[PATCH] Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check

[PATCH] Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check

[Dan Carpenter]

This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.

I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am
rubbish at writing integer overflow checks...  There are two issues.
First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit
systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size.  The other
issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow
the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the
access_ok():

	alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1);
	sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);

Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c
index 030d592ed1fe..ad9508e67384 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/send.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c
@@ -6306,7 +6306,7 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, void __user *arg_)
 	}
 
 	if (arg->clone_sources_count >
-	    ULLONG_MAX / sizeof(*arg->clone_sources)) {
+	    ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct clone_root) - 1) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}

[PATCH] Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check

[Dan Carpenter]

This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.

I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am
rubbish at writing integer overflow checks...  There are two issues.
First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit
systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size.  The other
issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow
the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the
access_ok():

	alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1);
	sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);

Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/send.c b/fs/btrfs/send.c
index 030d592ed1fe..ad9508e67384 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/send.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/send.c
@@ -6306,7 +6306,7 @@ long btrfs_ioctl_send(struct file *mnt_file, void __user *arg_)
 	}
 
 	if (arg->clone_sources_count >
-	    ULLONG_MAX / sizeof(*arg->clone_sources)) {
+	    ULONG_MAX / sizeof(struct clone_root) - 1) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}

Re: [PATCH] Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check

[David Sterba]

On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 11:51:20PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.
> 
> I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am
> rubbish at writing integer overflow checks...  There are two issues.
> First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit
> systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size.  The other
> issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow
> the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the
> access_ok():
> 
> 	alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1);
> 	sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
> 
> Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning")
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

I'll copy parts of the changelog and add as comments, it's not obvious
what the check does.

Re: [PATCH] Btrfs: fix an integer overflow check

[David Sterba]

On Fri, Mar 17, 2017 at 11:51:20PM +0300, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> This isn't super serious because you need CAP_ADMIN to run this code.
> 
> I added this integer overflow check last year but apparently I am
> rubbish at writing integer overflow checks...  There are two issues.
> First, access_ok() works on unsigned long type and not u64 so on 32 bit
> systems the access_ok() could be checking a truncated size.  The other
> issue is that we should be using a stricter limit so we don't overflow
> the kzalloc() setting ctx->clone_roots later in the function after the
> access_ok():
> 
> 	alloc_size = sizeof(struct clone_root) * (arg->clone_sources_count + 1);
> 	sctx->clone_roots = kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
> 
> Fixes: f5ecec3ce21f ("btrfs: send: silence an integer overflow warning")
> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>

I'll copy parts of the changelog and add as comments, it's not obvious
what the check does.