From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, luto@kernel.org, mgorman@techsingularity.net, Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, arnd@arndb.de Subject: [PATCH 09/10] x86, pkeys: allow configuration of init_pkru Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2016 09:30:23 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20160729163023.407672D2@viggo.jf.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20160729163009.5EC1D38C@viggo.jf.intel.com> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> As discussed in the previous patch, there is a reliability benefit to allowing an init value for the Protection Keys Rights User register (PKRU) which differs from what the XSAVE hardware provides. But, having PKRU be 0 (its init value) provides some nonzero amount of optimization potential to the hardware. It can, for instance, skip writes to the XSAVE buffer when it knows that PKRU is in its init state. The cost of losing this optimization is approximately 100 cycles per context switch for a workload which lightly using XSAVE state (something not using AVX much). The overhead comes from a combinaation of actually manipulating PKRU and the overhead of pullin in an extra cacheline. This overhead is not huge, but it's also not something that I think we should unconditionally inflict on everyone. So, make it configurable both at boot-time and from debugfs. Changes to the debugfs value affect all processes created after the write to debugfs. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: mgorman@techsingularity.net --- b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+) diff -puN arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c~pkeys-141-restrictive-init-pkru-debugfs arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c --- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c~pkeys-141-restrictive-init-pkru-debugfs 2016-07-29 09:18:59.811625219 -0700 +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c 2016-07-29 09:18:59.814625355 -0700 @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for * more details. */ +#include <linux/debugfs.h> /* debugfs_create_u32() */ #include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */ #include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */ #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h> @@ -159,3 +160,69 @@ void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void) */ write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot); } + +static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char buf[32]; + unsigned int len; + + len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value); + return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len); +} + +static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file, + const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char buf[32]; + ssize_t len; + u32 new_init_pkru; + + len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1); + if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len)) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */ + buf[len] = '\0'; + if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system + * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access + * or writes to pkey 0. + */ + if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT)) + return -EINVAL; + + WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru); + return count; +} + +static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = { + .read = init_pkru_read_file, + .write = init_pkru_write_file, + .llseek = default_llseek, +}; + +static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void) +{ + debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, + arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value); + +static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt) +{ + u32 new_init_pkru; + + if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru)) + return 1; + + WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru); + + return 1; +} +__setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru); + _
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org, luto@kernel.org, mgorman@techsingularity.net, Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net>, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, arnd@arndb.de Subject: [PATCH 09/10] x86, pkeys: allow configuration of init_pkru Date: Fri, 29 Jul 2016 09:30:23 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20160729163023.407672D2@viggo.jf.intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20160729163009.5EC1D38C@viggo.jf.intel.com> From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> As discussed in the previous patch, there is a reliability benefit to allowing an init value for the Protection Keys Rights User register (PKRU) which differs from what the XSAVE hardware provides. But, having PKRU be 0 (its init value) provides some nonzero amount of optimization potential to the hardware. It can, for instance, skip writes to the XSAVE buffer when it knows that PKRU is in its init state. The cost of losing this optimization is approximately 100 cycles per context switch for a workload which lightly using XSAVE state (something not using AVX much). The overhead comes from a combinaation of actually manipulating PKRU and the overhead of pullin in an extra cacheline. This overhead is not huge, but it's also not something that I think we should unconditionally inflict on everyone. So, make it configurable both at boot-time and from debugfs. Changes to the debugfs value affect all processes created after the write to debugfs. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: mgorman@techsingularity.net --- b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+) diff -puN arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c~pkeys-141-restrictive-init-pkru-debugfs arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c --- a/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c~pkeys-141-restrictive-init-pkru-debugfs 2016-07-29 09:18:59.811625219 -0700 +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pkeys.c 2016-07-29 09:18:59.814625355 -0700 @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ * FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for * more details. */ +#include <linux/debugfs.h> /* debugfs_create_u32() */ #include <linux/mm_types.h> /* mm_struct, vma, etc... */ #include <linux/pkeys.h> /* PKEY_* */ #include <uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h> @@ -159,3 +160,69 @@ void copy_init_pkru_to_fpregs(void) */ write_pkru(init_pkru_value_snapshot); } + +static ssize_t init_pkru_read_file(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char buf[32]; + unsigned int len; + + len = sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", init_pkru_value); + return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, len); +} + +static ssize_t init_pkru_write_file(struct file *file, + const char __user *user_buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char buf[32]; + ssize_t len; + u32 new_init_pkru; + + len = min(count, sizeof(buf) - 1); + if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, len)) + return -EFAULT; + + /* Make the buffer a valid string that we can not overrun */ + buf[len] = '\0'; + if (kstrtouint(buf, 0, &new_init_pkru)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Don't allow insane settings that will blow the system + * up immediately if someone attempts to disable access + * or writes to pkey 0. + */ + if (new_init_pkru & (PKRU_AD_BIT|PKRU_WD_BIT)) + return -EINVAL; + + WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru); + return count; +} + +static const struct file_operations fops_init_pkru = { + .read = init_pkru_read_file, + .write = init_pkru_write_file, + .llseek = default_llseek, +}; + +static int __init create_init_pkru_value(void) +{ + debugfs_create_file("init_pkru", S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR, + arch_debugfs_dir, NULL, &fops_init_pkru); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(create_init_pkru_value); + +static __init int setup_init_pkru(char *opt) +{ + u32 new_init_pkru; + + if (kstrtouint(opt, 0, &new_init_pkru)) + return 1; + + WRITE_ONCE(init_pkru_value, new_init_pkru); + + return 1; +} +__setup("init_pkru=", setup_init_pkru); + _ -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-29 16:31 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-07-29 16:30 [PATCH 00/10] [v6] System Calls for Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 01/10] x86, pkeys: add fault handling for PF_PK page fault bit Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:10 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] x86/pkeys: Add " tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 02/10] mm: implement new pkey_mprotect() system call Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:11 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] mm: Implement " tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 03/10] x86, pkeys: make mprotect_key() mask off additional vm_flags Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:11 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] x86/pkeys: Make " tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 04/10] x86, pkeys: allocation/free syscalls Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:12 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] x86/pkeys: Allocation/free syscalls tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 05/10] x86: wire up protection keys system calls Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:12 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] x86: Wire " tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 06/10] generic syscalls: wire up memory protection keys syscalls Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:12 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] generic syscalls: Wire " tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 07/10] pkeys: add details of system call use to Documentation/ Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:13 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] pkeys: Add " tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 08/10] x86, pkeys: default to a restrictive init PKRU Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 17:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-29 17:29 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-29 17:50 ` Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 17:50 ` Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 19:44 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-07-29 19:44 ` Andy Lutomirski 2016-08-01 14:42 ` Vlastimil Babka 2016-08-01 14:42 ` Vlastimil Babka 2016-08-01 14:58 ` Dave Hansen 2016-08-01 14:58 ` Dave Hansen 2016-08-02 8:20 ` Vlastimil Babka 2016-08-02 8:20 ` Vlastimil Babka 2016-09-09 11:13 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] x86/pkeys: Default " tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen [this message] 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 09/10] x86, pkeys: allow configuration of init_pkru Dave Hansen 2016-08-02 8:28 ` Vlastimil Babka 2016-08-02 8:28 ` Vlastimil Babka 2016-08-02 14:37 ` Dave Hansen 2016-08-02 14:37 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:14 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] x86/pkeys: Allow " tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` [PATCH 10/10] x86, pkeys: add self-tests Dave Hansen 2016-07-29 16:30 ` Dave Hansen 2016-09-09 11:14 ` [tip:mm/pkeys] x86/pkeys: Add self-tests tip-bot for Dave Hansen 2016-08-08 23:18 [PATCH 00/10] [v6] System Calls for Memory Protection Keys Dave Hansen 2016-08-08 23:18 ` [PATCH 09/10] x86, pkeys: allow configuration of init_pkru Dave Hansen 2016-08-08 23:18 ` Dave Hansen
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