[PATCH 4.9 00/72] 4.9.39-stable review

[PATCH 4.9 00/72] 4.9.39-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.39 release.
There are 72 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri Jul 21 10:23:57 UTC 2017.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.39-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.9.39-rc1

Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com>
    kvm: vmx: allow host to access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS

Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
    kvm: vmx: Check value written to IA32_BNDCFGS

Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
    kvm: x86: Guest BNDCFGS requires guest MPX support

Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
    kvm: vmx: Do not disable intercepts for BNDCFGS

Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org>
    tracing: Use SOFTIRQ_OFFSET for softirq dectection for more accurate results

Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
    PM / QoS: return -EINVAL for bogus strings

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    PM / wakeirq: Convert to SRCU

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    sched/topology: Fix overlapping sched_group_mask

Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
    sched/topology: Optimize build_group_mask()

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    sched/topology: Fix building of overlapping sched-groups

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    sched/fair, cpumask: Export for_each_cpu_wrap()

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Revert "sched/core: Optimize SCHED_SMT"

Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
    crypto: caam - fix signals handling

David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
    crypto: caam - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    crypto: sha1-ssse3 - Disable avx2

Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
    crypto: atmel - only treat EBUSY as transient if backlog

Martin Hicks <mort@bork.org>
    crypto: talitos - Extend max key length for SHA384/512-HMAC and AEAD

Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
    mm: fix overflow check in expand_upwards()

Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
    selftests/capabilities: Fix the test_execve test

Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    mnt: Make propagate_umount less slow for overlapping mount propagation trees

Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order

Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
    mnt: In umount propagation reparent in a separate pass

Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
    nvmem: core: fix leaks on registration errors

Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
    rcu: Add memory barriers for NOCB leader wakeup

Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
    vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls

Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
    ARM64: dts: marvell: armada37xx: Fix timer interrupt specifiers

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    s390: reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    powerpc: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    arm: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4MB

Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
    binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE

Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
    checkpatch: silence perl 5.26.0 unescaped left brace warnings

Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
    fs/dcache.c: fix spin lockup issue on nlru->lock

Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
    mm/list_lru.c: fix list_lru_count_node() to be race free

Marcin Nowakowski <marcin.nowakowski@imgtec.com>
    kernel/extable.c: mark core_kernel_text notrace

Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
    thp, mm: fix crash due race in MADV_FREE handling

Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
    tools/lib/lockdep: Reduce MAX_LOCK_DEPTH to avoid overflowing lock_chain/: Depth

Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
    parisc/mm: Ensure IRQs are off in switch_mm()

Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
    parisc: DMA API: return error instead of BUG_ON for dma ops on non dma devs

Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
    parisc: use compat_sys_keyctl()

Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
    parisc: Report SIGSEGV instead of SIGBUS when running out of stack

Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
    irqchip/gic-v3: Fix out-of-bound access in gic_set_affinity

Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
    cfg80211: Check if NAN service ID is of expected size

Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
    cfg80211: Check if PMKID attribute is of expected size

Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
    cfg80211: Validate frequencies nested in NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES

Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
    cfg80211: Define nla_policy for NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE

Bert Kenward <bkenward@solarflare.com>
    sfc: don't read beyond unicast address list

Peter S. Housel <housel@acm.org>
    brcmfmac: Fix glom_skb leak in brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain

Christophe Jaillet <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
    brcmfmac: Fix a memory leak in error handling path in 'brcmf_cfg80211_attach'

Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
    brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()

Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
    rds: tcp: use sock_create_lite() to create the accept socket

Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
    vrf: fix bug_on triggered by rx when destroying a vrf

David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
    net: ipv6: Compare lwstate in detecting duplicate nexthops

Alban Browaeys <alban.browaeys@gmail.com>
    net: core: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in netdev_stats_to_stats64

Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
    vxlan: fix hlist corruption

Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
    ipv6: dad: don't remove dynamic addresses if link is down

Gal Pressman <galp@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx5e: Fix TX carrier errors report in get stats ndo

Derek Chickles <derek.chickles@cavium.com>
    liquidio: fix bug in soft reset failure detection

Mohamad Haj Yahia <mohamad@mellanox.com>
    net/mlx5: Cancel delayed recovery work when unloading the driver

Michal Kubeček <mkubecek@suse.cz>
    net: handle NAPI_GRO_FREE_STOLEN_HEAD case also in napi_frags_finish()

Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
    bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged

Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
    rocker: move dereference before free

Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
    bridge: mdb: fix leak on complete_info ptr on fail path

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net: prevent sign extension in dev_get_stats()

WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    tcp: reset sk_rx_dst in tcp_disconnect()

Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
    net: dp83640: Avoid NULL pointer dereference.

WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
    ipv6: avoid unregistering inet6_dev for loopback

Zach Brown <zach.brown@ni.com>
    net/phy: micrel: configure intterupts after autoneg workaround

Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>
    net: sched: Fix one possible panic when no destroy callback

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net_sched: fix error recovery at qdisc creation

Vineeth Remanan Pillai <vineethp@amazon.com>
    xen-netfront: Rework the fix for Rx stall during OOM and network stress


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h                         |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi       |  12 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h                       |  12 +-
 arch/parisc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h              |  11 +-
 arch/parisc/include/asm/mmu_context.h              |  15 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscall_table.S                 |   2 +-
 arch/parisc/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h                     |  13 +-
 arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h                        |  15 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c                  |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h                         |  13 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h                   |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                               |   8 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                                 |  10 +-
 drivers/base/power/sysfs.c                         |   2 +
 drivers/base/power/wakeup.c                        |  32 ++--
 drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c                         |   4 +-
 drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg.c                      |  20 +-
 drivers/crypto/caam/caamhash.c                     |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c                      |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/talitos.c                           |   7 +-
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c                       |   3 +
 .../ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn23xx_pf_device.c    |   2 +-
 .../net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_device.c   |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c  |   2 -
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c   |  15 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c     |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_ofdpa.c         |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c                    |   8 +-
 drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c                          |   2 +-
 drivers/net/phy/micrel.c                           |   2 +
 drivers/net/vrf.c                                  |  11 +-
 drivers/net/vxlan.c                                |  30 ++-
 .../wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c  |   7 +-
 .../broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c         |   8 +-
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c                         |  14 +-
 drivers/nvmem/core.c                               |  13 +-
 drivers/parisc/ccio-dma.c                          |  12 ++
 drivers/parisc/dino.c                              |   5 +-
 drivers/parisc/lba_pci.c                           |   6 +-
 drivers/parisc/sba_iommu.c                         |  14 ++
 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c                                |   6 +-
 fs/binfmt_elf.c                                    |  59 +++++-
 fs/dcache.c                                        |   5 +-
 fs/exec.c                                          |  11 +-
 fs/mount.h                                         |   1 +
 fs/namespace.c                                     |   1 +
 fs/pnode.c                                         | 212 ++++++++++++++++-----
 include/linux/cpumask.h                            |  17 ++
 include/linux/list_lru.h                           |   1 +
 include/linux/mlx5/driver.h                        |   1 +
 include/net/ip6_route.h                            |   8 +
 include/net/vxlan.h                                |  10 +-
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                              |   5 +
 kernel/extable.c                                   |   2 +-
 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h                           |   2 +
 kernel/sched/core.c                                |  43 ++---
 kernel/sched/fair.c                                |  53 +-----
 kernel/sched/sched.h                               |  23 +--
 kernel/trace/trace.c                               |   2 +-
 lib/cpumask.c                                      |  32 ++++
 mm/huge_memory.c                                   |   2 +-
 mm/list_lru.c                                      |  14 +-
 mm/mmap.c                                          |   2 +-
 net/bridge/br_mdb.c                                |   3 +-
 net/core/dev.c                                     |  30 ++-
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                                     |   2 +
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c                                |  23 +--
 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c                                 |   5 +-
 net/ipv6/route.c                                   |   8 +-
 net/rds/tcp_listen.c                               |   2 +-
 net/sched/sch_api.c                                |   3 +
 net/sched/sch_hhf.c                                |   8 +-
 net/sched/sch_mq.c                                 |  10 +-
 net/sched/sch_mqprio.c                             |  19 +-
 net/sched/sch_sfq.c                                |   3 +-
 net/wireless/nl80211.c                             |  10 +-
 scripts/checkpatch.pl                              |   6 +-
 tools/lib/lockdep/uinclude/linux/lockdep.h         |   2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/test_execve.c |   7 +-
 81 files changed, 656 insertions(+), 355 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.9 01/72] xen-netfront: Rework the fix for Rx stall during OOM and network stress

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vineeth Remanan Pillai <vineethp@amazon.com>

commit 538d92912d3190a1dd809233a0d57277459f37b2 upstream.

The commit 90c311b0eeea ("xen-netfront: Fix Rx stall during network
stress and OOM") caused the refill timer to be triggerred almost on
all invocations of xennet_alloc_rx_buffers for certain workloads.
This reworks the fix by reverting to the old behaviour and taking into
consideration the skb allocation failure. Refill timer is now triggered
on insufficient requests or skb allocation failure.

Signed-off-by: Vineeth Remanan Pillai <vineethp@amazon.com>
Fixes: 90c311b0eeea (xen-netfront: Fix Rx stall during network stress and OOM)
Reported-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ static void xennet_alloc_rx_buffers(stru
 {
 	RING_IDX req_prod = queue->rx.req_prod_pvt;
 	int notify;
+	int err = 0;
 
 	if (unlikely(!netif_carrier_ok(queue->info->netdev)))
 		return;
@@ -295,8 +296,10 @@ static void xennet_alloc_rx_buffers(stru
 		struct xen_netif_rx_request *req;
 
 		skb = xennet_alloc_one_rx_buffer(queue);
-		if (!skb)
+		if (!skb) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
 			break;
+		}
 
 		id = xennet_rxidx(req_prod);
 
@@ -320,8 +323,13 @@ static void xennet_alloc_rx_buffers(stru
 
 	queue->rx.req_prod_pvt = req_prod;
 
-	/* Not enough requests? Try again later. */
-	if (req_prod - queue->rx.sring->req_prod < NET_RX_SLOTS_MIN) {
+	/* Try again later if there are not enough requests or skb allocation
+	 * failed.
+	 * Enough requests is quantified as the sum of newly created slots and
+	 * the unconsumed slots at the backend.
+	 */
+	if (req_prod - queue->rx.rsp_cons < NET_RX_SLOTS_MIN ||
+	    unlikely(err)) {
 		mod_timer(&queue->rx_refill_timer, jiffies + (HZ/10));
 		return;
 	}

[PATCH 4.9 02/72] net_sched: fix error recovery at qdisc creation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

commit 87b60cfacf9f17cf71933c6e33b66e68160af71d upstream.

Dmitry reported uses after free in qdisc code [1]

The problem here is that ops->init() can return an error.

qdisc_create_dflt() then call ops->destroy(),
while qdisc_create() does _not_ call it.

Four qdisc chose to call their own ops->destroy(), assuming their caller
would not.

This patch makes sure qdisc_create() calls ops->destroy()
and fixes the four qdisc to avoid double free.

[1]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mq_destroy+0x242/0x290 net/sched/sch_mq.c:33 at addr ffff8801d415d440
Read of size 8 by task syz-executor2/5030
CPU: 0 PID: 5030 Comm: syz-executor2 Not tainted 4.3.5-smp-DEV #119
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
 0000000000000046 ffff8801b435b870 ffffffff81bbbed4 ffff8801db000400
 ffff8801d415d440 ffff8801d415dc40 ffff8801c4988510 ffff8801b435b898
 ffffffff816682b1 ffff8801b435b928 ffff8801d415d440 ffff8801c49880c0
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff81bbbed4>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline]
 [<ffffffff81bbbed4>] dump_stack+0x6c/0x98 lib/dump_stack.c:51
 [<ffffffff816682b1>] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:158
 [<ffffffff81668524>] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:196 [inline]
 [<ffffffff81668524>] kasan_report_error+0x1b4/0x4b0 mm/kasan/report.c:285
 [<ffffffff81668953>] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:305 [inline]
 [<ffffffff81668953>] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x43/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:326
 [<ffffffff82527b02>] mq_destroy+0x242/0x290 net/sched/sch_mq.c:33
 [<ffffffff82524bdd>] qdisc_destroy+0x12d/0x290 net/sched/sch_generic.c:953
 [<ffffffff82524e30>] qdisc_create_dflt+0xf0/0x120 net/sched/sch_generic.c:848
 [<ffffffff8252550d>] attach_default_qdiscs net/sched/sch_generic.c:1029 [inline]
 [<ffffffff8252550d>] dev_activate+0x6ad/0x880 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1064
 [<ffffffff824b1db1>] __dev_open+0x221/0x320 net/core/dev.c:1403
 [<ffffffff824b24ce>] __dev_change_flags+0x15e/0x3e0 net/core/dev.c:6858
 [<ffffffff824b27de>] dev_change_flags+0x8e/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6926
 [<ffffffff824f5bf6>] dev_ifsioc+0x446/0x890 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:260
 [<ffffffff824f61fa>] dev_ioctl+0x1ba/0xb80 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:546
 [<ffffffff82430509>] sock_do_ioctl+0x99/0xb0 net/socket.c:879
 [<ffffffff82430d30>] sock_ioctl+0x2a0/0x390 net/socket.c:958
 [<ffffffff816f3b68>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:44 [inline]
 [<ffffffff816f3b68>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x8a8/0xe50 fs/ioctl.c:611
 [<ffffffff816f41a4>] SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:626 [inline]
 [<ffffffff816f41a4>] SyS_ioctl+0x94/0xc0 fs/ioctl.c:617
 [<ffffffff8123e357>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/sched/sch_api.c    |    2 ++
 net/sched/sch_hhf.c    |    8 ++++++--
 net/sched/sch_mq.c     |   10 +++-------
 net/sched/sch_mqprio.c |   19 ++++++-------------
 net/sched/sch_sfq.c    |    3 ++-
 5 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -1008,6 +1008,8 @@ static struct Qdisc *qdisc_create(struct
 
 		return sch;
 	}
+	/* ops->init() failed, we call ->destroy() like qdisc_create_dflt() */
+	ops->destroy(sch);
 err_out3:
 	dev_put(dev);
 	kfree((char *) sch - sch->padded);
--- a/net/sched/sch_hhf.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_hhf.c
@@ -627,7 +627,9 @@ static int hhf_init(struct Qdisc *sch, s
 			q->hhf_arrays[i] = hhf_zalloc(HHF_ARRAYS_LEN *
 						      sizeof(u32));
 			if (!q->hhf_arrays[i]) {
-				hhf_destroy(sch);
+				/* Note: hhf_destroy() will be called
+				 * by our caller.
+				 */
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 		}
@@ -638,7 +640,9 @@ static int hhf_init(struct Qdisc *sch, s
 			q->hhf_valid_bits[i] = hhf_zalloc(HHF_ARRAYS_LEN /
 							  BITS_PER_BYTE);
 			if (!q->hhf_valid_bits[i]) {
-				hhf_destroy(sch);
+				/* Note: hhf_destroy() will be called
+				 * by our caller.
+				 */
 				return -ENOMEM;
 			}
 		}
--- a/net/sched/sch_mq.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_mq.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static int mq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, st
 	/* pre-allocate qdiscs, attachment can't fail */
 	priv->qdiscs = kcalloc(dev->num_tx_queues, sizeof(priv->qdiscs[0]),
 			       GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (priv->qdiscs == NULL)
+	if (!priv->qdiscs)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (ntx = 0; ntx < dev->num_tx_queues; ntx++) {
@@ -60,18 +60,14 @@ static int mq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, st
 		qdisc = qdisc_create_dflt(dev_queue, get_default_qdisc_ops(dev, ntx),
 					  TC_H_MAKE(TC_H_MAJ(sch->handle),
 						    TC_H_MIN(ntx + 1)));
-		if (qdisc == NULL)
-			goto err;
+		if (!qdisc)
+			return -ENOMEM;
 		priv->qdiscs[ntx] = qdisc;
 		qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
 	}
 
 	sch->flags |= TCQ_F_MQROOT;
 	return 0;
-
-err:
-	mq_destroy(sch);
-	return -ENOMEM;
 }
 
 static void mq_attach(struct Qdisc *sch)
--- a/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_mqprio.c
@@ -118,10 +118,8 @@ static int mqprio_init(struct Qdisc *sch
 	/* pre-allocate qdisc, attachment can't fail */
 	priv->qdiscs = kcalloc(dev->num_tx_queues, sizeof(priv->qdiscs[0]),
 			       GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (priv->qdiscs == NULL) {
-		err = -ENOMEM;
-		goto err;
-	}
+	if (!priv->qdiscs)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < dev->num_tx_queues; i++) {
 		dev_queue = netdev_get_tx_queue(dev, i);
@@ -129,10 +127,9 @@ static int mqprio_init(struct Qdisc *sch
 					  get_default_qdisc_ops(dev, i),
 					  TC_H_MAKE(TC_H_MAJ(sch->handle),
 						    TC_H_MIN(i + 1)));
-		if (qdisc == NULL) {
-			err = -ENOMEM;
-			goto err;
-		}
+		if (!qdisc)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
 		priv->qdiscs[i] = qdisc;
 		qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE | TCQ_F_NOPARENT;
 	}
@@ -148,7 +145,7 @@ static int mqprio_init(struct Qdisc *sch
 		priv->hw_owned = 1;
 		err = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc(dev, sch->handle, 0, &tc);
 		if (err)
-			goto err;
+			return err;
 	} else {
 		netdev_set_num_tc(dev, qopt->num_tc);
 		for (i = 0; i < qopt->num_tc; i++)
@@ -162,10 +159,6 @@ static int mqprio_init(struct Qdisc *sch
 
 	sch->flags |= TCQ_F_MQROOT;
 	return 0;
-
-err:
-	mqprio_destroy(sch);
-	return err;
 }
 
 static void mqprio_attach(struct Qdisc *sch)
--- a/net/sched/sch_sfq.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_sfq.c
@@ -742,9 +742,10 @@ static int sfq_init(struct Qdisc *sch, s
 	q->ht = sfq_alloc(sizeof(q->ht[0]) * q->divisor);
 	q->slots = sfq_alloc(sizeof(q->slots[0]) * q->maxflows);
 	if (!q->ht || !q->slots) {
-		sfq_destroy(sch);
+		/* Note: sfq_destroy() will be called by our caller */
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
+
 	for (i = 0; i < q->divisor; i++)
 		q->ht[i] = SFQ_EMPTY_SLOT;
 

[PATCH 4.9 03/72] net: sched: Fix one possible panic when no destroy callback

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>

commit c1a4872ebfb83b1af7144f7b29ac8c4b344a12a8 upstream.

When qdisc fail to init, qdisc_create would invoke the destroy callback
to cleanup. But there is no check if the callback exists really. So it
would cause the panic if there is no real destroy callback like the qdisc
codel, fq, and so on.

Take codel as an example following:
When a malicious user constructs one invalid netlink msg, it would cause
codel_init->codel_change->nla_parse_nested failed.
Then kernel would invoke the destroy callback directly but qdisc codel
doesn't define one. It causes one panic as a result.

Now add one the check for destroy to avoid the possible panic.

Fixes: 87b60cfacf9f ("net_sched: fix error recovery at qdisc creation")
Signed-off-by: Gao Feng <gfree.wind@vip.163.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/sched/sch_api.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -1009,7 +1009,8 @@ static struct Qdisc *qdisc_create(struct
 		return sch;
 	}
 	/* ops->init() failed, we call ->destroy() like qdisc_create_dflt() */
-	ops->destroy(sch);
+	if (ops->destroy)
+		ops->destroy(sch);
 err_out3:
 	dev_put(dev);
 	kfree((char *) sch - sch->padded);

[PATCH 4.9 04/72] net/phy: micrel: configure intterupts after autoneg workaround

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zach Brown <zach.brown@ni.com>

commit b866203d872d5deeafcecd25ea429d6748b5bd56 upstream.

The commit ("net/phy: micrel: Add workaround for bad autoneg") fixes an
autoneg failure case by resetting the hardware. This turns off
intterupts. Things will work themselves out if the phy polls, as it will
figure out it's state during a poll. However if the phy uses only
intterupts, the phy will stall, since interrupts are off. This patch
fixes the issue by calling config_intr after resetting the phy.

Fixes: d2fd719bcb0e ("net/phy: micrel: Add workaround for bad autoneg ")
Signed-off-by: Zach Brown <zach.brown@ni.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/phy/micrel.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/micrel.c
@@ -622,6 +622,8 @@ static int ksz9031_read_status(struct ph
 	if ((regval & 0xFF) == 0xFF) {
 		phy_init_hw(phydev);
 		phydev->link = 0;
+		if (phydev->drv->config_intr && phy_interrupt_is_valid(phydev))
+			phydev->drv->config_intr(phydev);
 	}
 
 	return 0;

[PATCH 4.9 05/72] ipv6: avoid unregistering inet6_dev for loopback

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>

commit 60abc0be96e00ca71bac083215ac91ad2e575096 upstream.

The per netns loopback_dev->ip6_ptr is unregistered and set to
NULL when its mtu is set to smaller than IPV6_MIN_MTU, this
leads to that we could set rt->rt6i_idev NULL after a
rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev() and then crash after another
call.

In this case we should just bring its inet6_dev down, rather
than unregistering it, at least prior to commit 176c39af29bc
("netns: fix addrconf_ifdown kernel panic") we always
override the case for loopback.

Thanks a lot to Andrey for finding a reliable reproducer.

Fixes: 176c39af29bc ("netns: fix addrconf_ifdown kernel panic")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@fr.ibm.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -3316,6 +3316,7 @@ static int addrconf_notify(struct notifi
 	struct net_device *dev = netdev_notifier_info_to_dev(ptr);
 	struct netdev_notifier_changeupper_info *info;
 	struct inet6_dev *idev = __in6_dev_get(dev);
+	struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
 	int run_pending = 0;
 	int err;
 
@@ -3331,7 +3332,7 @@ static int addrconf_notify(struct notifi
 	case NETDEV_CHANGEMTU:
 		/* if MTU under IPV6_MIN_MTU stop IPv6 on this interface. */
 		if (dev->mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU) {
-			addrconf_ifdown(dev, 1);
+			addrconf_ifdown(dev, dev != net->loopback_dev);
 			break;
 		}
 
@@ -3447,7 +3448,7 @@ static int addrconf_notify(struct notifi
 			 * IPV6_MIN_MTU stop IPv6 on this interface.
 			 */
 			if (dev->mtu < IPV6_MIN_MTU)
-				addrconf_ifdown(dev, 1);
+				addrconf_ifdown(dev, dev != net->loopback_dev);
 		}
 		break;
 

[PATCH 4.9 06/72] net: dp83640: Avoid NULL pointer dereference.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>

commit db9d8b29d19d2801793e4419f4c6272bf8951c62 upstream.

The function, skb_complete_tx_timestamp(), used to allow passing in a
NULL pointer for the time stamps, but that was changed in commit
62bccb8cdb69051b95a55ab0c489e3cab261c8ef ("net-timestamp: Make the
clone operation stand-alone from phy timestamping"), and the existing
call sites, all of which are in the dp83640 driver, were fixed up.

Even though the kernel-doc was subsequently updated in commit
7a76a021cd5a292be875fbc616daf03eab1e6996 ("net-timestamp: Update
skb_complete_tx_timestamp comment"), still a bug fix from Manfred
Rudigier came into the driver using the old semantics.  Probably
Manfred derived that patch from an older kernel version.

This fix should be applied to the stable trees as well.

Fixes: 81e8f2e930fe ("net: dp83640: Fix tx timestamp overflow handling.")
Signed-off-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/dp83640.c
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static void decode_txts(struct dp83640_p
 	if (overflow) {
 		pr_debug("tx timestamp queue overflow, count %d\n", overflow);
 		while (skb) {
-			skb_complete_tx_timestamp(skb, NULL);
+			kfree_skb(skb);
 			skb = skb_dequeue(&dp83640->tx_queue);
 		}
 		return;

[PATCH 4.9 07/72] tcp: reset sk_rx_dst in tcp_disconnect()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: WANG Cong <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>

commit d747a7a51b00984127a88113cdbbc26f91e9d815 upstream.

We have to reset the sk->sk_rx_dst when we disconnect a TCP
connection, because otherwise when we re-connect it this
dst reference is simply overridden in tcp_finish_connect().

This fixes a dst leak which leads to a loopback dev refcnt
leak. It is a long-standing bug, Kevin reported a very similar
(if not same) bug before. Thanks to Andrei for providing such
a reliable reproducer which greatly narrows down the problem.

Fixes: 41063e9dd119 ("ipv4: Early TCP socket demux.")
Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Kevin Xu <kaiwen.xu@hulu.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2300,6 +2300,8 @@ int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int
 	tcp_init_send_head(sk);
 	memset(&tp->rx_opt, 0, sizeof(tp->rx_opt));
 	__sk_dst_reset(sk);
+	dst_release(sk->sk_rx_dst);
+	sk->sk_rx_dst = NULL;
 	tcp_saved_syn_free(tp);
 
 	WARN_ON(inet->inet_num && !icsk->icsk_bind_hash);

[PATCH 4.9 08/72] net: prevent sign extension in dev_get_stats()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

commit 6f64ec74515925cced6df4571638b5a099a49aae upstream.

Similar to the fix provided by Dominik Heidler in commit
9b3dc0a17d73 ("l2tp: cast l2tp traffic counter to unsigned")
we need to take care of 32bit kernels in dev_get_stats().

When using atomic_long_read(), we add a 'long' to u64 and
might misinterpret high order bit, unless we cast to unsigned.

Fixes: caf586e5f23ce ("net: add a core netdev->rx_dropped counter")
Fixes: 015f0688f57ca ("net: net: add a core netdev->tx_dropped counter")
Fixes: 6e7333d315a76 ("net: add rx_nohandler stat counter")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/core/dev.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -7563,9 +7563,9 @@ struct rtnl_link_stats64 *dev_get_stats(
 	} else {
 		netdev_stats_to_stats64(storage, &dev->stats);
 	}
-	storage->rx_dropped += atomic_long_read(&dev->rx_dropped);
-	storage->tx_dropped += atomic_long_read(&dev->tx_dropped);
-	storage->rx_nohandler += atomic_long_read(&dev->rx_nohandler);
+	storage->rx_dropped += (unsigned long)atomic_long_read(&dev->rx_dropped);
+	storage->tx_dropped += (unsigned long)atomic_long_read(&dev->tx_dropped);
+	storage->rx_nohandler += (unsigned long)atomic_long_read(&dev->rx_nohandler);
 	return storage;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(dev_get_stats);

[PATCH 4.9 09/72] bridge: mdb: fix leak on complete_info ptr on fail path

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>

commit 1bfb159673957644951ab0a8d2aec44b93ddb1ae upstream.

We currently get the following kmemleak report:
unreferenced object 0xffff8800039d9820 (size 32):
  comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4295212383 (age 792.416s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 0c e0 03 00 88 ff ff ff 02 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 01 ff 11 00 02 86 dd 00 00 ff ff ff ff  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff8152b4aa>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4a/0xa0
    [<ffffffff811d8ec8>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xb8/0x1c0
    [<ffffffffa0389683>] __br_mdb_notify+0x2a3/0x300 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa038a0ce>] br_mdb_notify+0x6e/0x70 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa0386479>] br_multicast_add_group+0x109/0x150 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa0386518>] br_ip6_multicast_add_group+0x58/0x60 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa0387fb5>] br_multicast_rcv+0x1d5/0xdb0 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa037d7cf>] br_handle_frame_finish+0xcf/0x510 [bridge]
    [<ffffffffa03a236b>] br_nf_hook_thresh.part.27+0xb/0x10 [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffffa03a3738>] br_nf_hook_thresh+0x48/0xb0 [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffffa03a3fb9>] br_nf_pre_routing_finish_ipv6+0x109/0x1d0 [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffffa03a4400>] br_nf_pre_routing_ipv6+0xd0/0x14c [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffffa03a3c27>] br_nf_pre_routing+0x197/0x3d0 [br_netfilter]
    [<ffffffff814a2952>] nf_iterate+0x52/0x60
    [<ffffffff814a29bc>] nf_hook_slow+0x5c/0xb0
    [<ffffffffa037ddf4>] br_handle_frame+0x1a4/0x2c0 [bridge]

This happens when switchdev_port_obj_add() fails. This patch
frees complete_info object in the fail path.

Reviewed-by: Vallish Vaidyeshwara <vallish@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/bridge/br_mdb.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_mdb.c
@@ -323,7 +323,8 @@ static void __br_mdb_notify(struct net_d
 			__mdb_entry_to_br_ip(entry, &complete_info->ip);
 			mdb.obj.complete_priv = complete_info;
 			mdb.obj.complete = br_mdb_complete;
-			switchdev_port_obj_add(port_dev, &mdb.obj);
+			if (switchdev_port_obj_add(port_dev, &mdb.obj))
+				kfree(complete_info);
 		}
 	} else if (port_dev && type == RTM_DELMDB) {
 		switchdev_port_obj_del(port_dev, &mdb.obj);

[PATCH 4.9 10/72] rocker: move dereference before free

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

commit acb4b7df48b539cb391287921de57e4e5fae3460 upstream.

My static checker complains that ofdpa_neigh_del() can sometimes free
"found".   It just makes sense to use it first before deleting it.

Fixes: ecf244f753e0 ("rocker: fix maybe-uninitialized warning")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_ofdpa.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_ofdpa.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/rocker/rocker_ofdpa.c
@@ -1505,8 +1505,8 @@ static int ofdpa_port_ipv4_nh(struct ofd
 		*index = entry->index;
 		resolved = false;
 	} else if (removing) {
-		ofdpa_neigh_del(trans, found);
 		*index = found->index;
+		ofdpa_neigh_del(trans, found);
 	} else if (updating) {
 		ofdpa_neigh_update(found, trans, NULL, false);
 		resolved = !is_zero_ether_addr(found->eth_dst);

[PATCH 4.9 11/72] bpf: prevent leaking pointer via xadd on unpriviledged

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>

commit 6bdf6abc56b53103324dfd270a86580306e1a232 upstream.

Leaking kernel addresses on unpriviledged is generally disallowed,
for example, verifier rejects the following:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400
  3: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r2
  R2 leaks addr into ctx

Doing pointer arithmetic on them is also forbidden, so that they
don't turn into unknown value and then get leaked out. However,
there's xadd as a special case, where we don't check the src reg
for being a pointer register, e.g. the following will pass:

  0: (b7) r0 = 0
  1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r1 +48) = r0
  2: (18) r2 = 0xffff897e82304400 ; map
  4: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r1 +48) += r2
  5: (95) exit

We could store the pointer into skb->cb, loose the type context,
and then read it out from there again to leak it eventually out
of a map value. Or more easily in a different variant, too:

   0: (bf) r6 = r1
   1: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
   2: (bf) r2 = r10
   3: (07) r2 += -8
   4: (18) r1 = 0x0
   6: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
   7: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+3
   R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
   8: (b7) r3 = 0
   9: (7b) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = r3
  10: (db) lock *(u64 *)(r0 +0) += r6
  11: (b7) r0 = 0
  12: (95) exit

  from 7 to 11: R0=inv,min_value=0,max_value=0 R6=ctx R10=fp
  11: (b7) r0 = 0
  12: (95) exit

Prevent this by checking xadd src reg for pointer types. Also
add a couple of test cases related to this.

Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Fixes: 17a5267067f3 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -885,6 +885,11 @@ static int check_xadd(struct bpf_verifie
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
+	if (is_pointer_value(env, insn->src_reg)) {
+		verbose("R%d leaks addr into mem\n", insn->src_reg);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
+
 	/* check whether atomic_add can read the memory */
 	err = check_mem_access(env, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
 			       BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ, -1);

[PATCH 4.9 13/72] net/mlx5: Cancel delayed recovery work when unloading the driver

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mohamad Haj Yahia <mohamad@mellanox.com>

commit 2a0165a034ac024b60cca49c61e46f4afa2e4d98 upstream.

Draining the health workqueue will ignore future health works including
the one that report hardware failure and thus we can't enter error state
Instead cancel the recovery flow and make sure only recovery flow won't
be scheduled.

Fixes: 5e44fca50470 ('net/mlx5: Only cancel recovery work when cleaning up device')
Signed-off-by: Mohamad Haj Yahia <mohamad@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c   |    2 +-
 include/linux/mlx5/driver.h                      |    1 +
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/health.c
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ enum {
 
 enum {
 	MLX5_DROP_NEW_HEALTH_WORK,
+	MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK,
 };
 
 static u8 get_nic_state(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
@@ -193,7 +194,7 @@ static void health_care(struct work_stru
 	mlx5_handle_bad_state(dev);
 
 	spin_lock(&health->wq_lock);
-	if (!test_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_HEALTH_WORK, &health->flags))
+	if (!test_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK, &health->flags))
 		schedule_delayed_work(&health->recover_work, recover_delay);
 	else
 		dev_err(&dev->pdev->dev,
@@ -328,6 +329,7 @@ void mlx5_start_health_poll(struct mlx5_
 	init_timer(&health->timer);
 	health->sick = 0;
 	clear_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_HEALTH_WORK, &health->flags);
+	clear_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK, &health->flags);
 	health->health = &dev->iseg->health;
 	health->health_counter = &dev->iseg->health_counter;
 
@@ -350,11 +352,22 @@ void mlx5_drain_health_wq(struct mlx5_co
 
 	spin_lock(&health->wq_lock);
 	set_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_HEALTH_WORK, &health->flags);
+	set_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK, &health->flags);
 	spin_unlock(&health->wq_lock);
 	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&health->recover_work);
 	cancel_work_sync(&health->work);
 }
 
+void mlx5_drain_health_recovery(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
+{
+	struct mlx5_core_health *health = &dev->priv.health;
+
+	spin_lock(&health->wq_lock);
+	set_bit(MLX5_DROP_NEW_RECOVERY_WORK, &health->flags);
+	spin_unlock(&health->wq_lock);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&dev->priv.health.recover_work);
+}
+
 void mlx5_health_cleanup(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)
 {
 	struct mlx5_core_health *health = &dev->priv.health;
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c
@@ -1169,7 +1169,7 @@ static int mlx5_unload_one(struct mlx5_c
 	int err = 0;
 
 	if (cleanup)
-		mlx5_drain_health_wq(dev);
+		mlx5_drain_health_recovery(dev);
 
 	mutex_lock(&dev->intf_state_mutex);
 	if (test_bit(MLX5_INTERFACE_STATE_DOWN, &dev->intf_state)) {
--- a/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h
+++ b/include/linux/mlx5/driver.h
@@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ int mlx5_health_init(struct mlx5_core_de
 void mlx5_start_health_poll(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
 void mlx5_stop_health_poll(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
 void mlx5_drain_health_wq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
+void mlx5_drain_health_recovery(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev);
 int mlx5_buf_alloc_node(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int size,
 			struct mlx5_buf *buf, int node);
 int mlx5_buf_alloc(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, int size, struct mlx5_buf *buf);

[PATCH 4.9 14/72] liquidio: fix bug in soft reset failure detection

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Derek Chickles <derek.chickles@cavium.com>

commit 05a6b4cae8c0cc1680c9dd33a97a49a13c0f01bc upstream.

The code that detects a failed soft reset of Octeon is comparing the wrong
value against the reset value of the Octeon SLI_SCRATCH_1 register,
resulting in an inability to detect a soft reset failure.  Fix it by using
the correct value in the comparison, which is any non-zero value.

Fixes: f21fb3ed364b ("Add support of Cavium Liquidio ethernet adapters")
Fixes: c0eab5b3580a ("liquidio: CN23XX firmware download")
Signed-off-by: Derek Chickles <derek.chickles@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Satanand Burla <satananda.burla@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Raghu Vatsavayi <raghu.vatsavayi@cavium.com>
Signed-off-by: Felix Manlunas <felix.manlunas@cavium.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn23xx_pf_device.c |    2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_device.c    |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn23xx_pf_device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn23xx_pf_device.c
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ static int cn23xx_pf_soft_reset(struct o
 	/* Wait for 100ms as Octeon resets. */
 	mdelay(100);
 
-	if (octeon_read_csr64(oct, CN23XX_SLI_SCRATCH1) == 0x1234ULL) {
+	if (octeon_read_csr64(oct, CN23XX_SLI_SCRATCH1)) {
 		dev_err(&oct->pci_dev->dev, "OCTEON[%d]: Soft reset failed\n",
 			oct->octeon_id);
 		return 1;
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/liquidio/cn66xx_device.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int lio_cn6xxx_soft_reset(struct octeon_
 	/* Wait for 10ms as Octeon resets. */
 	mdelay(100);
 
-	if (octeon_read_csr64(oct, CN6XXX_SLI_SCRATCH1) == 0x1234ULL) {
+	if (octeon_read_csr64(oct, CN6XXX_SLI_SCRATCH1)) {
 		dev_err(&oct->pci_dev->dev, "Soft reset failed\n");
 		return 1;
 	}

[PATCH 4.9 15/72] net/mlx5e: Fix TX carrier errors report in get stats ndo

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gal Pressman <galp@mellanox.com>

commit 8ff93de7668bd81bc8efa819d1184ebd48fae72d upstream.

Symbol error during carrier counter from PPCNT was mistakenly reported as
TX carrier errors in get_stats ndo, although it's an RX counter.

Fixes: 269e6b3af3bf ("net/mlx5e: Report additional error statistics in get stats ndo")
Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <galp@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c |    2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c
@@ -2671,8 +2671,6 @@ mlx5e_get_stats(struct net_device *dev,
 		PPORT_802_3_GET(pstats, a_frame_check_sequence_errors);
 	stats->rx_frame_errors = PPORT_802_3_GET(pstats, a_alignment_errors);
 	stats->tx_aborted_errors = PPORT_2863_GET(pstats, if_out_discards);
-	stats->tx_carrier_errors =
-		PPORT_802_3_GET(pstats, a_symbol_error_during_carrier);
 	stats->rx_errors = stats->rx_length_errors + stats->rx_crc_errors +
 			   stats->rx_frame_errors;
 	stats->tx_errors = stats->tx_aborted_errors + stats->tx_carrier_errors;

[PATCH 4.9 16/72] ipv6: dad: dont remove dynamic addresses if link is down

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>

commit ec8add2a4c9df723c94a863b8fcd6d93c472deed upstream.

Currently, when the link for $DEV is down, this command succeeds but the
address is removed immediately by DAD (1):

    ip addr add 1111::12/64 dev $DEV valid_lft 3600 preferred_lft 1800

In the same situation, this will succeed and not remove the address (2):

    ip addr add 1111::12/64 dev $DEV
    ip addr change 1111::12/64 dev $DEV valid_lft 3600 preferred_lft 1800

The comment in addrconf_dad_begin() when !IF_READY makes it look like
this is the intended behavior, but doesn't explain why:

     * If the device is not ready:
     * - keep it tentative if it is a permanent address.
     * - otherwise, kill it.

We clearly cannot prevent userspace from doing (2), but we can make (1)
work consistently with (2).

addrconf_dad_stop() is only called in two cases: if DAD failed, or to
skip DAD when the link is down. In that second case, the fix is to avoid
deleting the address, like we already do for permanent addresses.

Fixes: 3c21edbd1137 ("[IPV6]: Defer IPv6 device initialization until the link becomes ready.")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/ipv6/addrconf.c |   18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c
@@ -1875,15 +1875,7 @@ static void addrconf_dad_stop(struct ine
 	if (dad_failed)
 		ifp->flags |= IFA_F_DADFAILED;
 
-	if (ifp->flags&IFA_F_PERMANENT) {
-		spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
-		addrconf_del_dad_work(ifp);
-		ifp->flags |= IFA_F_TENTATIVE;
-		spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
-		if (dad_failed)
-			ipv6_ifa_notify(0, ifp);
-		in6_ifa_put(ifp);
-	} else if (ifp->flags&IFA_F_TEMPORARY) {
+	if (ifp->flags&IFA_F_TEMPORARY) {
 		struct inet6_ifaddr *ifpub;
 		spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
 		ifpub = ifp->ifpub;
@@ -1896,6 +1888,14 @@ static void addrconf_dad_stop(struct ine
 			spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
 		}
 		ipv6_del_addr(ifp);
+	} else if (ifp->flags&IFA_F_PERMANENT || !dad_failed) {
+		spin_lock_bh(&ifp->lock);
+		addrconf_del_dad_work(ifp);
+		ifp->flags |= IFA_F_TENTATIVE;
+		spin_unlock_bh(&ifp->lock);
+		if (dad_failed)
+			ipv6_ifa_notify(0, ifp);
+		in6_ifa_put(ifp);
 	} else {
 		ipv6_del_addr(ifp);
 	}

[PATCH 4.9 17/72] vxlan: fix hlist corruption

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>


[ Upstream commit 69e766612c4bcb79e19cebed9eed61d4222c1d47 ]

It's not a good idea to add the same hlist_node to two different hash lists.
This leads to various hard to debug memory corruptions.

Fixes: b1be00a6c39f ("vxlan: support both IPv4 and IPv6 sockets in a single vxlan device")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/vxlan.c |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
 include/net/vxlan.h |   10 +++++++++-
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c
+++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c
@@ -227,15 +227,15 @@ static struct vxlan_sock *vxlan_find_soc
 
 static struct vxlan_dev *vxlan_vs_find_vni(struct vxlan_sock *vs, __be32 vni)
 {
-	struct vxlan_dev *vxlan;
+	struct vxlan_dev_node *node;
 
 	/* For flow based devices, map all packets to VNI 0 */
 	if (vs->flags & VXLAN_F_COLLECT_METADATA)
 		vni = 0;
 
-	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(vxlan, vni_head(vs, vni), hlist) {
-		if (vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni == vni)
-			return vxlan;
+	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, vni_head(vs, vni), hlist) {
+		if (node->vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni == vni)
+			return node->vxlan;
 	}
 
 	return NULL;
@@ -2309,17 +2309,22 @@ static void vxlan_vs_del_dev(struct vxla
 	struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
 
 	spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
-	hlist_del_init_rcu(&vxlan->hlist);
+	hlist_del_init_rcu(&vxlan->hlist4.hlist);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	hlist_del_init_rcu(&vxlan->hlist6.hlist);
+#endif
 	spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
 }
 
-static void vxlan_vs_add_dev(struct vxlan_sock *vs, struct vxlan_dev *vxlan)
+static void vxlan_vs_add_dev(struct vxlan_sock *vs, struct vxlan_dev *vxlan,
+			     struct vxlan_dev_node *node)
 {
 	struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
 	__be32 vni = vxlan->default_dst.remote_vni;
 
+	node->vxlan = vxlan;
 	spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
-	hlist_add_head_rcu(&vxlan->hlist, vni_head(vs, vni));
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->hlist, vni_head(vs, vni));
 	spin_unlock(&vn->sock_lock);
 }
 
@@ -2778,6 +2783,7 @@ static int __vxlan_sock_add(struct vxlan
 {
 	struct vxlan_net *vn = net_generic(vxlan->net, vxlan_net_id);
 	struct vxlan_sock *vs = NULL;
+	struct vxlan_dev_node *node;
 
 	if (!vxlan->cfg.no_share) {
 		spin_lock(&vn->sock_lock);
@@ -2795,12 +2801,16 @@ static int __vxlan_sock_add(struct vxlan
 	if (IS_ERR(vs))
 		return PTR_ERR(vs);
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-	if (ipv6)
+	if (ipv6) {
 		rcu_assign_pointer(vxlan->vn6_sock, vs);
-	else
+		node = &vxlan->hlist6;
+	} else
 #endif
+	{
 		rcu_assign_pointer(vxlan->vn4_sock, vs);
-	vxlan_vs_add_dev(vs, vxlan);
+		node = &vxlan->hlist4;
+	}
+	vxlan_vs_add_dev(vs, vxlan, node);
 	return 0;
 }
 
--- a/include/net/vxlan.h
+++ b/include/net/vxlan.h
@@ -221,9 +221,17 @@ struct vxlan_config {
 	bool			no_share;
 };
 
+struct vxlan_dev_node {
+	struct hlist_node hlist;
+	struct vxlan_dev *vxlan;
+};
+
 /* Pseudo network device */
 struct vxlan_dev {
-	struct hlist_node hlist;	/* vni hash table */
+	struct vxlan_dev_node hlist4;	/* vni hash table for IPv4 socket */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct vxlan_dev_node hlist6;	/* vni hash table for IPv6 socket */
+#endif
 	struct list_head  next;		/* vxlan's per namespace list */
 	struct vxlan_sock __rcu *vn4_sock;	/* listening socket for IPv4 */
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)

[PATCH 4.9 18/72] net: core: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in netdev_stats_to_stats64

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alban Browaeys <alban.browaeys@gmail.com>

commit 9af9959e142c274f4a30fefb71d97d2b028b337f upstream.

commit 9256645af098 ("net/core: relax BUILD_BUG_ON in
netdev_stats_to_stats64") made an attempt to read beyond
the size of the source a possibility.

Fix to only copy src size to dest. As dest might be bigger than src.

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30 at addr ffff8801be248b20
 Read of size 192 by task VBoxNetAdpCtl/6734
 CPU: 1 PID: 6734 Comm: VBoxNetAdpCtl Tainted: G           O    4.11.4prahal+intel+ #118
 Hardware name: LENOVO 20CDCTO1WW/20CDCTO1WW, BIOS GQET52WW (1.32 ) 05/04/2017
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x63/0x86
  kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70
  kasan_report+0x270/0x520
  ? netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x190
  ? __module_address+0x3e/0x3b0
  ? unwind_next_frame+0x1ea/0xb00
  check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0
  memcpy+0x23/0x50
  netdev_stats_to_stats64+0xe/0x30
  dev_get_stats+0x1b9/0x230
  rtnl_fill_stats+0x44/0xc00
  ? nla_put+0xc6/0x130
  rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0xe9e/0x3700
  ? rtnl_fill_vfinfo+0xde0/0xde0
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock_local+0x120/0x130
  ? __module_address+0x3e/0x3b0
  ? unwind_next_frame+0x1ea/0xb00
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x1b/0x190
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? depot_save_stack+0x1d8/0x4a0
  ? depot_save_stack+0x34f/0x4a0
  ? depot_save_stack+0x34f/0x4a0
  ? save_stack+0xb1/0xd0
  ? save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x10d/0x350
  ? __kmalloc_reserve.isra.36+0x2c/0xc0
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x61/0x120
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo.part.25+0x16/0xb0
  ? rtmsg_ifinfo+0x47/0x70
  ? register_netdev+0x15/0x30
  ? vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0xc0/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  ? vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  ? SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  ? do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  ? init_object+0x64/0xa0
  ? ___slab_alloc+0x1ae/0x5c0
  ? ___slab_alloc+0x1ae/0x5c0
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? sched_clock+0x9/0x10
  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
  ? kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
  ? __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x246/0x350
  ? __alloc_skb+0xd0/0x560
  ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
  ? memset+0x31/0x40
  ? __alloc_skb+0x31f/0x560
  ? napi_consume_skb+0x320/0x320
  ? br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0xb7/0x120 [bridge]
  ? if_nlmsg_size+0x440/0x630
  rtmsg_ifinfo_build_skb+0x83/0x120
  rtmsg_ifinfo.part.25+0x16/0xb0
  rtmsg_ifinfo+0x47/0x70
  register_netdevice+0xa2b/0xe50
  ? __kmalloc+0x171/0x2d0
  ? netdev_change_features+0x80/0x80
  register_netdev+0x15/0x30
  vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0xc0/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  ? vboxNetAdpComposeMACAddress+0x1d0/0x1d0 [vboxnetadp]
  ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
  VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  ? VBoxNetAdpLinuxOpen+0x20/0x20 [vboxnetadp]
  ? lock_acquire+0x11c/0x270
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  ? ioctl_preallocate+0x1d0/0x1d0
  ? __audit_syscall_entry+0x2fb/0x660
  ? kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x250
  ? syscall_trace_enter+0x537/0xd00
  ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0x100/0x100
  SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  ? do_sys_open+0x350/0x350
  ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xff0/0xff0
  do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
 RIP: 0033:0x7f7e39a1ae07
 RSP: 002b:00007ffc6f04c6d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc6f04c730 RCX: 00007f7e39a1ae07
 RDX: 00007ffc6f04c730 RSI: 00000000c0207601 RDI: 0000000000000007
 RBP: 00007ffc6f04c700 R08: 00007ffc6f04c780 R09: 0000000000000008
 R10: 0000000000000541 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000007
 R13: 00000000c0207601 R14: 00007ffc6f04c730 R15: 0000000000000012
 Object at ffff8801be248008, in cache kmalloc-4096 size: 4096
 Allocated:
 PID = 6734
  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
  __kmalloc+0x171/0x2d0
  alloc_netdev_mqs+0x8a7/0xbe0
  vboxNetAdpOsCreate+0x65/0x1c0 [vboxnetadp]
  vboxNetAdpCreate+0x210/0x400 [vboxnetadp]
  VBoxNetAdpLinuxIOCtlUnlocked+0x14b/0x280 [vboxnetadp]
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x17f/0xff0
  SyS_ioctl+0x74/0x80
  do_syscall_64+0x182/0x390
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
 Freed:
 PID = 5600
  save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
  save_stack+0x46/0xd0
  kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0
  kfree+0xe4/0x220
  kvfree+0x25/0x30
  single_release+0x74/0xb0
  __fput+0x265/0x6b0
  ____fput+0x9/0x10
  task_work_run+0xd5/0x150
  exit_to_usermode_loop+0xe2/0x100
  do_syscall_64+0x26c/0x390
  return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a
 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ffff8801be248a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ffff8801be248b00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ffff8801be248b80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 fc fc fc fc
                                                     ^
  ffff8801be248c00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ffff8801be248c80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Alban Browaeys <alban.browaeys@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/core/dev.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -7531,7 +7531,7 @@ void netdev_stats_to_stats64(struct rtnl
 {
 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*stats64) < sizeof(*netdev_stats));
-	memcpy(stats64, netdev_stats, sizeof(*stats64));
+	memcpy(stats64, netdev_stats, sizeof(*netdev_stats));
 	/* zero out counters that only exist in rtnl_link_stats64 */
 	memset((char *)stats64 + sizeof(*netdev_stats), 0,
 	       sizeof(*stats64) - sizeof(*netdev_stats));

[PATCH 4.9 20/72] vrf: fix bug_on triggered by rx when destroying a vrf

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>

commit f630c38ef0d785101363a8992bbd4f302180f86f upstream.

When destroying a VRF device we cleanup the slaves in its ndo_uninit()
function, but that causes packets to be switched (skb->dev == vrf being
destroyed) even though we're pass the point where the VRF should be
receiving any packets while it is being dismantled. This causes a BUG_ON
to trigger if we have raw sockets (trace below).
The reason is that the inetdev of the VRF has been destroyed but we're
still sending packets up the stack with it, so let's free the slaves in
the dellink callback as David Ahern suggested.

Note that this fix doesn't prevent packets from going up when the VRF
device is admin down.

[   35.631371] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   35.631603] kernel BUG at net/ipv4/fib_frontend.c:285!
[   35.631854] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[   35.631977] Modules linked in:
[   35.632081] CPU: 2 PID: 22 Comm: ksoftirqd/2 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7+ #45
[   35.632247] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.7.5-20140531_083030-gandalf 04/01/2014
[   35.632477] task: ffff88005ad68000 task.stack: ffff88005ad64000
[   35.632632] RIP: 0010:fib_compute_spec_dst+0xfc/0x1ee
[   35.632769] RSP: 0018:ffff88005ad67978 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   35.632910] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880059a7f200 RCX: 0000000000000000
[   35.633084] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffff82274af0
[   35.633256] RBP: ffff88005ad679f8 R08: 000000000001ef70 R09: 0000000000000046
[   35.633430] R10: ffff88005ad679f8 R11: ffff880037731cb0 R12: 0000000000000001
[   35.633603] R13: ffff8800599e3000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8800599cb852
[   35.634114] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88005d900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   35.634306] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   35.634456] CR2: 00007f3563227095 CR3: 000000000201d000 CR4: 00000000000406e0
[   35.634632] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   35.634865] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   35.635055] Call Trace:
[   35.635271]  ? __lock_acquire+0xf0d/0x1117
[   35.635522]  ipv4_pktinfo_prepare+0x82/0x151
[   35.635831]  raw_rcv_skb+0x17/0x3c
[   35.636062]  raw_rcv+0xe5/0xf7
[   35.636287]  raw_local_deliver+0x169/0x1d9
[   35.636534]  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x87/0x1c4
[   35.636820]  ip_local_deliver+0x63/0x7f
[   35.637058]  ip_rcv_finish+0x340/0x3a1
[   35.637295]  ip_rcv+0x314/0x34a
[   35.637525]  __netif_receive_skb_core+0x49f/0x7c5
[   35.637780]  ? lock_acquire+0x13f/0x1d7
[   35.638018]  ? lock_acquire+0x15e/0x1d7
[   35.638259]  __netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x94
[   35.638502]  ? __netif_receive_skb+0x1e/0x94
[   35.638748]  netif_receive_skb_internal+0x74/0x300
[   35.639002]  ? dev_gro_receive+0x2ed/0x411
[   35.639246]  ? lock_is_held_type+0xc4/0xd2
[   35.639491]  napi_gro_receive+0x105/0x1a0
[   35.639736]  receive_buf+0xc32/0xc74
[   35.639965]  ? detach_buf+0x67/0x153
[   35.640201]  ? virtqueue_get_buf_ctx+0x120/0x176
[   35.640453]  virtnet_poll+0x128/0x1c5
[   35.640690]  net_rx_action+0x103/0x343
[   35.640932]  __do_softirq+0x1c7/0x4b7
[   35.641171]  run_ksoftirqd+0x23/0x5c
[   35.641403]  smpboot_thread_fn+0x24f/0x26d
[   35.641646]  ? sort_range+0x22/0x22
[   35.641878]  kthread+0x129/0x131
[   35.642104]  ? __list_add+0x31/0x31
[   35.642335]  ? __list_add+0x31/0x31
[   35.642568]  ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40
[   35.642804] Code: 05 bd 87 a3 00 01 e8 1f ef 98 ff 4d 85 f6 48 c7 c7 f0 4a 27 82 41 0f 94 c4 31 c9 31 d2 41 0f b6 f4 e8 04 71 a1 ff 45 84 e4 74 02 <0f> 0b 0f b7 93 c4 00 00 00 4d 8b a5 80 05 00 00 48 03 93 d0 00
[   35.644342] RIP: fib_compute_spec_dst+0xfc/0x1ee RSP: ffff88005ad67978

Fixes: 193125dbd8eb ("net: Introduce VRF device driver")
Reported-by: Chris Cormier <chriscormier@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/vrf.c |   11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/vrf.c
+++ b/drivers/net/vrf.c
@@ -787,15 +787,10 @@ static int vrf_del_slave(struct net_devi
 static void vrf_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
 {
 	struct net_vrf *vrf = netdev_priv(dev);
-	struct net_device *port_dev;
-	struct list_head *iter;
 
 	vrf_rtable_release(dev, vrf);
 	vrf_rt6_release(dev, vrf);
 
-	netdev_for_each_lower_dev(dev, port_dev, iter)
-		vrf_del_slave(dev, port_dev);
-
 	free_percpu(dev->dstats);
 	dev->dstats = NULL;
 }
@@ -1232,6 +1227,12 @@ static int vrf_validate(struct nlattr *t
 
 static void vrf_dellink(struct net_device *dev, struct list_head *head)
 {
+	struct net_device *port_dev;
+	struct list_head *iter;
+
+	netdev_for_each_lower_dev(dev, port_dev, iter)
+		vrf_del_slave(dev, port_dev);
+
 	unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, head);
 }
 

[PATCH 4.9 21/72] rds: tcp: use sock_create_lite() to create the accept socket

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>

commit 0933a578cd55b02dc80f219dc8f2efb17ec61c9a upstream.

There are two problems with calling sock_create_kern() from
rds_tcp_accept_one()
1. it sets up a new_sock->sk that is wasteful, because this ->sk
   is going to get replaced by inet_accept() in the subsequent ->accept()
2. The new_sock->sk is a leaked reference in sock_graft() which
   expects to find a null parent->sk

Avoid these problems by calling sock_create_lite().

Signed-off-by: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/rds/tcp_listen.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/rds/tcp_listen.c
+++ b/net/rds/tcp_listen.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int rds_tcp_accept_one(struct socket *so
 	if (!sock) /* module unload or netns delete in progress */
 		return -ENETUNREACH;
 
-	ret = sock_create_kern(sock_net(sock->sk), sock->sk->sk_family,
+	ret = sock_create_lite(sock->sk->sk_family,
 			       sock->sk->sk_type, sock->sk->sk_protocol,
 			       &new_sock);
 	if (ret)

[PATCH 4.9 23/72] brcmfmac: Fix a memory leak in error handling path in brcmf_cfg80211_attach

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christophe Jaillet <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>

commit 57c00f2fac512837f8de73474ec1f54020015bae upstream.

If 'wiphy_new()' fails, we leak 'ops'. Add a new label in the error
handling path to free it in such a case.

Fixes: 5c22fb85102a7 ("brcmfmac: add wowl gtk rekeying offload support")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/cfg80211.c
@@ -6876,7 +6876,7 @@ struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *brcmf_cfg802
 	wiphy = wiphy_new(ops, sizeof(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info));
 	if (!wiphy) {
 		brcmf_err("Could not allocate wiphy device\n");
-		return NULL;
+		goto ops_out;
 	}
 	memcpy(wiphy->perm_addr, drvr->mac, ETH_ALEN);
 	set_wiphy_dev(wiphy, busdev);
@@ -7010,6 +7010,7 @@ priv_out:
 	ifp->vif = NULL;
 wiphy_out:
 	brcmf_free_wiphy(wiphy);
+ops_out:
 	kfree(ops);
 	return NULL;
 }

[PATCH 4.9 24/72] brcmfmac: Fix glom_skb leak in brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter S. Housel <housel@acm.org>

commit 5ea59db8a375216e6c915c5586f556766673b5a7 upstream.

An earlier change to this function (3bdae810721b) fixed a leak in the
case of an unsuccessful call to brcmf_sdiod_buffrw(). However, the
glom_skb buffer, used for emulating a scattering read, is never used
or referenced after its contents are copied into the destination
buffers, and therefore always needs to be freed by the end of the
function.

Fixes: 3bdae810721b ("brcmfmac: Fix glob_skb leak in brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain")
Fixes: a413e39a38573 ("brcmfmac: fix brcmf_sdcard_recv_chain() for host without sg support")
Signed-off-by: Peter S. Housel <housel@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c |    7 +++----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/bcmsdh.c
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ done:
 int brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain(struct brcmf_sdio_dev *sdiodev,
 			   struct sk_buff_head *pktq, uint totlen)
 {
-	struct sk_buff *glom_skb;
+	struct sk_buff *glom_skb = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	u32 addr = sdiodev->sbwad;
 	int err = 0;
@@ -726,10 +726,8 @@ int brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain(struct brcmf_
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		err = brcmf_sdiod_buffrw(sdiodev, SDIO_FUNC_2, false, addr,
 					 glom_skb);
-		if (err) {
-			brcmu_pkt_buf_free_skb(glom_skb);
+		if (err)
 			goto done;
-		}
 
 		skb_queue_walk(pktq, skb) {
 			memcpy(skb->data, glom_skb->data, skb->len);
@@ -740,6 +738,7 @@ int brcmf_sdiod_recv_chain(struct brcmf_
 					    pktq);
 
 done:
+	brcmu_pkt_buf_free_skb(glom_skb);
 	return err;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.9 25/72] sfc: dont read beyond unicast address list

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bert Kenward <bkenward@solarflare.com>


[ Upstream commit c70d68150f71b84cea6997a53493e17bf18a54db ]

If we have more than 32 unicast MAC addresses assigned to an interface
we will read beyond the end of the address table in the driver when
adding filters. The next 256 entries store multicast addresses, so we
will end up attempting to insert duplicate filters, which is mostly
harmless. If we add more than 288 unicast addresses we will then read
past the multicast address table, which is likely to be more exciting.

Fixes: 12fb0da45c9a ("sfc: clean fallbacks between promisc/normal in efx_ef10_filter_sync_rx_mode")
Signed-off-by: Bert Kenward <bkenward@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c |    8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c
@@ -4399,12 +4399,9 @@ static void efx_ef10_filter_uc_addr_list
 	struct efx_ef10_filter_table *table = efx->filter_state;
 	struct net_device *net_dev = efx->net_dev;
 	struct netdev_hw_addr *uc;
-	int addr_count;
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	addr_count = netdev_uc_count(net_dev);
 	table->uc_promisc = !!(net_dev->flags & IFF_PROMISC);
-	table->dev_uc_count = 1 + addr_count;
 	ether_addr_copy(table->dev_uc_list[0].addr, net_dev->dev_addr);
 	i = 1;
 	netdev_for_each_uc_addr(uc, net_dev) {
@@ -4415,6 +4412,8 @@ static void efx_ef10_filter_uc_addr_list
 		ether_addr_copy(table->dev_uc_list[i].addr, uc->addr);
 		i++;
 	}
+
+	table->dev_uc_count = i;
 }
 
 static void efx_ef10_filter_mc_addr_list(struct efx_nic *efx)
@@ -4422,11 +4421,10 @@ static void efx_ef10_filter_mc_addr_list
 	struct efx_ef10_filter_table *table = efx->filter_state;
 	struct net_device *net_dev = efx->net_dev;
 	struct netdev_hw_addr *mc;
-	unsigned int i, addr_count;
+	unsigned int i;
 
 	table->mc_promisc = !!(net_dev->flags & (IFF_PROMISC | IFF_ALLMULTI));
 
-	addr_count = netdev_mc_count(net_dev);
 	i = 0;
 	netdev_for_each_mc_addr(mc, net_dev) {
 		if (i >= EFX_EF10_FILTER_DEV_MC_MAX) {

[PATCH 4.9 26/72] cfg80211: Define nla_policy for NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>

commit 8feb69c7bd89513be80eb19198d48f154b254021 upstream.

Buffer overread may happen as nl80211_set_station() reads 4 bytes
from the attribute NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE without
validating the size of data received when userspace sends less
than 4 bytes of data with NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE.
Define nla_policy for NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE to avoid
the buffer overread.

Fixes: 3b1c5a5307f ("{cfg,nl}80211: mesh power mode primitives and userspace access")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nl80211_p
 	[NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FLAGS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_P2P_CTWINDOW] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_P2P_OPPPS] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
+	[NL80211_ATTR_LOCAL_MESH_POWER_MODE] = {. type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_ACL_POLICY] = {. type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_MAC_ADDRS] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_STA_CAPABILITY] = { .type = NLA_U16 },

[PATCH 4.9 27/72] cfg80211: Validate frequencies nested in NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>

commit d7f13f7450369281a5d0ea463cc69890a15923ae upstream.

validate_scan_freqs() retrieves frequencies from attributes
nested in the attribute NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES with
nla_get_u32(), which reads 4 bytes from each attribute
without validating the size of data received. Attributes
nested in NL80211_ATTR_SCAN_FREQUENCIES don't have an nla policy.

Validate size of each attribute before parsing to avoid potential buffer
overread.

Fixes: 2a519311926 ("cfg80211/nl80211: scanning (and mac80211 update to use it)")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -6327,6 +6327,10 @@ static int validate_scan_freqs(struct nl
 	struct nlattr *attr1, *attr2;
 	int n_channels = 0, tmp1, tmp2;
 
+	nla_for_each_nested(attr1, freqs, tmp1)
+		if (nla_len(attr1) != sizeof(u32))
+			return 0;
+
 	nla_for_each_nested(attr1, freqs, tmp1) {
 		n_channels++;
 		/*

[PATCH 4.9 28/72] cfg80211: Check if PMKID attribute is of expected size

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>

commit 9361df14d1cbf966409d5d6f48bb334384fbe138 upstream.

nla policy checks for only maximum length of the attribute data
when the attribute type is NLA_BINARY. If userspace sends less
data than specified, the wireless drivers may access illegal
memory. When type is NLA_UNSPEC, nla policy check ensures that
userspace sends minimum specified length number of bytes.

Remove type assignment to NLA_BINARY from nla_policy of
NL80211_ATTR_PMKID to make this NLA_UNSPEC and to make sure minimum
WLAN_PMKID_LEN bytes are received from userspace with
NL80211_ATTR_PMKID.

Fixes: 67fbb16be69d ("nl80211: PMKSA caching support")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -305,8 +305,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy nl80211_p
 	[NL80211_ATTR_WPA_VERSIONS] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_PID] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_4ADDR] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
-	[NL80211_ATTR_PMKID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
-				 .len = WLAN_PMKID_LEN },
+	[NL80211_ATTR_PMKID] = { .len = WLAN_PMKID_LEN },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_DURATION] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_COOKIE] = { .type = NLA_U64 },
 	[NL80211_ATTR_TX_RATES] = { .type = NLA_NESTED },

[PATCH 4.9 29/72] cfg80211: Check if NAN service ID is of expected size

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>

commit 0a27844ce86d039d74221dd56cd8c0349b146b63 upstream.

nla policy checks for only maximum length of the attribute data when the
attribute type is NLA_BINARY. If userspace sends less data than
specified, cfg80211 may access illegal memory. When type is NLA_UNSPEC,
nla policy check ensures that userspace sends minimum specified length
number of bytes.

Remove type assignment to NLA_BINARY from nla_policy of
NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID to make these NLA_UNSPEC and to make sure
minimum NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID_LEN bytes are received from
userspace with NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID.

Fixes: a442b761b24 ("cfg80211: add add_nan_func / del_nan_func")
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Dasari <dasaris@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ nl80211_bss_select_policy[NL80211_BSS_SE
 static const struct nla_policy
 nl80211_nan_func_policy[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
 	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_TYPE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
-	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID] = { .type = NLA_BINARY,
+	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID] = {
 				    .len = NL80211_NAN_FUNC_SERVICE_ID_LEN },
 	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_PUBLISH_TYPE] = { .type = NLA_U8 },
 	[NL80211_NAN_FUNC_PUBLISH_BCAST] = { .type = NLA_FLAG },

[PATCH 4.9 30/72] irqchip/gic-v3: Fix out-of-bound access in gic_set_affinity

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>

commit 866d7c1b0a3c70387646c4e455e727a58c5d465a upstream.

The GICv3 driver doesn't check if the target CPU for gic_set_affinity
is valid before going ahead and making the changes. This triggers the
following splat with KASAN:

[  141.189434] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in gic_set_affinity+0x8c/0x140
[  141.189704] Read of size 8 at addr ffff200009741d20 by task swapper/1/0
[  141.189958]
[  141.190158] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7
[  141.190458] Hardware name: Foundation-v8A (DT)
[  141.190658] Call trace:
[  141.190908] [<ffff200008089d70>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x328
[  141.191224] [<ffff20000808a1b4>] show_stack+0x14/0x20
[  141.191507] [<ffff200008504c3c>] dump_stack+0xa4/0xc8
[  141.191858] [<ffff20000826c19c>] print_address_description+0x13c/0x250
[  141.192219] [<ffff20000826c5c8>] kasan_report+0x210/0x300
[  141.192547] [<ffff20000826ad54>] __asan_load8+0x84/0x98
[  141.192874] [<ffff20000854eeec>] gic_set_affinity+0x8c/0x140
[  141.193158] [<ffff200008148b14>] irq_do_set_affinity+0x54/0xb8
[  141.193473] [<ffff200008148d2c>] irq_set_affinity_locked+0x64/0xf0
[  141.193828] [<ffff200008148e00>] __irq_set_affinity+0x48/0x78
[  141.194158] [<ffff200008bc48a4>] arm_perf_starting_cpu+0x104/0x150
[  141.194513] [<ffff2000080d73bc>] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x17c/0x1f8
[  141.194783] [<ffff2000080d94ec>] notify_cpu_starting+0x8c/0xb8
[  141.195130] [<ffff2000080911ec>] secondary_start_kernel+0x15c/0x200
[  141.195390] [<0000000080db81b4>] 0x80db81b4
[  141.195603]
[  141.195685] The buggy address belongs to the variable:
[  141.196012]  __cpu_logical_map+0x200/0x220
[  141.196176]
[  141.196315] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  141.196586]  ffff200009741c00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  141.196913]  ffff200009741c80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  141.197158] >ffff200009741d00: 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  141.197487]                                ^
[  141.197758]  ffff200009741d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00
[  141.198060]  ffff200009741e00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  141.198358] ==================================================================
[  141.198609] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint
[  141.198961] CPU1: Booted secondary processor [410fd051]

This patch adds the check to make sure the cpu is valid.

Fixes: commit 021f653791ad17e03f98 ("irqchip: gic-v3: Initial support for GICv3")
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c
@@ -646,6 +646,9 @@ static int gic_set_affinity(struct irq_d
 	int enabled;
 	u64 val;
 
+	if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (gic_irq_in_rdist(d))
 		return -EINVAL;
 

[PATCH 4.9 31/72] parisc: Report SIGSEGV instead of SIGBUS when running out of stack

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>

commit 247462316f85a9e0479445c1a4223950b68ffac1 upstream.

When a process runs out of stack the parisc kernel wrongly faults with SIGBUS
instead of the expected SIGSEGV signal.

This example shows how the kernel faults:
do_page_fault() command='a.out' type=15 address=0xfaac2000 in libc-2.24.so[f8308000+16c000]
trap #15: Data TLB miss fault, vm_start = 0xfa2c2000, vm_end = 0xfaac2000

The vma->vm_end value is the first address which does not belong to the vma, so
adjust the check to include vma->vm_end to the range for which to send the
SIGSEGV signal.

This patch unbreaks building the debian libsigsegv package.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/parisc/mm/fault.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/mm/fault.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ bad_area:
 		case 15:	/* Data TLB miss fault/Data page fault */
 			/* send SIGSEGV when outside of vma */
 			if (!vma ||
-			    address < vma->vm_start || address > vma->vm_end) {
+			    address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end) {
 				si.si_signo = SIGSEGV;
 				si.si_code = SEGV_MAPERR;
 				break;

[PATCH 4.9 32/72] parisc: use compat_sys_keyctl()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

commit b0f94efd5aa8daa8a07d7601714c2573266cd4c9 upstream.

Architectures with a compat syscall table must put compat_sys_keyctl()
in it, not sys_keyctl().  The parisc architecture was not doing this;
fix it.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/parisc/kernel/syscall_table.S |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/syscall_table.S
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/syscall_table.S
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@
 	ENTRY_SAME(ni_syscall)	/* 263: reserved for vserver */
 	ENTRY_SAME(add_key)
 	ENTRY_SAME(request_key)		/* 265 */
-	ENTRY_SAME(keyctl)
+	ENTRY_COMP(keyctl)
 	ENTRY_SAME(ioprio_set)
 	ENTRY_SAME(ioprio_get)
 	ENTRY_SAME(inotify_init)

[PATCH 4.9 33/72] parisc: DMA API: return error instead of BUG_ON for dma ops on non dma devs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>

commit 33f9e02495d15a061f0c94ef46f5103a2d0c20f3 upstream.

Enabling parport pc driver on a B2600 (and probably other 64bit PARISC
systems) produced following BUG:

CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.12.0-rc5-30198-g1132d5e #156
task: 000000009e050000 task.stack: 000000009e04c000

     YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
PSW: 00001000000001101111111100001111 Not tainted
r00-03  000000ff0806ff0f 000000009e04c990 0000000040871b78 000000009e04cac0
r04-07  0000000040c14de0 ffffffffffffffff 000000009e07f098 000000009d82d200
r08-11  000000009d82d210 0000000000000378 0000000000000000 0000000040c345e0
r12-15  0000000000000005 0000000040c345e0 0000000000000000 0000000040c9d5e0
r16-19  0000000040c345e0 00000000f00001c4 00000000f00001bc 0000000000000061
r20-23  000000009e04ce28 0000000000000010 0000000000000010 0000000040b89e40
r24-27  0000000000000003 0000000000ffffff 000000009d82d210 0000000040c14de0
r28-31  0000000000000000 000000009e04ca90 000000009e04cb40 0000000000000000
sr00-03  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
sr04-07  0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000

IASQ: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 IAOQ: 00000000404aece0 00000000404aece4
 IIR: 03ffe01f    ISR: 0000000010340000  IOR: 000001781304cac8
 CPU:        0   CR30: 000000009e04c000 CR31: 00000000e2976de2
 ORIG_R28: 0000000000000200
 IAOQ[0]: sba_dma_supported+0x80/0xd0
 IAOQ[1]: sba_dma_supported+0x84/0xd0
 RP(r2): parport_pc_probe_port+0x178/0x1200

Cause is a call to dma_coerce_mask_and_coherenet in parport_pc_probe_port,
which PARISC DMA API doesn't handle very nicely. This commit gives back
DMA_ERROR_CODE for DMA API calls, if device isn't capable of DMA
transaction.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/parisc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h |   11 +++++++----
 drivers/parisc/ccio-dma.c             |   12 ++++++++++++
 drivers/parisc/dino.c                 |    5 ++++-
 drivers/parisc/lba_pci.c              |    6 ++++--
 drivers/parisc/sba_iommu.c            |   14 ++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/dma-mapping.h
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 ** flush/purge and allocate "regular" cacheable pages for everything.
 */
 
+#define DMA_ERROR_CODE	(~(dma_addr_t)0)
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_PA11
 extern struct dma_map_ops pcxl_dma_ops;
 extern struct dma_map_ops pcx_dma_ops;
@@ -54,12 +56,13 @@ parisc_walk_tree(struct device *dev)
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-	BUG_ON(!dev->platform_data);
 	return dev->platform_data;
 }
-		
-#define GET_IOC(dev) (HBA_DATA(parisc_walk_tree(dev))->iommu)
-	
+
+#define GET_IOC(dev) ({					\
+	void *__pdata = parisc_walk_tree(dev);		\
+	__pdata ? HBA_DATA(__pdata)->iommu : NULL;	\
+})
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_IOMMU_CCIO
 struct parisc_device;
--- a/drivers/parisc/ccio-dma.c
+++ b/drivers/parisc/ccio-dma.c
@@ -741,6 +741,8 @@ ccio_map_single(struct device *dev, void
 
 	BUG_ON(!dev);
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
 
 	BUG_ON(size <= 0);
 
@@ -814,6 +816,10 @@ ccio_unmap_page(struct device *dev, dma_
 	
 	BUG_ON(!dev);
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc) {
+		WARN_ON(!ioc);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	DBG_RUN("%s() iovp 0x%lx/%x\n",
 		__func__, (long)iova, size);
@@ -918,6 +924,8 @@ ccio_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct s
 	
 	BUG_ON(!dev);
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return 0;
 	
 	DBG_RUN_SG("%s() START %d entries\n", __func__, nents);
 
@@ -990,6 +998,10 @@ ccio_unmap_sg(struct device *dev, struct
 
 	BUG_ON(!dev);
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc) {
+		WARN_ON(!ioc);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	DBG_RUN_SG("%s() START %d entries, %p,%x\n",
 		__func__, nents, sg_virt(sglist), sglist->length);
--- a/drivers/parisc/dino.c
+++ b/drivers/parisc/dino.c
@@ -154,7 +154,10 @@ struct dino_device
 };
 
 /* Looks nice and keeps the compiler happy */
-#define DINO_DEV(d) ((struct dino_device *) d)
+#define DINO_DEV(d) ({				\
+	void *__pdata = d;			\
+	BUG_ON(!__pdata);			\
+	(struct dino_device *)__pdata; })
 
 
 /*
--- a/drivers/parisc/lba_pci.c
+++ b/drivers/parisc/lba_pci.c
@@ -111,8 +111,10 @@ static u32 lba_t32;
 
 
 /* Looks nice and keeps the compiler happy */
-#define LBA_DEV(d) ((struct lba_device *) (d))
-
+#define LBA_DEV(d) ({				\
+	void *__pdata = d;			\
+	BUG_ON(!__pdata);			\
+	(struct lba_device *)__pdata; })
 
 /*
 ** Only allow 8 subsidiary busses per LBA
--- a/drivers/parisc/sba_iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/parisc/sba_iommu.c
@@ -691,6 +691,8 @@ static int sba_dma_supported( struct dev
 		return 0;
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * check if mask is >= than the current max IO Virt Address
@@ -722,6 +724,8 @@ sba_map_single(struct device *dev, void
 	int pide;
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return DMA_ERROR_CODE;
 
 	/* save offset bits */
 	offset = ((dma_addr_t) (long) addr) & ~IOVP_MASK;
@@ -813,6 +817,10 @@ sba_unmap_page(struct device *dev, dma_a
 	DBG_RUN("%s() iovp 0x%lx/%x\n", __func__, (long) iova, size);
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc) {
+		WARN_ON(!ioc);
+		return;
+	}
 	offset = iova & ~IOVP_MASK;
 	iova ^= offset;        /* clear offset bits */
 	size += offset;
@@ -952,6 +960,8 @@ sba_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct sc
 	DBG_RUN_SG("%s() START %d entries\n", __func__, nents);
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc)
+		return 0;
 
 	/* Fast path single entry scatterlists. */
 	if (nents == 1) {
@@ -1037,6 +1047,10 @@ sba_unmap_sg(struct device *dev, struct
 		__func__, nents, sg_virt(sglist), sglist->length);
 
 	ioc = GET_IOC(dev);
+	if (!ioc) {
+		WARN_ON(!ioc);
+		return;
+	}
 
 #ifdef SBA_COLLECT_STATS
 	ioc->usg_calls++;

[PATCH 4.9 34/72] parisc/mm: Ensure IRQs are off in switch_mm()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>

commit 649aa24254e85bf6bd7807dd372d083707852b1f upstream.

This is because of commit f98db6013c55 ("sched/core: Add switch_mm_irqs_off()
and use it in the scheduler") in which switch_mm_irqs_off() is called by the
scheduler, vs switch_mm() which is used by use_mm().

This patch lets the parisc code mirror the x86 and powerpc code, ie. it
disables interrupts in switch_mm(), and optimises the scheduler case by
defining switch_mm_irqs_off().

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/parisc/include/asm/mmu_context.h |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -49,15 +49,26 @@ static inline void load_context(mm_conte
 	mtctl(__space_to_prot(context), 8);
 }
 
-static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static inline void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev,
+		struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk)
 {
-
 	if (prev != next) {
 		mtctl(__pa(next->pgd), 25);
 		load_context(next->context);
 	}
 }
 
+static inline void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev,
+		struct mm_struct *next, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	local_irq_save(flags);
+	switch_mm_irqs_off(prev, next, tsk);
+	local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+#define switch_mm_irqs_off switch_mm_irqs_off
+
 #define deactivate_mm(tsk,mm)	do { } while (0)
 
 static inline void activate_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)

[PATCH 4.9 35/72] tools/lib/lockdep: Reduce MAX_LOCK_DEPTH to avoid overflowing lock_chain/: Depth

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

commit 98dcea0cfd04e083ac74137ceb9a632604740e2d upstream.

liblockdep has been broken since commit 75dd602a5198 ("lockdep: Fix
lock_chain::base size"), as that adds a check that MAX_LOCK_DEPTH is
within the range of lock_chain::depth and in liblockdep it is much
too large.

That should have resulted in a compiler error, but didn't because:

- the check uses ARRAY_SIZE(), which isn't yet defined in liblockdep
  so is assumed to be an (undeclared) function
- putting a function call inside a BUILD_BUG_ON() expression quietly
  turns it into some nonsense involving a variable-length array

It did produce a compiler warning, but I didn't notice because
liblockdep already produces too many warnings if -Wall is enabled
(which I'll fix shortly).

Even before that commit, which reduced lock_chain::depth from 8 bits
to 6, MAX_LOCK_DEPTH was too large.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170525130005.5947-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 tools/lib/lockdep/uinclude/linux/lockdep.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/tools/lib/lockdep/uinclude/linux/lockdep.h
+++ b/tools/lib/lockdep/uinclude/linux/lockdep.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/utsname.h>
 #include <linux/compiler.h>
 
-#define MAX_LOCK_DEPTH 2000UL
+#define MAX_LOCK_DEPTH 63UL
 
 #define asmlinkage
 #define __visible

[PATCH 4.9 36/72] thp, mm: fix crash due race in MADV_FREE handling

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>

commit bbf29ffc7f963bb894f84f0580c70cfea01c3892 upstream.

Reinette reported the following crash:

  BUG: Bad page state in process log2exe  pfn:57600
  page:ffffea00015d8000 count:0 mapcount:0 mapping:          (null) index:0x20200
  flags: 0x4000000000040019(locked|uptodate|dirty|swapbacked)
  raw: 4000000000040019 0000000000000000 0000000000020200 00000000ffffffff
  raw: ffffea00015d8020 ffffea00015d8020 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: PAGE_FLAGS_CHECK_AT_FREE flag(s) set
  bad because of flags: 0x1(locked)
  Modules linked in: rfcomm 8021q bnep intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal coretemp efivars btusb btrtl btbcm pwm_lpss_pci snd_hda_codec_hdmi btintel pwm_lpss snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_soc_skl snd_hda_codec_generic snd_soc_skl_ipc spi_pxa2xx_platform snd_soc_sst_ipc snd_soc_sst_dsp i2c_designware_platform i2c_designware_core snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_sst_match snd_hda_intel snd_hda_codec mei_me snd_hda_core mei snd_soc_rt286 snd_soc_rl6347a snd_soc_core efivarfs
  CPU: 1 PID: 354 Comm: log2exe Not tainted 4.12.0-rc7-test-test #19
  Hardware name: Intel corporation NUC6CAYS/NUC6CAYB, BIOS AYAPLCEL.86A.0027.2016.1108.1529 11/08/2016
  Call Trace:
   bad_page+0x16a/0x1f0
   free_pages_check_bad+0x117/0x190
   free_hot_cold_page+0x7b1/0xad0
   __put_page+0x70/0xa0
   madvise_free_huge_pmd+0x627/0x7b0
   madvise_free_pte_range+0x6f8/0x1150
   __walk_page_range+0x6b5/0xe30
   walk_page_range+0x13b/0x310
   madvise_free_page_range.isra.16+0xad/0xd0
   madvise_free_single_vma+0x2e4/0x470
   SyS_madvise+0x8ce/0x1450

If somebody frees the page under us and we hold the last reference to
it, put_page() would attempt to free the page before unlocking it.

The fix is trivial reorder of operations.

Dave said:
 "I came up with the exact same patch.  For posterity, here's the test
  case, generated by syzkaller and trimmed down by Reinette:

  	https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/log2.c

  And the config that helps detect this:

  	https://www.sr71.net/~dave/intel/config-log2"

Fixes: b8d3c4c3009d ("mm/huge_memory.c: don't split THP page when MADV_FREE syscall is called")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170628101249.17879-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Reported-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 mm/huge_memory.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/mm/huge_memory.c
+++ b/mm/huge_memory.c
@@ -1373,8 +1373,8 @@ bool madvise_free_huge_pmd(struct mmu_ga
 		get_page(page);
 		spin_unlock(ptl);
 		split_huge_page(page);
-		put_page(page);
 		unlock_page(page);
+		put_page(page);
 		goto out_unlocked;
 	}
 

[PATCH 4.9 37/72] kernel/extable.c: mark core_kernel_text notrace

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marcin Nowakowski <marcin.nowakowski@imgtec.com>

commit c0d80ddab89916273cb97114889d3f337bc370ae upstream.

core_kernel_text is used by MIPS in its function graph trace processing,
so having this method traced leads to an infinite set of recursive calls
such as:

  Call Trace:
     ftrace_return_to_handler+0x50/0x128
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     prepare_ftrace_return+0x6c/0x114
     ftrace_graph_caller+0x20/0x44
     return_to_handler+0x10/0x30
     return_to_handler+0x0/0x30
     return_to_handler+0x0/0x30
     ftrace_ops_no_ops+0x114/0x1bc
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     ftrace_ops_no_ops+0x114/0x1bc
     core_kernel_text+0x10/0x1b8
     prepare_ftrace_return+0x6c/0x114
     ftrace_graph_caller+0x20/0x44
     (...)

Mark the function notrace to avoid it being traced.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498028607-6765-1-git-send-email-marcin.nowakowski@imgtec.com
Signed-off-by: Marcin Nowakowski <marcin.nowakowski@imgtec.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Meyer <thomas@m3y3r.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/extable.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/extable.c
+++ b/kernel/extable.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static inline int init_kernel_text(unsig
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int core_kernel_text(unsigned long addr)
+int notrace core_kernel_text(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	if (addr >= (unsigned long)_stext &&
 	    addr < (unsigned long)_etext)

[PATCH 4.9 38/72] mm/list_lru.c: fix list_lru_count_node() to be race free

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>

commit 2c80cd57c74339889a8752b20862a16c28929c3a upstream.

list_lru_count_node() iterates over all memcgs to get the total number of
entries on the node but it can race with memcg_drain_all_list_lrus(),
which migrates the entries from a dead cgroup to another.  This can return
incorrect number of entries from list_lru_count_node().

Fix this by keeping track of entries per node and simply return it in
list_lru_count_node().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498707555-30525-1-git-send-email-stummala@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Alexander Polakov <apolyakov@beget.ru>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/list_lru.h |    1 +
 mm/list_lru.c            |   14 ++++++--------
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/list_lru.h
+++ b/include/linux/list_lru.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ struct list_lru_node {
 	/* for cgroup aware lrus points to per cgroup lists, otherwise NULL */
 	struct list_lru_memcg	*memcg_lrus;
 #endif
+	long nr_items;
 } ____cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
 
 struct list_lru {
--- a/mm/list_lru.c
+++ b/mm/list_lru.c
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@ bool list_lru_add(struct list_lru *lru,
 		l = list_lru_from_kmem(nlru, item);
 		list_add_tail(item, &l->list);
 		l->nr_items++;
+		nlru->nr_items++;
 		spin_unlock(&nlru->lock);
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ bool list_lru_del(struct list_lru *lru,
 		l = list_lru_from_kmem(nlru, item);
 		list_del_init(item);
 		l->nr_items--;
+		nlru->nr_items--;
 		spin_unlock(&nlru->lock);
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -183,15 +185,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(list_lru_count_one);
 
 unsigned long list_lru_count_node(struct list_lru *lru, int nid)
 {
-	long count = 0;
-	int memcg_idx;
+	struct list_lru_node *nlru;
 
-	count += __list_lru_count_one(lru, nid, -1);
-	if (list_lru_memcg_aware(lru)) {
-		for_each_memcg_cache_index(memcg_idx)
-			count += __list_lru_count_one(lru, nid, memcg_idx);
-	}
-	return count;
+	nlru = &lru->node[nid];
+	return nlru->nr_items;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(list_lru_count_node);
 
@@ -226,6 +223,7 @@ restart:
 			assert_spin_locked(&nlru->lock);
 		case LRU_REMOVED:
 			isolated++;
+			nlru->nr_items--;
 			/*
 			 * If the lru lock has been dropped, our list
 			 * traversal is now invalid and so we have to

[PATCH 4.9 39/72] fs/dcache.c: fix spin lockup issue on nlru->lock

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>

commit b17c070fb624cf10162cf92ea5e1ec25cd8ac176 upstream.

__list_lru_walk_one() acquires nlru spin lock (nlru->lock) for longer
duration if there are more number of items in the lru list.  As per the
current code, it can hold the spin lock for upto maximum UINT_MAX
entries at a time.  So if there are more number of items in the lru
list, then "BUG: spinlock lockup suspected" is observed in the below
path:

  spin_bug+0x90
  do_raw_spin_lock+0xfc
  _raw_spin_lock+0x28
  list_lru_add+0x28
  dput+0x1c8
  path_put+0x20
  terminate_walk+0x3c
  path_lookupat+0x100
  filename_lookup+0x6c
  user_path_at_empty+0x54
  SyS_faccessat+0xd0
  el0_svc_naked+0x24

This nlru->lock is acquired by another CPU in this path -

  d_lru_shrink_move+0x34
  dentry_lru_isolate_shrink+0x48
  __list_lru_walk_one.isra.10+0x94
  list_lru_walk_node+0x40
  shrink_dcache_sb+0x60
  do_remount_sb+0xbc
  do_emergency_remount+0xb0
  process_one_work+0x228
  worker_thread+0x2e0
  kthread+0xf4
  ret_from_fork+0x10

Fix this lockup by reducing the number of entries to be shrinked from
the lru list to 1024 at once.  Also, add cond_resched() before
processing the lru list again.

Link: http://marc.info/?t=149722864900001&r=1&w=2
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498707575-2472-1-git-send-email-stummala@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Suggested-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Polakov <apolyakov@beget.ru>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/dcache.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -1133,11 +1133,12 @@ void shrink_dcache_sb(struct super_block
 		LIST_HEAD(dispose);
 
 		freed = list_lru_walk(&sb->s_dentry_lru,
-			dentry_lru_isolate_shrink, &dispose, UINT_MAX);
+			dentry_lru_isolate_shrink, &dispose, 1024);
 
 		this_cpu_sub(nr_dentry_unused, freed);
 		shrink_dentry_list(&dispose);
-	} while (freed > 0);
+		cond_resched();
+	} while (list_lru_count(&sb->s_dentry_lru) > 0);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(shrink_dcache_sb);
 

[PATCH 4.9 40/72] checkpatch: silence perl 5.26.0 unescaped left brace warnings

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>

commit 8d81ae05d0176da1c54aeaed697fa34be5c5575e upstream.

As of perl 5, version 26, subversion 0 (v5.26.0) some new warnings have
occurred when running checkpatch.

Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in
Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(.\s*){
<-- HERE \s*/ at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 3544.

Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in
Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in m/^(.\s*){
<-- HERE \s*/ at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 3885.

Unescaped left brace in regex is deprecated here (and will be fatal in
Perl 5.30), passed through in regex; marked by <-- HERE in
m/^(\+.*(?:do|\))){ <-- HERE / at scripts/checkpatch.pl line 4374.

It seems perfectly reasonable to do as the warning suggests and simply
escape the left brace in these three locations.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170607060135.17384-1-cyrilbur@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 scripts/checkpatch.pl |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/scripts/checkpatch.pl
+++ b/scripts/checkpatch.pl
@@ -3499,7 +3499,7 @@ sub process {
 				$fixedline =~ s/\s*=\s*$/ = {/;
 				fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, $fixedline);
 				$fixedline = $line;
-				$fixedline =~ s/^(.\s*){\s*/$1/;
+				$fixedline =~ s/^(.\s*)\{\s*/$1/;
 				fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, $fixedline);
 			}
 		}
@@ -3840,7 +3840,7 @@ sub process {
 				my $fixedline = rtrim($prevrawline) . " {";
 				fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, $fixedline);
 				$fixedline = $rawline;
-				$fixedline =~ s/^(.\s*){\s*/$1\t/;
+				$fixedline =~ s/^(.\s*)\{\s*/$1\t/;
 				if ($fixedline !~ /^\+\s*$/) {
 					fix_insert_line($fixlinenr, $fixedline);
 				}
@@ -4329,7 +4329,7 @@ sub process {
 			if (ERROR("SPACING",
 				  "space required before the open brace '{'\n" . $herecurr) &&
 			    $fix) {
-				$fixed[$fixlinenr] =~ s/^(\+.*(?:do|\))){/$1 {/;
+				$fixed[$fixlinenr] =~ s/^(\+.*(?:do|\)))\{/$1 {/;
 			}
 		}
 

[PATCH 4.9 41/72] binfmt_elf: use ELF_ET_DYN_BASE only for PIE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit eab09532d40090698b05a07c1c87f39fdbc5fab5 upstream.

The ELF_ET_DYN_BASE position was originally intended to keep loaders
away from ET_EXEC binaries.  (For example, running "/lib/ld-linux.so.2
/bin/cat" might cause the subsequent load of /bin/cat into where the
loader had been loaded.)

With the advent of PIE (ET_DYN binaries with an INTERP Program Header),
ELF_ET_DYN_BASE continued to be used since the kernel was only looking
at ET_DYN.  However, since ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is traditionally set at the
top 1/3rd of the TASK_SIZE, a substantial portion of the address space
is unused.

For 32-bit tasks when RLIMIT_STACK is set to RLIM_INFINITY, programs are
loaded above the mmap region.  This means they can be made to collide
(CVE-2017-1000370) or nearly collide (CVE-2017-1000371) with
pathological stack regions.

Lowering ELF_ET_DYN_BASE solves both by moving programs below the mmap
region in all cases, and will now additionally avoid programs falling
back to the mmap region by enforcing MAP_FIXED for program loads (i.e.
if it would have collided with the stack, now it will fail to load
instead of falling back to the mmap region).

To allow for a lower ELF_ET_DYN_BASE, loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP)
are loaded into the mmap region, leaving space available for either an
ET_EXEC binary with a fixed location or PIE being loaded into mmap by
the loader.  Only PIE programs are loaded offset from ELF_ET_DYN_BASE,
which means architectures can now safely lower their values without risk
of loaders colliding with their subsequently loaded programs.

For 64-bit, ELF_ET_DYN_BASE is best set to 4GB to allow runtimes to use
the entire 32-bit address space for 32-bit pointers.

Thanks to PaX Team, Daniel Micay, and Rik van Riel for inspiration and
suggestions on how to implement this solution.

Fixes: d1fd836dcf00 ("mm: split ET_DYN ASLR from mmap ASLR")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170621173201.GA114489@beast
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h |   13 +++++----
 fs/binfmt_elf.c            |   59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -245,12 +245,13 @@ extern int force_personality32;
 #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	4096
 
-/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
-   use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
-   the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
-   that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
-
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+/*
+ * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+ */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \
+						  0x100000000UL)
 
 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
    instruction set this CPU supports.  This could be done in user space,
--- a/fs/binfmt_elf.c
+++ b/fs/binfmt_elf.c
@@ -911,17 +911,60 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_
 		elf_flags = MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_DENYWRITE | MAP_EXECUTABLE;
 
 		vaddr = elf_ppnt->p_vaddr;
+		/*
+		 * If we are loading ET_EXEC or we have already performed
+		 * the ET_DYN load_addr calculations, proceed normally.
+		 */
 		if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_EXEC || load_addr_set) {
 			elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
 		} else if (loc->elf_ex.e_type == ET_DYN) {
-			/* Try and get dynamic programs out of the way of the
-			 * default mmap base, as well as whatever program they
-			 * might try to exec.  This is because the brk will
-			 * follow the loader, and is not movable.  */
-			load_bias = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE - vaddr;
-			if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
-				load_bias += arch_mmap_rnd();
-			load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias);
+			/*
+			 * This logic is run once for the first LOAD Program
+			 * Header for ET_DYN binaries to calculate the
+			 * randomization (load_bias) for all the LOAD
+			 * Program Headers, and to calculate the entire
+			 * size of the ELF mapping (total_size). (Note that
+			 * load_addr_set is set to true later once the
+			 * initial mapping is performed.)
+			 *
+			 * There are effectively two types of ET_DYN
+			 * binaries: programs (i.e. PIE: ET_DYN with INTERP)
+			 * and loaders (ET_DYN without INTERP, since they
+			 * _are_ the ELF interpreter). The loaders must
+			 * be loaded away from programs since the program
+			 * may otherwise collide with the loader (especially
+			 * for ET_EXEC which does not have a randomized
+			 * position). For example to handle invocations of
+			 * "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
+			 * the loader, the subsequent program that the
+			 * loader loads must avoid the loader itself, so
+			 * they cannot share the same load range. Sufficient
+			 * room for the brk must be allocated with the
+			 * loader as well, since brk must be available with
+			 * the loader.
+			 *
+			 * Therefore, programs are loaded offset from
+			 * ELF_ET_DYN_BASE and loaders are loaded into the
+			 * independently randomized mmap region (0 load_bias
+			 * without MAP_FIXED).
+			 */
+			if (elf_interpreter) {
+				load_bias = ELF_ET_DYN_BASE;
+				if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE)
+					load_bias += arch_mmap_rnd();
+				elf_flags |= MAP_FIXED;
+			} else
+				load_bias = 0;
+
+			/*
+			 * Since load_bias is used for all subsequent loading
+			 * calculations, we must lower it by the first vaddr
+			 * so that the remaining calculations based on the
+			 * ELF vaddrs will be correctly offset. The result
+			 * is then page aligned.
+			 */
+			load_bias = ELF_PAGESTART(load_bias - vaddr);
+
 			total_size = total_mapping_size(elf_phdata,
 							loc->elf_ex.e_phnum);
 			if (!total_size) {

[PATCH 4.9 42/72] arm: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4MB

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 6a9af90a3bcde217a1c053e135f5f43e5d5fafbd upstream.

Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we
have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the
address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions.

4MB is chosen here mainly to have parity with x86, where this is the
traditional minimum load location, likely to avoid historically
requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB
would be used (since the NULL address is avoided).

For ARM the position could be 0x8000, the standard ET_EXEC load address,
but that is needlessly close to the NULL address, and anyone running PIE
on 32-bit ARM will have an MMU, so the tight mapping is not needed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-2-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h |    8 ++------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -112,12 +112,8 @@ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t
 #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	4096
 
-/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
-   use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
-   the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
-   that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
-
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(TASK_SIZE / 3 * 2)
+/* This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x400000UL
 
 /* When the program starts, a1 contains a pointer to a function to be 
    registered with atexit, as per the SVR4 ABI.  A value of 0 means we 

[PATCH 4.9 43/72] arm64: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 02445990a96e60a67526510d8b00f7e3d14101c3 upstream.

Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we
have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the
address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions.

For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit
address space for 32-bit pointers.  On 32-bit use 4MB, to match ARM.
This could be 0x8000, the standard ET_EXEC load address, but that is
needlessly close to the NULL address, and anyone running arm compat PIE
will have an MMU, so the tight mapping is not needed.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498251600-132458-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h |   12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -113,12 +113,11 @@
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	PAGE_SIZE
 
 /*
- * This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
- * use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
- * the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
- * that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.
+ * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
  */
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	(2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x100000000UL
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
@@ -169,7 +168,8 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(s
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 
-#define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(2 * TASK_SIZE_32 / 3)
+/* PIE load location for compat arm. Must match ARM ELF_ET_DYN_BASE. */
+#define COMPAT_ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		0x000400000UL
 
 /* AArch32 registers. */
 #define COMPAT_ELF_NGREG		18

[PATCH 4.9 44/72] powerpc: move ELF_ET_DYN_BASE to 4GB / 4MB

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit 47ebb09d54856500c5a5e14824781902b3bb738e upstream.

Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we
have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the
address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions.

For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit
address space for 32-bit pointers.  On 32-bit use 4MB, which is the
traditional x86 minimum load location, likely to avoid historically
requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB
would be used (since the NULL address is avoided).

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -23,12 +23,13 @@
 #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	PAGE_SIZE
 
-/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
-   use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
-   the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
-   that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk.  */
-
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE	0x20000000
+/*
+ * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+ */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(is_32bit_task() ? 0x000400000UL : \
+						   0x100000000UL)
 
 #define ELF_CORE_EFLAGS (is_elf2_task() ? 2 : 0)
 

[PATCH 4.9 45/72] s390: reduce ELF_ET_DYN_BASE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit a73dc5370e153ac63718d850bddf0c9aa9d871e6 upstream.

Now that explicitly executed loaders are loaded in the mmap region, we
have more freedom to decide where we position PIE binaries in the
address space to avoid possible collisions with mmap or stack regions.

For 64-bit, align to 4GB to allow runtimes to use the entire 32-bit
address space for 32-bit pointers.  On 32-bit use 4MB, which is the
traditional x86 minimum load location, likely to avoid historically
requiring a 4MB page table entry when only a portion of the first 4MB
would be used (since the NULL address is avoided).  For s390 the
position could be 0x10000, but that is needlessly close to the NULL
address.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1498154792-49952-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com>
Cc: Pratyush Anand <panand@redhat.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h |   15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h
@@ -158,14 +158,13 @@ extern unsigned int vdso_enabled;
 #define CORE_DUMP_USE_REGSET
 #define ELF_EXEC_PAGESIZE	4096
 
-/* This is the location that an ET_DYN program is loaded if exec'ed.  Typical
-   use of this is to invoke "./ld.so someprog" to test out a new version of
-   the loader.  We need to make sure that it is out of the way of the program
-   that it will "exec", and that there is sufficient room for the brk. 64-bit
-   tasks are aligned to 4GB. */
-#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (is_compat_task() ? \
-				(STACK_TOP / 3 * 2) : \
-				(STACK_TOP / 3 * 2) & ~((1UL << 32) - 1))
+/*
+ * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
+ * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
+ * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
+ */
+#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE		(is_compat_task() ? 0x000400000UL : \
+						    0x100000000UL)
 
 /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
    instruction set this CPU supports. */

[PATCH 4.9 46/72] exec: Limit arg stack to at most 75% of _STK_LIM

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

commit da029c11e6b12f321f36dac8771e833b65cec962 upstream.

To avoid pathological stack usage or the need to special-case setuid
execs, just limit all arg stack usage to at most 75% of _STK_LIM (6MB).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/exec.c |   11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -215,8 +215,7 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct
 
 	if (write) {
 		unsigned long size = bprm->vma->vm_end - bprm->vma->vm_start;
-		unsigned long ptr_size;
-		struct rlimit *rlim;
+		unsigned long ptr_size, limit;
 
 		/*
 		 * Since the stack will hold pointers to the strings, we
@@ -245,14 +244,16 @@ static struct page *get_arg_page(struct
 			return page;
 
 		/*
-		 * Limit to 1/4-th the stack size for the argv+env strings.
+		 * Limit to 1/4 of the max stack size or 3/4 of _STK_LIM
+		 * (whichever is smaller) for the argv+env strings.
 		 * This ensures that:
 		 *  - the remaining binfmt code will not run out of stack space,
 		 *  - the program will have a reasonable amount of stack left
 		 *    to work from.
 		 */
-		rlim = current->signal->rlim;
-		if (size > READ_ONCE(rlim[RLIMIT_STACK].rlim_cur) / 4)
+		limit = _STK_LIM / 4 * 3;
+		limit = min(limit, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK) / 4);
+		if (size > limit)
 			goto fail;
 	}
 

[PATCH 4.9 47/72] ARM64: dts: marvell: armada37xx: Fix timer interrupt specifiers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

commit 88cda00733f0731711c76e535d4972c296ac512e upstream.

Contrary to popular belief, PPIs connected to a GICv3 to not have
an affinity field similar to that of GICv2. That is consistent
with the fact that GICv3 is designed to accomodate thousands of
CPUs, and fitting them as a bitmap in a byte is... difficult.

Fixes: adbc3695d9e4 ("arm64: dts: add the Marvell Armada 3700 family and a development board")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@free-electrons.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi |   12 ++++--------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/marvell/armada-37xx.dtsi
@@ -75,14 +75,10 @@
 
 	timer {
 		compatible = "arm,armv8-timer";
-		interrupts = <GIC_PPI 13
-			(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
-			     <GIC_PPI 14
-			(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
-			     <GIC_PPI 11
-			(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
-			     <GIC_PPI 10
-			(GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(2) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
+		interrupts = <GIC_PPI 13 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 14 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 11 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>,
+			     <GIC_PPI 10 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 	};
 
 	soc {

[PATCH 4.9 48/72] vt: fix unchecked __put_user() in tioclinux ioctls

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>

commit 6987dc8a70976561d22450b5858fc9767788cc1c upstream.

Only read access is checked before this call.

Actually, at the moment this is not an issue, as every in-tree arch does
the same manual checks for VERIFY_READ vs VERIFY_WRITE, relying on the MMU
to tell them apart, but this wasn't the case in the past and may happen
again on some odd arch in the future.

If anyone cares about 3.7 and earlier, this is a security hole (untested)
on real 80386 CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Adam Borowski <kilobyte@angband.pl>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c |    6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
@@ -2711,13 +2711,13 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, un
 	 * related to the kernel should not use this.
 	 */
 			data = vt_get_shift_state();
-			ret = __put_user(data, p);
+			ret = put_user(data, p);
 			break;
 		case TIOCL_GETMOUSEREPORTING:
 			console_lock();	/* May be overkill */
 			data = mouse_reporting();
 			console_unlock();
-			ret = __put_user(data, p);
+			ret = put_user(data, p);
 			break;
 		case TIOCL_SETVESABLANK:
 			console_lock();
@@ -2726,7 +2726,7 @@ int tioclinux(struct tty_struct *tty, un
 			break;
 		case TIOCL_GETKMSGREDIRECT:
 			data = vt_get_kmsg_redirect();
-			ret = __put_user(data, p);
+			ret = put_user(data, p);
 			break;
 		case TIOCL_SETKMSGREDIRECT:
 			if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {

[PATCH 4.9 49/72] rcu: Add memory barriers for NOCB leader wakeup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

commit 6b5fc3a1331810db407c9e0e673dc1837afdc9d0 upstream.

Wait/wakeup operations do not guarantee ordering on their own.  Instead,
either locking or memory barriers are required.  This commit therefore
adds memory barriers to wake_nocb_leader() and nocb_leader_wait().

Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h
+++ b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h
@@ -1767,6 +1767,7 @@ static void wake_nocb_leader(struct rcu_
 	if (READ_ONCE(rdp_leader->nocb_leader_sleep) || force) {
 		/* Prior smp_mb__after_atomic() orders against prior enqueue. */
 		WRITE_ONCE(rdp_leader->nocb_leader_sleep, false);
+		smp_mb(); /* ->nocb_leader_sleep before swake_up(). */
 		swake_up(&rdp_leader->nocb_wq);
 	}
 }
@@ -2021,6 +2022,7 @@ wait_again:
 	 * nocb_gp_head, where they await a grace period.
 	 */
 	gotcbs = false;
+	smp_mb(); /* wakeup before ->nocb_head reads. */
 	for (rdp = my_rdp; rdp; rdp = rdp->nocb_next_follower) {
 		rdp->nocb_gp_head = READ_ONCE(rdp->nocb_head);
 		if (!rdp->nocb_gp_head)

[PATCH 4.9 50/72] nvmem: core: fix leaks on registration errors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>

commit 3360acdf839170b612f5b212539694c20e3f16d0 upstream.

Make sure to deregister and release the nvmem device and underlying
memory on registration errors.

Note that the private data must be freed using put_device() once the
struct device has been initialised.

Also note that there's a related reference leak in the deregistration
function as reported by Mika Westerberg which is being fixed separately.

Fixes: b6c217ab9be6 ("nvmem: Add backwards compatibility support for older EEPROM drivers.")
Fixes: eace75cfdcf7 ("nvmem: Add a simple NVMEM framework for nvmem providers")
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Cc: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Cc: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrey Smirnov <andrew.smirnov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/nvmem/core.c |   13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/nvmem/core.c
+++ b/drivers/nvmem/core.c
@@ -488,21 +488,24 @@ struct nvmem_device *nvmem_register(cons
 
 	rval = device_add(&nvmem->dev);
 	if (rval)
-		goto out;
+		goto err_put_device;
 
 	if (config->compat) {
 		rval = nvmem_setup_compat(nvmem, config);
 		if (rval)
-			goto out;
+			goto err_device_del;
 	}
 
 	if (config->cells)
 		nvmem_add_cells(nvmem, config);
 
 	return nvmem;
-out:
-	ida_simple_remove(&nvmem_ida, nvmem->id);
-	kfree(nvmem);
+
+err_device_del:
+	device_del(&nvmem->dev);
+err_put_device:
+	put_device(&nvmem->dev);
+
 	return ERR_PTR(rval);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvmem_register);

[PATCH 4.9 51/72] mnt: In umount propagation reparent in a separate pass

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit 570487d3faf2a1d8a220e6ee10f472163123d7da upstream.

It was observed that in some pathlogical cases that the current code
does not unmount everything it should.  After investigation it
was determined that the issue is that mnt_change_mntpoint can
can change which mounts are available to be unmounted during mount
propagation which is wrong.

The trivial reproducer is:
$ cat ./pathological.sh

mount -t tmpfs test-base /mnt
cd /mnt
mkdir 1 2 1/1
mount --bind 1 1
mount --make-shared 1
mount --bind 1 2
mount --bind 1/1 1/1
mount --bind 1/1 1/1
echo
grep test-base /proc/self/mountinfo
umount 1/1
echo
grep test-base /proc/self/mountinfo

$ unshare -Urm ./pathological.sh

The expected output looks like:
46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
49 54 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
50 53 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
51 49 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
54 47 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
53 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
52 50 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000

46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000

The output without the fix looks like:
46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
49 54 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
50 53 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
51 49 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
54 47 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/1/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
53 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
52 50 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000

46 31 0:25 / /mnt rw,relatime - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
47 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
48 46 0:25 /1 /mnt/2 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000
52 48 0:25 /1/1 /mnt/2/1 rw,relatime shared:1 - tmpfs test-base rw,uid=1000,gid=1000

That last mount in the output was in the propgation tree to be unmounted but
was missed because the mnt_change_mountpoint changed it's parent before the walk
through the mount propagation tree observed it.

Fixes: 1064f874abc0 ("mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts.")
Acked-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Ram Pai <linuxram@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/mount.h     |    1 +
 fs/namespace.c |    1 +
 fs/pnode.c     |   35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/mount.h
+++ b/fs/mount.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct mount {
 	struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;	/* containing namespace */
 	struct mountpoint *mnt_mp;	/* where is it mounted */
 	struct hlist_node mnt_mp_list;	/* list mounts with the same mountpoint */
+	struct list_head mnt_reparent;	/* reparent list entry */
 #ifdef CONFIG_FSNOTIFY
 	struct hlist_head mnt_fsnotify_marks;
 	__u32 mnt_fsnotify_mask;
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ static struct mount *alloc_vfsmnt(const
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_slave_list);
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_slave);
 		INIT_HLIST_NODE(&mnt->mnt_mp_list);
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_reparent);
 #ifdef CONFIG_FSNOTIFY
 		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_fsnotify_marks);
 #endif
--- a/fs/pnode.c
+++ b/fs/pnode.c
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ static void mark_umount_candidates(struc
  * NOTE: unmounting 'mnt' naturally propagates to all other mounts its
  * parent propagates to.
  */
-static void __propagate_umount(struct mount *mnt)
+static void __propagate_umount(struct mount *mnt, struct list_head *to_reparent)
 {
 	struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
 	struct mount *m;
@@ -466,17 +466,38 @@ static void __propagate_umount(struct mo
 		 */
 		topper = find_topper(child);
 		if (topper)
-			mnt_change_mountpoint(child->mnt_parent, child->mnt_mp,
-					      topper);
+			list_add_tail(&topper->mnt_reparent, to_reparent);
 
-		if (list_empty(&child->mnt_mounts)) {
+		if (topper || list_empty(&child->mnt_mounts)) {
 			list_del_init(&child->mnt_child);
+			list_del_init(&child->mnt_reparent);
 			child->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
 			list_move_tail(&child->mnt_list, &mnt->mnt_list);
 		}
 	}
 }
 
+static void reparent_mounts(struct list_head *to_reparent)
+{
+	while (!list_empty(to_reparent)) {
+		struct mount *mnt, *parent;
+		struct mountpoint *mp;
+
+		mnt = list_first_entry(to_reparent, struct mount, mnt_reparent);
+		list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_reparent);
+
+		/* Where should this mount be reparented to? */
+		mp = mnt->mnt_mp;
+		parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
+		while (parent->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT) {
+			mp = parent->mnt_mp;
+			parent = parent->mnt_parent;
+		}
+
+		mnt_change_mountpoint(parent, mp, mnt);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * collect all mounts that receive propagation from the mount in @list,
  * and return these additional mounts in the same list.
@@ -487,11 +508,15 @@ static void __propagate_umount(struct mo
 int propagate_umount(struct list_head *list)
 {
 	struct mount *mnt;
+	LIST_HEAD(to_reparent);
 
 	list_for_each_entry_reverse(mnt, list, mnt_list)
 		mark_umount_candidates(mnt);
 
 	list_for_each_entry(mnt, list, mnt_list)
-		__propagate_umount(mnt);
+		__propagate_umount(mnt, &to_reparent);
+
+	reparent_mounts(&to_reparent);
+
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 4.9 52/72] mnt: In propgate_umount handle visiting mounts in any order

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit 99b19d16471e9c3faa85cad38abc9cbbe04c6d55 upstream.

While investigating some poor umount performance I realized that in
the case of overlapping mount trees where some of the mounts are locked
the code has been failing to unmount all of the mounts it should
have been unmounting.

This failure to unmount all of the necessary
mounts can be reproduced with:

$ cat locked_mounts_test.sh

mount -t tmpfs test-base /mnt
mount --make-shared /mnt
mkdir -p /mnt/b

mount -t tmpfs test1 /mnt/b
mount --make-shared /mnt/b
mkdir -p /mnt/b/10

mount -t tmpfs test2 /mnt/b/10
mount --make-shared /mnt/b/10
mkdir -p /mnt/b/10/20

mount --rbind /mnt/b /mnt/b/10/20

unshare -Urm --propagation unchaged /bin/sh -c 'sleep 5; if [ $(grep test /proc/self/mountinfo | wc -l) -eq 1 ] ; then echo SUCCESS ; else echo FAILURE ; fi'
sleep 1
umount -l /mnt/b
wait %%

$ unshare -Urm ./locked_mounts_test.sh

This failure is corrected by removing the prepass that marks mounts
that may be umounted.

A first pass is added that umounts mounts if possible and if not sets
mount mark if they could be unmounted if they weren't locked and adds
them to a list to umount possibilities.  This first pass reconsiders
the mounts parent if it is on the list of umount possibilities, ensuring
that information of umoutability will pass from child to mount parent.

A second pass then walks through all mounts that are umounted and processes
their children unmounting them or marking them for reparenting.

A last pass cleans up the state on the mounts that could not be umounted
and if applicable reparents them to their first parent that remained
mounted.

While a bit longer than the old code this code is much more robust
as it allows information to flow up from the leaves and down
from the trunk making the order in which mounts are encountered
in the umount propgation tree irrelevant.

Fixes: 0c56fe31420c ("mnt: Don't propagate unmounts to locked mounts")
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/mount.h     |    2 
 fs/namespace.c |    2 
 fs/pnode.c     |  150 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/mount.h
+++ b/fs/mount.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct mount {
 	struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;	/* containing namespace */
 	struct mountpoint *mnt_mp;	/* where is it mounted */
 	struct hlist_node mnt_mp_list;	/* list mounts with the same mountpoint */
-	struct list_head mnt_reparent;	/* reparent list entry */
+	struct list_head mnt_umounting; /* list entry for umount propagation */
 #ifdef CONFIG_FSNOTIFY
 	struct hlist_head mnt_fsnotify_marks;
 	__u32 mnt_fsnotify_mask;
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static struct mount *alloc_vfsmnt(const
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_slave_list);
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_slave);
 		INIT_HLIST_NODE(&mnt->mnt_mp_list);
-		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_reparent);
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_umounting);
 #ifdef CONFIG_FSNOTIFY
 		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_fsnotify_marks);
 #endif
--- a/fs/pnode.c
+++ b/fs/pnode.c
@@ -415,86 +415,95 @@ void propagate_mount_unlock(struct mount
 	}
 }
 
-/*
- * Mark all mounts that the MNT_LOCKED logic will allow to be unmounted.
- */
-static void mark_umount_candidates(struct mount *mnt)
+static void umount_one(struct mount *mnt, struct list_head *to_umount)
 {
-	struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
-	struct mount *m;
-
-	BUG_ON(parent == mnt);
-
-	for (m = propagation_next(parent, parent); m;
-			m = propagation_next(m, parent)) {
-		struct mount *child = __lookup_mnt(&m->mnt,
-						mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
-		if (!child || (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT))
-			continue;
-		if (!IS_MNT_LOCKED(child) || IS_MNT_MARKED(m)) {
-			SET_MNT_MARK(child);
-		}
-	}
+	CLEAR_MNT_MARK(mnt);
+	mnt->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
+	list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_child);
+	list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_umounting);
+	list_move_tail(&mnt->mnt_list, to_umount);
 }
 
 /*
  * NOTE: unmounting 'mnt' naturally propagates to all other mounts its
  * parent propagates to.
  */
-static void __propagate_umount(struct mount *mnt, struct list_head *to_reparent)
+static bool __propagate_umount(struct mount *mnt,
+			       struct list_head *to_umount,
+			       struct list_head *to_restore)
 {
-	struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
-	struct mount *m;
+	bool progress = false;
+	struct mount *child;
 
-	BUG_ON(parent == mnt);
-
-	for (m = propagation_next(parent, parent); m;
-			m = propagation_next(m, parent)) {
-		struct mount *topper;
-		struct mount *child = __lookup_mnt(&m->mnt,
-						mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
-		/*
-		 * umount the child only if the child has no children
-		 * and the child is marked safe to unmount.
-		 */
-		if (!child || !IS_MNT_MARKED(child))
+	/*
+	 * The state of the parent won't change if this mount is
+	 * already unmounted or marked as without children.
+	 */
+	if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & (MNT_UMOUNT | MNT_MARKED))
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Verify topper is the only grandchild that has not been
+	 * speculatively unmounted.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+		if (child->mnt_mountpoint == mnt->mnt.mnt_root)
+			continue;
+		if (!list_empty(&child->mnt_umounting) && IS_MNT_MARKED(child))
 			continue;
-		CLEAR_MNT_MARK(child);
+		/* Found a mounted child */
+		goto children;
+	}
 
-		/* If there is exactly one mount covering all of child
-		 * replace child with that mount.
-		 */
-		topper = find_topper(child);
-		if (topper)
-			list_add_tail(&topper->mnt_reparent, to_reparent);
-
-		if (topper || list_empty(&child->mnt_mounts)) {
-			list_del_init(&child->mnt_child);
-			list_del_init(&child->mnt_reparent);
-			child->mnt.mnt_flags |= MNT_UMOUNT;
-			list_move_tail(&child->mnt_list, &mnt->mnt_list);
+	/* Mark mounts that can be unmounted if not locked */
+	SET_MNT_MARK(mnt);
+	progress = true;
+
+	/* If a mount is without children and not locked umount it. */
+	if (!IS_MNT_LOCKED(mnt)) {
+		umount_one(mnt, to_umount);
+	} else {
+children:
+		list_move_tail(&mnt->mnt_umounting, to_restore);
+	}
+out:
+	return progress;
+}
+
+static void umount_list(struct list_head *to_umount,
+			struct list_head *to_restore)
+{
+	struct mount *mnt, *child, *tmp;
+	list_for_each_entry(mnt, to_umount, mnt_list) {
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
+			/* topper? */
+			if (child->mnt_mountpoint == mnt->mnt.mnt_root)
+				list_move_tail(&child->mnt_umounting, to_restore);
+			else
+				umount_one(child, to_umount);
 		}
 	}
 }
 
-static void reparent_mounts(struct list_head *to_reparent)
+static void restore_mounts(struct list_head *to_restore)
 {
-	while (!list_empty(to_reparent)) {
+	/* Restore mounts to a clean working state */
+	while (!list_empty(to_restore)) {
 		struct mount *mnt, *parent;
 		struct mountpoint *mp;
 
-		mnt = list_first_entry(to_reparent, struct mount, mnt_reparent);
-		list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_reparent);
+		mnt = list_first_entry(to_restore, struct mount, mnt_umounting);
+		CLEAR_MNT_MARK(mnt);
+		list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_umounting);
 
-		/* Where should this mount be reparented to? */
+		/* Should this mount be reparented? */
 		mp = mnt->mnt_mp;
 		parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
 		while (parent->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT) {
 			mp = parent->mnt_mp;
 			parent = parent->mnt_parent;
 		}
-
-		mnt_change_mountpoint(parent, mp, mnt);
+		if (parent != mnt->mnt_parent)
+			mnt_change_mountpoint(parent, mp, mnt);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -508,15 +517,34 @@ static void reparent_mounts(struct list_
 int propagate_umount(struct list_head *list)
 {
 	struct mount *mnt;
-	LIST_HEAD(to_reparent);
-
-	list_for_each_entry_reverse(mnt, list, mnt_list)
-		mark_umount_candidates(mnt);
+	LIST_HEAD(to_restore);
+	LIST_HEAD(to_umount);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(mnt, list, mnt_list)
-		__propagate_umount(mnt, &to_reparent);
+	list_for_each_entry(mnt, list, mnt_list) {
+		struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
+		struct mount *m;
+
+		for (m = propagation_next(parent, parent); m;
+		     m = propagation_next(m, parent)) {
+			struct mount *child = __lookup_mnt(&m->mnt,
+							   mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
+			if (!child)
+				continue;
+
+			/* Check the child and parents while progress is made */
+			while (__propagate_umount(child,
+						  &to_umount, &to_restore)) {
+				/* Is the parent a umount candidate? */
+				child = child->mnt_parent;
+				if (list_empty(&child->mnt_umounting))
+					break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
-	reparent_mounts(&to_reparent);
+	umount_list(&to_umount, &to_restore);
+	restore_mounts(&to_restore);
+	list_splice_tail(&to_umount, list);
 
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 4.9 53/72] mnt: Make propagate_umount less slow for overlapping mount propagation trees

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>

commit 296990deb389c7da21c78030376ba244dc1badf5 upstream.

Andrei Vagin pointed out that time to executue propagate_umount can go
non-linear (and take a ludicrious amount of time) when the mount
propogation trees of the mounts to be unmunted by a lazy unmount
overlap.

Make the walk of the mount propagation trees nearly linear by
remembering which mounts have already been visited, allowing
subsequent walks to detect when walking a mount propgation tree or a
subtree of a mount propgation tree would be duplicate work and to skip
them entirely.

Walk the list of mounts whose propgatation trees need to be traversed
from the mount highest in the mount tree to mounts lower in the mount
tree so that odds are higher that the code will walk the largest trees
first, allowing later tree walks to be skipped entirely.

Add cleanup_umount_visitation to remover the code's memory of which
mounts have been visited.

Add the functions last_slave and skip_propagation_subtree to allow
skipping appropriate parts of the mount propagation tree without
needing to change the logic of the rest of the code.

A script to generate overlapping mount propagation trees:

$ cat runs.h
set -e
mount -t tmpfs zdtm /mnt
mkdir -p /mnt/1 /mnt/2
mount -t tmpfs zdtm /mnt/1
mount --make-shared /mnt/1
mkdir /mnt/1/1

iteration=10
if [ -n "$1" ] ; then
	iteration=$1
fi

for i in $(seq $iteration); do
	mount --bind /mnt/1/1 /mnt/1/1
done

mount --rbind /mnt/1 /mnt/2

TIMEFORMAT='%Rs'
nr=$(( ( 2 ** ( $iteration + 1 ) ) + 1 ))
echo -n "umount -l /mnt/1 -> $nr        "
time umount -l /mnt/1

nr=$(cat /proc/self/mountinfo | grep zdtm | wc -l )
time umount -l /mnt/2

$ for i in $(seq 9 19); do echo $i; unshare -Urm bash ./run.sh $i; done

Here are the performance numbers with and without the patch:

     mhash |  8192   |  8192  | 1048576 | 1048576
    mounts | before  | after  |  before | after
    ------------------------------------------------
      1025 |  0.040s | 0.016s |  0.038s | 0.019s
      2049 |  0.094s | 0.017s |  0.080s | 0.018s
      4097 |  0.243s | 0.019s |  0.206s | 0.023s
      8193 |  1.202s | 0.028s |  1.562s | 0.032s
     16385 |  9.635s | 0.036s |  9.952s | 0.041s
     32769 | 60.928s | 0.063s | 44.321s | 0.064s
     65537 |         | 0.097s |         | 0.097s
    131073 |         | 0.233s |         | 0.176s
    262145 |         | 0.653s |         | 0.344s
    524289 |         | 2.305s |         | 0.735s
   1048577 |         | 7.107s |         | 2.603s

Andrei Vagin reports fixing the performance problem is part of the
work to fix CVE-2016-6213.

Fixes: a05964f3917c ("[PATCH] shared mounts handling: umount")
Reported-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrei Vagin <avagin@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 fs/pnode.c |   63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/pnode.c
+++ b/fs/pnode.c
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ static inline struct mount *first_slave(
 	return list_entry(p->mnt_slave_list.next, struct mount, mnt_slave);
 }
 
+static inline struct mount *last_slave(struct mount *p)
+{
+	return list_entry(p->mnt_slave_list.prev, struct mount, mnt_slave);
+}
+
 static inline struct mount *next_slave(struct mount *p)
 {
 	return list_entry(p->mnt_slave.next, struct mount, mnt_slave);
@@ -164,6 +169,19 @@ static struct mount *propagation_next(st
 	}
 }
 
+static struct mount *skip_propagation_subtree(struct mount *m,
+						struct mount *origin)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Advance m such that propagation_next will not return
+	 * the slaves of m.
+	 */
+	if (!IS_MNT_NEW(m) && !list_empty(&m->mnt_slave_list))
+		m = last_slave(m);
+
+	return m;
+}
+
 static struct mount *next_group(struct mount *m, struct mount *origin)
 {
 	while (1) {
@@ -507,6 +525,15 @@ static void restore_mounts(struct list_h
 	}
 }
 
+static void cleanup_umount_visitations(struct list_head *visited)
+{
+	while (!list_empty(visited)) {
+		struct mount *mnt =
+			list_first_entry(visited, struct mount, mnt_umounting);
+		list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_umounting);
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * collect all mounts that receive propagation from the mount in @list,
  * and return these additional mounts in the same list.
@@ -519,11 +546,23 @@ int propagate_umount(struct list_head *l
 	struct mount *mnt;
 	LIST_HEAD(to_restore);
 	LIST_HEAD(to_umount);
+	LIST_HEAD(visited);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(mnt, list, mnt_list) {
+	/* Find candidates for unmounting */
+	list_for_each_entry_reverse(mnt, list, mnt_list) {
 		struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
 		struct mount *m;
 
+		/*
+		 * If this mount has already been visited it is known that it's
+		 * entire peer group and all of their slaves in the propagation
+		 * tree for the mountpoint has already been visited and there is
+		 * no need to visit them again.
+		 */
+		if (!list_empty(&mnt->mnt_umounting))
+			continue;
+
+		list_add_tail(&mnt->mnt_umounting, &visited);
 		for (m = propagation_next(parent, parent); m;
 		     m = propagation_next(m, parent)) {
 			struct mount *child = __lookup_mnt(&m->mnt,
@@ -531,6 +570,27 @@ int propagate_umount(struct list_head *l
 			if (!child)
 				continue;
 
+			if (!list_empty(&child->mnt_umounting)) {
+				/*
+				 * If the child has already been visited it is
+				 * know that it's entire peer group and all of
+				 * their slaves in the propgation tree for the
+				 * mountpoint has already been visited and there
+				 * is no need to visit this subtree again.
+				 */
+				m = skip_propagation_subtree(m, parent);
+				continue;
+			} else if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT) {
+				/*
+				 * We have come accross an partially unmounted
+				 * mount in list that has not been visited yet.
+				 * Remember it has been visited and continue
+				 * about our merry way.
+				 */
+				list_add_tail(&child->mnt_umounting, &visited);
+				continue;
+			}
+
 			/* Check the child and parents while progress is made */
 			while (__propagate_umount(child,
 						  &to_umount, &to_restore)) {
@@ -544,6 +604,7 @@ int propagate_umount(struct list_head *l
 
 	umount_list(&to_umount, &to_restore);
 	restore_mounts(&to_restore);
+	cleanup_umount_visitations(&visited);
 	list_splice_tail(&to_umount, list);
 
 	return 0;

[PATCH 4.9 54/72] selftests/capabilities: Fix the test_execve test

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

commit 796a3bae2fba6810427efdb314a1c126c9490fb3 upstream.

test_execve does rather odd mount manipulations to safely create
temporary setuid and setgid executables that aren't visible to the
rest of the system.  Those executables end up in the test's cwd, but
that cwd is MNT_DETACHed.

The core namespace code considers MNT_DETACHed trees to belong to no
mount namespace at all and, in general, MNT_DETACHed trees are only
barely function.  This interacted with commit 380cf5ba6b0a ("fs:
Treat foreign mounts as nosuid") to cause all MNT_DETACHed trees to
act as though they're nosuid, breaking the test.

Fix it by just not detaching the tree.  It's still in a private
mount namespace and is therefore still invisible to the rest of the
system (except via /proc, and the same nosuid logic will protect all
other programs on the system from believing in test_execve's setuid
bits).

While we're at it, fix some blatant whitespace problems.

Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org>
Fixes: 380cf5ba6b0a ("fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid")
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/test_execve.c |    7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/test_execve.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/capabilities/test_execve.c
@@ -138,9 +138,6 @@ static void chdir_to_tmpfs(void)
 
 	if (chdir(cwd) != 0)
 		err(1, "chdir to private tmpfs");
-
-	if (umount2(".", MNT_DETACH) != 0)
-		err(1, "detach private tmpfs");
 }
 
 static void copy_fromat_to(int fromfd, const char *fromname, const char *toname)
@@ -248,7 +245,7 @@ static int do_tests(int uid, const char
 			err(1, "chown");
 		if (chmod("validate_cap_sgidnonroot", S_ISGID | 0710) != 0)
 			err(1, "chmod");
-}
+	}
 
 	capng_get_caps_process();
 
@@ -384,7 +381,7 @@ static int do_tests(int uid, const char
 	} else {
 		printf("[RUN]\tNon-root +ia, sgidnonroot => i\n");
 		exec_other_validate_cap("./validate_cap_sgidnonroot",
-						false, false, true, false);
+					false, false, true, false);
 
 		if (fork_wait()) {
 			printf("[RUN]\tNon-root +ia, sgidroot => i\n");

[PATCH 4.9 57/72] crypto: atmel - only treat EBUSY as transient if backlog

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>

commit 1606043f214f912a52195293614935811a6e3e53 upstream.

The Atmel SHA driver was treating -EBUSY as indication of queueing
to backlog without checking that backlog is enabled for the request.

Fix it by checking request flags.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/atmel-sha.c
@@ -1000,7 +1000,9 @@ static int atmel_sha_finup(struct ahash_
 	ctx->flags |= SHA_FLAGS_FINUP;
 
 	err1 = atmel_sha_update(req);
-	if (err1 == -EINPROGRESS || err1 == -EBUSY)
+	if (err1 == -EINPROGRESS ||
+	    (err1 == -EBUSY && (ahash_request_flags(req) &
+				CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG)))
 		return err1;
 
 	/*

[PATCH 4.9 58/72] crypto: sha1-ssse3 - Disable avx2

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit b82ce24426a4071da9529d726057e4e642948667 upstream.

It has been reported that sha1-avx2 can cause page faults by reading
beyond the end of the input.  This patch disables it until it can be
fixed.

Fixes: 7c1da8d0d046 ("crypto: sha - SHA1 transform x86_64 AVX2")
Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/sha1_ssse3_glue.c
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ asmlinkage void sha1_transform_avx2(u32
 
 static bool avx2_usable(void)
 {
-	if (avx_usable() && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2)
+	if (false && avx_usable() && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2)
 		&& boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMI1)
 		&& boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BMI2))
 		return true;

[PATCH 4.9 61/72] Revert "sched/core: Optimize SCHED_SMT"

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

This reverts commit 1b568f0aabf280555125bc7cefc08321ff0ebaba.

For the 4.9 kernel tree, this patch causes scheduler regressions.  It is
fixed in newer kernels with a large number of individual patches, the
sum of which is too big for the stable kernel tree.

Ingo recommended just reverting the single patch for this tree, as it's
much simpler.

Reported-by: Ben Guthro <ben@guthro.net>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/sched/core.c  |   19 -------------------
 kernel/sched/fair.c  |    8 +-------
 kernel/sched/sched.h |   23 ++++++-----------------
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -7422,22 +7422,6 @@ int sched_cpu_dying(unsigned int cpu)
 }
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sched_smt_present);
-
-static void sched_init_smt(void)
-{
-	/*
-	 * We've enumerated all CPUs and will assume that if any CPU
-	 * has SMT siblings, CPU0 will too.
-	 */
-	if (cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(0)) > 1)
-		static_branch_enable(&sched_smt_present);
-}
-#else
-static inline void sched_init_smt(void) { }
-#endif
-
 void __init sched_init_smp(void)
 {
 	cpumask_var_t non_isolated_cpus;
@@ -7467,9 +7451,6 @@ void __init sched_init_smp(void)
 
 	init_sched_rt_class();
 	init_sched_dl_class();
-
-	sched_init_smt();
-
 	sched_smp_initialized = true;
 }
 
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -5376,7 +5376,7 @@ static inline bool test_idle_cores(int c
  * Since SMT siblings share all cache levels, inspecting this limited remote
  * state should be fairly cheap.
  */
-void __update_idle_core(struct rq *rq)
+void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq)
 {
 	int core = cpu_of(rq);
 	int cpu;
@@ -5408,9 +5408,6 @@ static int select_idle_core(struct task_
 	struct cpumask *cpus = this_cpu_cpumask_var_ptr(select_idle_mask);
 	int core, cpu, wrap;
 
-	if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_smt_present))
-		return -1;
-
 	if (!test_idle_cores(target, false))
 		return -1;
 
@@ -5444,9 +5441,6 @@ static int select_idle_smt(struct task_s
 {
 	int cpu;
 
-	if (!static_branch_likely(&sched_smt_present))
-		return -1;
-
 	for_each_cpu(cpu, cpu_smt_mask(target)) {
 		if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(p)))
 			continue;
--- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
@@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ extern void cpu_load_update_active(struc
 static inline void cpu_load_update_active(struct rq *this_rq) { }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
+extern void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq);
+#else
+static inline void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq) { }
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Helpers for converting nanosecond timing to jiffy resolution
  */
@@ -731,23 +737,6 @@ static inline int cpu_of(struct rq *rq)
 #endif
 }
 
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
-
-extern struct static_key_false sched_smt_present;
-
-extern void __update_idle_core(struct rq *rq);
-
-static inline void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq)
-{
-	if (static_branch_unlikely(&sched_smt_present))
-		__update_idle_core(rq);
-}
-
-#else
-static inline void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq) { }
-#endif
-
 DECLARE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct rq, runqueues);
 
 #define cpu_rq(cpu)		(&per_cpu(runqueues, (cpu)))

[PATCH 4.9 62/72] sched/fair, cpumask: Export for_each_cpu_wrap()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit c6508a39640b9a27fc2bc10cb708152672c82045 upstream.

commit c743f0a5c50f2fcbc628526279cfa24f3dabe182 upstream.

More users for for_each_cpu_wrap() have appeared. Promote the construct
to generic cpumask interface.

The implementation is slightly modified to reduce arguments.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: lwang@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170414122005.o35me2h5nowqkxbv@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 include/linux/cpumask.h |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 kernel/sched/fair.c     |   45 ++++-----------------------------------------
 lib/cpumask.c           |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/cpumask.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpumask.h
@@ -236,6 +236,23 @@ unsigned int cpumask_local_spread(unsign
 		(cpu) = cpumask_next_zero((cpu), (mask)),	\
 		(cpu) < nr_cpu_ids;)
 
+extern int cpumask_next_wrap(int n, const struct cpumask *mask, int start, bool wrap);
+
+/**
+ * for_each_cpu_wrap - iterate over every cpu in a mask, starting at a specified location
+ * @cpu: the (optionally unsigned) integer iterator
+ * @mask: the cpumask poiter
+ * @start: the start location
+ *
+ * The implementation does not assume any bit in @mask is set (including @start).
+ *
+ * After the loop, cpu is >= nr_cpu_ids.
+ */
+#define for_each_cpu_wrap(cpu, mask, start)					\
+	for ((cpu) = cpumask_next_wrap((start)-1, (mask), (start), false);	\
+	     (cpu) < nr_cpumask_bits;						\
+	     (cpu) = cpumask_next_wrap((cpu), (mask), (start), true))
+
 /**
  * for_each_cpu_and - iterate over every cpu in both masks
  * @cpu: the (optionally unsigned) integer iterator
--- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
@@ -5310,43 +5310,6 @@ find_idlest_cpu(struct sched_group *grou
 	return shallowest_idle_cpu != -1 ? shallowest_idle_cpu : least_loaded_cpu;
 }
 
-/*
- * Implement a for_each_cpu() variant that starts the scan at a given cpu
- * (@start), and wraps around.
- *
- * This is used to scan for idle CPUs; such that not all CPUs looking for an
- * idle CPU find the same CPU. The down-side is that tasks tend to cycle
- * through the LLC domain.
- *
- * Especially tbench is found sensitive to this.
- */
-
-static int cpumask_next_wrap(int n, const struct cpumask *mask, int start, int *wrapped)
-{
-	int next;
-
-again:
-	next = find_next_bit(cpumask_bits(mask), nr_cpumask_bits, n+1);
-
-	if (*wrapped) {
-		if (next >= start)
-			return nr_cpumask_bits;
-	} else {
-		if (next >= nr_cpumask_bits) {
-			*wrapped = 1;
-			n = -1;
-			goto again;
-		}
-	}
-
-	return next;
-}
-
-#define for_each_cpu_wrap(cpu, mask, start, wrap)				\
-	for ((wrap) = 0, (cpu) = (start)-1;					\
-		(cpu) = cpumask_next_wrap((cpu), (mask), (start), &(wrap)),	\
-		(cpu) < nr_cpumask_bits; )
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
 
 static inline void set_idle_cores(int cpu, int val)
@@ -5406,14 +5369,14 @@ unlock:
 static int select_idle_core(struct task_struct *p, struct sched_domain *sd, int target)
 {
 	struct cpumask *cpus = this_cpu_cpumask_var_ptr(select_idle_mask);
-	int core, cpu, wrap;
+	int core, cpu;
 
 	if (!test_idle_cores(target, false))
 		return -1;
 
 	cpumask_and(cpus, sched_domain_span(sd), tsk_cpus_allowed(p));
 
-	for_each_cpu_wrap(core, cpus, target, wrap) {
+	for_each_cpu_wrap(core, cpus, target) {
 		bool idle = true;
 
 		for_each_cpu(cpu, cpu_smt_mask(core)) {
@@ -5476,7 +5439,7 @@ static int select_idle_cpu(struct task_s
 	u64 avg_cost, avg_idle = this_rq()->avg_idle;
 	u64 time, cost;
 	s64 delta;
-	int cpu, wrap;
+	int cpu;
 
 	this_sd = rcu_dereference(*this_cpu_ptr(&sd_llc));
 	if (!this_sd)
@@ -5493,7 +5456,7 @@ static int select_idle_cpu(struct task_s
 
 	time = local_clock();
 
-	for_each_cpu_wrap(cpu, sched_domain_span(sd), target, wrap) {
+	for_each_cpu_wrap(cpu, sched_domain_span(sd), target) {
 		if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, tsk_cpus_allowed(p)))
 			continue;
 		if (idle_cpu(cpu))
--- a/lib/cpumask.c
+++ b/lib/cpumask.c
@@ -43,6 +43,38 @@ int cpumask_any_but(const struct cpumask
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpumask_any_but);
 
+/**
+ * cpumask_next_wrap - helper to implement for_each_cpu_wrap
+ * @n: the cpu prior to the place to search
+ * @mask: the cpumask pointer
+ * @start: the start point of the iteration
+ * @wrap: assume @n crossing @start terminates the iteration
+ *
+ * Returns >= nr_cpu_ids on completion
+ *
+ * Note: the @wrap argument is required for the start condition when
+ * we cannot assume @start is set in @mask.
+ */
+int cpumask_next_wrap(int n, const struct cpumask *mask, int start, bool wrap)
+{
+	int next;
+
+again:
+	next = cpumask_next(n, mask);
+
+	if (wrap && n < start && next >= start) {
+		return nr_cpumask_bits;
+
+	} else if (next >= nr_cpumask_bits) {
+		wrap = true;
+		n = -1;
+		goto again;
+	}
+
+	return next;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpumask_next_wrap);
+
 /* These are not inline because of header tangles. */
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
 /**

[PATCH 4.9 63/72] sched/topology: Fix building of overlapping sched-groups

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 0372dd2736e02672ac6e189c31f7d8c02ad543cd upstream.

When building the overlapping groups, we very obviously should start
with the previous domain of _this_ @cpu, not CPU-0.

This can be readily demonstrated with a topology like:

  node   0   1   2   3
    0:  10  20  30  20
    1:  20  10  20  30
    2:  30  20  10  20
    3:  20  30  20  10

Where (for example) CPU1 ends up generating the following nonsensical groups:

  [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
  []  domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
  []   groups: 1 2 0
  []   domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
  []    groups: 1-3 (cpu_capacity = 3072) 0-1,3 (cpu_capacity = 3072)

Where the fact that domain 1 doesn't include a group with span 0-2 is
the obvious fail.

With patch this looks like:

  [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
  []  domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
  []   groups: 1 0 2
  []   domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
  []    groups: 0-2 (cpu_capacity = 3072) 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity = 3072)

Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e3589f6c81e4 ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/sched/core.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -6148,7 +6148,7 @@ build_overlap_sched_groups(struct sched_
 
 	cpumask_clear(covered);
 
-	for_each_cpu(i, span) {
+	for_each_cpu_wrap(i, span, cpu) {
 		struct cpumask *sg_span;
 
 		if (cpumask_test_cpu(i, covered))

[PATCH 4.9 64/72] sched/topology: Optimize build_group_mask()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>

commit f32d782e31bf079f600dcec126ed117b0577e85c upstream.

The group mask is always used in intersection with the group CPUs. So,
when building the group mask, we don't have to care about CPUs that are
not part of the group.

Signed-off-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: lwang@redhat.com
Cc: riel@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1492717903-5195-2-git-send-email-lvenanci@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/sched/core.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -6113,12 +6113,12 @@ enum s_alloc {
  */
 static void build_group_mask(struct sched_domain *sd, struct sched_group *sg)
 {
-	const struct cpumask *span = sched_domain_span(sd);
+	const struct cpumask *sg_span = sched_group_cpus(sg);
 	struct sd_data *sdd = sd->private;
 	struct sched_domain *sibling;
 	int i;
 
-	for_each_cpu(i, span) {
+	for_each_cpu(i, sg_span) {
 		sibling = *per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sd, i);
 		if (!cpumask_test_cpu(i, sched_domain_span(sibling)))
 			continue;

[PATCH 4.9 65/72] sched/topology: Fix overlapping sched_group_mask

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 73bb059f9b8a00c5e1bf2f7ca83138c05d05e600 upstream.

The point of sched_group_mask is to select those CPUs from
sched_group_cpus that can actually arrive at this balance domain.

The current code gets it wrong, as can be readily demonstrated with a
topology like:

  node   0   1   2   3
    0:  10  20  30  20
    1:  20  10  20  30
    2:  30  20  10  20
    3:  20  30  20  10

Where (for example) domain 1 on CPU1 ends up with a mask that includes
CPU0:

  [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
  []  domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
  []   groups: 1 (mask: 1), 2, 0
  []   domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
  []    groups: 0-2 (mask: 0-2) (cpu_capacity: 3072), 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity: 3072)

This causes sched_balance_cpu() to compute the wrong CPU and
consequently should_we_balance() will terminate early resulting in
missed load-balance opportunities.

The fixed topology looks like:

  [] CPU1 attaching sched-domain:
  []  domain 0: span 0-2 level NUMA
  []   groups: 1 (mask: 1), 2, 0
  []   domain 1: span 0-3 level NUMA
  []    groups: 0-2 (mask: 1) (cpu_capacity: 3072), 0,2-3 (cpu_capacity: 3072)

(note: this relies on OVERLAP domains to always have children, this is
 true because the regular topology domains are still here -- this is
 before degenerate trimming)

Debugged-by: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lvenanci@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e3589f6c81e4 ("sched: Allow for overlapping sched_domain spans")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/sched/core.c |   18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -6102,6 +6102,9 @@ enum s_alloc {
  * Build an iteration mask that can exclude certain CPUs from the upwards
  * domain traversal.
  *
+ * Only CPUs that can arrive at this group should be considered to continue
+ * balancing.
+ *
  * Asymmetric node setups can result in situations where the domain tree is of
  * unequal depth, make sure to skip domains that already cover the entire
  * range.
@@ -6120,11 +6123,24 @@ static void build_group_mask(struct sche
 
 	for_each_cpu(i, sg_span) {
 		sibling = *per_cpu_ptr(sdd->sd, i);
-		if (!cpumask_test_cpu(i, sched_domain_span(sibling)))
+
+		/*
+		 * Can happen in the asymmetric case, where these siblings are
+		 * unused. The mask will not be empty because those CPUs that
+		 * do have the top domain _should_ span the domain.
+		 */
+		if (!sibling->child)
+			continue;
+
+		/* If we would not end up here, we can't continue from here */
+		if (!cpumask_equal(sg_span, sched_domain_span(sibling->child)))
 			continue;
 
 		cpumask_set_cpu(i, sched_group_mask(sg));
 	}
+
+	/* We must not have empty masks here */
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(cpumask_empty(sched_group_mask(sg)));
 }
 
 /*

[PATCH 4.9 66/72] PM / wakeirq: Convert to SRCU

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit ea0212f40c6bc0594c8eff79266759e3ecd4bacc upstream.

The wakeirq infrastructure uses RCU to protect the list of wakeirqs. That
breaks the irq bus locking infrastructure, which is allows sleeping
functions to be called so interrupt controllers behind slow busses,
e.g. i2c, can be handled.

The wakeirq functions hold rcu_read_lock and call into irq functions, which
in case of interrupts using the irq bus locking will trigger a
might_sleep() splat.

Convert the wakeirq infrastructure to Sleepable RCU and unbreak it.

Fixes: 4990d4fe327b (PM / Wakeirq: Add automated device wake IRQ handling)
Reported-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Suggested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Tested-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/base/power/wakeup.c |   32 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/base/power/wakeup.c
+++ b/drivers/base/power/wakeup.c
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ static LIST_HEAD(wakeup_sources);
 
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(wakeup_count_wait_queue);
 
+DEFINE_STATIC_SRCU(wakeup_srcu);
+
 static struct wakeup_source deleted_ws = {
 	.name = "deleted",
 	.lock =  __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(deleted_ws.lock),
@@ -198,7 +200,7 @@ void wakeup_source_remove(struct wakeup_
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&events_lock, flags);
 	list_del_rcu(&ws->entry);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&events_lock, flags);
-	synchronize_rcu();
+	synchronize_srcu(&wakeup_srcu);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wakeup_source_remove);
 
@@ -332,12 +334,12 @@ void device_wakeup_detach_irq(struct dev
 void device_wakeup_arm_wake_irqs(void)
 {
 	struct wakeup_source *ws;
+	int srcuidx;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
+	srcuidx = srcu_read_lock(&wakeup_srcu);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ws, &wakeup_sources, entry)
 		dev_pm_arm_wake_irq(ws->wakeirq);
-
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	srcu_read_unlock(&wakeup_srcu, srcuidx);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -348,12 +350,12 @@ void device_wakeup_arm_wake_irqs(void)
 void device_wakeup_disarm_wake_irqs(void)
 {
 	struct wakeup_source *ws;
+	int srcuidx;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
+	srcuidx = srcu_read_lock(&wakeup_srcu);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ws, &wakeup_sources, entry)
 		dev_pm_disarm_wake_irq(ws->wakeirq);
-
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	srcu_read_unlock(&wakeup_srcu, srcuidx);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -805,10 +807,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pm_wakeup_event);
 void pm_print_active_wakeup_sources(void)
 {
 	struct wakeup_source *ws;
-	int active = 0;
+	int srcuidx, active = 0;
 	struct wakeup_source *last_activity_ws = NULL;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
+	srcuidx = srcu_read_lock(&wakeup_srcu);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ws, &wakeup_sources, entry) {
 		if (ws->active) {
 			pr_info("active wakeup source: %s\n", ws->name);
@@ -824,7 +826,7 @@ void pm_print_active_wakeup_sources(void
 	if (!active && last_activity_ws)
 		pr_info("last active wakeup source: %s\n",
 			last_activity_ws->name);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	srcu_read_unlock(&wakeup_srcu, srcuidx);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pm_print_active_wakeup_sources);
 
@@ -951,8 +953,9 @@ void pm_wakep_autosleep_enabled(bool set
 {
 	struct wakeup_source *ws;
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get();
+	int srcuidx;
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
+	srcuidx = srcu_read_lock(&wakeup_srcu);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ws, &wakeup_sources, entry) {
 		spin_lock_irq(&ws->lock);
 		if (ws->autosleep_enabled != set) {
@@ -966,7 +969,7 @@ void pm_wakep_autosleep_enabled(bool set
 		}
 		spin_unlock_irq(&ws->lock);
 	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	srcu_read_unlock(&wakeup_srcu, srcuidx);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP */
 
@@ -1027,15 +1030,16 @@ static int print_wakeup_source_stats(str
 static int wakeup_sources_stats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *unused)
 {
 	struct wakeup_source *ws;
+	int srcuidx;
 
 	seq_puts(m, "name\t\tactive_count\tevent_count\twakeup_count\t"
 		"expire_count\tactive_since\ttotal_time\tmax_time\t"
 		"last_change\tprevent_suspend_time\n");
 
-	rcu_read_lock();
+	srcuidx = srcu_read_lock(&wakeup_srcu);
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(ws, &wakeup_sources, entry)
 		print_wakeup_source_stats(m, ws);
-	rcu_read_unlock();
+	srcu_read_unlock(&wakeup_srcu, srcuidx);
 
 	print_wakeup_source_stats(m, &deleted_ws);
 

[PATCH 4.9 67/72] PM / QoS: return -EINVAL for bogus strings

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>

commit 2ca30331c156ca9e97643ad05dd8930b8fe78b01 upstream.

In the current code, if the user accidentally writes a bogus command to
this sysfs file, then we set the latency tolerance to an uninitialized
variable.

Fixes: 2d984ad132a8 (PM / QoS: Introcuce latency tolerance device PM QoS type)
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 drivers/base/power/sysfs.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/base/power/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/base/power/sysfs.c
@@ -268,6 +268,8 @@ static ssize_t pm_qos_latency_tolerance_
 			value = PM_QOS_LATENCY_TOLERANCE_NO_CONSTRAINT;
 		else if (!strcmp(buf, "any") || !strcmp(buf, "any\n"))
 			value = PM_QOS_LATENCY_ANY;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
 	}
 	ret = dev_pm_qos_update_user_latency_tolerance(dev, value);
 	return ret < 0 ? ret : n;

[PATCH 4.9 68/72] tracing: Use SOFTIRQ_OFFSET for softirq dectection for more accurate results

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org>

commit c59f29cb144a6a0dfac16ede9dc8eafc02dc56ca upstream.

The 's' flag is supposed to indicate that a softirq is running. This
can be detected by testing the preempt_count with SOFTIRQ_OFFSET.

The current code tests the preempt_count with SOFTIRQ_MASK, which
would be true even when softirqs are disabled but not serving a
softirq.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1481300417-3564-1-git-send-email-pkondeti@codeaurora.org

Signed-off-by: Pavankumar Kondeti <pkondeti@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Amit Pundir <amit.pundir@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/trace/trace.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ tracing_generic_entry_update(struct trac
 #endif
 		((pc & NMI_MASK    ) ? TRACE_FLAG_NMI     : 0) |
 		((pc & HARDIRQ_MASK) ? TRACE_FLAG_HARDIRQ : 0) |
-		((pc & SOFTIRQ_MASK) ? TRACE_FLAG_SOFTIRQ : 0) |
+		((pc & SOFTIRQ_OFFSET) ? TRACE_FLAG_SOFTIRQ : 0) |
 		(tif_need_resched() ? TRACE_FLAG_NEED_RESCHED : 0) |
 		(test_preempt_need_resched() ? TRACE_FLAG_PREEMPT_RESCHED : 0);
 }

[PATCH 4.9 72/72] kvm: vmx: allow host to access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com>

commit 691bd4340bef49cf7e5855d06cf24444b5bf2d85 upstream.

It's easier for host applications, such as QEMU, if they can always
access guest MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS in VMCS, even though MPX is disabled in
guest cpuid.

Signed-off-by: Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |    6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -2987,7 +2987,8 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
-		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() || !guest_cpuid_has_mpx(vcpu))
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has_mpx(vcpu)))
 			return 1;
 		msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
 		break;
@@ -3069,7 +3070,8 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *
 		vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
-		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() || !guest_cpuid_has_mpx(vcpu))
+		if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
+		    (!msr_info->host_initiated && !guest_cpuid_has_mpx(vcpu)))
 			return 1;
 		if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK) ||
 		    (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/72] 4.9.39-stable review

[Sumit Semwal]

Hi Greg,

On 19 July 2017 at 15:53, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.39 release.
> There are 72 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Fri Jul 21 10:23:57 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
For arm64, built and boot tested with defconfig on hikey, no regressions noted.

> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.39-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>

Best,
Sumit.

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/72] 4.9.39-stable review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 12:23:54PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.39 release.
> There are 72 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Fri Jul 21 10:23:57 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 145 pass: 145 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 122 pass: 122 fail: 0

Details are available at http://kerneltests.org/builders.

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/72] 4.9.39-stable review

[Shuah Khan]

On 07/19/2017 04:23 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.39 release.
> There are 72 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Fri Jul 21 10:23:57 UTC 2017.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.39-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>   git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/72] 4.9.39-stable review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 09:28:58PM +0530, Sumit Semwal wrote:
> Hi Greg,
> 
> On 19 July 2017 at 15:53, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.39 release.
> > There are 72 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> >
> > Responses should be made by Fri Jul 21 10:23:57 UTC 2017.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> >
> For arm64, built and boot tested with defconfig on hikey, no regressions noted.

Thanks for testing and letting me know.

greg k-h