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From: marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
To: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] kernel: Add SELinux SCTP protocol support
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2017 18:58:02 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170123185802.GD3781@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1485177542.4077.2.camel@btinternet.com>

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 01:19:02PM +0000, Richard Haines wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-12-14 at 13:34 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Wed, 2016-12-14 at 13:39 +0000, Richard Haines wrote:
<snip>
> > > +   3) SCTP sockets inherit their labels from the creating process
> > > (unless
> > > +      there are policy rules to change this). They do NOT follow
> > > the
> > > TCP
> > > +      labeling method even for TCP-style sockets. For reference:
> > > TCP
> > > child
> > > +      sockets take the TE information from the parent server
> > > socket,
> > > but the
> > > +      MLS/MCS information from the connection when CIPSO is
> > > enabled.
> > 
> > This seems problematic, given that the TCP child socket behavior was
> > specifically introduced to allow MLS connections to operate
> > correctly.
> > Why diverge?  At some point, it would be useful to rework that to use
> > security_transition_sid() or similar to derive the child socket label
> > and let policy dictate h
> > that's a separate change.
> I'll attempt to fix this, currently I've tested against equivalent in
> the SELinux test suite:
> CIPSO loopback full-labeling - ok
> CIPSO - fails some tests
> CALIPSO - fails some tests
> NetLabel Fallback labeling - ok
> iptables - ok
> IPSEC - fails probably because rfc3554 (sctp/ipsec support) has
> not been implemented yet.

FWIW, the kernel side for SCTP/IPSEC is there, but the userspace bits
aren't. There is an initiative to do it in libreswan but it's just on
papers yet. And sure, bugs might be uncovered during so..

  Marcelo


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
To: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 1/1] kernel: Add SELinux SCTP protocol support
Date: Mon, 23 Jan 2017 16:58:02 -0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170123185802.GD3781@localhost.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1485177542.4077.2.camel@btinternet.com>

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 01:19:02PM +0000, Richard Haines wrote:
> On Wed, 2016-12-14 at 13:34 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> > On Wed, 2016-12-14 at 13:39 +0000, Richard Haines wrote:
<snip>
> > > +   3) SCTP sockets inherit their labels from the creating process
> > > (unless
> > > +      there are policy rules to change this). They do NOT follow
> > > the
> > > TCP
> > > +      labeling method even for TCP-style sockets. For reference:
> > > TCP
> > > child
> > > +      sockets take the TE information from the parent server
> > > socket,
> > > but the
> > > +      MLS/MCS information from the connection when CIPSO is
> > > enabled.
> > 
> > This seems problematic, given that the TCP child socket behavior was
> > specifically introduced to allow MLS connections to operate
> > correctly.
> > Why diverge?  At some point, it would be useful to rework that to use
> > security_transition_sid() or similar to derive the child socket label
> > and let policy dictate h
> > that's a separate change.
> I'll attempt to fix this, currently I've tested against equivalent in
> the SELinux test suite:
> CIPSO loopback full-labeling - ok
> CIPSO - fails some tests
> CALIPSO - fails some tests
> NetLabel Fallback labeling - ok
> iptables - ok
> IPSEC - fails probably because rfc3554 (sctp/ipsec support) has
> not been implemented yet.

FWIW, the kernel side for SCTP/IPSEC is there, but the userspace bits
aren't. There is an initiative to do it in libreswan but it's just on
papers yet. And sure, bugs might be uncovered during so..

  Marcelo

  reply	other threads:[~2017-01-23 18:58 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-12-14 13:39 [RFC PATCH 1/1] kernel: Add SELinux SCTP protocol support Richard Haines
2016-12-14 13:39 ` Richard Haines
2016-12-14 14:01 ` David Laight
2016-12-16 13:40   ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2016-12-16 13:40     ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2016-12-21 12:26     ` Richard Haines
2016-12-14 17:02 ` Casey Schaufler
2016-12-14 17:02   ` Casey Schaufler
2016-12-16 13:31   ` Richard Haines
2016-12-14 18:34 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-12-14 18:34   ` Stephen Smalley
2017-01-23 13:19   ` Richard Haines
2017-01-23 13:19     ` Richard Haines
2017-01-23 18:58     ` marcelo.leitner [this message]
2017-01-23 18:58       ` marcelo.leitner
2016-12-21 16:09 ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2016-12-21 16:09   ` Marcelo Ricardo Leitner
2017-02-06 14:30   ` Richard Haines
2017-02-06 14:30     ` Richard Haines

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