[PATCH -stable 4.1 0/2] perf/core: Fix CVE-2017-6001

[PATCH -stable 4.1 0/2] perf/core: Fix CVE-2017-6001

[Wang Nan]

These two patch are needed for stable 4.1. They fix CVE-2017-6001.

Peter Zijlstra (2):
  perf: Restructure perf syscall point of no return
  perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race

 kernel/events/core.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)

-- 
2.10.1

[PATCH -stable 4.1 1/2] perf: Restructure perf syscall point of no return

[Wang Nan]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

[ Upstream commit f55fc2a57cc9ca3b1bb4fb8eb25b6e1989e5b993 ]

The exclusive_event_installable() stuff only works because its
exclusive with the grouping bits.

Rework the code such that there is a sane place to error out before we
go do things we cannot undo.

CVE 2017-6001

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 6da64f0..77be116 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -8124,13 +8124,30 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
 	if (move_group) {
 		gctx = group_leader->ctx;
+		mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
+	} else {
+		mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Must be under the same ctx::mutex as perf_install_in_context(),
+	 * because we need to serialize with concurrent event creation.
+	 */
+	if (!exclusive_event_installable(event, ctx)) {
+		/* exclusive and group stuff are assumed mutually exclusive */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(move_group);
+
+		err = -EBUSY;
+		goto err_locked;
+	}
 
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
+
+	if (move_group) {
 		/*
 		 * See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details
 		 * of swizzling perf_event::ctx.
 		 */
-		mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
-
 		perf_remove_from_context(group_leader, false);
 
 		list_for_each_entry(sibling, &group_leader->sibling_list,
@@ -8138,13 +8155,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 			perf_remove_from_context(sibling, false);
 			put_ctx(gctx);
 		}
-	} else {
-		mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
-	}
-
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx);
 
-	if (move_group) {
 		/*
 		 * Wait for everybody to stop referencing the events through
 		 * the old lists, before installing it on new lists.
@@ -8176,22 +8187,20 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		perf_event__state_init(group_leader);
 		perf_install_in_context(ctx, group_leader, group_leader->cpu);
 		get_ctx(ctx);
-	}
 
-	if (!exclusive_event_installable(event, ctx)) {
-		err = -EBUSY;
-		mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
-		fput(event_file);
-		goto err_context;
+		/*
+		 * Now that all events are installed in @ctx, nothing
+		 * references @gctx anymore, so drop the last reference we have
+		 * on it.
+		 */
+		put_ctx(gctx);
 	}
 
 	perf_install_in_context(ctx, event, event->cpu);
 	perf_unpin_context(ctx);
 
-	if (move_group) {
+	if (move_group)
 		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
-		put_ctx(gctx);
-	}
 	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
 
 	put_online_cpus();
@@ -8218,6 +8227,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	fd_install(event_fd, event_file);
 	return event_fd;
 
+err_locked:
+	if (move_group)
+		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+/* err_file: */
+	fput(event_file);
 err_context:
 	perf_unpin_context(ctx);
 	put_ctx(ctx);
-- 
2.10.1

[PATCH -stable 4.1 2/2] perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race

[Wang Nan]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

[ Upstream commit 321027c1fe77f892f4ea07846aeae08cefbbb290 ]

Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.

The problem is exactly that described in commit:

  f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")

... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.

That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.

So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).

Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.

CVE-2017-6001

Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
[ - Correct code context
  - Use group_flags instead of group_caps
]
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 77be116..3973df8 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -7900,6 +7900,37 @@ static int perf_event_set_clock(struct perf_event *event, clockid_t clk_id)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * Variation on perf_event_ctx_lock_nested(), except we take two context
+ * mutexes.
+ */
+static struct perf_event_context *
+__perf_event_ctx_lock_double(struct perf_event *group_leader,
+			     struct perf_event_context *ctx)
+{
+	struct perf_event_context *gctx;
+
+again:
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	gctx = READ_ONCE(group_leader->ctx);
+	if (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&gctx->refcount)) {
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		goto again;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
+
+	if (group_leader->ctx != gctx) {
+		mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
+		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+		put_ctx(gctx);
+		goto again;
+	}
+
+	return gctx;
+}
+
 /**
  * sys_perf_event_open - open a performance event, associate it to a task/cpu
  *
@@ -8123,8 +8154,26 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (move_group) {
-		gctx = group_leader->ctx;
-		mutex_lock_double(&gctx->mutex, &ctx->mutex);
+		gctx = __perf_event_ctx_lock_double(group_leader, ctx);
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if we raced against another sys_perf_event_open() call
+		 * moving the software group underneath us.
+		 */
+		if (!(group_leader->group_flags & PERF_GROUP_SOFTWARE)) {
+			/*
+			 * If someone moved the group out from under us, check
+			 * if this new event wound up on the same ctx, if so
+			 * its the regular !move_group case, otherwise fail.
+			 */
+			if (gctx != ctx) {
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				goto err_locked;
+			} else {
+				perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
+				move_group = 0;
+			}
+		}
 	} else {
 		mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex);
 	}
@@ -8200,7 +8249,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	perf_unpin_context(ctx);
 
 	if (move_group)
-		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+		perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
 	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
 
 	put_online_cpus();
@@ -8229,7 +8278,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 
 err_locked:
 	if (move_group)
-		mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex);
+		perf_event_ctx_unlock(group_leader, gctx);
 	mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex);
 /* err_file: */
 	fput(event_file);
-- 
2.10.1