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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Cc: "ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org"
	<ksummit-discuss@lists.linuxfoundation.org>,
	Emily Ratliff <eratliff@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Subject: Re: [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 09:33:27 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jLkkiE8mAbfqSC=KzLuZ+hxarbmPfmCS2tNCVd8dTyPNA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150825163034.GB12878@sirena.org.uk>

On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 9:30 AM, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 09:15:32AM -0600, Shuah Khan wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 10:35 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
>> > I agree with the sentiment here, but not with the language. Finding
>> > flaws (which is what selftests, KASan, Trinity, etc do) isn't
>> > hardening. Hardening is stopping the exploitation of flaws. The
>> > hardening the kernel needs is about taking away exploitation tools,
>> > not killing bugs. (Though killing bugs is still great.)
>
>> I agree with Kees on this. Kselftest or any other test suites can help
>> with regression testing and make sure Kernel works the way it should.
>> Also these tests can tell us if kernel is hardened or not.
>
>> Hardening means something different to me. i.e making sure kernel
>> can protect against attacks and fail gracefully. This is something to
>> address during design and development process.
>
> Testsuites can help here if we get into the habit of making sure they
> exercise error conditions; they're off to the side a bit but they can
> be a useful way of promoting good practice (at least in my experience).

Yeah, this is what I've done with a bunch of the newer tests in the
lkdtm module. They're designed to Oops the machine by performing
actions that should be caught by various mitigations (e.g. writing to
kernel text, executing userspace memory from the kernel, etc).

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

  reply	other threads:[~2015-08-25 16:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-08-24  4:20 [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening James Morris
2015-08-24 11:46 ` Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 11:56   ` James Morris
2015-08-24 17:17     ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 17:28       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 17:39         ` Julia Lawall
2015-08-24 18:01         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 18:57             ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:52       ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 18:59         ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 19:00         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 22:05           ` Greg KH
2015-08-25  0:51             ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2015-08-31 20:10             ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-08-31 20:22               ` josh
2015-08-26 20:51       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-26 21:10         ` Matthew Garrett
2015-08-30  0:41           ` [Ksummit-discuss] Self nomination Matthew Garrett
2015-08-24 11:48 ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Jiri Kosina
2015-08-24 12:29 ` Linus Walleij
2015-08-24 12:51   ` Jason Cooper
2015-08-24 16:35   ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:09     ` James Bottomley
2015-08-24 20:17       ` James Morris
2015-08-24 20:46         ` Thomas Gleixner
2015-08-24 22:22           ` James Morris
2015-08-24 23:20             ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:54               ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-08-25  0:06                 ` James Morris
2015-08-25  0:06                 ` Kees Cook
2015-08-27 22:08                   ` [Ksummit-discuss] grsecurity and kernel hardening Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-27 22:49                     ` James Bottomley
2015-08-27 23:03                       ` Stephen Hemminger
2015-08-24 23:04           ` [Ksummit-discuss] [TECH TOPIC] Kernel Hardening Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:45           ` Luis R. Rodriguez
2015-08-24 22:57         ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:25           ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 20:28       ` josh
2015-08-24 22:55       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 23:13         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-31 20:58         ` Eric W. Biederman
2015-09-01  9:03           ` Jiri Kosina
2015-09-01 16:52             ` Kees Cook
2015-09-01 16:50           ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 15:15     ` Shuah Khan
2015-08-25 16:15       ` Kees Cook
2015-08-25 16:30       ` Mark Brown
2015-08-25 16:33         ` Kees Cook [this message]
2015-08-25 16:58         ` Shuah Khan
2015-09-22 12:24     ` Dan Carpenter
2015-09-22 12:55       ` Yves-Alexis Perez
2015-09-22 12:59       ` Julia Lawall
2015-09-22 18:02         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-08-24 16:20 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2015-08-24 17:19   ` Kees Cook
2015-08-24 18:50     ` James Morris

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