From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 06:29:11 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170329102911.GO9021@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw) In-Reply-To: <3292783.lRT1C7ihKT@x2> On 2017-03-09 09:34, Steve Grubb wrote: > On Tuesday, March 7, 2017 4:10:49 PM EST Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > > > one possibly audit-worth case which (if I read correctly) this will > > > > > > skip is where a setuid-root binary has filecaps which *limit* its > > > > > > privs. > > > > > > Does that matter? > > > > > > > > > > I hadn't thought of that case, but I did consider in the setuid case > > > > > comparing before and after without setuid forcing the drop of all > > > > > capabilities via "ambient". Mind you, this bug has been around before > > > > > Luto's patch that adds the ambient capabilities set. > > > > > > > > Can you suggest a scenario where that might happen? > > > > > > Sorry, do you mean the case I brought up, or the one you mentioned? I > > > don't quite understnad the one you brought up. For mine it's pretty > > > simple to reproduce, just > > > > I was talking about the case you brought up, but they could be the same > > case. > > > > I was thinking of a case where the caps actually change, but are > > overridden by the blanket full permissions of setuid. > > If there actually is a change in capability bits besides the implied change of > capabilities based on the change of the uid alone, then it should be logged. Are you speaking of a change in pP' only from pI, or also pI', pE' and pA'? Something like ( pP' xor pI ) not empty? The previous patch I'd sent was reasonably easy to understand, but I'm having trouble adding this new twist to the logic expression in question due to the inverted combination of pre-existing items. I'm having trouble visualizing a 5 or more-dimensional Karnaugh map... While I am at it, I notice pA is missing from the audit record. The record contains fields "old_pp", "old_pi", "old_pe", "new_pp", "new_pi", "new_pe" so in keeping with the previous record normalizations, I'd like to change the "new_*" variants to simply drop the "new_" prefix. https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/40 > -Steve - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
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From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> To: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Date: Wed, 29 Mar 2017 06:29:11 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20170329102911.GO9021@madcap2.tricolour.ca> (raw) In-Reply-To: <3292783.lRT1C7ihKT@x2> On 2017-03-09 09:34, Steve Grubb wrote: > On Tuesday, March 7, 2017 4:10:49 PM EST Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > > > > > one possibly audit-worth case which (if I read correctly) this will > > > > > > skip is where a setuid-root binary has filecaps which *limit* its > > > > > > privs. > > > > > > Does that matter? > > > > > > > > > > I hadn't thought of that case, but I did consider in the setuid case > > > > > comparing before and after without setuid forcing the drop of all > > > > > capabilities via "ambient". Mind you, this bug has been around before > > > > > Luto's patch that adds the ambient capabilities set. > > > > > > > > Can you suggest a scenario where that might happen? > > > > > > Sorry, do you mean the case I brought up, or the one you mentioned? I > > > don't quite understnad the one you brought up. For mine it's pretty > > > simple to reproduce, just > > > > I was talking about the case you brought up, but they could be the same > > case. > > > > I was thinking of a case where the caps actually change, but are > > overridden by the blanket full permissions of setuid. > > If there actually is a change in capability bits besides the implied change of > capabilities based on the change of the uid alone, then it should be logged. Are you speaking of a change in pP' only from pI, or also pI', pE' and pA'? Something like ( pP' xor pI ) not empty? The previous patch I'd sent was reasonably easy to understand, but I'm having trouble adding this new twist to the logic expression in question due to the inverted combination of pre-existing items. I'm having trouble visualizing a 5 or more-dimensional Karnaugh map... While I am at it, I notice pA is missing from the audit record. The record contains fields "old_pp", "old_pi", "old_pe", "new_pp", "new_pi", "new_pe" so in keeping with the previous record normalizations, I'd like to change the "new_*" variants to simply drop the "new_" prefix. https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/40 > -Steve - RGB -- Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Kernel Security Engineering, Base Operating Systems, Red Hat Remote, Ottawa, Canada Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-03-29 10:29 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-03-03 1:10 [PATCH] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs 2017-03-03 2:07 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-03-03 2:50 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-03-07 17:22 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-03-07 18:10 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-03-07 21:10 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-03-07 21:25 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-03-09 14:34 ` Steve Grubb 2017-03-09 14:34 ` Steve Grubb 2017-03-29 10:29 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message] 2017-03-29 10:29 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-04-11 19:36 ` Paul Moore 2017-04-11 19:36 ` Paul Moore 2017-04-12 6:43 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-04-12 6:43 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-04-12 14:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-04-12 14:51 ` Serge E. Hallyn 2017-04-12 18:49 ` Steve Grubb 2017-04-12 18:49 ` Steve Grubb 2017-04-13 8:50 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-04-13 8:50 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-04-13 19:36 ` Steve Grubb 2017-04-13 19:36 ` Steve Grubb
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