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From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Emily Ratliff <eratliff@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
	<ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2015 15:24:09 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150922122409.GC4953@mwanda> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+XR7TJSgbTNYhCP0YhvvNwA5HtEL=xKCR9GUttzb06Uw@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 09:35:50AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> As an example, making the kernel code memory read-only means an
> attacker cannot just directly change the kernel's execution path when
> they use an arbitrary memory-writing flaw.

Part of the problem is that C defaults to writable and you have to
explicitly add a const if you want it read only.  Then when you are
reading the code and you see:

static struct uvc_format_desc uvc_fmts[] = {

You can't immediately tell if it is writeable because it needs to be or
because that's just the default.  We should make a new keyword that
means non constant then we could grep for structs which have a function
pointer and complain if they weren't specified as const or __writable.

Maybe there is a way to do this with GCC attributes but I have never
used them before and I couldn't immediately see how to do it.

regards,
dan carpenter

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-09-22 12:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-08-24  4:20 [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening James Morris
2015-08-24 11:46 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 11:56   ` James Morris
2015-08-24 17:17     ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 17:28       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 17:39         ` Julia Lawall
2015-08-24 18:01         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 18:57             ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:52       ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 18:59         ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 19:00         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 22:05           ` Greg KH
2015-08-25  0:51             ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2015-08-31 20:10             ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-31 20:22               ` josh
2015-08-26 20:51       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-26 21:10         ` Matthew Garrett
2015-08-30  0:41           ` [Ksummit-discuss] Self nomination Matthew Garrett
2015-08-24 11:48 ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 12:29 ` Linus Walleij
2015-08-24 12:51   ` Jason Cooper
2015-08-24 16:35   ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:09     ` James Bottomley
2015-08-24 20:17       ` James Morris
2015-08-24 20:46         ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 22:22           ` James Morris
2015-08-24 23:20             ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:54               ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-08-25  0:06                 ` James Morris
2015-08-25  0:06                 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-27 22:08                   ` [Ksummit-discuss] grsecurity and kernel hardening Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-27 22:49                     ` James Bottomley
2015-08-27 23:03                       ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-24 23:04           ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:45           ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-08-24 22:57         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:25           ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:28       ` josh
2015-08-24 22:55       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:13         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-31 20:58         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-09-01  9:03           ` Jiri Kosina
2015-09-01 16:52             ` Kees Cook
2015-09-01 16:50           ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 15:15     ` Shuah Khan
2015-08-25 16:15       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:30       ` Mark Brown
2015-08-25 16:33         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:58         ` Shuah Khan
2015-09-22 12:24     ` Dan Carpenter [this message]
2015-09-22 12:55       ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2015-09-22 12:59       ` Julia Lawall
2015-09-22 18:02         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 16:20 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2015-08-24 17:19   ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:50     ` James Morris

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