[PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files

[PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files

[Kees Cook]

As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
the cgroup debug entries.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
index 53bbca7c4859..b794bcadefa4 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 		struct task_struct *task;
 		int count = 0;
 
-		seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset);
+		seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset);
 
 		list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) {
 			if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS)
-- 
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

[kernel-hardening] [PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files

[Kees Cook]

As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
the cgroup debug entries.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 kernel/cgroup.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
index 53bbca7c4859..b794bcadefa4 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -6589,7 +6589,7 @@ static int cgroup_css_links_read(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
 		struct task_struct *task;
 		int count = 0;
 
-		seq_printf(seq, "css_set %p\n", cset);
+		seq_printf(seq, "css_set %pK\n", cset);
 
 		list_for_each_entry(task, &cset->tasks, cg_list) {
 			if (count++ > MAX_TASKS_SHOWN_PER_CSS)
-- 
2.7.4


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

Re: [PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files

[Tejun Heo]

On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 01:56:48AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
> the cgroup debug entries.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Applied to cgroup/for-4.11-fixes.

Thanks.

-- 
tejun

[kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files

[Tejun Heo]

On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 01:56:48AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
> the cgroup debug entries.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Applied to cgroup/for-4.11-fixes.

Thanks.

-- 
tejun

Re: [PATCH] cgroups: censor kernel pointer in debug files

[Tejun Heo]

On Sat, Feb 25, 2017 at 01:56:48AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> As found in grsecurity, this avoids exposing a kernel pointer through
> the cgroup debug entries.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>

Applied to cgroup/for-4.11-fixes.

Thanks.

-- 
tejun