s", module_name);
+
+ /* Load the PKCS#7 message from the digest buffer. */
+ pkcs7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ PKCS7_NOCERTS | PKCS7_PARTIAL | PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED | PKCS7_STREAM);
+ ERR(!pkcs7, "PKCS7_sign");
+
+ ERR(!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(pkcs7, x509, private_key, digest_algo, PKCS7_NOCERTS | PKCS7_BINARY),
+ "PKCS7_sign_add_signer");
+ ERR(PKCS7_final(pkcs7, bm, PKCS7_NOCERTS | PKCS7_BINARY) < 0,
+ "PKCS7_final");
+
+ if (save_pkcs7) {
+ char *pkcs7_name;
+
+ ERR(asprintf(&pkcs7_name, "%s.pkcs7", module_name) < 0, "asprintf");
+ b = BIO_new_file(pkcs7_name, "wb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", pkcs7_name);
+ ERR(i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(b, pkcs7, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", pkcs7_name);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ }
+
+ /* Append the marker and the PKCS#7 message to the destination file */
+ ERR(BIO_reset(bm) < 0, "%s", module_name);
+ while ((n = BIO_read(bm, buf, sizeof(buf))),
+ n > 0) {
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, buf, n) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ }
+ ERR(n < 0, "%s", module_name);
+ module_size = BIO_number_written(bd);
+
+ ERR(i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(bd, pkcs7, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ pkcs7_size = BIO_number_written(bd) - module_size;
+ sig_info.sig_len = htonl(pkcs7_size);
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, &sig_info, sizeof(sig_info)) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ ERR(BIO_write(bd, magic_number, sizeof(magic_number) - 1) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ ERR(BIO_free(bd) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ /* Finally, if we're signing in place, replace the original. */
+ if (replace_orig)
+ ERR(rename(dest_name, module_name) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 07/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 messages as module signatures [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 06/27] MODSIGN: Provide a utility to append a PKCS#7 signature to a module " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:44 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 08/27] sign-file: Add option to only create signature file " David Howells
` (20 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Move to using PKCS#7 messages as module signatures because:
(1) We have to be able to support the use of X.509 certificates that don't
have a subjKeyId set. We're currently relying on this to look up the
X.509 certificate in the trusted keyring list.
(2) PKCS#7 message signed information blocks have a field that supplies the
data required to match with the X.509 certificate that signed it.
(3) The PKCS#7 certificate carries fields that specify the digest algorithm
used to generate the signature in a standardised way and the X.509
certificates specify the public key algorithm in a standardised way - so
we don't need our own methods of specifying these.
(4) We now have PKCS#7 message support in the kernel for signed kexec purposes
and we can make use of this.
To make this work, the old sign-file script has been replaced with a program
that needs compiling in a previous patch. The rules to build it are added
here.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
---
Makefile | 2
init/Kconfig | 1
kernel/module_signing.c | 220 +++++--------------------
scripts/Makefile | 2
scripts/sign-file | 421 -----------------------------------------------
5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 598 deletions(-)
delete mode 100755 scripts/sign-file
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index a9ad4908e870..dc87ec280fbc 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL
MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv
MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509
export MODPUBKEY
-mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
+mod_sign_cmd = scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
else
mod_sign_cmd = true
endif
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index af09b4fb43d2..e16d9e587cee 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1869,6 +1869,7 @@ config MODULE_SIG
select ASN1
select OID_REGISTRY
select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
help
Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
is simply appended to the module. For more information see
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index be5b8fac4bd0..8eb20cc66b39 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
-#include <crypto/public_key.h>
-#include <crypto/hash.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
/*
@@ -28,157 +27,53 @@
* - Information block
*/
struct module_signature {
- u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [enum pkey_algo] */
- u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [enum hash_algo] */
- u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [enum pkey_id_type] */
- u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name */
- u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier */
+ u8 algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
+ u8 hash; /* Digest algorithm [0] */
+ u8 id_type; /* Key identifier type [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] */
+ u8 signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0] */
+ u8 key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0] */
u8 __pad[3];
__be32 sig_len; /* Length of signature data */
};
/*
- * Digest the module contents.
+ * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on a module.
*/
-static struct public_key_signature *mod_make_digest(enum hash_algo hash,
- const void *mod,
- unsigned long modlen)
+static int mod_verify_pkcs7(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len)
{
- struct public_key_signature *pks;
- struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- struct shash_desc *desc;
- size_t digest_size, desc_size;
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ bool trusted;
int ret;
- pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-
- /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
- * big the hash operational data will be.
- */
- tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_algo_name[hash], 0, 0);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) ? ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
-
- desc_size = crypto_shash_descsize(tfm) + sizeof(*desc);
- digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
-
- /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
- * context data and the digest output buffer on the end of that.
- */
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- pks = kzalloc(digest_size + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!pks)
- goto error_no_pks;
-
- pks->pkey_hash_algo = hash;
- pks->digest = (u8 *)pks + sizeof(*pks) + desc_size;
- pks->digest_size = digest_size;
-
- desc = (void *)pks + sizeof(*pks);
- desc->tfm = tfm;
- desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
-
- ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+ /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
+ if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, mod, modlen) < 0) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, mod, modlen, pks->digest);
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = ok\n", __func__);
- return pks;
+ if (!trusted) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ }
error:
- kfree(pks);
-error_no_pks:
- crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return ERR_PTR(ret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Extract an MPI array from the signature data. This represents the actual
- * signature. Each raw MPI is prefaced by a BE 2-byte value indicating the
- * size of the MPI in bytes.
- *
- * RSA signatures only have one MPI, so currently we only read one.
- */
-static int mod_extract_mpi_array(struct public_key_signature *pks,
- const void *data, size_t len)
-{
- size_t nbytes;
- MPI mpi;
-
- if (len < 3)
- return -EBADMSG;
- nbytes = ((const u8 *)data)[0] << 8 | ((const u8 *)data)[1];
- data += 2;
- len -= 2;
- if (len != nbytes)
- return -EBADMSG;
-
- mpi = mpi_read_raw_data(data, nbytes);
- if (!mpi)
- return -ENOMEM;
- pks->mpi[0] = mpi;
- pks->nr_mpi = 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Request an asymmetric key.
- */
-static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
- const u8 *key_id, size_t key_id_len)
-{
- key_ref_t key;
- size_t i;
- char *id, *q;
-
- pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu,,%zu)\n", __func__, signer_len, key_id_len);
-
- /* Construct an identifier. */
- id = kmalloc(signer_len + 2 + key_id_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!id)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
-
- memcpy(id, signer, signer_len);
-
- q = id + signer_len;
- *q++ = ':';
- *q++ = ' ';
- for (i = 0; i < key_id_len; i++) {
- *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id >> 4];
- *q++ = hex_asc[*key_id++ & 0x0f];
- }
-
- *q = 0;
-
- pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
-
- key = keyring_search(make_key_ref(system_trusted_keyring, 1),
- &key_type_asymmetric, id);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- pr_warn("Request for unknown module key '%s' err %ld\n",
- id, PTR_ERR(key));
- kfree(id);
-
- if (IS_ERR(key)) {
- switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
- /* Hide some search errors */
- case -EACCES:
- case -ENOTDIR:
- case -EAGAIN:
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
- default:
- return ERR_CAST(key);
- }
- }
-
- pr_devel("<==%s() = 0 [%x]\n", __func__, key_serial(key_ref_to_ptr(key)));
- return key_ref_to_ptr(key);
+ return ret;
}
/*
@@ -186,12 +81,8 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(const char *signer, size_t signer_len,
*/
int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
{
- struct public_key_signature *pks;
struct module_signature ms;
- struct key *key;
- const void *sig;
size_t modlen = *_modlen, sig_len;
- int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
@@ -205,46 +96,23 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
if (sig_len >= modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
modlen -= sig_len;
- if ((size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len >= modlen)
- return -EBADMSG;
- modlen -= (size_t)ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len;
-
*_modlen = modlen;
- sig = mod + modlen;
-
- /* For the moment, only support RSA and X.509 identifiers */
- if (ms.algo != PKEY_ALGO_RSA ||
- ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_X509)
- return -ENOPKG;
- if (ms.hash >= PKEY_HASH__LAST ||
- !hash_algo_name[ms.hash])
+ if (ms.id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7) {
+ pr_err("Module is not signed with expected PKCS#7 message\n");
return -ENOPKG;
-
- key = request_asymmetric_key(sig, ms.signer_len,
- sig + ms.signer_len, ms.key_id_len);
- if (IS_ERR(key))
- return PTR_ERR(key);
-
- pks = mod_make_digest(ms.hash, mod, modlen);
- if (IS_ERR(pks)) {
- ret = PTR_ERR(pks);
- goto error_put_key;
}
- ret = mod_extract_mpi_array(pks, sig + ms.signer_len + ms.key_id_len,
- sig_len);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_pks;
-
- ret = verify_signature(key, pks);
- pr_devel("verify_signature() = %d\n", ret);
+ if (ms.algo != 0 ||
+ ms.hash != 0 ||
+ ms.signer_len != 0 ||
+ ms.key_id_len != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[0] != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[1] != 0 ||
+ ms.__pad[2] != 0) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature info has unexpected non-zero params\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
-error_free_pks:
- mpi_free(pks->rsa.s);
- kfree(pks);
-error_put_key:
- key_put(key);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return ret;
+ return mod_verify_pkcs7(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len);
}
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile
index 2016a64497ab..b12fe020664d 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/Makefile
@@ -16,9 +16,11 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash
hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file
HOSTCFLAGS_sortextable.o = -I$(srctree)/tools/include
HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -I$(srctree)/include
+HOSTLOADLIBES_sign-file = -lcrypto
always := $(hostprogs-y) $(hostprogs-m)
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file b/scripts/sign-file
deleted file mode 100755
index 3906ee1e2f76..000000000000
--- a/scripts/sign-file
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,421 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl -w
-#
-# Sign a module file using the given key.
-#
-
-my $USAGE =
-"Usage: scripts/sign-file [-v] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n" .
-" scripts/sign-file [-v] -s <raw sig> <hash algo> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n";
-
-use strict;
-use FileHandle;
-use IPC::Open2;
-use Getopt::Std;
-
-my %opts;
-getopts('vs:', \%opts) or die $USAGE;
-my $verbose = $opts{'v'};
-my $signature_file = $opts{'s'};
-
-die $USAGE if ($#ARGV > 4);
-die $USAGE if (!$signature_file && $#ARGV < 3 || $signature_file && $#ARGV < 2);
-
-my $dgst = shift @ARGV;
-my $private_key;
-if (!$signature_file) {
- $private_key = shift @ARGV;
-}
-my $x509 = shift @ARGV;
-my $module = shift @ARGV;
-my ($dest, $keep_orig);
-if (@ARGV) {
- $dest = $ARGV[0];
- $keep_orig = 1;
-} else {
- $dest = $module . "~";
-}
-
-die "Can't read private key\n" if (!$signature_file && !-r $private_key);
-die "Can't read signature file\n" if ($signature_file && !-r $signature_file);
-die "Can't read X.509 certificate\n" unless (-r $x509);
-die "Can't read module\n" unless (-r $module);
-
-#
-# Function to read the contents of a file into a variable.
-#
-sub read_file($)
-{
- my ($file) = @_;
- my $contents;
- my $len;
-
- open(FD, "<$file") || die $file;
- binmode FD;
- my @st = stat(FD);
- die $file if (!@st);
- $len = read(FD, $contents, $st[7]) || die $file;
- close(FD) || die $file;
- die "$file: Wanted length ", $st[7], ", got ", $len, "\n"
- if ($len != $st[7]);
- return $contents;
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# First of all, we have to parse the X.509 certificate to find certain details
-# about it.
-#
-# We read the DER-encoded X509 certificate and parse it to extract the Subject
-# name and Subject Key Identifier. Theis provides the data we need to build
-# the certificate identifier.
-#
-# The signer's name part of the identifier is fabricated from the commonName,
-# the organizationName or the emailAddress components of the X.509 subject
-# name.
-#
-# The subject key ID is used to select which of that signer's certificates
-# we're intending to use to sign the module.
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $x509_certificate = read_file($x509);
-
-my $UNIV = 0 << 6;
-my $APPL = 1 << 6;
-my $CONT = 2 << 6;
-my $PRIV = 3 << 6;
-
-my $CONS = 0x20;
-
-my $BOOLEAN = 0x01;
-my $INTEGER = 0x02;
-my $BIT_STRING = 0x03;
-my $OCTET_STRING = 0x04;
-my $NULL = 0x05;
-my $OBJ_ID = 0x06;
-my $UTF8String = 0x0c;
-my $SEQUENCE = 0x10;
-my $SET = 0x11;
-my $UTCTime = 0x17;
-my $GeneralizedTime = 0x18;
-
-my %OIDs = (
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 3) => "commonName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 6) => "countryName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 10) => "organizationName",
- pack("CCC", 85, 4, 11) => "organizationUnitName",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 1) => "rsaEncryption",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 1, 5) => "sha1WithRSAEncryption",
- pack("CCCCCCCCC", 42, 134, 72, 134, 247, 13, 1, 9, 1) => "emailAddress",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 35) => "authorityKeyIdentifier",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 14) => "subjectKeyIdentifier",
- pack("CCC", 85, 29, 19) => "basicConstraints"
-);
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Extract an ASN.1 element from a string and return information about it.
-#
-###############################################################################
-sub asn1_extract($$@)
-{
- my ($cursor, $expected_tag, $optional) = @_;
-
- return [ -1 ]
- if ($cursor->[1] == 0 && $optional);
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (elem ", $cursor->[1], ")\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < 2);
-
- my ($tag, $len) = unpack("CC", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 2));
-
- if ($expected_tag != -1 && $tag != $expected_tag) {
- return [ -1 ]
- if ($optional);
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 unexpected tag (", $tag,
- " not ", $expected_tag, ")\n";
- }
-
- $cursor->[0] += 2;
- $cursor->[1] -= 2;
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 long tag\n"
- if (($tag & 0x1f) == 0x1f);
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 indefinite length\n"
- if ($len == 0x80);
-
- if ($len > 0x80) {
- my $l = $len - 0x80;
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (len len $l)\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < $l);
-
- if ($l == 0x1) {
- $len = unpack("C", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 1));
- } elsif ($l == 0x2) {
- $len = unpack("n", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 2));
- } elsif ($l == 0x3) {
- $len = unpack("C", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 1)) << 16;
- $len = unpack("n", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0] + 1, 2));
- } elsif ($l == 0x4) {
- $len = unpack("N", substr(${$cursor->[2]}, $cursor->[0], 4));
- } else {
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 element too long (", $l, ")\n";
- }
-
- $cursor->[0] += $l;
- $cursor->[1] -= $l;
- }
-
- die $x509, ": ", $cursor->[0], ": ASN.1 data underrun (", $len, ")\n"
- if ($cursor->[1] < $len);
-
- my $ret = [ $tag, [ $cursor->[0], $len, $cursor->[2] ] ];
- $cursor->[0] += $len;
- $cursor->[1] -= $len;
-
- return $ret;
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Retrieve the data referred to by a cursor
-#
-###############################################################################
-sub asn1_retrieve($)
-{
- my ($cursor) = @_;
- my ($offset, $len, $data) = @$cursor;
- return substr($$data, $offset, $len);
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Roughly parse the X.509 certificate
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $cursor = [ 0, length($x509_certificate), \$x509_certificate ];
-
-my $cert = asn1_extract($cursor, $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $tbs = asn1_extract($cert->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $version = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 0, 1);
-my $serial_number = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $INTEGER);
-my $sig_type = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $issuer = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $validity = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $subject = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $key = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-my $issuer_uid = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 1, 1);
-my $subject_uid = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 2, 1);
-my $extension_list = asn1_extract($tbs->[1], $CONT | $CONS | 3, 1);
-
-my $subject_key_id = ();
-my $authority_key_id = ();
-
-#
-# Parse the extension list
-#
-if ($extension_list->[0] != -1) {
- my $extensions = asn1_extract($extension_list->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
-
- while ($extensions->[1]->[1] > 0) {
- my $ext = asn1_extract($extensions->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
- my $x_oid = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $OBJ_ID);
- my $x_crit = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $BOOLEAN, 1);
- my $x_val = asn1_extract($ext->[1], $UNIV | $OCTET_STRING);
-
- my $raw_oid = asn1_retrieve($x_oid->[1]);
- next if (!exists($OIDs{$raw_oid}));
- my $x_type = $OIDs{$raw_oid};
-
- my $raw_value = asn1_retrieve($x_val->[1]);
-
- if ($x_type eq "subjectKeyIdentifier") {
- my $vcursor = [ 0, length($raw_value), \$raw_value ];
-
- $subject_key_id = asn1_extract($vcursor, $UNIV | $OCTET_STRING);
- }
- }
-}
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Determine what we're going to use as the signer's name. In order of
-# preference, take one of: commonName, organizationName or emailAddress.
-#
-###############################################################################
-my $org = "";
-my $cn = "";
-my $email = "";
-
-while ($subject->[1]->[1] > 0) {
- my $rdn = asn1_extract($subject->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SET);
- my $attr = asn1_extract($rdn->[1], $UNIV | $CONS | $SEQUENCE);
- my $n_oid = asn1_extract($attr->[1], $UNIV | $OBJ_ID);
- my $n_val = asn1_extract($attr->[1], -1);
-
- my $raw_oid = asn1_retrieve($n_oid->[1]);
- next if (!exists($OIDs{$raw_oid}));
- my $n_type = $OIDs{$raw_oid};
-
- my $raw_value = asn1_retrieve($n_val->[1]);
-
- if ($n_type eq "organizationName") {
- $org = $raw_value;
- } elsif ($n_type eq "commonName") {
- $cn = $raw_value;
- } elsif ($n_type eq "emailAddress") {
- $email = $raw_value;
- }
-}
-
-my $signers_name = $email;
-
-if ($org && $cn) {
- # Don't use the organizationName if the commonName repeats it
- if (length($org) <= length($cn) &&
- substr($cn, 0, length($org)) eq $org) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
- goto got_id_name;
- }
-
- # Or a signifcant chunk of it
- if (length($org) >= 7 &&
- length($cn) >= 7 &&
- substr($cn, 0, 7) eq substr($org, 0, 7)) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
- goto got_id_name;
- }
-
- $signers_name = $org . ": " . $cn;
-} elsif ($org) {
- $signers_name = $org;
-} elsif ($cn) {
- $signers_name = $cn;
-}
-
-got_id_name:
-
-die $x509, ": ", "X.509: Couldn't find the Subject Key Identifier extension\n"
- if (!$subject_key_id);
-
-my $key_identifier = asn1_retrieve($subject_key_id->[1]);
-
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Create and attach the module signature
-#
-###############################################################################
-
-#
-# Signature parameters
-#
-my $algo = 1; # Public-key crypto algorithm: RSA
-my $hash = 0; # Digest algorithm
-my $id_type = 1; # Identifier type: X.509
-
-#
-# Digest the data
-#
-my $prologue;
-if ($dgst eq "sha1") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
- 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14);
- $hash = 2;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha224") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C);
- $hash = 7;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha256") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20);
- $hash = 4;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha384") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30);
- $hash = 5;
-} elsif ($dgst eq "sha512") {
- $prologue = pack("C*",
- 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
- 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40);
- $hash = 6;
-} else {
- die "Unknown hash algorithm: $dgst\n";
-}
-
-my $signature;
-if ($signature_file) {
- $signature = read_file($signature_file);
-} else {
- #
- # Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
- #
- my $digest;
- $digest = readpipe("openssl dgst -$dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
-
- #
- # Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that
- # comprises the signature with no metadata attached.
- #
- my $pid;
- $pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
- "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
- die "openssl rsautl";
- binmode write_to;
- print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
- close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
-
- binmode read_from;
- read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
- close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
- waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
- die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
-}
-$signature = pack("n", length($signature)) . $signature,
-
-#
-# Build the signed binary
-#
-my $unsigned_module = read_file($module);
-
-my $magic_number = "~Module signature appended~\n";
-
-my $info = pack("CCCCCxxxN",
- $algo, $hash, $id_type,
- length($signers_name),
- length($key_identifier),
- length($signature));
-
-if ($verbose) {
- print "Size of unsigned module: ", length($unsigned_module), "\n";
- print "Size of signer's name : ", length($signers_name), "\n";
- print "Size of key identifier : ", length($key_identifier), "\n";
- print "Size of signature : ", length($signature), "\n";
- print "Size of information : ", length($info), "\n";
- print "Size of magic number : ", length($magic_number), "\n";
- print "Signer's name : '", $signers_name, "'\n";
- print "Digest : $dgst\n";
-}
-
-open(FD, ">$dest") || die $dest;
-binmode FD;
-print FD
- $unsigned_module,
- $signers_name,
- $key_identifier,
- $signature,
- $info,
- $magic_number
- ;
-close FD || die $dest;
-
-if (!$keep_orig) {
- rename($dest, $module) || die $module;
-}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 08/27] sign-file: Add option to only create signature file [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 07/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 messages as module signatures " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:44 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 09/27] system_keyring.c doesn't need to #include module-internal.h " David Howells
` (19 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Make the -d option (which currently isn't actually wired to anything) write
out the PKCS#7 message as per the -p option and then exit without either
modifying the source or writing out a compound file of the source, signature
and metadata.
This will be useful when firmware signature support is added
upstream as firmware will be left intact, and we'll only require
the signature file. The descriptor is implicit by file extension
and the file's own size.
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
scripts/sign-file.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
index 5b8a6dda3235..39aaabe89388 100755
--- a/scripts/sign-file.c
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -86,13 +86,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
char *hash_algo = NULL;
char *private_key_name, *x509_name, *module_name, *dest_name;
bool save_pkcs7 = false, replace_orig;
+ bool sign_only = false;
unsigned char buf[4096];
unsigned long module_size, pkcs7_size;
const EVP_MD *digest_algo;
EVP_PKEY *private_key;
PKCS7 *pkcs7;
X509 *x509;
- BIO *b, *bd, *bm;
+ BIO *b, *bd = NULL, *bm;
int opt, n;
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
opt = getopt(argc, argv, "dp");
switch (opt) {
case 'p': save_pkcs7 = true; break;
+ case 'd': sign_only = true; save_pkcs7 = true; break;
case -1: break;
default: format();
}
@@ -148,8 +150,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/* Open the destination file now so that we can shovel the module data
* across as we read it.
*/
- bd = BIO_new_file(dest_name, "wb");
- ERR(!bd, "%s", dest_name);
+ if (!sign_only) {
+ bd = BIO_new_file(dest_name, "wb");
+ ERR(!bd, "%s", dest_name);
+ }
/* Digest the module data. */
OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
@@ -180,6 +184,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_free(b);
}
+ if (sign_only)
+ return 0;
+
/* Append the marker and the PKCS#7 message to the destination file */
ERR(BIO_reset(bm) < 0, "%s", module_name);
while ((n = BIO_read(bm, buf, sizeof(buf))),
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 09/27] system_keyring.c doesn't need to #include module-internal.h [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 08/27] sign-file: Add option to only create signature file " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:44 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 10/27] MODSIGN: Extract the blob PKCS#7 signature verifier from module signing " David Howells
` (18 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
system_keyring.c doesn't need to #include module-internal.h as it doesn't use
the one thing that exports. Remove the inclusion.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/system_keyring.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index 875f64e8935b..4cda71ee51c7 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
-#include "module-internal.h"
struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 10/27] MODSIGN: Extract the blob PKCS#7 signature verifier from module signing [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 09/27] system_keyring.c doesn't need to #include module-internal.h " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:45 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 11/27] modsign: Abort modules_install when signing fails " David Howells
` (17 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Extract the function that drives the PKCS#7 signature verification given a
data blob and a PKCS#7 blob out from the module signing code and lump it with
the system keyring code as it's generic. This makes it independent of module
config options and opens it to use by the firmware loader.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>
---
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 5 ++++
init/Kconfig | 29 ++++++++++++++++--------
kernel/module_signing.c | 44 +-----------------------------------
kernel/system_keyring.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 72665eb80692..9791c907cdb7 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -28,4 +28,9 @@ static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len);
+#endif
+
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index e16d9e587cee..14b3d8422502 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1752,6 +1752,24 @@ config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+config SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+ def_bool n
+ select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ select KEYS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
+ select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
+ select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
+ select ASN1
+ select OID_REGISTRY
+ select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
+ select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ help
+ Provide PKCS#7 message verification using the contents of the system
+ trusted keyring to provide public keys. This then can be used for
+ module verification, kexec image verification and firmware blob
+ verification.
+
config PROFILING
bool "Profiling support"
help
@@ -1860,16 +1878,7 @@ config MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL
config MODULE_SIG
bool "Module signature verification"
depends on MODULES
- select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
- select KEYS
- select CRYPTO
- select ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
- select ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE
- select PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA
- select ASN1
- select OID_REGISTRY
- select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER
- select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER
+ select SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
help
Check modules for valid signatures upon load: the signature
is simply appended to the module. For more information see
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 8eb20cc66b39..70ad463f6df0 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -10,10 +10,8 @@
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/err.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
-#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
/*
@@ -37,46 +35,6 @@ struct module_signature {
};
/*
- * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on a module.
- */
-static int mod_verify_pkcs7(const void *mod, unsigned long modlen,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len)
-{
- struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
- bool trusted;
- int ret;
-
- pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
- if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
- return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
-
- /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
- if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, mod, modlen) < 0) {
- pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
- ret = -EBADMSG;
- goto error;
- }
-
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
-
- if (!trusted) {
- pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
- ret = -ENOKEY;
- }
-
-error:
- pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
- pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
* Verify the signature on a module.
*/
int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
@@ -114,5 +72,5 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
}
- return mod_verify_pkcs7(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len);
+ return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len);
}
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index 4cda71ee51c7..95f2dcbc7616 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
+#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_trusted_keyring);
@@ -103,3 +104,52 @@ dodgy_cert:
return 0;
}
late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+
+/**
+ * Verify a PKCS#7-based signature on system data.
+ * @data: The data to be verified.
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
+ * @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ */
+int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
+ bool trusted;
+ int ret;
+
+ pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(raw_pkcs7, pkcs7_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pkcs7))
+ return PTR_ERR(pkcs7);
+
+ /* The data should be detached - so we need to supply it. */
+ if (pkcs7_supply_detached_data(pkcs7, data, len) < 0) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature with non-detached data\n");
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!trusted) {
+ pr_err("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n");
+ ret = -ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+error:
+ pkcs7_free_message(pkcs7);
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(system_verify_data);
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 11/27] modsign: Abort modules_install when signing fails [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 10/27] MODSIGN: Extract the blob PKCS#7 signature verifier from module signing " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:45 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 12/27] modsign: Allow password to be specified for signing key " David Howells
` (16 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
scripts/Makefile.modinst | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modinst b/scripts/Makefile.modinst
index e48a4e9d8868..07650eeaaf06 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.modinst
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.modinst
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ quiet_cmd_modules_install = INSTALL $@
mkdir -p $(2) ; \
cp $@ $(2) ; \
$(mod_strip_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) ; \
- $(mod_sign_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) $(patsubst %,|| true,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)) ; \
+ $(mod_sign_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@) $(patsubst %,|| true,$(KBUILD_EXTMOD)) && \
$(mod_compress_cmd) $(2)/$(notdir $@)
# Modules built outside the kernel source tree go into extra by default
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 12/27] modsign: Allow password to be specified for signing key [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 11/27] modsign: Abort modules_install when signing fails " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:45 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 13/27] modsign: Allow signing key to be PKCS#11 " David Howells
` (15 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
We don't want this in the Kconfig since it might then get exposed in
/proc/config.gz. So make it a parameter to Kbuild instead. This also
means we don't have to jump through hoops to strip quotes from it, as
we would if it was a config option.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt | 5 +++++
Documentation/module-signing.txt | 3 +++
scripts/sign-file.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt b/Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt
index 6466704d47b5..0ff6a466a05b 100644
--- a/Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kbuild/kbuild.txt
@@ -174,6 +174,11 @@ The output directory is often set using "O=..." on the commandline.
The value can be overridden in which case the default value is ignored.
+KBUILD_SIGN_PIN
+--------------------------------------------------
+This variable allows a passphrase or PIN to be passed to the sign-file
+utility when signing kernel modules, if the private key requires such.
+
KBUILD_MODPOST_WARN
--------------------------------------------------
KBUILD_MODPOST_WARN can be set to avoid errors in case of undefined
diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
index c72702ec1ded..faaa6ea002f7 100644
--- a/Documentation/module-signing.txt
+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ The hash algorithm used does not have to match the one configured, but if it
doesn't, you should make sure that hash algorithm is either built into the
kernel or can be loaded without requiring itself.
+If the private key requires a passphrase or PIN, it can be provided in the
+$KBUILD_SIGN_PIN environment variable.
+
============================
SIGNED MODULES AND STRIPPING
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
index 39aaabe89388..720b9bc933ae 100755
--- a/scripts/sign-file.c
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -80,6 +80,27 @@ static void drain_openssl_errors(void)
} \
} while(0)
+static const char *key_pass;
+
+static int pem_pw_cb(char *buf, int len, int w, void *v)
+{
+ int pwlen;
+
+ if (!key_pass)
+ return -1;
+
+ pwlen = strlen(key_pass);
+ if (pwlen >= len)
+ return -1;
+
+ strcpy(buf, key_pass);
+
+ /* If it's wrong, don't keep trying it. */
+ key_pass = NULL;
+
+ return pwlen;
+}
+
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct module_signature sig_info = { .id_type = PKEY_ID_PKCS7 };
@@ -96,9 +117,12 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
BIO *b, *bd = NULL, *bm;
int opt, n;
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_clear_error();
+ key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
+
do {
opt = getopt(argc, argv, "dp");
switch (opt) {
@@ -132,7 +156,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
*/
b = BIO_new_file(private_key_name, "rb");
ERR(!b, "%s", private_key_name);
- private_key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ private_key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, NULL);
+ ERR(!private_key, "%s", private_key_name);
BIO_free(b);
b = BIO_new_file(x509_name, "rb");
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 13/27] modsign: Allow signing key to be PKCS#11 [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 12/27] modsign: Allow password to be specified for signing key " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:45 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 14/27] modsign: Allow external signing key to be specified " David Howells
` (14 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
This is only the key; the corresponding *cert* still needs to be in
$(topdir)/signing_key.x509. And there's no way to actually use this
from the build system yet.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
scripts/sign-file.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
index 720b9bc933ae..ad0aa21bd3ac 100755
--- a/scripts/sign-file.c
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
struct module_signature {
uint8_t algo; /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0] */
@@ -154,11 +155,29 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/* Read the private key and the X.509 cert the PKCS#7 message
* will point to.
*/
- b = BIO_new_file(private_key_name, "rb");
- ERR(!b, "%s", private_key_name);
- private_key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, NULL);
- ERR(!private_key, "%s", private_key_name);
- BIO_free(b);
+ if (!strncmp(private_key_name, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+ ENGINE *e;
+
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ e = ENGINE_by_id("pkcs11");
+ ERR(!e, "Load PKCS#11 ENGINE");
+ if (ENGINE_init(e))
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ else
+ ERR(1, "ENGINE_init");
+ if (key_pass)
+ ERR(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "PIN", key_pass, 0), "Set PKCS#11 PIN");
+ private_key = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, private_key_name, NULL,
+ NULL);
+ ERR(!private_key, "%s", private_key_name);
+ } else {
+ b = BIO_new_file(private_key_name, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", private_key_name);
+ private_key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, NULL);
+ ERR(!private_key, "%s", private_key_name);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ }
b = BIO_new_file(x509_name, "rb");
ERR(!b, "%s", x509_name);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 14/27] modsign: Allow external signing key to be specified [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 13/27] modsign: Allow signing key to be PKCS#11 " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:45 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 15/27] modsign: Extract signing cert from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed " David Howells
` (13 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
Documentation/module-signing.txt | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
Makefile | 2 +-
init/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++
kernel/Makefile | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
index faaa6ea002f7..84597c7ea175 100644
--- a/Documentation/module-signing.txt
+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
@@ -88,6 +88,22 @@ This has a number of options available:
than being a module) so that modules signed with that algorithm can have
their signatures checked without causing a dependency loop.
+ (4) "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)
+
+ Setting this option to something other than its default of
+ "signing_key.priv" will disable the autogeneration of signing keys and
+ allow the kernel modules to be signed with a key of your choosing.
+ The string provided should identify a file containing a private key
+ in PEM form, or — on systems where the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is
+ appropriately installed — a PKCS#11 URI as defined by RFC7512.
+
+ If the PEM file containing the private key is encrypted, or if the
+ PKCS#11 token requries a PIN, this can be provided at build time by
+ means of the KBUILD_SIGN_PIN variable.
+
+ The corresponding X.509 certificate in DER form should still be placed
+ in a file named signing_key.x509 in the top-level build directory.
+
=======================
GENERATING SIGNING KEYS
@@ -100,8 +116,9 @@ it can be deleted or stored securely. The public key gets built into the
kernel so that it can be used to check the signatures as the modules are
loaded.
-Under normal conditions, the kernel build will automatically generate a new
-keypair using openssl if one does not exist in the files:
+Under normal conditions, when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY is unchanged from its
+default of "signing_key.priv", the kernel build will automatically generate
+a new keypair using openssl if one does not exist in the files:
signing_key.priv
signing_key.x509
@@ -135,8 +152,12 @@ kernel sources tree and the openssl command. The following is an example to
generate the public/private key files:
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -sha256 -days 36500 -batch -x509 \
- -config x509.genkey -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
- -keyout signing_key.priv
+ -config x509.genkey -outform PEM -out kernel_key.pem \
+ -keyout kernel_key.pem
+
+The full pathname for the resulting kernel_key.pem file can then be specified
+in the CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY option, and the certificate and key therein will
+be used instead of an autogenerated keypair.
=========================
@@ -181,7 +202,7 @@ To manually sign a module, use the scripts/sign-file tool available in
the Linux kernel source tree. The script requires 4 arguments:
1. The hash algorithm (e.g., sha256)
- 2. The private key filename
+ 2. The private key filename or PKCS#11 URI
3. The public key filename
4. The kernel module to be signed
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index dc87ec280fbc..531dd16c9751 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ INITRD_COMPRESS-$(CONFIG_RD_LZ4) := lz4
# export INITRD_COMPRESS := $(INITRD_COMPRESS-y)
ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL
-MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv
+MODSECKEY = $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)
MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509
export MODPUBKEY
mod_sign_cmd = scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 14b3d8422502..1b1148e9181b 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1948,6 +1948,20 @@ config MODULE_SIG_HASH
default "sha384" if MODULE_SIG_SHA384
default "sha512" if MODULE_SIG_SHA512
+config MODULE_SIG_KEY
+ string "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key"
+ default "signing_key.priv"
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
+ help
+ Provide the file name of a private key in PKCS#8 PEM format, or
+ a PKCS#11 URI according to RFC7512. The corresponding X.509
+ certificate in DER form should be present in signing_key.x509
+ in the top-level build directory.
+
+ If this option is unchanged from its default "signing_key.priv",
+ then the kernel will automatically generate the private key and
+ certificate as described in Documentation/module-signing.txt
+
config MODULE_COMPRESS
bool "Compress modules on installation"
depends on MODULES
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 43c4c920f30a..2c937ace292e 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH
$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config)
endif
+# We do it this way rather than having a boolean option for enabling an
+# external private key, because 'make randconfig' might enable such a
+# boolean option and we unfortunately can't make it depend on !RANDCONFIG.
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),"signing_key.priv")
signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey
@echo "###"
@echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules."
@@ -207,3 +211,4 @@ x509.genkey:
@echo >>x509.genkey "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
@echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
endif
+endif
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 15/27] modsign: Extract signing cert from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 14/27] modsign: Allow external signing key to be specified " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:45 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 16/27] modsign: Use single PEM file for autogenerated key " David Howells
` (12 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Where an external PEM file or PKCS#11 URI is given, we can get the cert
from it for ourselves instead of making the user drop signing_key.x509
in place for us.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
Documentation/module-signing.txt | 11 +--
init/Kconfig | 8 +-
kernel/Makefile | 38 +++++++++++
scripts/Makefile | 3 +
| 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 scripts/extract-cert.c
diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
index 84597c7ea175..693001920890 100644
--- a/Documentation/module-signing.txt
+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
@@ -93,17 +93,16 @@ This has a number of options available:
Setting this option to something other than its default of
"signing_key.priv" will disable the autogeneration of signing keys and
allow the kernel modules to be signed with a key of your choosing.
- The string provided should identify a file containing a private key
- in PEM form, or — on systems where the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is
- appropriately installed — a PKCS#11 URI as defined by RFC7512.
+ The string provided should identify a file containing both a private
+ key and its corresponding X.509 certificate in PEM form, or — on
+ systems where the OpenSSL ENGINE_pkcs11 is functional — a PKCS#11 URI
+ as defined by RFC7512. In the latter case, the PKCS#11 URI should
+ reference both a certificate and a private key.
If the PEM file containing the private key is encrypted, or if the
PKCS#11 token requries a PIN, this can be provided at build time by
means of the KBUILD_SIGN_PIN variable.
- The corresponding X.509 certificate in DER form should still be placed
- in a file named signing_key.x509 in the top-level build directory.
-
=======================
GENERATING SIGNING KEYS
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 1b1148e9181b..e2e0a1d27886 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1953,10 +1953,10 @@ config MODULE_SIG_KEY
default "signing_key.priv"
depends on MODULE_SIG
help
- Provide the file name of a private key in PKCS#8 PEM format, or
- a PKCS#11 URI according to RFC7512. The corresponding X.509
- certificate in DER form should be present in signing_key.x509
- in the top-level build directory.
+ Provide the file name of a private key/certificate in PEM format,
+ or a PKCS#11 URI according to RFC7512. The file should contain, or
+ the URI should identify, both the certificate and its corresponding
+ private key.
If this option is unchanged from its default "signing_key.priv",
then the kernel will automatically generate the private key and
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 2c937ace292e..fa2f8b84b18a 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -210,5 +210,43 @@ x509.genkey:
@echo >>x509.genkey "keyUsage=digitalSignature"
@echo >>x509.genkey "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
@echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
+else
+# For external (PKCS#11 or PEM) key, we need to obtain the certificate from
+# CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY automatically.
+quiet_cmd_extract_der = CERT_DER $(2)
+ cmd_extract_der = scripts/extract-cert "$(2)" signing_key.x509
+
+# CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY is either a PKCS#11 URI or a filename. It is
+# surrounded by quotes, and may contain spaces. To strip the quotes
+# with $(patsubst) we need to turn the spaces into something else.
+# And if it's a filename, those spaces need to be escaped as '\ ' in
+# order to use it in dependencies or $(wildcard).
+space :=
+space +=
+space_escape := %%%SPACE%%%
+X509_SOURCE_temp := $(subst $(space),$(space_escape),$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+# We need this to check for absolute paths or PKCS#11 URIs.
+X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD := $(patsubst "%",%,$(X509_SOURCE_temp))
+# This is the actual source filename/URI without the quotes
+X509_SOURCE := $(subst $(space_escape),$(space),$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD))
+# This\ version\ with\ spaces\ escaped\ for\ $(wildcard)\ and\ dependencies
+X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED := $(subst $(space_escape),\$(space),$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD))
+
+ifeq ($(patsubst pkcs11:%,%,$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD)),$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD))
+# If it's a filename, depend on it.
+X509_DEP := $(X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED)
+ifeq ($(patsubst /%,%,$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD)),$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD))
+ifeq ($(wildcard $(X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED)),)
+ifneq ($(wildcard $(srctree)/$(X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED)),)
+# Non-absolute filename, found in source tree and not build tree
+X509_SOURCE := $(srctree)/$(X509_SOURCE)
+X509_DEP := $(srctree)/$(X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED)
+endif
+endif
+endif
+endif
+
+signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert include/config/module/sig/key.h $(X509_DEP)
+ $(call cmd,extract_der,$(X509_SOURCE))
endif
endif
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile
index b12fe020664d..236f683510bd 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/Makefile
@@ -16,11 +16,12 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash
hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file extract-cert
HOSTCFLAGS_sortextable.o = -I$(srctree)/tools/include
HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -I$(srctree)/include
HOSTLOADLIBES_sign-file = -lcrypto
+HOSTLOADLIBES_extract-cert = -lcrypto
always := $(hostprogs-y) $(hostprogs-m)
--git a/scripts/extract-cert.c b/scripts/extract-cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4fd5b2f07b45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/extract-cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/* Extract X.509 certificate in DER form from PKCS#11 or PEM.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2014 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright © 2015 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Authors: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
+ * David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <err.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#define PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+static __attribute__((noreturn))
+void format(void)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Usage: scripts/extract-cert <source> <dest>\n");
+ exit(2);
+}
+
+static void display_openssl_errors(int l)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ char buf[120];
+ int e, line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ fprintf(stderr, "At main.c:%d:\n", l);
+
+ while ((e = ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line))) {
+ ERR_error_string(e, buf);
+ fprintf(stderr, "- SSL %s: %s:%d\n", buf, file, line);
+ }
+}
+
+static void drain_openssl_errors(void)
+{
+ const char *file;
+ int line;
+
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ while (ERR_get_error_line(&file, &line)) {}
+}
+
+#define ERR(cond, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ bool __cond = (cond); \
+ display_openssl_errors(__LINE__); \
+ if (__cond) { \
+ err(1, fmt, ## __VA_ARGS__); \
+ } \
+ } while(0)
+
+static const char *key_pass;
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ char *cert_src, *cert_dst;
+ X509 *x509;
+ BIO *b;
+
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
+
+ if (argc != 3)
+ format();
+
+ cert_src = argv[1];
+ cert_dst = argv[2];
+
+ if (!strncmp(cert_src, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+ ENGINE *e;
+ struct {
+ const char *cert_id;
+ X509 *cert;
+ } parms;
+
+ parms.cert_id = cert_src;
+ parms.cert = NULL;
+
+ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ e = ENGINE_by_id("pkcs11");
+ ERR(!e, "Load PKCS#11 ENGINE");
+ if (ENGINE_init(e))
+ drain_openssl_errors();
+ else
+ ERR(1, "ENGINE_init");
+ if (key_pass)
+ ERR(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "PIN", key_pass, 0), "Set PKCS#11 PIN");
+ ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "LOAD_CERT_CTRL", 0, &parms, NULL, 1);
+ ERR(!parms.cert, "Get X.509 from PKCS#11");
+ x509 = parms.cert;
+ } else {
+ b = BIO_new_file(cert_src, "rb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", cert_src);
+ x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ ERR(!x509, "%s", cert_src);
+ BIO_free(b);
+ }
+
+ b = BIO_new_file(cert_dst, "wb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", cert_dst);
+ ERR(!i2d_X509_bio(b, x509), cert_dst);
+ BIO_free(b);
+
+ return 0;
+}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 16/27] modsign: Use single PEM file for autogenerated key [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 15/27] modsign: Extract signing cert from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:46 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 17/27] modsign: Add explicit CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS option " David Howells
` (11 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
The current rule for generating signing_key.priv and signing_key.x509 is
a classic example of a bad rule which has a tendency to break parallel
make. When invoked to create *either* target, it generates the other
target as a side-effect that make didn't predict.
So let's switch to using a single file signing_key.pem which contains
both key and certificate. That matches what we do in the case of an
external key specified by CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY anyway, so it's also
slightly cleaner.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
.gitignore | 1 +
Documentation/module-signing.txt | 9 ++++-----
Makefile | 4 ++--
init/Kconfig | 4 ++--
kernel/Makefile | 15 +++++++--------
5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 4ad4a98b884b..17fa24dd7e46 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ GTAGS
# Leavings from module signing
#
extra_certificates
+signing_key.pem
signing_key.priv
signing_key.x509
x509.genkey
diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
index 693001920890..5d5e4e32dc26 100644
--- a/Documentation/module-signing.txt
+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ This has a number of options available:
(4) "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)
Setting this option to something other than its default of
- "signing_key.priv" will disable the autogeneration of signing keys and
+ "signing_key.pem" will disable the autogeneration of signing keys and
allow the kernel modules to be signed with a key of your choosing.
The string provided should identify a file containing both a private
key and its corresponding X.509 certificate in PEM form, or — on
@@ -116,11 +116,10 @@ kernel so that it can be used to check the signatures as the modules are
loaded.
Under normal conditions, when CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY is unchanged from its
-default of "signing_key.priv", the kernel build will automatically generate
-a new keypair using openssl if one does not exist in the files:
+default, the kernel build will automatically generate a new keypair using
+openssl if one does not exist in the file:
- signing_key.priv
- signing_key.x509
+ signing_key.pem
during the building of vmlinux (the public part of the key needs to be built
into vmlinux) using parameters in the:
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 531dd16c9751..6ab99d8cc23c 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1173,8 +1173,8 @@ MRPROPER_DIRS += include/config usr/include include/generated \
arch/*/include/generated .tmp_objdiff
MRPROPER_FILES += .config .config.old .version .old_version \
Module.symvers tags TAGS cscope* GPATH GTAGS GRTAGS GSYMS \
- signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 x509.genkey \
- extra_certificates signing_key.x509.keyid \
+ signing_key.pem signing_key.priv signing_key.x509 \
+ x509.genkey extra_certificates signing_key.x509.keyid \
signing_key.x509.signer vmlinux-gdb.py
# clean - Delete most, but leave enough to build external modules
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index e2e0a1d27886..2b119850784b 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ config MODULE_SIG_HASH
config MODULE_SIG_KEY
string "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key"
- default "signing_key.priv"
+ default "signing_key.pem"
depends on MODULE_SIG
help
Provide the file name of a private key/certificate in PEM format,
@@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ config MODULE_SIG_KEY
the URI should identify, both the certificate and its corresponding
private key.
- If this option is unchanged from its default "signing_key.priv",
+ If this option is unchanged from its default "signing_key.pem",
then the kernel will automatically generate the private key and
certificate as described in Documentation/module-signing.txt
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index fa2f8b84b18a..7453283981ca 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -173,8 +173,8 @@ endif
# We do it this way rather than having a boolean option for enabling an
# external private key, because 'make randconfig' might enable such a
# boolean option and we unfortunately can't make it depend on !RANDCONFIG.
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),"signing_key.priv")
-signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),"signing_key.pem")
+signing_key.pem: x509.genkey
@echo "###"
@echo "### Now generating an X.509 key pair to be used for signing modules."
@echo "###"
@@ -185,8 +185,8 @@ signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey
@echo "###"
openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
-batch -x509 -config x509.genkey \
- -outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
- -keyout signing_key.priv 2>&1
+ -outform PEM -out signing_key.pem \
+ -keyout signing_key.pem 2>&1
@echo "###"
@echo "### Key pair generated."
@echo "###"
@@ -210,9 +210,9 @@ x509.genkey:
@echo >>x509.genkey "keyUsage=digitalSignature"
@echo >>x509.genkey "subjectKeyIdentifier=hash"
@echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
-else
-# For external (PKCS#11 or PEM) key, we need to obtain the certificate from
-# CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY automatically.
+endif
+
+# We need to obtain the certificate from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY.
quiet_cmd_extract_der = CERT_DER $(2)
cmd_extract_der = scripts/extract-cert "$(2)" signing_key.x509
@@ -249,4 +249,3 @@ endif
signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert include/config/module/sig/key.h $(X509_DEP)
$(call cmd,extract_der,$(X509_SOURCE))
endif
-endif
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 17/27] modsign: Add explicit CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS option [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 16/27] modsign: Use single PEM file for autogenerated key " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:46 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 18/27] PKCS#7: Check content type and versions " David Howells
` (10 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Let the user explicitly provide a file containing trusted keys, instead of
just automatically finding files matching *.x509 in the build tree and
trusting whatever we find. This really ought to be an *explicit*
configuration, and the build rules for dealing with the files were
fairly painful too.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
Documentation/module-signing.txt | 15 +++--
init/Kconfig | 13 ++++
kernel/Makefile | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
3 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/module-signing.txt b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
index 5d5e4e32dc26..4e62bc29666e 100644
--- a/Documentation/module-signing.txt
+++ b/Documentation/module-signing.txt
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ This has a number of options available:
than being a module) so that modules signed with that algorithm can have
their signatures checked without causing a dependency loop.
+
(4) "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key" (CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY)
Setting this option to something other than its default of
@@ -104,6 +105,13 @@ This has a number of options available:
means of the KBUILD_SIGN_PIN variable.
+ (5) "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring" (CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS)
+
+ This option can be set to the filename of a PEM-encoded file containing
+ additional certificates which will be included in the system keyring by
+ default.
+
+
=======================
GENERATING SIGNING KEYS
=======================
@@ -171,10 +179,9 @@ in a keyring called ".system_keyring" that can be seen by:
302d2d52 I------ 1 perm 1f010000 0 0 asymmetri Fedora kernel signing key: d69a84e6bce3d216b979e9505b3e3ef9a7118079: X509.RSA a7118079 []
...
-Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, any file
-placed in the kernel source root directory or the kernel build root directory
-whose name is suffixed with ".x509" will be assumed to be an X.509 public key
-and will be added to the keyring.
+Beyond the public key generated specifically for module signing, additional
+trusted certificates can be provided in a PEM-encoded file referenced by the
+CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS configuration option.
Further, the architecture code may take public keys from a hardware store and
add those in also (e.g. from the UEFI key database).
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 2b119850784b..62b725653c36 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1752,6 +1752,19 @@ config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
+config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
+ string "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring"
+ depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ help
+ If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formatted file
+ containing trusted X.509 certificates to be included in the default
+ system keyring. Any certificate used for module signing is implicitly
+ also trusted.
+
+ NOTE: If you previously provided keys for the system keyring in the
+ form of DER-encoded *.x509 files in the top-level build directory,
+ those are no longer used. You will need to set this option instead.
+
config SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
def_bool n
select SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 7453283981ca..686d93b93006 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -114,46 +114,75 @@ $(obj)/config_data.h: $(obj)/config_data.gz FORCE
###############################################################################
#
-# Roll all the X.509 certificates that we can find together and pull them into
-# the kernel so that they get loaded into the system trusted keyring during
-# boot.
+# When a Kconfig string contains a filename, it is suitable for
+# passing to shell commands. It is surrounded by double-quotes, and
+# any double-quotes or backslashes within it are escaped by
+# backslashes.
#
-# We look in the source root and the build root for all files whose name ends
-# in ".x509". Unfortunately, this will generate duplicate filenames, so we
-# have make canonicalise the pathnames and then sort them to discard the
-# duplicates.
+# This is no use for dependencies or $(wildcard). We need to strip the
+# surrounding quotes and the escaping from quotes and backslashes, and
+# we *do* need to escape any spaces in the string. So, for example:
+#
+# Usage: $(eval $(call config_filename,FOO))
+#
+# Defines FOO_FILENAME based on the contents of the CONFIG_FOO option,
+# transformed as described above to be suitable for use within the
+# makefile.
+#
+# Also, if the filename is a relative filename and exists in the source
+# tree but not the build tree, define FOO_SRCPREFIX as $(srctree)/ to
+# be prefixed to *both* command invocation and dependencies.
+#
+# Note: We also print the filenames in the quiet_cmd_foo text, and
+# perhaps ought to have a version specially escaped for that purpose.
+# But it's only cosmetic, and $(patsubst "%",%,$(CONFIG_FOO)) is good
+# enough. It'll strip the quotes in the common case where there's no
+# space and it's a simple filename, and it'll retain the quotes when
+# there's a space. There are some esoteric cases in which it'll print
+# the wrong thing, but we don't really care. The actual dependencies
+# and commands *do* get it right, with various combinations of single
+# and double quotes, backslashes and spaces in the filenames.
#
###############################################################################
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
-X509_CERTIFICATES-y := $(wildcard *.x509) $(wildcard $(srctree)/*.x509)
-X509_CERTIFICATES-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += $(objtree)/signing_key.x509
-X509_CERTIFICATES-raw := $(sort $(foreach CERT,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-y), \
- $(or $(realpath $(CERT)),$(CERT))))
-X509_CERTIFICATES := $(subst $(realpath $(objtree))/,,$(X509_CERTIFICATES-raw))
-
-ifeq ($(X509_CERTIFICATES),)
-$(warning *** No X.509 certificates found ***)
+#
+quote := $(firstword " ")
+space :=
+space +=
+space_escape := %%%SPACE%%%
+#
+define config_filename =
+ifneq ($$(CONFIG_$(1)),"")
+$(1)_FILENAME := $$(subst \\,\,$$(subst \$$(quote),$$(quote),$$(subst $$(space_escape),\$$(space),$$(patsubst "%",%,$$(subst $$(space),$$(space_escape),$$(CONFIG_$(1)))))))
+ifneq ($$(patsubst /%,%,$$(firstword $$($(1)_FILENAME))),$$(firstword $$($(1)_FILENAME)))
+else
+ifeq ($$(wildcard $$($(1)_FILENAME)),)
+ifneq ($$(wildcard $$(srctree)/$$($(1)_FILENAME)),)
+$(1)_SRCPREFIX := $(srctree)/
+endif
endif
-
-ifneq ($(wildcard $(obj)/.x509.list),)
-ifneq ($(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list),$(X509_CERTIFICATES))
-$(warning X.509 certificate list changed to "$(X509_CERTIFICATES)" from "$(shell cat $(obj)/.x509.list)")
-$(shell rm $(obj)/.x509.list)
endif
endif
+endef
+#
+###############################################################################
+
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+
+SIGNING_X509-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
kernel/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $@
- cmd_x509certs = cat $(X509_CERTIFICATES) /dev/null >$@ $(foreach X509,$(X509_CERTIFICATES),; $(kecho) " - Including cert $(X509)")
+quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $(SIGNING_X509-y) $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+ cmd_x509certs = ( cat $(SIGNING_X509-y) /dev/null; \
+ awk '/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{flag=1;next}/-----END CERTIFICATE-----/{flag=0}flag' $(2) /dev/null | base64 -d ) > $@ || ( rm $@; exit 1)
targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(X509_CERTIFICATES) $(obj)/.x509.list
- $(call if_changed,x509certs)
+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(SIGNING_X509-y) include/config/system/trusted/keys.h $(wildcard include/config/module/sig.h) $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_FILENAME)
+ $(call if_changed,x509certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
-targets += $(obj)/.x509.list
-$(obj)/.x509.list:
- @echo $(X509_CERTIFICATES) >$@
endif
clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
@@ -212,40 +241,16 @@ x509.genkey:
@echo >>x509.genkey "authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid"
endif
-# We need to obtain the certificate from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY.
-quiet_cmd_extract_der = CERT_DER $(2)
- cmd_extract_der = scripts/extract-cert "$(2)" signing_key.x509
+$(eval $(call config_filename,MODULE_SIG_KEY))
-# CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY is either a PKCS#11 URI or a filename. It is
-# surrounded by quotes, and may contain spaces. To strip the quotes
-# with $(patsubst) we need to turn the spaces into something else.
-# And if it's a filename, those spaces need to be escaped as '\ ' in
-# order to use it in dependencies or $(wildcard).
-space :=
-space +=
-space_escape := %%%SPACE%%%
-X509_SOURCE_temp := $(subst $(space),$(space_escape),$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY))
-# We need this to check for absolute paths or PKCS#11 URIs.
-X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD := $(patsubst "%",%,$(X509_SOURCE_temp))
-# This is the actual source filename/URI without the quotes
-X509_SOURCE := $(subst $(space_escape),$(space),$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD))
-# This\ version\ with\ spaces\ escaped\ for\ $(wildcard)\ and\ dependencies
-X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED := $(subst $(space_escape),\$(space),$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD))
-
-ifeq ($(patsubst pkcs11:%,%,$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD)),$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD))
-# If it's a filename, depend on it.
-X509_DEP := $(X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED)
-ifeq ($(patsubst /%,%,$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD)),$(X509_SOURCE_ONEWORD))
-ifeq ($(wildcard $(X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED)),)
-ifneq ($(wildcard $(srctree)/$(X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED)),)
-# Non-absolute filename, found in source tree and not build tree
-X509_SOURCE := $(srctree)/$(X509_SOURCE)
-X509_DEP := $(srctree)/$(X509_SOURCE_ESCAPED)
-endif
-endif
-endif
+# If CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY isn't a PKCS#11 URI, depend on it
+ifeq ($(patsubst pkcs11:%,%,$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME))),$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)))
+X509_DEP := $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)
endif
+quiet_cmd_extract_der = SIGNING_CERT $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+ cmd_extract_der = scripts/extract-cert $(2) signing_key.x509
+
signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert include/config/module/sig/key.h $(X509_DEP)
- $(call cmd,extract_der,$(X509_SOURCE))
+ $(call cmd,extract_der,$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY))
endif
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 18/27] PKCS#7: Check content type and versions [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 17/27] modsign: Add explicit CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS option " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:46 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 19/27] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer " David Howells
` (9 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
We only support PKCS#7 signed-data [RFC2315 sec 9] content at the top level,
so reject anything else. Further, check that the version numbers in
SignedData and SignerInfo are 1 in both cases.
Note that we don't restrict the inner content type. In the PKCS#7 code we
don't parse the data attached there, but merely verify the signature over
it.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 6 +--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
index a5a14ef28c86..05504431e1c1 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
PKCS7ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- contentType ContentType,
+ contentType ContentType ({ pkcs7_check_content_type }),
content [0] EXPLICIT SignedData OPTIONAL
}
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
- version INTEGER,
+ version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signeddata_version }),
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
contentInfo ContentInfo,
certificates CHOICE {
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ SignerInfos ::= CHOICE {
}
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- version INTEGER,
+ version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version }),
issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }),
authenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 3bd5a1e4c493..ab427f04b299 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -226,6 +226,79 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/*
+ * We only support signed data [RFC2315 sec 9].
+ */
+int pkcs7_check_content_type(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ if (ctx->last_oid != OID_signed_data) {
+ pr_warn("Only support pkcs7_signedData type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the SignedData version
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signeddata_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ unsigned version;
+
+ if (vlen != 1)
+ goto unsupported;
+
+ version = *(const u8 *)value;
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ /* PKCS#7 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 9.1] */
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto unsupported;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+unsupported:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported SignedData version\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the SignerInfo version
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ unsigned version;
+
+ if (vlen != 1)
+ goto unsupported;
+
+ version = *(const u8 *)value;
+ switch (version) {
+ case 1:
+ /* PKCS#7 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 9.2] */
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto unsupported;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+unsupported:
+ pr_warn("Unsupported SignerInfo version\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
* Extract a certificate and store it in the context.
*/
int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -326,7 +399,7 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/*
- * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 9.3]
+ * Note the set of auth attributes for digestion purposes [RFC2315 sec 9.3]
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 19/27] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 18/27] PKCS#7: Check content type and versions " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:46 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 20/27] PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] " David Howells
` (8 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
The key identifiers fabricated from an X.509 certificate are currently:
(A) Concatenation of serial number and issuer
(B) Concatenation of subject and subjectKeyID (SKID)
When verifying one X.509 certificate with another, the AKID in the target
can be used to match the authoritative certificate. The AKID can specify
the match in one or both of two ways:
(1) Compare authorityCertSerialNumber and authorityCertIssuer from the AKID
to identifier (A) above.
(2) Compare keyIdentifier from the AKID plus the issuer from the target
certificate to identifier (B) above.
When verifying a PKCS#7 message, the only available comparison is between
the IssuerAndSerialNumber field and identifier (A) above.
However, a subsequent patch adds CMS support. Whilst CMS still supports a
match on IssuerAndSerialNumber as for PKCS#7, it also supports an
alternative - which is the SubjectKeyIdentifier field. This is used to
match to an X.509 certificate on the SKID alone. No subject information is
available to be used.
To this end change the fabrication of (B) above to be from the X.509 SKID
alone. The AKID in keyIdentifier form then only matches on that and does
not include the issuer.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 8 ++------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 6c130dd56f35..849fd760923e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -454,9 +454,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
ctx->cert->raw_skid_size = vlen;
ctx->cert->raw_skid = v;
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_subject,
- ctx->cert->raw_subject_size,
- v, vlen);
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
ctx->cert->skid = kid;
@@ -553,9 +551,7 @@ int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
if (ctx->cert->akid_skid)
return 0;
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
- ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size,
- value, vlen);
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, vlen, "", 0);
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 20/27] PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 19/27] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:46 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 21/27] sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 " David Howells
` (7 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Since CMS is an evolution of PKCS#7, with much of the ASN.1 being
compatible, add support for CMS signed-data messages also [RFC5652 sec 5].
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 10 +++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 5 ++-
3 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
index 05504431e1c1..6bf8ff4f7414 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ SignerInfos ::= CHOICE {
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version }),
- issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ sid SignerIdentifier, -- CMS variant, not PKCS#7
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ({ pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo }),
authenticatedAttributes CHOICE {
aaSet [0] IMPLICIT SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
} OPTIONAL
} ({ pkcs7_note_signed_info })
+SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
+ -- RFC5652 sec 5.3
+ issuerAndSerialNumber IssuerAndSerialNumber,
+ subjectKeyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT SubjectKeyIdentifier
+}
+
IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name ({ pkcs7_sig_note_issuer }),
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber ({ pkcs7_sig_note_serial })
@@ -95,6 +101,8 @@ IssuerAndSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
+SubjectKeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_skid })
+
SetOfAuthenticatedAttribute ::= SET OF AuthenticatedAttribute
AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index ab427f04b299..826e2f3f507b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
unsigned raw_serial_size;
unsigned raw_issuer_size;
const void *raw_issuer;
+ const void *raw_skid;
+ unsigned raw_skid_size;
+ bool expect_skid;
};
/*
@@ -249,15 +252,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signeddata_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
unsigned version;
if (vlen != 1)
goto unsupported;
- version = *(const u8 *)value;
+ ctx->msg->version = version = *(const u8 *)value;
switch (version) {
case 1:
- /* PKCS#7 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 9.1] */
+ /* PKCS#7 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 9.1]
+ * CMS ver 1 SignedData [RFC5652 sec 5.1]
+ */
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ /* CMS ver 3 SignedData [RFC2315 sec 5.1] */
break;
default:
goto unsupported;
@@ -277,6 +286,7 @@ int pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
unsigned version;
if (vlen != 1)
@@ -285,7 +295,18 @@ int pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
version = *(const u8 *)value;
switch (version) {
case 1:
- /* PKCS#7 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 9.2] */
+ /* PKCS#7 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 9.2]
+ * CMS ver 1 SignerInfo [RFC5652 sec 5.3]
+ */
+ if (ctx->msg->version != 1)
+ goto version_mismatch;
+ ctx->expect_skid = false;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ /* CMS ver 3 SignerInfo [RFC2315 sec 5.3] */
+ if (ctx->msg->version == 1)
+ goto version_mismatch;
+ ctx->expect_skid = true;
break;
default:
goto unsupported;
@@ -296,6 +317,9 @@ int pkcs7_note_signerinfo_version(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsupported:
pr_warn("Unsupported SignerInfo version\n");
return -EINVAL;
+version_mismatch:
+ pr_warn("SignedData-SignerInfo version mismatch\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
}
/*
@@ -440,6 +464,22 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/*
+ * Note the issuing cert's subjectKeyIdentifier
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_skid(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ pr_devel("SKID: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
+
+ ctx->raw_skid = value;
+ ctx->raw_skid_size = vlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Note the signature data
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -472,13 +512,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
- kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
- ctx->raw_serial_size,
- ctx->raw_issuer,
- ctx->raw_issuer_size);
+ if (!ctx->expect_skid) {
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
+ ctx->raw_serial_size,
+ ctx->raw_issuer,
+ ctx->raw_issuer_size);
+ } else {
+ kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_skid,
+ ctx->raw_skid_size,
+ "", 0);
+ }
if (IS_ERR(kid))
return PTR_ERR(kid);
+ pr_devel("SINFO KID: %u [%*phN]\n", kid->len, kid->len, kid->data);
+
sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
*ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index efc7dc9b8f9c..790dd7cec82c 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -33,7 +33,9 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
unsigned authattrs_len;
const void *authattrs;
- /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
+ /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1]
+ * or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
+ */
struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
/* Message signature.
@@ -50,6 +52,7 @@ struct pkcs7_message {
struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificate list */
struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */
struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
+ u8 version; /* Version of cert (1 -> PKCS#7 or CMS; 3 -> CMS) */
/* Content Data (or NULL) */
enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 21/27] sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 20/27] PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:47 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 22/27] extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file " David Howells
` (6 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Make sign-file use the OpenSSL CMS routines to generate a message to be
used as the signature blob instead of the PKCS#7 routines. This allows us
to change how the matching X.509 certificate is selected. With PKCS#7 the
only option is to match on the serial number and issuer fields of an X.509
certificate; with CMS, we also have the option of matching by subjectKeyId
extension. The new behaviour is selected with the "-k" flag.
Without the -k flag specified, the output is pretty much identical to the
PKCS#7 output.
Whilst we're at it, don't include the S/MIME capability list in the message
as it's irrelevant to us.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-By: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com
---
scripts/sign-file.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
index ad0aa21bd3ac..de213e5c0cd3 100755
--- a/scripts/sign-file.c
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
-#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
+#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
@@ -107,13 +107,14 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct module_signature sig_info = { .id_type = PKEY_ID_PKCS7 };
char *hash_algo = NULL;
char *private_key_name, *x509_name, *module_name, *dest_name;
- bool save_pkcs7 = false, replace_orig;
+ bool save_cms = false, replace_orig;
bool sign_only = false;
unsigned char buf[4096];
- unsigned long module_size, pkcs7_size;
+ unsigned long module_size, cms_size;
+ unsigned int use_keyid = 0;
const EVP_MD *digest_algo;
EVP_PKEY *private_key;
- PKCS7 *pkcs7;
+ CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
X509 *x509;
BIO *b, *bd = NULL, *bm;
int opt, n;
@@ -125,10 +126,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
do {
- opt = getopt(argc, argv, "dp");
+ opt = getopt(argc, argv, "dpk");
switch (opt) {
- case 'p': save_pkcs7 = true; break;
- case 'd': sign_only = true; save_pkcs7 = true; break;
+ case 'p': save_cms = true; break;
+ case 'd': sign_only = true; save_cms = true; break;
+ case 'k': use_keyid = CMS_USE_KEYID; break;
case -1: break;
default: format();
}
@@ -208,23 +210,24 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
bm = BIO_new_file(module_name, "rb");
ERR(!bm, "%s", module_name);
- /* Load the PKCS#7 message from the digest buffer. */
- pkcs7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- PKCS7_NOCERTS | PKCS7_PARTIAL | PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED | PKCS7_STREAM);
- ERR(!pkcs7, "PKCS7_sign");
+ /* Load the CMS message from the digest buffer. */
+ cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_BINARY | CMS_DETACHED | CMS_STREAM);
+ ERR(!cms, "CMS_sign");
- ERR(!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(pkcs7, x509, private_key, digest_algo, PKCS7_NOCERTS | PKCS7_BINARY),
- "PKCS7_sign_add_signer");
- ERR(PKCS7_final(pkcs7, bm, PKCS7_NOCERTS | PKCS7_BINARY) < 0,
- "PKCS7_final");
+ ERR(!CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo,
+ CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY | CMS_NOSMIMECAP | use_keyid),
+ "CMS_sign_add_signer");
+ ERR(CMS_final(cms, bm, NULL, CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY) < 0,
+ "CMS_final");
- if (save_pkcs7) {
- char *pkcs7_name;
+ if (save_cms) {
+ char *cms_name;
- ERR(asprintf(&pkcs7_name, "%s.pkcs7", module_name) < 0, "asprintf");
- b = BIO_new_file(pkcs7_name, "wb");
- ERR(!b, "%s", pkcs7_name);
- ERR(i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(b, pkcs7, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", pkcs7_name);
+ ERR(asprintf(&cms_name, "%s.p7s", module_name) < 0, "asprintf");
+ b = BIO_new_file(cms_name, "wb");
+ ERR(!b, "%s", cms_name);
+ ERR(i2d_CMS_bio_stream(b, cms, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", cms_name);
BIO_free(b);
}
@@ -240,9 +243,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
ERR(n < 0, "%s", module_name);
module_size = BIO_number_written(bd);
- ERR(i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream(bd, pkcs7, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
- pkcs7_size = BIO_number_written(bd) - module_size;
- sig_info.sig_len = htonl(pkcs7_size);
+ ERR(i2d_CMS_bio_stream(bd, cms, NULL, 0) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
+ cms_size = BIO_number_written(bd) - module_size;
+ sig_info.sig_len = htonl(cms_size);
ERR(BIO_write(bd, &sig_info, sizeof(sig_info)) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
ERR(BIO_write(bd, magic_number, sizeof(magic_number) - 1) < 0, "%s", dest_name);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 22/27] extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 21/27] sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:47 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 23/27] modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS " David Howells
` (5 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
This is not required for the module signing key, although it doesn't do any
harm — it just means that any additional certs in the PEM file are also
trusted by the kernel.
But it does allow us to use the extract-cert tool for processing the extra
certs from CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS, instead of that horrid awk|base64
hack.
Also cope with being invoked with no input file, creating an empty output
file as a result.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
| 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--git a/scripts/extract-cert.c b/scripts/extract-cert.c
index 4fd5b2f07b45..fd0db015c65c 100644
--- a/scripts/extract-cert.c
+++ b/scripts/extract-cert.c
@@ -73,17 +73,34 @@ static void drain_openssl_errors(void)
} while(0)
static const char *key_pass;
+static BIO *wb;
+static char *cert_dst;
+int kbuild_verbose;
+
+static void write_cert(X509 *x509)
+{
+ char buf[200];
+
+ if (!wb) {
+ wb = BIO_new_file(cert_dst, "wb");
+ ERR(!wb, "%s", cert_dst);
+ }
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x509), buf, sizeof(buf));
+ ERR(!i2d_X509_bio(wb, x509), cert_dst);
+ if (kbuild_verbose)
+ fprintf(stderr, "Extracted cert: %s\n", buf);
+}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char *cert_src, *cert_dst;
- X509 *x509;
- BIO *b;
+ char *cert_src;
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
ERR_clear_error();
+ kbuild_verbose = atoi(getenv("KBUILD_VERBOSE")?:"0");
+
key_pass = getenv("KBUILD_SIGN_PIN");
if (argc != 3)
@@ -92,7 +109,13 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
cert_src = argv[1];
cert_dst = argv[2];
- if (!strncmp(cert_src, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
+ if (!cert_src[0]) {
+ /* Invoked with no input; create empty file */
+ FILE *f = fopen(cert_dst, "wb");
+ ERR(!f, "%s", cert_dst);
+ fclose(f);
+ exit(0);
+ } else if (!strncmp(cert_src, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
ENGINE *e;
struct {
const char *cert_id;
@@ -114,19 +137,30 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
ERR(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "PIN", key_pass, 0), "Set PKCS#11 PIN");
ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "LOAD_CERT_CTRL", 0, &parms, NULL, 1);
ERR(!parms.cert, "Get X.509 from PKCS#11");
- x509 = parms.cert;
+ write_cert(parms.cert);
} else {
+ BIO *b;
+ X509 *x509;
+
b = BIO_new_file(cert_src, "rb");
ERR(!b, "%s", cert_src);
- x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- ERR(!x509, "%s", cert_src);
- BIO_free(b);
+
+ while (1) {
+ x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (wb && !x509) {
+ unsigned long err = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM &&
+ ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) {
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ERR(!x509, "%s", cert_src);
+ write_cert(x509);
+ }
}
- b = BIO_new_file(cert_dst, "wb");
- ERR(!b, "%s", cert_dst);
- ERR(!i2d_X509_bio(b, x509), cert_dst);
- BIO_free(b);
+ BIO_free(wb);
return 0;
}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 23/27] modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 22/27] extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:47 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 24/27] PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder " David Howells
` (4 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
From: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Fix up the dependencies somewhat too, while we're at it.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
kernel/Makefile | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
kernel/system_certificates.S | 3 +++
scripts/Makefile | 3 ++-
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 686d93b93006..9e31922138d0 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -166,23 +166,22 @@ endef
#
###############################################################################
-
ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING),y)
$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
-SIGNING_X509-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += signing_key.x509
-
-kernel/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
+# GCC doesn't include .incbin files in -MD generated dependencies (PR#66871)
+$(obj)/system_certificates.o: $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-quiet_cmd_x509certs = CERTS $(SIGNING_X509-y) $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
- cmd_x509certs = ( cat $(SIGNING_X509-y) /dev/null; \
- awk '/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{flag=1;next}/-----END CERTIFICATE-----/{flag=0}flag' $(2) /dev/null | base64 -d ) > $@ || ( rm $@; exit 1)
+# Cope with signing_key.x509 existing in $(srctree) not $(objtree)
+AFLAGS_system_certificates.o := -I$(srctree)
-targets += $(obj)/x509_certificate_list
-$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: $(SIGNING_X509-y) include/config/system/trusted/keys.h $(wildcard include/config/module/sig.h) $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_FILENAME)
- $(call if_changed,x509certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
+quiet_cmd_extract_certs = EXTRACT_CERTS $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+ cmd_extract_certs = scripts/extract-cert $(2) $@ || ( rm $@; exit 1)
+targets += x509_certificate_list
+$(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_FILENAME) FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
endif
clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
@@ -248,9 +247,9 @@ ifeq ($(patsubst pkcs11:%,%,$(firstword $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME))),$(firstword
X509_DEP := $(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_FILENAME)
endif
-quiet_cmd_extract_der = SIGNING_CERT $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
- cmd_extract_der = scripts/extract-cert $(2) signing_key.x509
+# GCC PR#66871 again.
+$(obj)/system_certificates.o: signing_key.x509
signing_key.x509: scripts/extract-cert include/config/module/sig/key.h $(X509_DEP)
- $(call cmd,extract_der,$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY))
+ $(call cmd,extract_certs,$(MODULE_SIG_KEY_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY))
endif
diff --git a/kernel/system_certificates.S b/kernel/system_certificates.S
index 3e9868d47535..6ba2f75e7ba5 100644
--- a/kernel/system_certificates.S
+++ b/kernel/system_certificates.S
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
.globl VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list)
VMLINUX_SYMBOL(system_certificate_list):
__cert_list_start:
+#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
+ .incbin "signing_key.x509"
+#endif
.incbin "kernel/x509_certificate_list"
__cert_list_end:
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile b/scripts/Makefile
index 236f683510bd..1b2661712d44 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile
+++ b/scripts/Makefile
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_VT) += conmakehash
hostprogs-$(BUILD_C_RECORDMCOUNT) += recordmcount
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT) += sortextable
hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1) += asn1_compiler
-hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file extract-cert
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG) += sign-file
+hostprogs-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += extract-cert
HOSTCFLAGS_sortextable.o = -I$(srctree)/tools/include
HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -I$(srctree)/include
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 24/27] PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 23/27] modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:47 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 25/27] PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes " David Howells
` (3 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Make the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder fill in a time64_t rather than a
struct tm to make comparison easier (unfortunately, this makes readable
display less easy) and export it so that it can be used by the PKCS#7 code
too.
Further, tighten up its parsing to reject invalid dates (eg. weird
characters, non-existent hour numbers) and unsupported dates (eg. timezones
other than 'Z' or dates earlier than 1970).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 7 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 9 ---
3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 849fd760923e..af71878dc15b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -472,60 +472,105 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Record a certificate time.
+/**
+ * x509_decode_time - Decode an X.509 time ASN.1 object
+ * @_t: The time to fill in
+ * @hdrlen: The length of the object header
+ * @tag: The object tag
+ * @value: The object value
+ * @vlen: The size of the object value
+ *
+ * Decode an ASN.1 universal time or generalised time field into a struct the
+ * kernel can handle and check it for validity. The time is decoded thus:
+ *
+ * [RFC5280 §4.1.2.5]
+ * CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate validity
+ * dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity dates in
+ * 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime. Conforming
+ * applications MUST be able to process validity dates that are encoded in
+ * either UTCTime or GeneralizedTime.
*/
-static int x509_note_time(struct tm *tm, size_t hdrlen,
- unsigned char tag,
- const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
+int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen)
{
+ static const unsigned char month_lengths[] = { 31, 29, 31, 30, 31, 30,
+ 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31 };
const unsigned char *p = value;
+ unsigned year, mon, day, hour, min, sec, mon_len;
-#define dec2bin(X) ((X) - '0')
+#define dec2bin(X) ({ unsigned char x = (X) - '0'; if (x > 9) goto invalid_time; x; })
#define DD2bin(P) ({ unsigned x = dec2bin(P[0]) * 10 + dec2bin(P[1]); P += 2; x; })
if (tag == ASN1_UNITIM) {
/* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 13)
goto unsupported_time;
- tm->tm_year = DD2bin(p);
- if (tm->tm_year >= 50)
- tm->tm_year += 1900;
+ year = DD2bin(p);
+ if (year >= 50)
+ year += 1900;
else
- tm->tm_year += 2000;
+ year += 2000;
} else if (tag == ASN1_GENTIM) {
/* GenTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ */
if (vlen != 15)
goto unsupported_time;
- tm->tm_year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
+ year = DD2bin(p) * 100 + DD2bin(p);
+ if (year >= 1950 && year <= 2049)
+ goto invalid_time;
} else {
goto unsupported_time;
}
- tm->tm_year -= 1900;
- tm->tm_mon = DD2bin(p) - 1;
- tm->tm_mday = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_hour = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_min = DD2bin(p);
- tm->tm_sec = DD2bin(p);
+ mon = DD2bin(p);
+ day = DD2bin(p);
+ hour = DD2bin(p);
+ min = DD2bin(p);
+ sec = DD2bin(p);
if (*p != 'Z')
goto unsupported_time;
+ mon_len = month_lengths[mon];
+ if (mon == 2) {
+ if (year % 4 == 0) {
+ mon_len = 29;
+ if (year % 100 == 0) {
+ year /= 100;
+ if (year % 4 != 0)
+ mon_len = 28;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (year < 1970 ||
+ mon < 1 || mon > 12 ||
+ day < 1 || day > mon_len ||
+ hour < 0 || hour > 23 ||
+ min < 0 || min > 59 ||
+ sec < 0 || sec > 59)
+ goto invalid_time;
+
+ *_t = mktime64(year, mon, day, hour, min, sec);
return 0;
unsupported_time:
- pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*.*s'\n",
- tag, (int)vlen, (int)vlen, value);
+ pr_debug("Got unsupported time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
+ tag, (int)vlen, value);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+invalid_time:
+ pr_debug("Got invalid time [tag %02x]: '%*phN'\n",
+ tag, (int)vlen, value);
return -EBADMSG;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_decode_time);
int x509_note_not_before(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
- return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+ return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_from, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
@@ -533,7 +578,7 @@ int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
- return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+ return x509_decode_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
}
/*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index dcdb5c94f514..1de01eaec884 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ struct x509_certificate {
struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */
struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_id; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->id (optional) */
struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_skid; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->skid (optional) */
- struct tm valid_from;
- struct tm valid_to;
+ time64_t valid_from;
+ time64_t valid_to;
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of sigature */
@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
*/
extern void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert);
extern struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
+extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const unsigned char *value, size_t vlen);
/*
* x509_public_key.c
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 6b060b290e77..6d88dd15c98d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -302,14 +302,7 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
}
pr_devel("Cert Key Algo: %s\n", pkey_algo_name[cert->pub->pkey_algo]);
- pr_devel("Cert Valid From: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- cert->valid_from.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_from.tm_mon + 1,
- cert->valid_from.tm_mday, cert->valid_from.tm_hour,
- cert->valid_from.tm_min, cert->valid_from.tm_sec);
- pr_devel("Cert Valid To: %04ld-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d\n",
- cert->valid_to.tm_year + 1900, cert->valid_to.tm_mon + 1,
- cert->valid_to.tm_mday, cert->valid_to.tm_hour,
- cert->valid_to.tm_min, cert->valid_to.tm_sec);
+ pr_devel("Cert Valid period: %lld-%lld\n", cert->valid_from, cert->valid_to);
pr_devel("Cert Signature: %s + %s\n",
pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 25/27] PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 24/27] PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:47 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 26/27] KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 " David Howells
` (2 subsequent siblings)
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes
that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that
signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself
signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then
contributes to the signature.
Further, we already require the master message content type to be
pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data
itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the
authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1].
We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them
entirely as appropriate. To this end:
(1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one
signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one
that does not.
(2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them.
Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are
rejected:
(a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the
content type in the SignedData object.
(b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data.
(c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable
UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within
the validity window of the matching X.509 cert.
(d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents.
(e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents.
(f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents.
The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is
an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if
not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present.
The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed
to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only
affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP).
The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or
if it contains more than one element in its set of values.
(3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of three options:
(A) Require pkcs7_data type content and forbid authattrs entirely.
(B) Require pkcs7_data type content and require authattrs but to
reject Microsoft Authenticode authattrs.
(C) Require an Authenticode type content (only indirect data is
currently supported) and permit/require certain Authenticode
authattrs.
(4) Have module verification choose option (A) above. This means that
with module signing, the signature is over the content digest only.
sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR to suppress authattrs. We could be more
flexible and permit (A) or (B) for module signing.
(5) Have kexec verification of PE executables choose option (C) above. We
may need to relax this if signed PE files may be encountered that
don't have authattrs in their PKCS#7 message.
Kexec does not currently verify non-PE executables - but if this is
added in the future it should probably use option (A).
(6) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between
the above options for testing purposes.
Future patches add firmware signing support. Firmware signing will require
a signed authattr containing the firmware name as passed to
request_firmware() and so would pick option (B) above, but we would also
need to permit the firmware name authattr.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 6 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 9 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 15 +++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 53 +++++++++++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 2
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 13 +++
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 4 +
kernel/system_keyring.c | 2
scripts/sign-file.c | 5 +
10 files changed, 226 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
index 6bf8ff4f7414..1eca740b816a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signeddata_version }),
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
- contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ contentInfo ContentInfo ({ pkcs7_note_content }),
certificates CHOICE {
certSet [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
certSequence [2] IMPLICIT Certificates
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
}
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- contentType ContentType,
+ contentType ContentType ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
content [0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
}
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
}
UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
- type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
values SET OF ANY
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index 3d13b042da73..6eae1a30b143 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+static unsigned pkcs7_want_authattrs;
+module_param_named(authattrs, pkcs7_want_authattrs, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_want_authattrs,
+ "Whether or not a PKCS#7 message should contain authattrs (0-2)");
+
/*
* Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
*/
@@ -40,7 +45,9 @@ static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error;
}
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ if (pkcs7_want_authattrs > 2)
+ pkcs7_want_authattrs = 0;
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, pkcs7_want_authattrs);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 826e2f3f507b..e6298b7a945a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -81,6 +81,30 @@ void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+/*
+ * Check authenticatedAttributes are provided or not provided consistently.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_check_authattrs(struct pkcs7_message *msg)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+ bool want;
+
+ sinfo = msg->signed_infos;
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
+ want = true;
+ msg->have_authattrs = true;
+ }
+
+ for (sinfo = sinfo->next; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next)
+ if (!!sinfo->authattrs != want)
+ goto inconsistent;
+ return 0;
+
+inconsistent:
+ pr_warn("Inconsistently supplied authAttrs\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
/**
* pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message
* @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed
@@ -113,6 +137,10 @@ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
goto out;
}
+ ret = pkcs7_check_authattrs(ctx->msg);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
msg = ctx->msg;
ctx->msg = NULL;
@@ -381,6 +409,25 @@ int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/*
+ * Note the content type.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_content(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ if (ctx->last_oid != OID_data &&
+ ctx->last_oid != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Unsupported data type %d\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in
* the context.
*/
@@ -395,31 +442,90 @@ int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
ctx->msg->data = value;
ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
- ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
}
/*
- * Parse authenticated attributes
+ * Parse authenticated attributes.
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+ enum OID content_type;
pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_contentType:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ content_type = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (content_type != ctx->msg->data_type) {
+ pr_warn("Mismatch between global data type (%d) and sinfo %u (%d)\n",
+ ctx->msg->data_type, sinfo->index,
+ content_type);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case OID_signingTime:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ /* Should we check that the signing time is consistent
+ * with the signer's X.509 cert?
+ */
+ return x509_decode_time(&sinfo->signing_time,
+ hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+
case OID_messageDigest:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
return -EBADMSG;
- ctx->sinfo->msgdigest = value;
- ctx->sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ sinfo->msgdigest = value;
+ sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ return 0;
+
+ case OID_smimeCapabilites:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_smime_caps, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("S/MIME Caps only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Microsoft SpOpusInfo seems to be contain cont[0] 16-bit BE
+ * char URLs and cont[1] 8-bit char URLs.
+ *
+ * Microsoft StatementType seems to contain a list of OIDs that
+ * are also used as extendedKeyUsage types in X.509 certs.
+ */
+ case OID_msSpOpusInfo:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ goto authenticode_check;
+ case OID_msStatementType:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_statement_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ authenticode_check:
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Authenticode AuthAttrs only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* I'm not sure how to validate these */
return 0;
default:
return 0;
}
+
+repeated:
+ /* We permit max one item per AuthenticatedAttribute and no repeats */
+ pr_warn("Repeated/multivalue AuthAttrs not permitted\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
/*
@@ -430,10 +536,25 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+
+ if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+ (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData &&
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) {
+ pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData &&
+ test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ pr_warn("Unexpected Authenticode AuthAttr\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
/* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
- ctx->sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
- ctx->sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
return 0;
}
@@ -511,6 +632,11 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && !sinfo->authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Authenticode requires AuthAttrs\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
if (!ctx->expect_skid) {
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index 790dd7cec82c..a66b19ebcf47 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
struct pkcs7_signed_info {
struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
- unsigned index;
- bool trusted;
- bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
+ unsigned index;
+ bool trusted;
+ bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
const void *msgdigest;
@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
/* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
unsigned authattrs_len;
const void *authattrs;
+ unsigned long aa_set;
+#define sinfo_has_content_type 0
+#define sinfo_has_signing_time 1
+#define sinfo_has_message_digest 2
+#define sinfo_has_smime_caps 3
+#define sinfo_has_ms_opus_info 4
+#define sinfo_has_ms_statement_type 5
+ time64_t signing_time;
/* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1]
* or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
@@ -53,6 +61,7 @@ struct pkcs7_message {
struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */
struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
u8 version; /* Version of cert (1 -> PKCS#7 or CMS; 3 -> CMS) */
+ bool have_authattrs; /* T if have authattrs */
/* Content Data (or NULL) */
enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 404f89a0f852..320f9a0b0ae9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -70,9 +70,15 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
* digest we just calculated.
*/
- if (sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
u8 tag;
+ if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
@@ -314,6 +320,18 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+ /* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
+ * certificate. We can't, however, check against the system clock
+ * since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
+ sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
+ pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -328,6 +346,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/**
* pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ * @attr_style: Whether we want authenticatedAttributes or not.
*
* Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
* matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
@@ -350,7 +369,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified
* (note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or:
*/
-int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, enum pkcs7_attr_style attr_style)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *x509;
@@ -359,6 +378,36 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
kenter("");
+ switch (attr_style) {
+ case PKCS7_REJECT_AUTHATTRS:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Signed message is not ordinary data\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Message contains unwanted authAttrs\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PKCS7_REQUIRE_AUTHATTRS:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Signed message is not ordinary data\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Message does not contain authAttrs\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case PKCS7_AUTHENTICODE_AUTHATTRS:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Signed message is not Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* Authattr presence checked in parser */
+ break;
+ }
+
for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 2421f46184ce..d2044eeb72f4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, PKCS7_AUTHENTICODE_AUTHATTRS);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index e235ab4957ee..15214059f408 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -9,6 +9,9 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+
struct key;
struct pkcs7_message;
@@ -33,7 +36,15 @@ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/*
* pkcs7_verify.c
*/
-extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+enum pkcs7_attr_style {
+ PKCS7_REJECT_AUTHATTRS,
+ PKCS7_REQUIRE_AUTHATTRS,
+ PKCS7_AUTHENTICODE_AUTHATTRS,
+};
+extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum pkcs7_attr_style attr_style);
extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void *data, size_t datalen);
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index c2bbf672b84e..93e0ff92fb9b 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ enum OID {
OID_signed_data, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 */
/* PKCS#9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)} */
OID_email_address, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 */
- OID_content_type, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */
+ OID_contentType, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */
OID_messageDigest, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4 */
OID_signingTime, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5 */
OID_smimeCapabilites, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 */
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ enum OID {
/* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */
OID_msIndirectData, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */
+ OID_msStatementType, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.11 */
+ OID_msSpOpusInfo, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12 */
OID_msPeImageDataObjId, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 */
OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */
OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index 95f2dcbc7616..f9e1a75db59b 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
goto error;
}
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, PKCS7_REJECT_AUTHATTRS);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
index de213e5c0cd3..e9741e879bbd 100755
--- a/scripts/sign-file.c
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
bool sign_only = false;
unsigned char buf[4096];
unsigned long module_size, cms_size;
- unsigned int use_keyid = 0;
+ unsigned int use_keyid = 0, use_signed_attrs = CMS_NOATTR;
const EVP_MD *digest_algo;
EVP_PKEY *private_key;
CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
@@ -216,7 +216,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
ERR(!cms, "CMS_sign");
ERR(!CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo,
- CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY | CMS_NOSMIMECAP | use_keyid),
+ CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY | CMS_NOSMIMECAP |
+ use_keyid | use_signed_attrs),
"CMS_sign_add_signer");
ERR(CMS_final(cms, bm, NULL, CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY) < 0,
"CMS_final");
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 26/27] KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 25/27] PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:47 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 13:48 ` [PATCH 27/27] PKCS#7: Restrict content type and authenticated attributes by purpose " David Howells
2015-08-05 14:27 ` [PATCH 25/27] PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes " David Howells
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 into the pkey_id_type_name array.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 2f6e4fb1a1ea..81efccbe22d5 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_algo);
const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST] = {
[PKEY_ID_PGP] = "PGP",
[PKEY_ID_X509] = "X509",
+ [PKEY_ID_PKCS7] = "PKCS#7",
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name);
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 27/27] PKCS#7: Restrict content type and authenticated attributes by purpose [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 26/27] KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 13:48 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 14:27 ` [PATCH 25/27] PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes " David Howells
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 13:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings; +Cc: mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Restrict the content type in the and the authenticated attributes permitted
in a PKCS#7 SignedData object according the purpose to which the message is
being put:
(*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE
These three all require the SignedData content type to be pkcs7-data.
The first also forbids authattrs, the second requires them and the
third is okay either way.
(*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE
This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and
requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr but also permits an
SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr
because the pesign program doesn't remove these).
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE
These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when
limiting the use of X.509 certs.
The PKCS#7 test key type is given the usage to specify in a module
parameter. For example:
echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage
keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7
will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a
firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 4 +++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 11 ++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 19 +++++++++++------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 7 ++++--
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 9 +++-----
include/crypto/public_key.h | 14 ++++++++++++
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4 +++-
include/linux/verify_pefile.h | 6 ++++-
kernel/module_signing.c | 3 ++-
kernel/system_keyring.c | 6 ++++-
11 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index ca83f7ac388b..fab22e72808c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -536,7 +536,9 @@ static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
int ret;
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ system_trusted_keyring,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ &trusted);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!trusted)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index b0e4ed23d668..1916680ad81b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -20,6 +21,16 @@
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
+ [VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "mod sig",
+ [VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE] = "firmware sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig",
+ [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig",
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
+
static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index 6eae1a30b143..10d34dbd00b9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -14,21 +14,23 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
-static unsigned pkcs7_want_authattrs;
-module_param_named(authattrs, pkcs7_want_authattrs, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_want_authattrs,
- "Whether or not a PKCS#7 message should contain authattrs (0-2)");
+static unsigned pkcs7_usage;
+module_param_named(usage, pkcs7_usage, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_usage,
+ "Usage to specify when verifying the PKCS#7 message");
/*
* Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
*/
static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
+ enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
@@ -37,6 +39,11 @@ static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
kenter("");
+ if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
+ pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
saved_prep_data = prep->data;
saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
@@ -45,9 +52,7 @@ static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error;
}
- if (pkcs7_want_authattrs > 2)
- pkcs7_want_authattrs = 0;
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, pkcs7_want_authattrs);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 320f9a0b0ae9..d20c0b4b880e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/**
* pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
- * @attr_style: Whether we want authenticatedAttributes or not.
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
*
* Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
* matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
@@ -358,6 +358,9 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
*
* Returns, in order of descending priority:
*
+ * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
+ * odds with the specified usage, or:
+ *
* (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
* appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
*
@@ -369,7 +372,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified
* (note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or:
*/
-int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, enum pkcs7_attr_style attr_style)
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *x509;
@@ -378,34 +382,42 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, enum pkcs7_attr_style attr_style)
kenter("");
- switch (attr_style) {
- case PKCS7_REJECT_AUTHATTRS:
+ switch (usage) {
+ case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
- pr_warn("Signed message is not ordinary data\n");
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
- pr_warn("Message contains unwanted authAttrs\n");
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
break;
- case PKCS7_REQUIRE_AUTHATTRS:
+ case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
- pr_warn("Signed message is not ordinary data\n");
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
- pr_warn("Message does not contain authAttrs\n");
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
break;
- case PKCS7_AUTHENTICODE_AUTHATTRS:
+ case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
- pr_warn("Signed message is not Authenticode\n");
+ pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
/* Authattr presence checked in parser */
break;
+ case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
}
for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index d2044eeb72f4..897b734dabf9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -393,6 +393,7 @@ error_no_desc:
* @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
* @pelen: Length of the binary image
* @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
*
* Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
@@ -417,7 +418,9 @@ error_no_desc:
* May also return -ENOMEM.
*/
int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted)
+ struct key *trusted_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool *_trusted)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
struct pefile_context ctx;
@@ -462,7 +465,7 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, PKCS7_AUTHENTICODE_AUTHATTRS);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index 15214059f408..441aff9b5aa7 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
#ifndef _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
struct key;
struct pkcs7_message;
@@ -36,13 +38,8 @@ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/*
* pkcs7_verify.c
*/
-enum pkcs7_attr_style {
- PKCS7_REJECT_AUTHATTRS,
- PKCS7_REQUIRE_AUTHATTRS,
- PKCS7_AUTHENTICODE_AUTHATTRS,
-};
extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
- enum pkcs7_attr_style attr_style);
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void *data, size_t datalen);
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index fda097e079a4..067c242b1e15 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -40,6 +40,20 @@ enum pkey_id_type {
extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
/*
+ * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
+ */
+enum key_being_used_for {
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+ NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
+};
+extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
+
+/*
* Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
*
* Note that this may include private part of the key as well as the public
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 9791c907cdb7..b20cd885c1fd 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
@@ -30,7 +31,8 @@ static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len);
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
#endif
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
index ac34819214f9..da2049b5161c 100644
--- a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
+++ b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted);
+ struct key *trusted_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool *_trusted);
#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 70ad463f6df0..bd62f5cda746 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -72,5 +72,6 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
}
- return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len);
+ return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
}
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index f9e1a75db59b..2570598b784d 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -113,9 +113,11 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
* @len: Size of @data.
* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
*/
int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len)
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
bool trusted;
@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
goto error;
}
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, PKCS7_REJECT_AUTHATTRS);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 25/27] PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2015-08-05 13:48 ` [PATCH 27/27] PKCS#7: Restrict content type and authenticated attributes by purpose " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 14:27 ` David Howells
27 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 14:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: keyrings
Cc: dhowells, mcgrof, zohar, kyle, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, dwmw2
I've squashed together patches 25 and 27, merged the descriptions and put the
result after patch 26. Here's the resulting squashed patch.
David
---
PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content type
A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes
that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that
signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself
signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then
contributes to the signature.
Further, we already require the master message content type to be
pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data
itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the
authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1].
We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them
entirely as appropriate. To this end:
(1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one
signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one
that does not.
(2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them.
Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are
rejected:
(a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the
content type in the SignedData object.
(b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data.
(c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable
UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within
the validity window of the matching X.509 cert.
(d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents.
(e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents.
(f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents.
The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is
an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if
not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present.
The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed
to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only
affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP).
The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or
if it contains more than one element in its set of values.
(3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following
restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers:
(*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more
flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal
content.
(*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and
requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute
holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE
This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but
allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set.
(*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE
This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type
and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the
minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and
an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't
remove these).
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE
(*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE
These are invalid in this context but are included for later use
when limiting the use of X.509 certs.
(4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between
the above options for testing purposes. For example:
echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage
keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7
will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a
firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE).
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c | 4
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 11 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 6 -
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c | 14 ++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h | 15 ++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 65 ++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 7 +
include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 10 ++
include/crypto/public_key.h | 14 +++
include/keys/system_keyring.h | 4
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 4
include/linux/verify_pefile.h | 6 +
kernel/module_signing.c | 3
kernel/system_keyring.c | 6 -
scripts/sign-file.c | 5 -
16 files changed, 285 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index ca83f7ac388b..fab22e72808c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -536,7 +536,9 @@ static int bzImage64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
int ret;
ret = verify_pefile_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
- system_trusted_keyring, &trusted);
+ system_trusted_keyring,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ &trusted);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (!trusted)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index b0e4ed23d668..1916680ad81b 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
*/
#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h>
#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -20,6 +21,16 @@
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
+ [VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "mod sig",
+ [VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE] = "firmware sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig",
+ [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig",
+ [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE] = "unspec sig",
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
+
static LIST_HEAD(asymmetric_key_parsers);
static DECLARE_RWSEM(asymmetric_key_parsers_sem);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
index 6bf8ff4f7414..1eca740b816a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID })
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
version INTEGER ({ pkcs7_note_signeddata_version }),
digestAlgorithms DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers,
- contentInfo ContentInfo,
+ contentInfo ContentInfo ({ pkcs7_note_content }),
certificates CHOICE {
certSet [0] IMPLICIT ExtendedCertificatesAndCertificates,
certSequence [2] IMPLICIT Certificates
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
}
ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
- contentType ContentType,
+ contentType ContentType ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
content [0] EXPLICIT Data OPTIONAL
}
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ AuthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
}
UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
- type OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
+ type OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
values SET OF ANY
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
index 3d13b042da73..10d34dbd00b9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c
@@ -14,16 +14,23 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+static unsigned pkcs7_usage;
+module_param_named(usage, pkcs7_usage, uint, S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(pkcs7_usage,
+ "Usage to specify when verifying the PKCS#7 message");
+
/*
* Preparse a PKCS#7 wrapped and validated data blob.
*/
static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
+ enum key_being_used_for usage = pkcs7_usage;
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
const void *data, *saved_prep_data;
size_t datalen, saved_prep_datalen;
@@ -32,6 +39,11 @@ static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
kenter("");
+ if (usage >= NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR) {
+ pr_err("Invalid usage type %d\n", usage);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
saved_prep_data = prep->data;
saved_prep_datalen = prep->datalen;
pkcs7 = pkcs7_parse_message(saved_prep_data, saved_prep_datalen);
@@ -40,7 +52,7 @@ static int pkcs7_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error;
}
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_free;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 826e2f3f507b..e6298b7a945a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -81,6 +81,30 @@ void pkcs7_free_message(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_free_message);
+/*
+ * Check authenticatedAttributes are provided or not provided consistently.
+ */
+static int pkcs7_check_authattrs(struct pkcs7_message *msg)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
+ bool want;
+
+ sinfo = msg->signed_infos;
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
+ want = true;
+ msg->have_authattrs = true;
+ }
+
+ for (sinfo = sinfo->next; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next)
+ if (!!sinfo->authattrs != want)
+ goto inconsistent;
+ return 0;
+
+inconsistent:
+ pr_warn("Inconsistently supplied authAttrs\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
/**
* pkcs7_parse_message - Parse a PKCS#7 message
* @data: The raw binary ASN.1 encoded message to be parsed
@@ -113,6 +137,10 @@ struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7_parse_message(const void *data, size_t datalen)
goto out;
}
+ ret = pkcs7_check_authattrs(ctx->msg);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
msg = ctx->msg;
ctx->msg = NULL;
@@ -381,6 +409,25 @@ int pkcs7_note_certificate_list(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/*
+ * Note the content type.
+ */
+int pkcs7_note_content(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ if (ctx->last_oid != OID_data &&
+ ctx->last_oid != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Unsupported data type %d\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
* Extract the data from the message and store that and its content type OID in
* the context.
*/
@@ -395,31 +442,90 @@ int pkcs7_note_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
ctx->msg->data = value;
ctx->msg->data_len = vlen;
ctx->msg->data_hdrlen = hdrlen;
- ctx->msg->data_type = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
}
/*
- * Parse authenticated attributes
+ * Parse authenticated attributes.
*/
int pkcs7_sig_note_authenticated_attr(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+ enum OID content_type;
pr_devel("AuthAttr: %02x %zu [%*ph]\n", tag, vlen, (unsigned)vlen, value);
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
+ case OID_contentType:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ content_type = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (content_type != ctx->msg->data_type) {
+ pr_warn("Mismatch between global data type (%d) and sinfo %u (%d)\n",
+ ctx->msg->data_type, sinfo->index,
+ content_type);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ case OID_signingTime:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ /* Should we check that the signing time is consistent
+ * with the signer's X.509 cert?
+ */
+ return x509_decode_time(&sinfo->signing_time,
+ hdrlen, tag, value, vlen);
+
case OID_messageDigest:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
if (tag != ASN1_OTS)
return -EBADMSG;
- ctx->sinfo->msgdigest = value;
- ctx->sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ sinfo->msgdigest = value;
+ sinfo->msgdigest_len = vlen;
+ return 0;
+
+ case OID_smimeCapabilites:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_smime_caps, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("S/MIME Caps only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Microsoft SpOpusInfo seems to be contain cont[0] 16-bit BE
+ * char URLs and cont[1] 8-bit char URLs.
+ *
+ * Microsoft StatementType seems to contain a list of OIDs that
+ * are also used as extendedKeyUsage types in X.509 certs.
+ */
+ case OID_msSpOpusInfo:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ goto authenticode_check;
+ case OID_msStatementType:
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(sinfo_has_ms_statement_type, &sinfo->aa_set))
+ goto repeated;
+ authenticode_check:
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Authenticode AuthAttrs only allowed with Authenticode\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* I'm not sure how to validate these */
return 0;
default:
return 0;
}
+
+repeated:
+ /* We permit max one item per AuthenticatedAttribute and no repeats */
+ pr_warn("Repeated/multivalue AuthAttrs not permitted\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
/*
@@ -430,10 +536,25 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
+
+ if (!test_bit(sinfo_has_content_type, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_message_digest, &sinfo->aa_set) ||
+ (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData &&
+ !test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set))) {
+ pr_warn("Missing required AuthAttr\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type != OID_msIndirectData &&
+ test_bit(sinfo_has_ms_opus_info, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ pr_warn("Unexpected Authenticode AuthAttr\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
/* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
- ctx->sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
- ctx->sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
return 0;
}
@@ -511,6 +632,11 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
+ if (ctx->msg->data_type == OID_msIndirectData && !sinfo->authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Authenticode requires AuthAttrs\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
/* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
if (!ctx->expect_skid) {
kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
index 790dd7cec82c..a66b19ebcf47 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@
struct pkcs7_signed_info {
struct pkcs7_signed_info *next;
struct x509_certificate *signer; /* Signing certificate (in msg->certs) */
- unsigned index;
- bool trusted;
- bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
+ unsigned index;
+ bool trusted;
+ bool unsupported_crypto; /* T if not usable due to missing crypto */
/* Message digest - the digest of the Content Data (or NULL) */
const void *msgdigest;
@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
/* Authenticated Attribute data (or NULL) */
unsigned authattrs_len;
const void *authattrs;
+ unsigned long aa_set;
+#define sinfo_has_content_type 0
+#define sinfo_has_signing_time 1
+#define sinfo_has_message_digest 2
+#define sinfo_has_smime_caps 3
+#define sinfo_has_ms_opus_info 4
+#define sinfo_has_ms_statement_type 5
+ time64_t signing_time;
/* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name [PKCS#7 or CMS ver 1]
* or issuing cert's SKID [CMS ver 3].
@@ -53,6 +61,7 @@ struct pkcs7_message {
struct x509_certificate *crl; /* Revocation list */
struct pkcs7_signed_info *signed_infos;
u8 version; /* Version of cert (1 -> PKCS#7 or CMS; 3 -> CMS) */
+ bool have_authattrs; /* T if have authattrs */
/* Content Data (or NULL) */
enum OID data_type; /* Type of Data */
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 404f89a0f852..d20c0b4b880e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -70,9 +70,15 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
* digest we just calculated.
*/
- if (sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
u8 tag;
+ if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
@@ -314,6 +320,18 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+ /* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
+ * certificate. We can't, however, check against the system clock
+ * since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
+ sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
+ pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -328,6 +346,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/**
* pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
*
* Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
* matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
@@ -339,6 +358,9 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
*
* Returns, in order of descending priority:
*
+ * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
+ * odds with the specified usage, or:
+ *
* (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
* appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
*
@@ -350,7 +372,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified
* (note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or:
*/
-int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *x509;
@@ -359,6 +382,44 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
kenter("");
+ switch (usage) {
+ case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* Authattr presence checked in parser */
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
if (ret < 0)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 2421f46184ce..897b734dabf9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -393,6 +393,7 @@ error_no_desc:
* @pebuf: Buffer containing the PE binary image
* @pelen: Length of the binary image
* @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
* @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
*
* Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message inside the PE
@@ -417,7 +418,9 @@ error_no_desc:
* May also return -ENOMEM.
*/
int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted)
+ struct key *trusted_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool *_trusted)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
struct pefile_context ctx;
@@ -462,7 +465,7 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
index e235ab4957ee..441aff9b5aa7 100644
--- a/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/include/crypto/pkcs7.h
@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+#define _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H
+
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
struct key;
struct pkcs7_message;
@@ -33,7 +38,10 @@ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
/*
* pkcs7_verify.c
*/
-extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
+extern int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
extern int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
const void *data, size_t datalen);
+
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_PKCS7_H */
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index fda097e079a4..067c242b1e15 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -40,6 +40,20 @@ enum pkey_id_type {
extern const char *const pkey_id_type_name[PKEY_ID_TYPE__LAST];
/*
+ * The use to which an asymmetric key is being put.
+ */
+enum key_being_used_for {
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+ VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
+ NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
+};
+extern const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR];
+
+/*
* Cryptographic data for the public-key subtype of the asymmetric key type.
*
* Note that this may include private part of the key as well as the public
diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
index 9791c907cdb7..b20cd885c1fd 100644
--- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
+++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
#include <linux/key.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
extern struct key *system_trusted_keyring;
static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
@@ -30,7 +31,8 @@ static inline struct key *get_system_trusted_keyring(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
extern int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len);
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage);
#endif
#endif /* _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index c2bbf672b84e..93e0ff92fb9b 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ enum OID {
OID_signed_data, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2 */
/* PKCS#9 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)} */
OID_email_address, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.1 */
- OID_content_type, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */
+ OID_contentType, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3 */
OID_messageDigest, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4 */
OID_signingTime, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.5 */
OID_smimeCapabilites, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.9.15 */
@@ -54,6 +54,8 @@ enum OID {
/* Microsoft Authenticode & Software Publishing */
OID_msIndirectData, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.4 */
+ OID_msStatementType, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.11 */
+ OID_msSpOpusInfo, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.12 */
OID_msPeImageDataObjId, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.15 */
OID_msIndividualSPKeyPurpose, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.1.21 */
OID_msOutlookExpress, /* 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.16.4 */
diff --git a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
index ac34819214f9..da2049b5161c 100644
--- a/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
+++ b/include/linux/verify_pefile.h
@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
#define _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+
extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
- struct key *trusted_keyring, bool *_trusted);
+ struct key *trusted_keyring,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage,
+ bool *_trusted);
#endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index 70ad463f6df0..bd62f5cda746 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -72,5 +72,6 @@ int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, unsigned long *_modlen)
return -EBADMSG;
}
- return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len);
+ return system_verify_data(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
+ VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
}
diff --git a/kernel/system_keyring.c b/kernel/system_keyring.c
index 95f2dcbc7616..2570598b784d 100644
--- a/kernel/system_keyring.c
+++ b/kernel/system_keyring.c
@@ -113,9 +113,11 @@ late_initcall(load_system_certificate_list);
* @len: Size of @data.
* @raw_pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message that is the signature.
* @pkcs7_len: The size of @raw_pkcs7.
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put.
*/
int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
- const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len)
+ const void *raw_pkcs7, size_t pkcs7_len,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
bool trusted;
@@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ int system_verify_data(const void *data, unsigned long len,
goto error;
}
- ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7);
+ ret = pkcs7_verify(pkcs7, usage);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
index de213e5c0cd3..e9741e879bbd 100755
--- a/scripts/sign-file.c
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
bool sign_only = false;
unsigned char buf[4096];
unsigned long module_size, cms_size;
- unsigned int use_keyid = 0;
+ unsigned int use_keyid = 0, use_signed_attrs = CMS_NOATTR;
const EVP_MD *digest_algo;
EVP_PKEY *private_key;
CMS_ContentInfo *cms;
@@ -216,7 +216,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
ERR(!cms, "CMS_sign");
ERR(!CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo,
- CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY | CMS_NOSMIMECAP | use_keyid),
+ CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY | CMS_NOSMIMECAP |
+ use_keyid | use_signed_attrs),
"CMS_sign_add_signer");
ERR(CMS_final(cms, bm, NULL, CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY) < 0,
"CMS_final");
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler " David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 18:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2015-08-05 18:26 ` David Howells
1 sibling, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2015-08-05 18:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: keyrings, mcgrof, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
Hi David,
This patch isn't applying properly against linux-security/next. The
rest seem to be fine.
Mimi
On Wed, 2015-08-05 at 14:43 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler rather than storing a pointer
> into the source text. This means we don't have to use "%*.*s" all over the
> place.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
> ---
>
> scripts/asn1_compiler.c | 155 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
> 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
> index 6e4ba992a51f..e000f44e37b8 100644
> --- a/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
> +++ b/scripts/asn1_compiler.c
> @@ -294,8 +294,8 @@ static const char *const directives[NR__DIRECTIVES] = {
>
> struct action {
> struct action *next;
> + char *name;
> unsigned char index;
> - char name[];
> };
>
> static struct action *action_list;
> @@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ struct token {
> enum token_type token_type : 8;
> unsigned char size;
> struct action *action;
> - const char *value;
> + char *content;
> struct type *type;
> };
>
> @@ -328,11 +328,9 @@ static int directive_compare(const void *_key, const void *_pdir)
> dlen = strlen(dir);
> clen = (dlen < token->size) ? dlen : token->size;
>
> - //debug("cmp(%*.*s,%s) = ",
> - // (int)token->size, (int)token->size, token->value,
> - // dir);
> + //debug("cmp(%s,%s) = ", token->content, dir);
>
> - val = memcmp(token->value, dir, clen);
> + val = memcmp(token->content, dir, clen);
> if (val != 0) {
> //debug("%d [cmp]\n", val);
> return val;
> @@ -352,7 +350,7 @@ static int directive_compare(const void *_key, const void *_pdir)
> static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
> {
> struct token *tokens;
> - char *line, *nl, *p, *q;
> + char *line, *nl, *start, *p, *q;
> unsigned tix, lineno;
>
> /* Assume we're going to have half as many tokens as we have
> @@ -411,11 +409,11 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
> break;
>
> tokens[tix].line = lineno;
> - tokens[tix].value = p;
> + start = p;
>
> /* Handle string tokens */
> if (isalpha(*p)) {
> - const char **dir;
> + const char **dir, *start = p;
>
> /* Can be a directive, type name or element
> * name. Find the end of the name.
> @@ -426,10 +424,18 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
> tokens[tix].size = q - p;
> p = q;
>
> + tokens[tix].content = malloc(tokens[tix].size + 1);
> + if (!tokens[tix].content) {
> + perror(NULL);
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + memcpy(tokens[tix].content, start, tokens[tix].size);
> + tokens[tix].content[tokens[tix].size] = 0;
> +
> /* If it begins with a lowercase letter then
> * it's an element name
> */
> - if (islower(tokens[tix].value[0])) {
> + if (islower(tokens[tix].content[0])) {
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME;
> continue;
> }
> @@ -458,6 +464,13 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
> q++;
> tokens[tix].size = q - p;
> p = q;
> + tokens[tix].content = malloc(tokens[tix].size + 1);
> + if (!tokens[tix].content) {
> + perror(NULL);
> + exit(1);
> + }
> + memcpy(tokens[tix].content, start, tokens[tix].size);
> + tokens[tix].content[tokens[tix].size] = 0;
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_NUMBER;
> continue;
> }
> @@ -466,6 +479,7 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
> if (memcmp(p, "::=", 3) == 0) {
> p += 3;
> tokens[tix].size = 3;
> + tokens[tix].content = "::=";
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_ASSIGNMENT;
> continue;
> }
> @@ -475,12 +489,14 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
> if (memcmp(p, "({", 2) == 0) {
> p += 2;
> tokens[tix].size = 2;
> + tokens[tix].content = "({";
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_ACTION;
> continue;
> }
> if (memcmp(p, "})", 2) == 0) {
> p += 2;
> tokens[tix].size = 2;
> + tokens[tix].content = "})";
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION;
> continue;
> }
> @@ -491,22 +507,27 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
> switch (*p) {
> case '{':
> p += 1;
> + tokens[tix].content = "{";
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY;
> continue;
> case '}':
> p += 1;
> + tokens[tix].content = "}";
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY;
> continue;
> case '[':
> p += 1;
> + tokens[tix].content = "[";
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_OPEN_SQUARE;
> continue;
> case ']':
> p += 1;
> + tokens[tix].content = "]";
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE;
> continue;
> case ',':
> p += 1;
> + tokens[tix].content = ",";
> tokens[tix++].token_type = TOKEN_COMMA;
> continue;
> default:
> @@ -527,10 +548,7 @@ static void tokenise(char *buffer, char *end)
> {
> int n;
> for (n = 0; n < nr_tokens; n++)
> - debug("Token %3u: '%*.*s'\n",
> - n,
> - (int)token_list[n].size, (int)token_list[n].size,
> - token_list[n].value);
> + debug("Token %3u: '%s'\n", n, token_list[n].content);
> }
> #endif
> }
> @@ -709,7 +727,7 @@ static int type_index_compare(const void *_a, const void *_b)
> if ((*a)->name->size != (*b)->name->size)
> return (*a)->name->size - (*b)->name->size;
> else
> - return memcmp((*a)->name->value, (*b)->name->value,
> + return memcmp((*a)->name->content, (*b)->name->content,
> (*a)->name->size);
> }
>
> @@ -722,7 +740,7 @@ static int type_finder(const void *_key, const void *_ti)
> if (token->size != type->name->size)
> return token->size - type->name->size;
> else
> - return memcmp(token->value, type->name->value,
> + return memcmp(token->content, type->name->content,
> token->size);
> }
>
> @@ -776,10 +794,7 @@ static void build_type_list(void)
> #if 0
> for (n = 0; n < nr_types; n++) {
> struct type *type = type_index[n];
> - debug("- %*.*s\n",
> - (int)type->name->size,
> - (int)type->name->size,
> - type->name->value);
> + debug("- %*.*s\n", type->name->content);
> }
> #endif
> }
> @@ -809,9 +824,8 @@ static void parse(void)
> type->element->type_def = type;
>
> if (cursor != type[1].name) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%*.*s'\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Parse error at token '%s'\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
>
> @@ -878,34 +892,31 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
> cursor++;
> break;
> default:
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%*.*s'\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unrecognised tag class token '%s'\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
>
> if (cursor >= end)
> goto overrun_error;
> if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_NUMBER) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%*.*s'\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing tag number '%s'\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
>
> element->tag &= ~0x1f;
> - element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->value, &p, 10);
> + element->tag |= strtoul(cursor->content, &p, 10);
> element->flags |= ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED;
> - if (p - cursor->value != cursor->size)
> + if (p - cursor->content != cursor->size)
> abort();
> cursor++;
>
> if (cursor >= end)
> goto overrun_error;
> if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_SQUARE) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%*.*s'\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing closing square bracket '%s'\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
> cursor++;
> @@ -1005,9 +1016,8 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
> ref = bsearch(cursor, type_index, nr_types, sizeof(type_index[0]),
> type_finder);
> if (!ref) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%*.*s' undefined\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Type '%s' undefined\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
> cursor->type = *ref;
> @@ -1056,9 +1066,8 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
> break;
>
> default:
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' does not introduce a type\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%s' does not introduce a type\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
>
> @@ -1075,20 +1084,18 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
> if (cursor >= end)
> goto overrun_error;
> if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_ELEMENT_NAME) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%*.*s' is not an action function name\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Token '%s' is not an action function name\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
>
> - action = malloc(sizeof(struct action) + cursor->size + 1);
> + action = malloc(sizeof(struct action));
> if (!action) {
> perror(NULL);
> exit(1);
> }
> action->index = 0;
> - memcpy(action->name, cursor->value, cursor->size);
> - action->name[cursor->size] = 0;
> + action->name = cursor->content;
>
> for (ppaction = &action_list;
> *ppaction;
> @@ -1118,9 +1125,8 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
> if (cursor >= end)
> goto overrun_error;
> if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_ACTION) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%*.*s'\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Missing close action, got '%s'\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
> cursor++;
> @@ -1130,9 +1136,8 @@ static struct element *parse_type(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
> return top;
>
> parse_error:
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%*.*s'\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Unexpected token '%s'\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
>
> overrun_error:
> @@ -1150,9 +1155,8 @@ static struct element *parse_compound(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
> struct token *cursor = *_cursor, *name;
>
> if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_OPEN_CURLY) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%*.*s'\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound to start with brace not '%s'\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
> cursor++;
> @@ -1193,9 +1197,8 @@ static struct element *parse_compound(struct token **_cursor, struct token *end,
> children->flags &= ~ELEMENT_CONDITIONAL;
>
> if (cursor->token_type != TOKEN_CLOSE_CURLY) {
> - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%*.*s'\n",
> - filename, cursor->line,
> - (int)cursor->size, (int)cursor->size, cursor->value);
> + fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: Expected compound closure, got '%s'\n",
> + filename, cursor->line, cursor->content);
> exit(1);
> }
> cursor++;
> @@ -1212,10 +1215,8 @@ static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
> {
> const struct element *c;
> const struct type *t = e->type_def;
> - const char *name = e->name ? e->name->value : ".";
> - int nsize = e->name ? e->name->size : 1;
> - const char *tname = t && t->name ? t->name->value : ".";
> - int tnsize = t && t->name ? t->name->size : 1;
> + const char *name = e->name ? e->name->content : ".";
> + const char *tname = t && t->name ? t->name->content : ".";
> char tag[32];
>
> if (e->class == 0 && e->method == 0 && e->tag == 0)
> @@ -1231,7 +1232,7 @@ static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
> asn1_methods[e->method],
> e->tag);
>
> - printf("%c%c%c%c%c %c %*s[*] \e[33m%s\e[m %*.*s %*.*s \e[35m%s\e[m\n",
> + printf("%c%c%c%c%c %c %*s[*] \e[33m%s\e[m %s %s \e[35m%s\e[m\n",
> e->flags & ELEMENT_IMPLICIT ? 'I' : '-',
> e->flags & ELEMENT_EXPLICIT ? 'E' : '-',
> e->flags & ELEMENT_TAG_SPECIFIED ? 'T' : '-',
> @@ -1240,8 +1241,8 @@ static void dump_element(const struct element *e, int level)
> "-tTqQcaro"[e->compound],
> level, "",
> tag,
> - tnsize, tnsize, tname,
> - nsize, nsize, name,
> + tname,
> + name,
> e->action ? e->action->name : "");
> if (e->compound == TYPE_REF)
> dump_element(e->type->type->element, level + 3);
> @@ -1454,9 +1455,7 @@ static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag)
> outofline = 1;
>
> if (e->type_def && out) {
> - render_more(out, "\t// %*.*s\n",
> - (int)e->type_def->name->size, (int)e->type_def->name->size,
> - e->type_def->name->value);
> + render_more(out, "\t// %s\n", e->type_def->name->content);
> }
>
> /* Render the operation */
> @@ -1468,9 +1467,7 @@ static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag)
> render_opcode(out, "ASN1_OP_%sMATCH_ANY%s%s,",
> cond, act, skippable ? "_OR_SKIP" : "");
> if (e->name)
> - render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s",
> - (int)e->name->size, (int)e->name->size,
> - e->name->value);
> + render_more(out, "\t\t// %s", e->name->content);
> render_more(out, "\n");
> goto dont_render_tag;
>
> @@ -1503,9 +1500,7 @@ static void render_element(FILE *out, struct element *e, struct element *tag)
>
> x = tag ?: e;
> if (x->name)
> - render_more(out, "\t\t// %*.*s",
> - (int)x->name->size, (int)x->name->size,
> - x->name->value);
> + render_more(out, "\t\t// %s", x->name->content);
> render_more(out, "\n");
>
> /* Render the tag */
> @@ -1543,10 +1538,8 @@ dont_render_tag:
> * skipability */
> render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index);
> if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name)
> - render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s",
> - (int)e->type_def->name->size,
> - (int)e->type_def->name->size,
> - e->type_def->name->value);
> + render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %s",
> + e->type_def->name->content);
> render_more(out, "\n");
> if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) {
> e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED;
> @@ -1571,10 +1564,8 @@ dont_render_tag:
> * skipability */
> render_opcode(out, "_jump_target(%u),", e->entry_index);
> if (e->type_def && e->type_def->name)
> - render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %*.*s",
> - (int)e->type_def->name->size,
> - (int)e->type_def->name->size,
> - e->type_def->name->value);
> + render_more(out, "\t\t// --> %s",
> + e->type_def->name->content);
> render_more(out, "\n");
> if (!(e->flags & ELEMENT_RENDERED)) {
> e->flags |= ELEMENT_RENDERED;
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler [ver #7]
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler " David Howells
2015-08-05 18:13 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2015-08-05 18:26 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 18:56 ` Mimi Zohar
1 sibling, 1 reply; 32+ messages in thread
From: David Howells @ 2015-08-05 18:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar
Cc: dhowells, keyrings, mcgrof, kyle, linux-kernel,
linux-security-module, dwmw2
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> This patch isn't applying properly against linux-security/next. The
> rest seem to be fine.
Did you apply the asn1-fixes-20150805 first and patch 1?
Note that the branch is based on security/next, with my asn1-fixes-20150805
tag merged on top - so it *ought* to apply.
David
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler [ver #7]
2015-08-05 18:26 ` David Howells
@ 2015-08-05 18:56 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 0 replies; 32+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2015-08-05 18:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: keyrings, mcgrof, kyle, linux-kernel, linux-security-module, dwmw2
On Wed, 2015-08-05 at 19:26 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
>
> > This patch isn't applying properly against linux-security/next. The
> > rest seem to be fine.
>
> Did you apply the asn1-fixes-20150805 first and patch 1?
>
> Note that the branch is based on security/next, with my asn1-fixes-20150805
> tag merged on top - so it *ought* to apply.
Yes, that works.
Thanks!
Mimi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 32+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2015-08-05 18:56 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2015-08-05 13:43 [PATCH 00/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 for module signatures [ver #7] David Howells
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 01/27] ASN.1: Add an ASN.1 compiler option to dump the element tree " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 02/27] ASN.1: Copy string names to tokens in ASN.1 compiler " David Howells
2015-08-05 18:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2015-08-05 18:26 ` David Howells
2015-08-05 18:56 ` Mimi Zohar
2015-08-05 13:43 ` [PATCH 03/27] X.509: Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 04/27] X.509: Support X.509 lookup by Issuer+Serial form " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 05/27] PKCS#7: Allow detached data to be supplied for signature checking purposes " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 06/27] MODSIGN: Provide a utility to append a PKCS#7 signature to a module " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 07/27] MODSIGN: Use PKCS#7 messages as module signatures " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 08/27] sign-file: Add option to only create signature file " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:44 ` [PATCH 09/27] system_keyring.c doesn't need to #include module-internal.h " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 10/27] MODSIGN: Extract the blob PKCS#7 signature verifier from module signing " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 11/27] modsign: Abort modules_install when signing fails " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 12/27] modsign: Allow password to be specified for signing key " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 13/27] modsign: Allow signing key to be PKCS#11 " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 14/27] modsign: Allow external signing key to be specified " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:45 ` [PATCH 15/27] modsign: Extract signing cert from CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY if needed " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 16/27] modsign: Use single PEM file for autogenerated key " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 17/27] modsign: Add explicit CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS option " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 18/27] PKCS#7: Check content type and versions " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 19/27] X.509: Change recorded SKID & AKID to not include Subject or Issuer " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:46 ` [PATCH 20/27] PKCS#7: Support CMS messages also [RFC5652] " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 21/27] sign-file: Generate CMS message as signature instead of PKCS#7 " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 22/27] extract-cert: Cope with multiple X.509 certificates in a single file " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 23/27] modsign: Use extract-cert to process CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 24/27] PKCS#7: Improve and export the X.509 ASN.1 time object decoder " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 25/27] PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:47 ` [PATCH 26/27] KEYS: Add a name for PKEY_ID_PKCS7 " David Howells
2015-08-05 13:48 ` [PATCH 27/27] PKCS#7: Restrict content type and authenticated attributes by purpose " David Howells
2015-08-05 14:27 ` [PATCH 25/27] PKCS#7: Appropriately require or forbid authenticated attributes " David Howells
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