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From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: ia64 exceptions (Re: [RFC][CFT][PATCHSET v1] uaccess unification)
Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2017 09:08:57 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170405080857.GR29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170405050507.GQ29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 06:05:08AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:

> Speaking of ia64: copy_user.S contains the following oddity:
> 2:
>         EX(.failure_in3,(p16) ld8 val1[0]=[src1],16)
> (p16)   ld8 val2[0]=[src2],16
> 
> src1 is 16-byte aligned, src2 is src1 + 8.
> 
> What guarantees that we can't race with e.g. TLB shootdown from a thread on
> another CPU, ending up with the second insn taking a fault and oopsing?
> 
> AFAICS, other places where we have such pairs of loads or stores (e.g.
> EX(.ex_handler, (p16)   ld8     r34=[src0],16)
> EK(.ex_handler, (p16)   ld8     r38=[src1],16)
> in the memcpy_mck.S counterpart of that code) both have exception table
> entries associated with them.
> 
> Is that one intentional and correct for some subtle reason, or is it a very
> narrow race on the hardware nobody gives a damn anymore?  It is pre-mckinley
> stuff, after all...

Actually, the piece immediately after that one is worse.  By that point,
we have
	* checked that len is large enough to be worth bothering with word
copies.  Fine.
	* checked that src and dst have the same remainder modulo 8.
	* copied until src is a multiple of 16, incrementing src and dst
by the same amount.
	* prepared for copying in multiples of 16 bytes
	* set src2 and dst2 8 bytes past src1 and dst1 resp.
and now we have a pipelined loop with
        EX(.failure_in3,(p16) ld8 val1[0]=[src1],16)
(p16)   ld8 val2[0]=[src2],16

        EX(.failure_out, (EPI)  st8 [dst1]=val1[PIPE_DEPTH-1],16)
(EPI)   st8 [dst2]=val2[PIPE_DEPTH-1],16
for body.  Now, consider the following case:

	* to is 8 bytes before the end of user page, next page is unmapped
	* from is at the beginning of kernel page
	* len is simply PAGE_SIZE

and we call copy_to_user().  All the preparation work won't read or write
anything - all alignments are fine.  src1 and src2 are kernel page and
kernel page + 8 resp.; dst1 is 8 bytes before the end of user page, dst2
is at the beginning of unmapped user page.  No loads are going to fail;
the first store into dst1 won't fail either.  The *second* store - one to
dst2 will not just fail, it'll oops.

<goes to test>

... and sure enough, on generic kernel (CONFIG_ITANIUM) that yields a nice
shiny oops at precisely that insn.

We really need tests for uaccess primitives.  That's not a recent regression,
BTW - it had been that way since 2.3.48-pre2, as far as I can see.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Subject: Re: ia64 exceptions (Re: [RFC][CFT][PATCHSET v1] uaccess unification)
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 08:08:57 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170405080857.GR29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170405050507.GQ29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>

On Wed, Apr 05, 2017 at 06:05:08AM +0100, Al Viro wrote:

> Speaking of ia64: copy_user.S contains the following oddity:
> 2:
>         EX(.failure_in3,(p16) ld8 val1[0]=[src1],16)
> (p16)   ld8 val2[0]=[src2],16
> 
> src1 is 16-byte aligned, src2 is src1 + 8.
> 
> What guarantees that we can't race with e.g. TLB shootdown from a thread on
> another CPU, ending up with the second insn taking a fault and oopsing?
> 
> AFAICS, other places where we have such pairs of loads or stores (e.g.
> EX(.ex_handler, (p16)   ld8     r34=[src0],16)
> EK(.ex_handler, (p16)   ld8     r38=[src1],16)
> in the memcpy_mck.S counterpart of that code) both have exception table
> entries associated with them.
> 
> Is that one intentional and correct for some subtle reason, or is it a very
> narrow race on the hardware nobody gives a damn anymore?  It is pre-mckinley
> stuff, after all...

Actually, the piece immediately after that one is worse.  By that point,
we have
	* checked that len is large enough to be worth bothering with word
copies.  Fine.
	* checked that src and dst have the same remainder modulo 8.
	* copied until src is a multiple of 16, incrementing src and dst
by the same amount.
	* prepared for copying in multiples of 16 bytes
	* set src2 and dst2 8 bytes past src1 and dst1 resp.
and now we have a pipelined loop with
        EX(.failure_in3,(p16) ld8 val1[0]=[src1],16)
(p16)   ld8 val2[0]=[src2],16

        EX(.failure_out, (EPI)  st8 [dst1]=val1[PIPE_DEPTH-1],16)
(EPI)   st8 [dst2]=val2[PIPE_DEPTH-1],16
for body.  Now, consider the following case:

	* to is 8 bytes before the end of user page, next page is unmapped
	* from is at the beginning of kernel page
	* len is simply PAGE_SIZE

and we call copy_to_user().  All the preparation work won't read or write
anything - all alignments are fine.  src1 and src2 are kernel page and
kernel page + 8 resp.; dst1 is 8 bytes before the end of user page, dst2
is at the beginning of unmapped user page.  No loads are going to fail;
the first store into dst1 won't fail either.  The *second* store - one to
dst2 will not just fail, it'll oops.

<goes to test>

... and sure enough, on generic kernel (CONFIG_ITANIUM) that yields a nice
shiny oops at precisely that insn.

We really need tests for uaccess primitives.  That's not a recent regression,
BTW - it had been that way since 2.3.48-pre2, as far as I can see.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-04-05  8:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-03-29  5:57 [RFC][CFT][PATCHSET v1] uaccess unification Al Viro
2017-03-29  5:57 ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 20:08 ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-29 20:08   ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-29 20:08   ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-29 20:29   ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 20:29     ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 20:37     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-29 20:37       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-29 21:03       ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 21:03         ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 21:24         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-29 21:24           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-29 23:09           ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 23:09             ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 23:43             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-29 23:43               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 15:31               ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 15:31                 ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 21:14     ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-29 21:14       ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-29 23:42       ` Al Viro
2017-03-29 23:42         ` Al Viro
2017-03-30  0:02         ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-30  0:02           ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-30  0:27           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30  0:27             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30  1:15             ` Al Viro
2017-03-30  1:15               ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 20:40             ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-30 20:40               ` Vineet Gupta
2017-03-30 20:59               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 20:59                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 23:21                 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-30 23:21                   ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-30 12:32 ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-03-30 12:32   ` Martin Schwidefsky
2017-03-30 14:48   ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 14:48     ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 16:22 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-30 16:22   ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2017-03-30 16:43   ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 16:43     ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 17:18     ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 17:18       ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 18:48       ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 18:48         ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 18:54         ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 18:54           ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 18:59           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 18:59             ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 19:10             ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 19:10               ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 19:19               ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 19:19                 ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 21:08                 ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 21:08                   ` Al Viro
2017-03-30 18:56         ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-30 18:56           ` Linus Torvalds
2017-03-31  0:21 ` Kees Cook
2017-03-31  0:21   ` Kees Cook
2017-03-31 13:38   ` James Hogan
2017-03-31 13:38     ` James Hogan
2017-04-03 16:27 ` James Morse
2017-04-03 16:27   ` James Morse
2017-04-04 20:26 ` Max Filippov
2017-04-04 20:26   ` Max Filippov
2017-04-04 20:26   ` Max Filippov
2017-04-04 20:52   ` Al Viro
2017-04-04 20:52     ` Al Viro
2017-04-05  5:05 ` ia64 exceptions (Re: [RFC][CFT][PATCHSET v1] uaccess unification) Al Viro
2017-04-05  5:05   ` Al Viro
2017-04-05  8:08   ` Al Viro [this message]
2017-04-05  8:08     ` Al Viro
2017-04-05 18:44     ` Tony Luck
2017-04-05 18:44       ` Tony Luck
2017-04-05 20:33       ` Al Viro
2017-04-05 20:33         ` Al Viro
2017-04-07  0:24 ` [RFC][CFT][PATCHSET v2] uaccess unification Al Viro
2017-04-07  0:24   ` Al Viro
2017-04-07  0:35   ` Al Viro
2017-04-07  0:35     ` Al Viro

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