All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:56:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185639.18967.41488.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
"in place."

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |    4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 7da6de3..aac9ed9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
@@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
-void __init sme_enable(void);
+void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
 
 /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
 void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
@@ -58,7 +60,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
-static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { }
+static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 9e94ed2..1ff2e98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static void __init *fixup_pointer(void *ptr, unsigned long physaddr)
 	return ptr - (void *)_text + (void *)physaddr;
 }
 
-void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
+void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, struct boot_params *bp)
 {
 	unsigned long load_delta, *p;
 	unsigned long pgtable_flags;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
 		for (;;);
 
 	/* Activate Secure Memory Encryption (SME) if supported and enabled */
-	sme_enable();
+	sme_enable(bp);
 
 	/* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
 	load_delta += sme_get_me_mask();
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 6e87662..13f780e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -13,19 +13,34 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
-#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+/*
+ * Some SME functions run very early causing issues with the stack-protector
+ * support. Provide a way to turn off this support on a per-function basis.
+ */
+#define SME_NOSTACKP __attribute__((__optimize__("no-stack-protector")))
+
+static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
+static char sme_cmdline_on[]  __initdata = "on";
+static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -200,6 +215,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
 
 	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
 	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+
+	pr_info("AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) active\n");
 }
 
 void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
@@ -527,8 +544,73 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
 }
 
-void __init sme_enable(void)
+void __init SME_NOSTACKP sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 {
+	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+	bool active_by_default;
+	unsigned long me_mask;
+	char buffer[16];
+	u64 msr;
+
+	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
+	eax = 0x80000000;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for the SME feature:
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
+	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
+	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
+	 */
+	eax = 0x8000001f;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (!(eax & 1))
+		return;
+
+	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+
+	/* Check if SME is enabled */
+	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
+	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running
+	 * identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command
+	 * line argument data using rip-relative addressing.
+	 */
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
+		active_by_default = true;
+	else
+		active_by_default = false;
+
+	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
+
+	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
+		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
+		sme_me_mask = 0;
+	else
+		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
 }
 
 unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kvm-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	linux-doc-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
	kexec-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	kasan-dev-/JYPxA39Uh5TLH3MbocFFw@public.gmane.org,
	xen-devel-GuqFBffKawuEi8DpZVb4nw@public.gmane.org,
	linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org,
	iommu-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani-ZPxbGqLxI0U@public.gmane.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin"
	<mst-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Matt Fleming"
	<matt-mF/unelCI9GS6iBeEJttW/XRex20P6io@public.gmane.org>,
	"Alexander Potapenko"
	<glider-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky"
	<boris.ostrovsky-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet-T1hC0tSOHrs@public.gmane.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Larry Woodman"
	<lwoodman-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin"
	<aryabinin-5HdwGun5lf+gSpxsJD1C4w@public.gmane.org>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross-IBi9RG/b67k@public.gmane.org>,
	"Paolo Bonzini"
	<pbonzini-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Subject: [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:56:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185639.18967.41488.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit-qCXWGYdRb2BnqfbPTmsdiZQ+2ll4COg0XqFh9Ls21Oc@public.gmane.org>

Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
"in place."

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky-5C7GfCeVMHo@public.gmane.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |    4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 7da6de3..aac9ed9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
@@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
-void __init sme_enable(void);
+void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
 
 /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
 void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
@@ -58,7 +60,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
-static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { }
+static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 9e94ed2..1ff2e98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static void __init *fixup_pointer(void *ptr, unsigned long physaddr)
 	return ptr - (void *)_text + (void *)physaddr;
 }
 
-void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
+void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, struct boot_params *bp)
 {
 	unsigned long load_delta, *p;
 	unsigned long pgtable_flags;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
 		for (;;);
 
 	/* Activate Secure Memory Encryption (SME) if supported and enabled */
-	sme_enable();
+	sme_enable(bp);
 
 	/* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
 	load_delta += sme_get_me_mask();
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 6e87662..13f780e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -13,19 +13,34 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
-#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+/*
+ * Some SME functions run very early causing issues with the stack-protector
+ * support. Provide a way to turn off this support on a per-function basis.
+ */
+#define SME_NOSTACKP __attribute__((__optimize__("no-stack-protector")))
+
+static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
+static char sme_cmdline_on[]  __initdata = "on";
+static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -200,6 +215,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
 
 	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
 	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+
+	pr_info("AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) active\n");
 }
 
 void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
@@ -527,8 +544,73 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
 }
 
-void __init sme_enable(void)
+void __init SME_NOSTACKP sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 {
+	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+	bool active_by_default;
+	unsigned long me_mask;
+	char buffer[16];
+	u64 msr;
+
+	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
+	eax = 0x80000000;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for the SME feature:
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
+	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
+	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
+	 */
+	eax = 0x8000001f;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (!(eax & 1))
+		return;
+
+	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+
+	/* Check if SME is enabled */
+	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
+	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running
+	 * identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command
+	 * line argument data using rip-relative addressing.
+	 */
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
+		active_by_default = true;
+	else
+		active_by_default = false;
+
+	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
+
+	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
+		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
+		sme_me_mask = 0;
+	else
+		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
 }
 
 unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:56:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185639.18967.41488.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
"in place."

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |    4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 7da6de3..aac9ed9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
@@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
-void __init sme_enable(void);
+void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
 
 /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
 void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
@@ -58,7 +60,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
-static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { }
+static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 9e94ed2..1ff2e98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static void __init *fixup_pointer(void *ptr, unsigned long physaddr)
 	return ptr - (void *)_text + (void *)physaddr;
 }
 
-void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
+void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, struct boot_params *bp)
 {
 	unsigned long load_delta, *p;
 	unsigned long pgtable_flags;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
 		for (;;);
 
 	/* Activate Secure Memory Encryption (SME) if supported and enabled */
-	sme_enable();
+	sme_enable(bp);
 
 	/* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
 	load_delta += sme_get_me_mask();
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 6e87662..13f780e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -13,19 +13,34 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
-#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+/*
+ * Some SME functions run very early causing issues with the stack-protector
+ * support. Provide a way to turn off this support on a per-function basis.
+ */
+#define SME_NOSTACKP __attribute__((__optimize__("no-stack-protector")))
+
+static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
+static char sme_cmdline_on[]  __initdata = "on";
+static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -200,6 +215,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
 
 	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
 	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+
+	pr_info("AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) active\n");
 }
 
 void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
@@ -527,8 +544,73 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
 }
 
-void __init sme_enable(void)
+void __init SME_NOSTACKP sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 {
+	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+	bool active_by_default;
+	unsigned long me_mask;
+	char buffer[16];
+	u64 msr;
+
+	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
+	eax = 0x80000000;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for the SME feature:
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
+	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
+	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
+	 */
+	eax = 0x8000001f;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (!(eax & 1))
+		return;
+
+	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+
+	/* Check if SME is enabled */
+	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
+	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running
+	 * identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command
+	 * line argument data using rip-relative addressing.
+	 */
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
+		active_by_default = true;
+	else
+		active_by_default = false;
+
+	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
+
+	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
+		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
+		sme_me_mask = 0;
+	else
+		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
 }
 
 unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)

--
To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in
the body to majordomo@kvack.org.  For more info on Linux MM,
see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ .
Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, xen-devel@lists.xen.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org
Cc: "Brijesh Singh" <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	"Toshimitsu Kani" <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Larry Woodman" <lwoodman@redhat.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	"Rik van Riel" <riel@redhat.com>, "Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
	"Juergen Gross" <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
Date: Fri, 16 Jun 2017 13:56:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170616185639.18967.41488.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170616184947.18967.84890.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

Add support to check if SME has been enabled and if memory encryption
should be activated (checking of command line option based on the
configuration of the default state).  If memory encryption is to be
activated, then the encryption mask is set and the kernel is encrypted
"in place."

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |    6 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c           |    4 +-
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          |   86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 7da6de3..aac9ed9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
@@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 
 void __init sme_early_init(void);
 
-void __init sme_enable(void);
+void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp);
 
 /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
 void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
@@ -58,7 +60,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data) { }
 
 static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { }
 
-static inline void __init sme_enable(void) { }
+static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
index 9e94ed2..1ff2e98 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head64.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ static void __init *fixup_pointer(void *ptr, unsigned long physaddr)
 	return ptr - (void *)_text + (void *)physaddr;
 }
 
-void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
+void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr, struct boot_params *bp)
 {
 	unsigned long load_delta, *p;
 	unsigned long pgtable_flags;
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ void __init __startup_64(unsigned long physaddr)
 		for (;;);
 
 	/* Activate Secure Memory Encryption (SME) if supported and enabled */
-	sme_enable();
+	sme_enable(bp);
 
 	/* Include the SME encryption mask in the fixup value */
 	load_delta += sme_get_me_mask();
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 6e87662..13f780e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -13,19 +13,34 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
 #include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/fixmap.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
-#include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/set_memory.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+/*
+ * Some SME functions run very early causing issues with the stack-protector
+ * support. Provide a way to turn off this support on a per-function basis.
+ */
+#define SME_NOSTACKP __attribute__((__optimize__("no-stack-protector")))
+
+static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
+static char sme_cmdline_on[]  __initdata = "on";
+static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
 
 /*
  * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
@@ -200,6 +215,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
 
 	/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
 	swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+
+	pr_info("AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) active\n");
 }
 
 void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
@@ -527,8 +544,73 @@ void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
 	native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
 }
 
-void __init sme_enable(void)
+void __init SME_NOSTACKP sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
 {
+	const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+	bool active_by_default;
+	unsigned long me_mask;
+	char buffer[16];
+	u64 msr;
+
+	/* Check for the SME support leaf */
+	eax = 0x80000000;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (eax < 0x8000001f)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for the SME feature:
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
+	 *     Secure Memory Encryption support
+	 *   CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
+	 *     Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
+	 */
+	eax = 0x8000001f;
+	ecx = 0;
+	native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+	if (!(eax & 1))
+		return;
+
+	me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+
+	/* Check if SME is enabled */
+	msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
+	if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running
+	 * identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command
+	 * line argument data using rip-relative addressing.
+	 */
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_on)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
+	asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
+	     : "=r" (cmdline_off)
+	     : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
+		active_by_default = true;
+	else
+		active_by_default = false;
+
+	cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+				     ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
+
+	cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+	if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
+		sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+	else if (strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)) == 0)
+		sme_me_mask = 0;
+	else
+		sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
 }
 
 unsigned long sme_get_me_mask(void)


_______________________________________________
kexec mailing list
kexec@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-16 18:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 384+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-06-16 18:49 [PATCH v7 00/36] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` [PATCH v7 01/36] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:49   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 02/36] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 03/36] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:21     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 04/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 05/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` [PATCH v7 06/36] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:50   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:49     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 07/36] x86/mm: Don't use phys_to_virt in ioremap() if SME is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-20 20:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:37     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 13:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:37   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 08/36] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  7:38     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:52       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  7:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  7:16   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:14       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:38         ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:30           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 18:52           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52           ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:52             ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 18:30         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:38       ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 09/36] x86/mm: Simplify p[gum]d_page() macros Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 10/36] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  7:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  7:18     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-06-21  8:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:23     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` [PATCH v7 11/36] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa() Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20  8:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20  8:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 16:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17   ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:17     ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-06-20 16:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 16:23     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 12/36] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 13/36] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 14/36] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 15:30     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 15/36] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52 ` [PATCH v7 16/36] efi: Add an EFI table address match function Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:52   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:57   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:57   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/36] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0 Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:03   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:03   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/36] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:58   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 10:58     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/36] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-20 20:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-20 20:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 11:04   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04     ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-22 11:04   ` Matt Fleming
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/36] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  8:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  8:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/36] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 22/36] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 23/36] x86, realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  9:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 24/36] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21  9:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21  9:54     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 25/36] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 10:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 10:50     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-21 15:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-21 15:37       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 26/36] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22  9:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22  9:40     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` [PATCH v7 27/36] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 10:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-22 16:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-22 16:48       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 28/36] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 29/36] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 14:08   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08   ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-17 14:08     ` kbuild test robot
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 30/36] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 31/36] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23  8:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  8:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:55 ` [PATCH v7 32/36] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-17 10:40   ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40     ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-17 10:40   ` Juergen Gross
2017-06-23  9:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:09     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 33/36] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23  9:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23  9:32     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 34/36] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 10:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44     ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:44       ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 15:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 15:45         ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-26 16:34         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34           ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-26 16:34         ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 10:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 35/36] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 11:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` [PATCH v7 36/36] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-16 18:56   ` Tom Lendacky
2017-06-23 17:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2017-06-23 17:39   ` Borislav Petkov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170616185639.18967.41488.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=jgross@suse.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=kexec@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=lwoodman@redhat.com \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mst@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=riel@redhat.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xen.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.