* [U-Boot] [PATCH 0/5] Introduce secure boot for Baytrail
@ 2017-05-11 15:14 Anatolij Gustschin
2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/5] x86: congatec: add secureboot enabled defconfig for conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 Anatolij Gustschin
` (4 more replies)
0 siblings, 5 replies; 15+ messages in thread
From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de>
This patch series makes the hardware mechanisms for verified boot on
baytrail based platforms usable in/for U-Boot. The series contains
a tool which allows to easily create and assemble a secure boot
manifest. The manifest gets utilized by the Trusted Execution Engine
on the Soc.
Markus Valentin (5):
x86: congatec: add secureboot enabled defconfig for
conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845
x86: baytrail: Add fsp-header verification for secure boot fsp
x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot
tools: add secure_boot_helper.py
doc: x86: Add section about secure boot on Baytrail
arch/x86/Kconfig | 13 +-
arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile | 1 +
arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c | 117 ++++++++
.../include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h | 2 +
arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c | 31 ++
...0-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig | 77 +++++
doc/README.x86 | 41 +++
tools/secure_boot_helper.py | 313 +++++++++++++++++++++
9 files changed, 597 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c
create mode 100644 configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig
create mode 100644 tools/secure_boot_helper.py
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread* [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/5] x86: congatec: add secureboot enabled defconfig for conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 2017-05-11 15:14 [U-Boot] [PATCH 0/5] Introduce secure boot for Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/5] x86: baytrail: Add fsp-header verification for secure boot fsp Anatolij Gustschin ` (3 subsequent siblings) 4 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> [agust: rebased, fixed to build with v2017.05] Signed-off-by: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> --- ...0-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+) create mode 100644 configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig diff --git a/configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig b/configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b78f90e --- /dev/null +++ b/configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +CONFIG_X86=y +CONFIG_VENDOR_CONGATEC=y +CONFIG_TARGET_CONGA_QEVAL20_QA3_E3845=y +CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEVICE_TREE="conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845" +CONFIG_INTERNAL_UART=y +CONFIG_HAVE_INTEL_ME=y +CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT=y +CONFIG_ENABLE_MRC_CACHE=y +CONFIG_SMP=y +CONFIG_HAVE_VGA_BIOS=y +CONFIG_VGA_BIOS_ADDR=0xfffa0000 +CONFIG_GENERATE_PIRQ_TABLE=y +CONFIG_GENERATE_MP_TABLE=y +CONFIG_GENERATE_ACPI_TABLE=y +CONFIG_SEABIOS=y +CONFIG_FIT=y +CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE=y +CONFIG_BOOTSTAGE=y +CONFIG_BOOTSTAGE_REPORT=y +CONFIG_SYS_CONSOLE_INFO_QUIET=y +CONFIG_HUSH_PARSER=y +CONFIG_CMD_CPU=y +# CONFIG_CMD_IMLS is not set +# CONFIG_CMD_FLASH is not set +CONFIG_CMD_MMC=y +CONFIG_CMD_SF=y +CONFIG_CMD_SPI=y +CONFIG_CMD_I2C=y +CONFIG_CMD_USB=y +CONFIG_CMD_GPIO=y +# CONFIG_CMD_SETEXPR is not set +CONFIG_CMD_DHCP=y +# CONFIG_CMD_NFS is not set +CONFIG_CMD_PING=y +CONFIG_CMD_TIME=y +CONFIG_CMD_BOOTSTAGE=y +CONFIG_CMD_EXT2=y +CONFIG_CMD_EXT4=y +CONFIG_CMD_EXT4_WRITE=y +CONFIG_CMD_FAT=y +CONFIG_CMD_FS_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_OF_CONTROL=y +CONFIG_REGMAP=y +CONFIG_SYSCON=y +CONFIG_CPU=y +CONFIG_DM_I2C=y +CONFIG_SYS_I2C_INTEL=y +CONFIG_WINBOND_W83627=y +CONFIG_MMC=y +CONFIG_MMC_PCI=y +CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI=y +CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_SDMA=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_GIGADEVICE=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_MACRONIX=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_STMICRO=y +CONFIG_SPI_FLASH_WINBOND=y +CONFIG_DM_ETH=y +CONFIG_E1000=y +CONFIG_DM_PCI=y +CONFIG_DM_RTC=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_UART=y +CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_BASE=0x3f8 +CONFIG_DEBUG_UART_CLOCK=1843200 +CONFIG_SYS_NS16550=y +CONFIG_ICH_SPI=y +CONFIG_TIMER=y +CONFIG_USB=y +CONFIG_DM_USB=y +CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=y +CONFIG_USB_KEYBOARD=y +CONFIG_DM_VIDEO=y +CONFIG_VIDEO_VESA=y +CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_SET_VESA_MODE=y +CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_VESA_MODE_114=y +CONFIG_CONSOLE_SCROLL_LINES=5 +CONFIG_USE_PRIVATE_LIBGCC=y -- 2.7.4 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/5] x86: congatec: add secureboot enabled defconfig for conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/5] x86: congatec: add secureboot enabled defconfig for conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread From: Simon Glass @ 2017-05-15 3:03 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On 11 May 2017 at 09:14, Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> wrote: > From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > > Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > [agust: rebased, fixed to build with v2017.05] > Signed-off-by: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> > --- > ...0-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 configs/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/5] x86: baytrail: Add fsp-header verification for secure boot fsp 2017-05-11 15:14 [U-Boot] [PATCH 0/5] Introduce secure boot for Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/5] x86: congatec: add secureboot enabled defconfig for conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot Anatolij Gustschin ` (2 subsequent siblings) 4 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> Introduce a new Kconfig variable for secure boot on baytrail based platforms. If this variable is set the build process tries to use fsp-sb.bin instead of fsp.bin (-sb is the secure boot enabled fsp). Also check the two fsp headers against each other and print if secure boot is enabled or not. Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 9ead3eb..8cea393 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -348,7 +348,8 @@ config HAVE_FSP config FSP_FILE string "Firmware Support Package binary filename" depends on HAVE_FSP - default "fsp.bin" + default "fsp.bin" if !BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT + default "fsp-sb.bin" if BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT help The filename of the file to use as Firmware Support Package binary in the board directory. @@ -400,6 +401,16 @@ config FSP_BROKEN_HOB do not overwrite the important boot service data which is used by FSP, otherwise the subsequent call to fsp_notify() will fail. +config BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT + bool "Enable Secure Boot on BayTrail" + depends on HAVE_FSP + default n + help + Use the SecureBoot Features of the BayTrail platform. This switch + enables the usage of the secure-boot enabled fsp.bin(fsp-sb.bin) + for your board you need to provide this yourself. You can reconfigure + your fsp with the Intel BCT tool to enable SecureBoot. + config ENABLE_MRC_CACHE bool "Enable MRC cache" depends on !EFI && !SYS_COREBOOT diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h index 61d811f..bae17bc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ #define FSP_LOWMEM_BASE 0x100000UL #define FSP_HIGHMEM_BASE 0x100000000ULL #define UPD_TERMINATOR 0x55AA +#define FSP_FIRST_HEADER_OFFSET 0x94 +#define FSP_SECOND_HEADER_OFFSET 0x20494 /** diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c index a480361..3a537d0 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c @@ -119,6 +119,13 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf) /* No valid FSP info header was found */ panic("Invalid FSP header"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT + /* compare primary and secondary header */ + if (memcmp((void *)(CONFIG_FSP_ADDR + FSP_FIRST_HEADER_OFFSET), + (void *)(CONFIG_FSP_ADDR + FSP_SECOND_HEADER_OFFSET), + fsp_hdr->hdr_len)) + panic("SB: first & secondary FSP headers don't match"); +#endif config_data.common.fsp_hdr = fsp_hdr; config_data.common.stack_top = stack_top; @@ -134,6 +141,15 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf) fsp_upd = &config_data.fsp_upd; +#ifdef CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT + /* + * if the enable secure boot flag is not 1, secure boot has not + * been activated in the FSP which results in the TXE-Engine not + * getting loaded + */ + printf("FSP: Secure Boot %sabled\n", + fsp_vpd->enable_secure_boot == 1 ? "en" : "dis"); +#endif /* Copy default data from Flash */ memcpy(fsp_upd, (void *)(fsp_hdr->img_base + fsp_vpd->upd_offset), sizeof(struct upd_region)); -- 2.7.4 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/5] x86: baytrail: Add fsp-header verification for secure boot fsp 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/5] x86: baytrail: Add fsp-header verification for secure boot fsp Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-15 7:20 ` Anatolij Gustschin 0 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread From: Simon Glass @ 2017-05-15 3:03 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On 11 May 2017 at 09:14, Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> wrote: > From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > > Introduce a new Kconfig variable for secure boot on baytrail based > platforms. If this variable is set the build process tries to use > fsp-sb.bin instead of fsp.bin (-sb is the secure boot enabled fsp). > > Also check the two fsp headers against each other and print if secure > boot is enabled or not. > > Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > --- > arch/x86/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++++++- > arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h | 2 ++ > arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ > 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org> But please see below > diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig > index 9ead3eb..8cea393 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig > +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig > @@ -348,7 +348,8 @@ config HAVE_FSP > config FSP_FILE > string "Firmware Support Package binary filename" > depends on HAVE_FSP > - default "fsp.bin" > + default "fsp.bin" if !BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT > + default "fsp-sb.bin" if BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT > help > The filename of the file to use as Firmware Support Package binary > in the board directory. > @@ -400,6 +401,16 @@ config FSP_BROKEN_HOB > do not overwrite the important boot service data which is used by > FSP, otherwise the subsequent call to fsp_notify() will fail. > > +config BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT > + bool "Enable Secure Boot on BayTrail" > + depends on HAVE_FSP > + default n > + help > + Use the SecureBoot Features of the BayTrail platform. This switch > + enables the usage of the secure-boot enabled fsp.bin(fsp-sb.bin) > + for your board you need to provide this yourself. You can reconfigure > + your fsp with the Intel BCT tool to enable SecureBoot. > + > config ENABLE_MRC_CACHE > bool "Enable MRC cache" > depends on !EFI && !SYS_COREBOOT > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h > index 61d811f..bae17bc 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/fsp/fsp_support.h > @@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ > #define FSP_LOWMEM_BASE 0x100000UL > #define FSP_HIGHMEM_BASE 0x100000000ULL > #define UPD_TERMINATOR 0x55AA > +#define FSP_FIRST_HEADER_OFFSET 0x94 > +#define FSP_SECOND_HEADER_OFFSET 0x20494 > > > /** > diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c > index a480361..3a537d0 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c > +++ b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c > @@ -119,6 +119,13 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf) > /* No valid FSP info header was found */ > panic("Invalid FSP header"); > } > +#ifdef CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT Can you use if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT) instead of #ifdef? It reduces the number of build paths. > + /* compare primary and secondary header */ > + if (memcmp((void *)(CONFIG_FSP_ADDR + FSP_FIRST_HEADER_OFFSET), > + (void *)(CONFIG_FSP_ADDR + FSP_SECOND_HEADER_OFFSET), > + fsp_hdr->hdr_len)) > + panic("SB: first & secondary FSP headers don't match"); How about s/SB/Secure Boot/? > +#endif > > config_data.common.fsp_hdr = fsp_hdr; > config_data.common.stack_top = stack_top; > @@ -134,6 +141,15 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf) > > fsp_upd = &config_data.fsp_upd; > > +#ifdef CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT > + /* > + * if the enable secure boot flag is not 1, secure boot has not > + * been activated in the FSP which results in the TXE-Engine not > + * getting loaded > + */ > + printf("FSP: Secure Boot %sabled\n", > + fsp_vpd->enable_secure_boot == 1 ? "en" : "dis"); > +#endif > /* Copy default data from Flash */ > memcpy(fsp_upd, (void *)(fsp_hdr->img_base + fsp_vpd->upd_offset), > sizeof(struct upd_region)); > -- > 2.7.4 > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/5] x86: baytrail: Add fsp-header verification for secure boot fsp 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass @ 2017-05-15 7:20 ` Anatolij Gustschin 0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-15 7:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Hi Simon, On Sun, 14 May 2017 21:03:27 -0600 Simon Glass sjg at chromium.org wrote: ... > > @@ -119,6 +119,13 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf) > > /* No valid FSP info header was found */ > > panic("Invalid FSP header"); > > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT > > Can you use if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT) instead of > #ifdef? It reduces the number of build paths. OK, will fix it. > > + /* compare primary and secondary header */ > > + if (memcmp((void *)(CONFIG_FSP_ADDR + FSP_FIRST_HEADER_OFFSET), > > + (void *)(CONFIG_FSP_ADDR + FSP_SECOND_HEADER_OFFSET), > > + fsp_hdr->hdr_len)) > > + panic("SB: first & secondary FSP headers don't match"); > > How about s/SB/Secure Boot/? OK, I'll change it. Thanks! -- Anatolij ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot 2017-05-11 15:14 [U-Boot] [PATCH 0/5] Introduce secure boot for Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/5] x86: congatec: add secureboot enabled defconfig for conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/5] x86: baytrail: Add fsp-header verification for secure boot fsp Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-12 8:25 ` Lothar Waßmann 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/5] tools: add secure_boot_helper.py Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 5/5] doc: x86: Add section about secure boot on Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin 4 siblings, 2 replies; 15+ messages in thread From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> Introduce functions that check the integrity of u-boot by utilising the hashes stored in the oem-data block. The verification functions get called in fsp_init() Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> --- arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++ .../include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h | 3 + arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c | 15 +++ 4 files changed, 136 insertions(+) create mode 100644 arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c diff --git a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile index a0216f3..dbf9a82 100644 --- a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile @@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ obj-y += cpu.o obj-y += early_uart.o obj-y += fsp_configs.o obj-y += valleyview.o +obj-$(CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_ACPI_TABLE) += acpi.o diff --git a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..37c83db --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2017 Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + */ + +#include <common.h> + +#define SB_MANIFEST_BASE 0xFFFE0000 +#define SB_MANIFEST_SIZE 0x400 +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_DATA_OFFSET 0x58 +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_OFFSET (SB_MANIFEST_OEM_DATA_OFFSET + 4) +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_BASE (SB_MANIFEST_BASE +\ + SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_OFFSET) +#define SB_MANIFEST_END (SB_MANIFEST_BASE + SB_MANIFEST_SIZE) + +#define PUB_KEY_MODULUS_SIZE 0x100 +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE 0xDD360 +#define U_BOOT_OFFSET 0x2CA0 + +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_START (CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE + U_BOOT_OFFSET) +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_END (U_BOOT_STAGE_START + U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE) + +#define SHA256_U_BOOT_STAGE_ID 0 +#define SHA256_FSP_STAGE2_ID 1 +#define SHA256_FIT_PUB_KEY_ID 2 + +#define FIT_KEY_NAME "dev" + +/** + * This function compares a hash which gets retrieved from the oem data block + * with the runtime calculated hash of start_address+size. If they match, + * this function returns true. If not, it returns false. + * + * @param hash_id offset of oem-data block for hash to compare + * @param start_address address where the hash calculation should start + * @param size length of the region for hash calculation + * @return true on success, false on error + */ +static bool verify_oem_sha256(unsigned int hash_id, + void *start_address, + size_t size) +{ + uint8_t value[SHA256_SUM_LEN]; + int value_len; + + /* calculate address of hash to compare in the oemdata block*/ + void *hash_to_verify = (void *)SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_BASE + + (SHA256_SUM_LEN * hash_id); +#ifdef DEBUG + unsigned int i = 0; + uint8_t oem_value[SHA256_SUM_LEN]; + + memcpy(oem_value, hash_to_verify, SHA256_SUM_LEN); + printf("SB: Hash to verify:\t"); + for (i = 0; i < SHA256_SUM_LEN; i++) + printf("%X", oem_value[i]); + printf("\n"); +#endif + + /* caluclate the hash of the binary */ + calculate_hash(start_address, size, "sha256", (unsigned char *)value, + &value_len); + +#ifdef DEBUG + printf("SB: calculated hash:\t"); + for (i = 0; i < SHA256_SUM_LEN; i++) + printf("%X", value[i]); + printf("\n"); +#endif + /* compare the two hash values */ + if (memcmp(hash_to_verify, value, SHA256_SUM_LEN)) + return false; + return true; +} + +/** + * This function verifies the integrity for u-boot, its devicetree and the ucode + * appended or inserted to the devicetree. + * + * @return true on success, false on error + */ +bool verify_u_boot_bin(void) +{ + return verify_oem_sha256(SHA256_U_BOOT_STAGE_ID, + (void *)U_BOOT_STAGE_START, + U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE); +} + +/** + * This function verifies the integrity for the modulus of the public key which + * is stored in the u-boot devicetree for fit image verification. It tries to + * find the "rsa,modulus" property in the dtb and then verifies it with the + * checksum stored in the oem-data block + * + * @return true on success, false on error + */ +bool verify_public_key(void) +{ + void *fit_public_key_modulus; + + int offset = fdt_node_offset_by_prop_value(gd->fdt_blob, -1, + "key-name-hint", + FIT_KEY_NAME, + 4); + + fit_public_key_modulus = (void *)fdt_getprop(gd->fdt_blob, offset, + "rsa,modulus", NULL); + if (!fit_public_key_modulus) { + debug("SB: Could not fetch public key from U-Boot Devicetree\n"); + return false; + } + + return verify_oem_sha256(SHA256_FIT_PUB_KEY_ID, + fit_public_key_modulus, + PUB_KEY_MODULUS_SIZE); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h index e539890..b5dd5a4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h @@ -16,4 +16,7 @@ struct fspinit_rtbuf { struct common_buf common; /* FSP common runtime data structure */ }; +bool verify_u_boot_bin(void); +bool verify_public_key(void); + #endif /* __FSP_CONFIGS_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c index 3a537d0..5669700 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c +++ b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c @@ -149,6 +149,21 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf) */ printf("FSP: Secure Boot %sabled\n", fsp_vpd->enable_secure_boot == 1 ? "en" : "dis"); + if (!verify_u_boot_bin()) { + /* if our u-boot binary checksum isn't equal to + * our expected checksum we need to stop booting + */ + puts("SB: Failed to verify u-boot and dtb\n"); + hang(); + } + + /* + * verification of the public key happens with verification of + * the devicetree binary (thats where its stored), this check is + * not necessary, but nice to see its integer + */ + if (!verify_public_key()) + puts("SB: Failed to verify public key for fit-image\n"); #endif /* Copy default data from Flash */ memcpy(fsp_upd, (void *)(fsp_hdr->img_base + fsp_vpd->upd_offset), -- 2.7.4 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-12 8:25 ` Lothar Waßmann 2017-05-12 8:56 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 1 sibling, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread From: Lothar Waßmann @ 2017-05-12 8:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Hi, On Thu, 11 May 2017 17:14:54 +0200 Anatolij Gustschin wrote: > From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > > Introduce functions that check the integrity of u-boot by utilising the > hashes stored in the oem-data block. > > The verification functions get called in fsp_init() > > Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > --- > arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile | 1 + > arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++ > .../include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h | 3 + > arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c | 15 +++ > 4 files changed, 136 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c > > diff --git a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile > index a0216f3..dbf9a82 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile > @@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ obj-y += cpu.o > obj-y += early_uart.o > obj-y += fsp_configs.o > obj-y += valleyview.o > +obj-$(CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o > obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_ACPI_TABLE) += acpi.o > diff --git a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..37c83db > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c > @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2017 Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > + * > + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ > + */ > + > +#include <common.h> > + > +#define SB_MANIFEST_BASE 0xFFFE0000 > +#define SB_MANIFEST_SIZE 0x400 > +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_DATA_OFFSET 0x58 > +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_OFFSET (SB_MANIFEST_OEM_DATA_OFFSET + 4) > +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_BASE (SB_MANIFEST_BASE +\ > + SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_OFFSET) > +#define SB_MANIFEST_END (SB_MANIFEST_BASE + SB_MANIFEST_SIZE) > + > +#define PUB_KEY_MODULUS_SIZE 0x100 > +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE 0xDD360 > +#define U_BOOT_OFFSET 0x2CA0 > + > +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_START (CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE + U_BOOT_OFFSET) > +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_END (U_BOOT_STAGE_START + U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE) > + > +#define SHA256_U_BOOT_STAGE_ID 0 > +#define SHA256_FSP_STAGE2_ID 1 > +#define SHA256_FIT_PUB_KEY_ID 2 > + > +#define FIT_KEY_NAME "dev" > + > +/** > + * This function compares a hash which gets retrieved from the oem data block > + * with the runtime calculated hash of start_address+size. If they match, > + * this function returns true. If not, it returns false. > + * > + * @param hash_id offset of oem-data block for hash to compare > + * @param start_address address where the hash calculation should start > + * @param size length of the region for hash calculation > + * @return true on success, false on error > + */ > +static bool verify_oem_sha256(unsigned int hash_id, > + void *start_address, > + size_t size) > +{ > + uint8_t value[SHA256_SUM_LEN]; > 'unsigned char' here ... > + int value_len; > + > + /* calculate address of hash to compare in the oemdata block*/ > + void *hash_to_verify = (void *)SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_BASE + > + (SHA256_SUM_LEN * hash_id); > +#ifdef DEBUG > + unsigned int i = 0; > + uint8_t oem_value[SHA256_SUM_LEN]; > + > + memcpy(oem_value, hash_to_verify, SHA256_SUM_LEN); > + printf("SB: Hash to verify:\t"); > + for (i = 0; i < SHA256_SUM_LEN; i++) > + printf("%X", oem_value[i]); > + printf("\n"); > +#endif > + > + /* caluclate the hash of the binary */ > + calculate_hash(start_address, size, "sha256", (unsigned char *)value, > + &value_len); > ... would avoid the '(unsigned char *)' cast here. > + > +#ifdef DEBUG > + printf("SB: calculated hash:\t"); > + for (i = 0; i < SHA256_SUM_LEN; i++) > + printf("%X", value[i]); > + printf("\n"); > +#endif > + /* compare the two hash values */ > + if (memcmp(hash_to_verify, value, SHA256_SUM_LEN)) > + return false; > + return true; > +} > + > +/** > + * This function verifies the integrity for u-boot, its devicetree and the ucode > + * appended or inserted to the devicetree. > + * > + * @return true on success, false on error > + */ > +bool verify_u_boot_bin(void) > +{ > + return verify_oem_sha256(SHA256_U_BOOT_STAGE_ID, > + (void *)U_BOOT_STAGE_START, > + U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE); > +} > + > +/** > + * This function verifies the integrity for the modulus of the public key which > + * is stored in the u-boot devicetree for fit image verification. It tries to > + * find the "rsa,modulus" property in the dtb and then verifies it with the > + * checksum stored in the oem-data block > + * > + * @return true on success, false on error > + */ > +bool verify_public_key(void) > +{ > + void *fit_public_key_modulus; > 'const void *' here ... > + > + int offset = fdt_node_offset_by_prop_value(gd->fdt_blob, -1, > + "key-name-hint", > + FIT_KEY_NAME, > + 4); > + > + fit_public_key_modulus = (void *)fdt_getprop(gd->fdt_blob, offset, > + "rsa,modulus", NULL); > ... would eliminate the need for the '(void *)' cast here. > + if (!fit_public_key_modulus) { > + debug("SB: Could not fetch public key from U-Boot Devicetree\n"); > + return false; > + } > + > + return verify_oem_sha256(SHA256_FIT_PUB_KEY_ID, > + fit_public_key_modulus, > + PUB_KEY_MODULUS_SIZE); > +} Lothar Waßmann ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot 2017-05-12 8:25 ` Lothar Waßmann @ 2017-05-12 8:56 ` Anatolij Gustschin 0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-12 8:56 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Hi, On Fri, 12 May 2017 10:25:50 +0200 Lothar Waßmann LW at KARO-electronics.de wrote: ... > > +static bool verify_oem_sha256(unsigned int hash_id, > > + void *start_address, > > + size_t size) > > +{ > > + uint8_t value[SHA256_SUM_LEN]; > > > 'unsigned char' here ... > > > + int value_len; > > + > > + /* calculate address of hash to compare in the oemdata block*/ > > + void *hash_to_verify = (void *)SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_BASE + > > + (SHA256_SUM_LEN * hash_id); > > +#ifdef DEBUG > > + unsigned int i = 0; > > + uint8_t oem_value[SHA256_SUM_LEN]; > > + > > + memcpy(oem_value, hash_to_verify, SHA256_SUM_LEN); > > + printf("SB: Hash to verify:\t"); > > + for (i = 0; i < SHA256_SUM_LEN; i++) > > + printf("%X", oem_value[i]); > > + printf("\n"); > > +#endif > > + > > + /* caluclate the hash of the binary */ > > + calculate_hash(start_address, size, "sha256", (unsigned char *)value, > > + &value_len); > > > ... would avoid the '(unsigned char *)' cast here. I'll drop this cast, the fourth argument of calculate_hash() is uint8_t *. ... > > +bool verify_public_key(void) > > +{ > > + void *fit_public_key_modulus; > > > 'const void *' here ... > > + > > + int offset = fdt_node_offset_by_prop_value(gd->fdt_blob, -1, > > + "key-name-hint", > > + FIT_KEY_NAME, > > + 4); > > + > > + fit_public_key_modulus = (void *)fdt_getprop(gd->fdt_blob, offset, > > + "rsa,modulus", NULL); > > > ... would eliminate the need for the '(void *)' cast here. OK, will fix. Thanks! -- Anatolij ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-12 8:25 ` Lothar Waßmann @ 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-15 7:29 ` Anatolij Gustschin 1 sibling, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread From: Simon Glass @ 2017-05-15 3:03 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Hi, On 11 May 2017 at 09:14, Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> wrote: > From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > > Introduce functions that check the integrity of u-boot by utilising the > hashes stored in the oem-data block. U-Boot > > The verification functions get called in fsp_init() > > Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > --- > arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile | 1 + > arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++ > .../include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h | 3 + > arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c | 15 +++ > 4 files changed, 136 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c > > diff --git a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile > index a0216f3..dbf9a82 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile > +++ b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/Makefile > @@ -8,4 +8,5 @@ obj-y += cpu.o > obj-y += early_uart.o > obj-y += fsp_configs.o > obj-y += valleyview.o > +obj-$(CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o > obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_ACPI_TABLE) += acpi.o > diff --git a/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000..37c83db > --- /dev/null > +++ b/arch/x86/cpu/baytrail/secure_boot.c > @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ > +/* > + * Copyright (C) 2017 Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > + * > + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ > + */ > + > +#include <common.h> > + > +#define SB_MANIFEST_BASE 0xFFFE0000 > +#define SB_MANIFEST_SIZE 0x400 > +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_DATA_OFFSET 0x58 > +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_OFFSET (SB_MANIFEST_OEM_DATA_OFFSET + 4) > +#define SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_BASE (SB_MANIFEST_BASE +\ > + SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_OFFSET) > +#define SB_MANIFEST_END (SB_MANIFEST_BASE + SB_MANIFEST_SIZE) > + > +#define PUB_KEY_MODULUS_SIZE 0x100 > +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE 0xDD360 > +#define U_BOOT_OFFSET 0x2CA0 > + > +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_START (CONFIG_SYS_TEXT_BASE + U_BOOT_OFFSET) > +#define U_BOOT_STAGE_END (U_BOOT_STAGE_START + U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE) > + > +#define SHA256_U_BOOT_STAGE_ID 0 > +#define SHA256_FSP_STAGE2_ID 1 > +#define SHA256_FIT_PUB_KEY_ID 2 > + > +#define FIT_KEY_NAME "dev" > + > +/** > + * This function compares a hash which gets retrieved from the oem data block I think the function style we have settled on is: /** * verify_oem_sha256() - one line summary * * More explanation here * * @hashid: ... * ... */ > + * with the runtime calculated hash of start_address+size. If they match, > + * this function returns true. If not, it returns false. > + * > + * @param hash_id offset of oem-data block for hash to compare > + * @param start_address address where the hash calculation should start > + * @param size length of the region for hash calculation > + * @return true on success, false on error > + */ > +static bool verify_oem_sha256(unsigned int hash_id, > + void *start_address, > + size_t size) > +{ > + uint8_t value[SHA256_SUM_LEN]; > + int value_len; > + > + /* calculate address of hash to compare in the oemdata block*/ > + void *hash_to_verify = (void *)SB_MANIFEST_OEM_HASH_BASE + > + (SHA256_SUM_LEN * hash_id); > +#ifdef DEBUG > + unsigned int i = 0; > + uint8_t oem_value[SHA256_SUM_LEN]; > + > + memcpy(oem_value, hash_to_verify, SHA256_SUM_LEN); > + printf("SB: Hash to verify:\t"); > + for (i = 0; i < SHA256_SUM_LEN; i++) > + printf("%X", oem_value[i]); > + printf("\n"); > +#endif > + > + /* caluclate the hash of the binary */ > + calculate_hash(start_address, size, "sha256", (unsigned char *)value, > + &value_len); > + > +#ifdef DEBUG > + printf("SB: calculated hash:\t"); > + for (i = 0; i < SHA256_SUM_LEN; i++) > + printf("%X", value[i]); > + printf("\n"); > +#endif > + /* compare the two hash values */ > + if (memcmp(hash_to_verify, value, SHA256_SUM_LEN)) > + return false; > + return true; > +} > + > +/** > + * This function verifies the integrity for u-boot, its devicetree and the ucode > + * appended or inserted to the devicetree. > + * > + * @return true on success, false on error > + */ Can you put this comment in the header file? > +bool verify_u_boot_bin(void) > +{ > + return verify_oem_sha256(SHA256_U_BOOT_STAGE_ID, > + (void *)U_BOOT_STAGE_START, > + U_BOOT_STAGE_SIZE); > +} > + > +/** > + * This function verifies the integrity for the modulus of the public key which > + * is stored in the u-boot devicetree for fit image verification. It tries to > + * find the "rsa,modulus" property in the dtb and then verifies it with the > + * checksum stored in the oem-data block > + * > + * @return true on success, false on error > + */ > +bool verify_public_key(void) > +{ > + void *fit_public_key_modulus; > + > + int offset = fdt_node_offset_by_prop_value(gd->fdt_blob, -1, > + "key-name-hint", > + FIT_KEY_NAME, > + 4); > + > + fit_public_key_modulus = (void *)fdt_getprop(gd->fdt_blob, offset, > + "rsa,modulus", NULL); > + if (!fit_public_key_modulus) { > + debug("SB: Could not fetch public key from U-Boot Devicetree\n"); > + return false; > + } > + > + return verify_oem_sha256(SHA256_FIT_PUB_KEY_ID, > + fit_public_key_modulus, > + PUB_KEY_MODULUS_SIZE); > +} > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h > index e539890..b5dd5a4 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/arch-baytrail/fsp/fsp_configs.h > @@ -16,4 +16,7 @@ struct fspinit_rtbuf { > struct common_buf common; /* FSP common runtime data structure */ > }; > > +bool verify_u_boot_bin(void); > +bool verify_public_key(void); These nee comments. Also how about an fsp_ prefix since they are in the fsp file? > + > #endif /* __FSP_CONFIGS_H__ */ > diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c > index 3a537d0..5669700 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c > +++ b/arch/x86/lib/fsp/fsp_support.c > @@ -149,6 +149,21 @@ void fsp_init(u32 stack_top, u32 boot_mode, void *nvs_buf) > */ > printf("FSP: Secure Boot %sabled\n", > fsp_vpd->enable_secure_boot == 1 ? "en" : "dis"); > + if (!verify_u_boot_bin()) { > + /* if our u-boot binary checksum isn't equal to /* * If our ... > + * our expected checksum we need to stop booting > + */ > + puts("SB: Failed to verify u-boot and dtb\n"); > + hang(); > + } > + > + /* > + * verification of the public key happens with verification of > + * the devicetree binary (thats where its stored), this check is > + * not necessary, but nice to see its integer > + */ > + if (!verify_public_key()) > + puts("SB: Failed to verify public key for fit-image\n"); > #endif > /* Copy default data from Flash */ > memcpy(fsp_upd, (void *)(fsp_hdr->img_base + fsp_vpd->upd_offset), > -- > 2.7.4 > Regards, Simon ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass @ 2017-05-15 7:29 ` Anatolij Gustschin 0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-15 7:29 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Hi Simon, On Sun, 14 May 2017 21:03:34 -0600 Simon Glass sjg at chromium.org wrote: ... > > Introduce functions that check the integrity of u-boot by utilising the > > hashes stored in the oem-data block. > > U-Boot yes, will fix it. ... > > +/** > > + * This function compares a hash which gets retrieved from the oem data block > > I think the function style we have settled on is: > > /** > * verify_oem_sha256() - one line summary > * > * More explanation here > * > * @hashid: ... > * ... > */ OK, I'll rework and resubmit. ... > > + > > +/** > > + * This function verifies the integrity for u-boot, its devicetree and the ucode > > + * appended or inserted to the devicetree. > > + * > > + * @return true on success, false on error > > + */ > > Can you put this comment in the header file? yes, will do. ... > > +bool verify_u_boot_bin(void); > > +bool verify_public_key(void); > > These nee comments. Also how about an fsp_ prefix since they are in > the fsp file? OK, I'll move comments from functions in .c file to this header and use fsp_ prefix. ... > > + if (!verify_u_boot_bin()) { > > + /* if our u-boot binary checksum isn't equal to > > /* > * If our ... OK, thanks! -- Anatolij ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/5] tools: add secure_boot_helper.py 2017-05-11 15:14 [U-Boot] [PATCH 0/5] Introduce secure boot for Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin ` (2 preceding siblings ...) 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 5/5] doc: x86: Add section about secure boot on Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin 4 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> This script should be used for simple creation of secure bootable images for baytrail platforms Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> --- tools/secure_boot_helper.py | 313 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 313 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/secure_boot_helper.py diff --git a/tools/secure_boot_helper.py b/tools/secure_boot_helper.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..884786e --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/secure_boot_helper.py @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env python3 +""" + Copyright (C) 2017 Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> + + SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ + """ + + +import argparse +import binascii + +from hashlib import sha256 +from os.path import basename, isfile, splitext +from os.path import join as pjoin +from struct import pack + +import OpenSSL +from OpenSSL import crypto + +from cryptography import x509 +from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend + + +FSP_FILE_NAME = "fsp-sb.bin" +FSP_STAGE2_FILE_NAME = "fsp_stage2.bin" +U_BOOT_ROM_FILE_NAME = 'u-boot.rom' +U_BOOT_TO_SIGN_FILE_NAME = 'u-boot-to-sign.bin' +IBB_FILE_NAME = 'ibb.bin' +FPF_CONFIG_FILE_NAME = 'fpf_config.txt' +SIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME = 'signed_manifest.bin' +UNSIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME = 'un'+SIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME +OEM_FILE_NAME = 'oemdata.bin' + +OEM_PRIV_KEY_FILE_NAME = 'oemkey.pem' +OEM_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME = 'pub_oemkey.pem' +OEM_PUBKEY_BIN_FILE_NAME = 'pub_oemkey.bin' +OEM_PUBKEY_AND_SIG_FILE_NAME = 'oem_pub_sig.bin' + +FIT_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME = "dev.crt" + +FSP_STAGE_2_SIZE = 0x1f400 +IBB_SIZE = 0x1fc00 +MANIFEST_SIZE = 0x400 +OEM_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE = 0x190 +U_BOOT_ROM_SIZE = 0x800000 +ROMFILE_SYS_TEXT_BASE = 0x00700000 +U_BOOT_TO_SIGN_OFFSET = 0x2CA0 + + +MANIFEST_IDENTIFIER = b'$VBM' +VERSION = 1 +SECURE_VERSION_NUMBER = 2 +OEM_DATA_PREAMBLE = '01000200' + +oem_data_hash_files = [] + + +def append_binary_files(first_file, second_file, new_file): + with open(new_file, 'wb') as f: + f.write(bytearray(open(first_file, 'rb').read())) + f.write(bytearray(open(second_file, 'rb').read())) + + +# this function creates a oemdata data block which gets constructed +# as stated in section 3.2 of the document "Secure-Boot for Intel +# Bay Trail based platfomrs with U-Boot" +def assemble_oem_data(file_path): + file_size = 0 + with open(file_path, 'wb') as f: + f.write(binascii.unhexlify(OEM_DATA_PREAMBLE)) + file_size += 4 + for hash_file in oem_data_hash_files: + f.write(open(hash_file, 'rb').read()) + file_size += 32 + pad_file_with_zeros(f, OEM_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE-file_size) + + +# this function creates the final u-boot-verified.rom from +# the original u-boot.rom and the signed Initial Boot Block +# which contains the secure boot manifest +def assemble_secure_boot_image(u_boot_rom, signed_ibb): + data = bytearray(open(u_boot_rom, 'rb').read()) + ibb = bytearray(open(signed_ibb, 'rb').read()) + data[-(MANIFEST_SIZE+IBB_SIZE):] = ibb + open("u-boot-verified.rom", 'wb').write(data) + + +# when calling this function it constructs a complete secure-boot manifest +# which is just missing oem-publickey and the manifest-signature (see +# section 3.1) +def create_unsigned_secure_boot_manifest(unsigned_manifest, + oem_file='oemdata.bin', + ibb='ibb.bin'): + with open(unsigned_manifest, 'wb') as f: + f.write(MANIFEST_IDENTIFIER) + f.write(pack('i', VERSION)) + f.write(pack('i', MANIFEST_SIZE)) + f.write(pack('i', SECURE_VERSION_NUMBER)) + pad_file_with_zeros(f, 4) + hash_function = sha256() + hash_function.update(bytearray(open(ibb, 'rb').read())) + f.write(hash_function.digest()[::-1]) + pad_file_with_zeros(f, 36) + f.write(bytearray(open(oem_file, 'rb').read())) + pad_file_with_zeros(f, 20) + + +# fetch a subpart of a binary from byte to byte and write this part to a +# secondary file +def extract_binary_part(binary_to_extract_from, to_file, from_byte, to_byte): + data = open(binary_to_extract_from, 'rb').read() + open(to_file, 'wb').write(data[from_byte:to_byte]) + + +# calculate a sha256 checksum over a file and write a file with it to a +# file next to the original file, if given change endianness (sometimes needed +# because the txe engine wants a other byteorder) +def sha256_to_file(binary_dir, file_to_hash, change_endianess=False): + # we collect the hashes in a list(in the correct order) to be able + # to put them later to the oem section + if not oem_data_hash_files.__contains__(hashfile_path(binary_dir, + file_to_hash)): + oem_data_hash_files.append(hashfile_path(binary_dir, file_to_hash)) + with open(file_to_hash, 'rb') as f: + hash_function = sha256() + hash_function.update(f.read()) + # write as little to file + if change_endianess: + open(hashfile_path(binary_dir, file_to_hash), + 'wb').write(hash_function.digest()) + else: + open(hashfile_path(binary_dir, file_to_hash), + 'wb').write(hash_function.digest()[::-1]) + + +# create hashfile name using the file-to-hash name +def hashfile_path(binary_dir, file_to_hash): + hash_file_name = splitext( + basename(file_to_hash))[0].__add__('.sha256') + return pjoin(binary_dir, hash_file_name) + + +# pad the given files with a given byte number of zeros +# byte count must be dividable by 4 +def pad_file_with_zeros(file_handle, byte_count): + if byte_count % 4 != 0: + print("Given byte count is not 4-divideable exiting") + exit() + pad_count = 0 + while pad_count < byte_count: + file_handle.write(pack('i', 0)) + pad_count += 4 + + +# extract the modulus of a public key the txe-engine gets the publickey +# split in modulus and exponent (for this reason we need to extract it) +def get_modulus_from_pubkey(public_key_path): + public_key = open(public_key_path, 'rb').read() + cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(public_key, default_backend()) + return ("%X" % (cert.public_key().public_numbers().n)) + + +# save a given modulus and exponent to a file as binary for use within +# the manifest +def save_binary_public_key(pub_key_file_path, modulus, exponent=0x10001): + with open(pub_key_file_path, 'wb') as f: + f.write(binascii.unhexlify(modulus)[::-1]) + f.write(pack('i', exponent)) + + +# replace the public key hash in the fuse configuration text file +# and set the lock bit +def replace_oem_pubkey_hash(pubkey_hash, fpf_config_path, lock_fuses): + data = binascii.hexlify(pubkey_hash) + + new_line_hash = "FUSE_FILE_OEM_KEY_HASH_1:{:s}:{}\n"\ + .format(data.upper().decode('ascii'), + str(lock_fuses).upper()) + new_line_sb_enabled = "FUSE_FILE_SECURE_BOOT_EN:01:{}\n"\ + .format(str(lock_fuses).upper()) + + with open(fpf_config_path, 'w') as f: + f.write(new_line_sb_enabled) + f.write(new_line_hash) + + +# for the txe engine one needs to change the endianness +def reverse_endianess(file_to_reverse): + data = open(file_to_reverse, 'rb').read() + open(file_to_reverse, 'wb').write(data[::-1]) + + +# sign the given file with the given private key and +# write it to the signature_file using openssl +def sign_file(unsigned_file, private_key, signature_file): + key = open(private_key, 'r').read() + pkey_obj = crypto.load_privatekey(crypto.FILETYPE_PEM, key) + data = open(unsigned_file, 'rb').read() + signature = OpenSSL.crypto.sign(pkey_obj, data, "sha256") + open(signature_file, 'wb').write(signature) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="This script assembles a " + + "verified boot enabled u-boot using " + + "openssl") + parser.add_argument("-c", "--fpf-config", default="./fpf_config.txt", + help="Path to the fpf-config file defaults to" + + " ./fpf_config.txt", + required=True) + parser.add_argument("-I", "--board-dir", help="set directory to get the " + + " fsp and other board related files from.") + parser.add_argument("-b", "--binary_dir", default=".", + help="directory to fetch binaries from and " + + "save created binaries to.") + parser.add_argument("-k", "--key-dir", default="./mykeys", + help="directory to fetch keys from") + parser.add_argument('--lock-fuses', action='store_true', + help="Set this flag to configure fuses to " + + "lock the values") + + args = parser.parse_args() + + # assemble correct paths + fsp = pjoin(args.board_dir, FSP_FILE_NAME) + fsp_stage2 = pjoin(args.board_dir, FSP_STAGE2_FILE_NAME) + + fit_public_key = pjoin(args.key_dir, FIT_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME) + fit_public_key_modulus = pjoin(args.key_dir, FIT_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME+".mod") + + u_boot_rom = pjoin(args.binary_dir, U_BOOT_ROM_FILE_NAME) + u_boot_to_sign = pjoin(args.binary_dir, U_BOOT_TO_SIGN_FILE_NAME) + + ibb = pjoin(args.binary_dir, IBB_FILE_NAME) + + signed_ibb = pjoin(args.binary_dir, "signed_"+IBB_FILE_NAME) + unsigned_manifest = pjoin(args.binary_dir, UNSIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME) + signed_manifest = pjoin(args.binary_dir, SIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME) + + manifest_signature = pjoin(args.binary_dir, splitext( + basename(UNSIGNED_MANIFEST_FILE_NAME))[0]. + __add__(".signature")) + + oem_file = pjoin(args.binary_dir, OEM_FILE_NAME) + oem_private_key = pjoin(args.key_dir, OEM_PRIV_KEY_FILE_NAME) + oem_public_key = pjoin(args.key_dir, OEM_PUB_KEY_FILE_NAME) + oem_pubkey_binary = pjoin(args.key_dir, OEM_PUBKEY_BIN_FILE_NAME) + oem_pubkey_and_sig = pjoin(args.key_dir, + OEM_PUBKEY_AND_SIG_FILE_NAME) + + # check for needed files to be available + for f in [fsp, u_boot_rom, fit_public_key, oem_private_key]: + if not isfile(f): + print("%s not found ... exiting" % (f)) + exit() + + # get everything from rom-file execept IBB+Manfifest(128k) and write it to + # seperated file and calculate hash + extract_binary_part(u_boot_rom, u_boot_to_sign, + (ROMFILE_SYS_TEXT_BASE+U_BOOT_TO_SIGN_OFFSET), + (U_BOOT_ROM_SIZE-(IBB_SIZE+MANIFEST_SIZE))) + sha256_to_file(args.binary_dir, u_boot_to_sign, True) + + # extract stage2 of the fsp and calculate a hash about + # the file + extract_binary_part(fsp, fsp_stage2, 0, FSP_STAGE_2_SIZE) + sha256_to_file(args.binary_dir, fsp_stage2) + + with open(fit_public_key_modulus, 'wb') as f: + f.write(binascii.unhexlify(get_modulus_from_pubkey(fit_public_key))) + sha256_to_file(args.binary_dir, fit_public_key_modulus, True) + + # assemble oemdata + print("Assembling oem data from %d hashes: \n %s" % + (oem_data_hash_files.__len__(), oem_data_hash_files)) + assemble_oem_data(oem_file) + + print("Extracting last 127K:\n from %s as %s" + % (u_boot_rom, ibb)) + extract_binary_part(u_boot_rom, ibb, + (U_BOOT_ROM_SIZE-IBB_SIZE), U_BOOT_ROM_SIZE) + + print("Creating Secure Boot Manifest") + create_unsigned_secure_boot_manifest(unsigned_manifest, + oem_file, + ibb) + + print("Signing manifest with openssl and private key %s" + % (oem_private_key)) + sign_file(unsigned_manifest, oem_private_key, manifest_signature) + + print("Append public key and signature to unsigned Manifest") + oem_pub_key_modulus = get_modulus_from_pubkey(oem_public_key) + save_binary_public_key(oem_pubkey_binary, oem_pub_key_modulus) + + reverse_endianess(manifest_signature) + append_binary_files(oem_pubkey_binary, manifest_signature, + oem_pubkey_and_sig) + + append_binary_files(unsigned_manifest, oem_pubkey_and_sig, + signed_manifest) + + hash_function = sha256() + hash_function.update(bytearray(open(oem_pubkey_binary, 'rb').read())) + replace_oem_pubkey_hash(hash_function.digest()[::-1], args.fpf_config, + args.lock_fuses) + + print("Append manifest with signature to ibb") + append_binary_files(signed_manifest, ibb, signed_ibb) + + print("Assemble u-boot-verified.rom from:\n %s and %s" + % (u_boot_rom, signed_manifest)) + assemble_secure_boot_image(u_boot_rom, signed_ibb) -- 2.7.4 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/5] tools: add secure_boot_helper.py 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/5] tools: add secure_boot_helper.py Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread From: Simon Glass @ 2017-05-15 3:03 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Hi, On 11 May 2017 at 09:14, Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> wrote: > From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > > This script should be used for simple creation of secure bootable > images for baytrail platforms > > Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > --- > tools/secure_boot_helper.py | 313 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 313 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 tools/secure_boot_helper.py It seems to me that this should use binman rather than a separate tool. Regards, Simon ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 5/5] doc: x86: Add section about secure boot on Baytrail 2017-05-11 15:14 [U-Boot] [PATCH 0/5] Introduce secure boot for Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin ` (3 preceding siblings ...) 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/5] tools: add secure_boot_helper.py Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 4 siblings, 1 reply; 15+ messages in thread From: Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-11 15:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> [agust: slightly reworded and fixed alignment] Signed-off-by: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> --- doc/README.x86 | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/README.x86 b/doc/README.x86 index a38cc1b..8ba64b3 100644 --- a/doc/README.x86 +++ b/doc/README.x86 @@ -1056,6 +1056,45 @@ provides the same EFI run-time services) is not currently supported on x86. See README.efi for details of EFI support in U-Boot. +Secure Boot for BayTrail +------------------------ +U-Boot for BayTrail based platforms supports to boot in a verified manner using +the Trusted Execution Enginge(TXE). To enable secure boot you need to enable + the Kconfig parameter CONFIG_BAYTRAIL_SECURE_BOOT. + +The verification of U-Boot happens by a public key appended to the so called +secure boot manifest. The manifest gets created by the secure_boot_helper.py +script which is located in the tools directory. + +To be able to perform a verified boot with U-Boot you need: + * A OEM-keypair which we use to sign U-Boot. Create this yourself like below: + mkdir mykeys && \ + openssl req -batch -x509 -nodes -newkey rsa:2048 \ + -keyout 'mykeys/oemkey.pem' -out 'mykeys/pub_oemkey.pem' + * fpf_config.txt gets created by the helper script. It stores the fuse + register configuration to a text file which can be used by the Intel + FPT tool to write fuses (the FPT is provided in the TXE Firmware Kit). + It contains a hash over the public part of the OEM-keypair. + (To burn fuses run "FPT -writebatch fpf_config.txt" on the target) + * A secure boot enabled FSP[18] which we can assemble with the BCT Tool[19] + (the secure boot enabled fsp should be placed as fsp-sb.bin in the + board directory) + +If these prerequisites are met, you can build u-boot and call the helper script. +The following commands give an example flow for the congatec conga-QA3 SoM: + make conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845-internal-uart-secure-boot_defconfig + make all + make u-boot.rom + python3 ./tools/secure_boot_helper.py \ + -I board/congatec/conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 \ + -c fpf_config.txt \ + --lock-fuses + +This creates a "u-boot-verified.rom", this file can be used as the normal +u-boot.rom. For enabling the verification you need to configure the fuses +either by burning them or by using the FPF-Mirroring feature for development. +Further authentication can be done with the fit-image mechanism. + 64-bit Support -------------- U-Boot supports booting a 64-bit kernel directly and is able to change to @@ -1098,3 +1137,5 @@ References [15] doc/device-tree-bindings/misc/intel,irq-router.txt [16] http://www.acpi.info [17] https://www.acpica.org/downloads +[18] https://github.com/IntelFsp/FSP.git +[19] https://github.com/IntelFsp/BCT.git -- 2.7.4 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
* [U-Boot] [PATCH 5/5] doc: x86: Add section about secure boot on Baytrail 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 5/5] doc: x86: Add section about secure boot on Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin @ 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 0 siblings, 0 replies; 15+ messages in thread From: Simon Glass @ 2017-05-15 3:03 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot On 11 May 2017 at 09:14, Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> wrote: > From: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > > Signed-off-by: Markus Valentin <mv@denx.de> > [agust: slightly reworded and fixed alignment] > Signed-off-by: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> > --- > doc/README.x86 | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+) > Looks good. Please use 'U-Boot' consistently. May need adjusting to use binman. Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 15+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-05-15 7:29 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 15+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2017-05-11 15:14 [U-Boot] [PATCH 0/5] Introduce secure boot for Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 1/5] x86: congatec: add secureboot enabled defconfig for conga-qeval20-qa3-e3845 Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 2/5] x86: baytrail: Add fsp-header verification for secure boot fsp Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-15 7:20 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 3/5] x86: baytrail: secureboot: Add functions for verification of u-boot Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-12 8:25 ` Lothar Waßmann 2017-05-12 8:56 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-15 7:29 ` Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 4/5] tools: add secure_boot_helper.py Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass 2017-05-11 15:14 ` [U-Boot] [PATCH 5/5] doc: x86: Add section about secure boot on Baytrail Anatolij Gustschin 2017-05-15 3:03 ` Simon Glass
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