* [RFC PATCH 1/4] libxl: introduce a new structure to represent static shared memory regions
2017-08-04 2:20 [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files Zhongze Liu
@ 2017-08-04 2:20 ` Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] libxl:xl: add parsing code to parse "libxl_static_sshm" from xl config files Zhongze Liu
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-04 2:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Ian Jackson, Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Zhongze Liu
Add a new structure to the IDL famliy to represent static shared memory regions,
as proposed in the proposal "Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs
from xl config file" (see [1]).
[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-07/msg03047.html
Signed-off-by: Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@gmail.com>
---
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
---
tools/libxl/libxl.h | 4 ++++
tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl.h b/tools/libxl/libxl.h
index 7cf0f31f68..7c29ebc9e0 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl.h
@@ -2228,6 +2228,10 @@ int libxl_fd_set_nonblock(libxl_ctx *ctx, int fd, int nonblock);
int libxl_qemu_monitor_command(libxl_ctx *ctx, uint32_t domid,
const char *command_line, char **output);
+/* Constants for libxl_static_shm */
+#define LIBXL_SSHM_RANGE_UNKNOWN UINT64_MAX
+#define LIBXL_SSHM_ID_MAXLEN 128
+
#include <libxl_event.h>
#endif /* LIBXL_H */
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
index 8a9849c643..1aa59a72a2 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl
@@ -779,6 +779,33 @@ libxl_device_channel = Struct("device_channel", [
])),
])
+libxl_sshm_cachepolicy = Enumeration("sshm_cachepolicy", [
+ (-1, "UNKNOWN"),
+ (0, "ARM_NORMAL"), # ARM policies should be between 0 ~ 16
+ (32, "X86_NORMAL"), # X86 policies should be >= 32
+ ], init_val = "LIBXL_SSHM_CHCHE_POLICY_UNKNOWN")
+
+libxl_sshm_prot = Enumeration("sshm_prot", [
+ (-1, "UNKNOWN"),
+ (3, "RW"),
+ ], init_val = "LIBXL_SSHM_PROT_UNKNOWN")
+
+libxl_sshm_role = Enumeration("sshm_role", [
+ (-1, "UNKNOWN"),
+ (0, "MASTER"),
+ (1, "SLAVE"),
+ ], init_val = "LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_UNKNOWN")
+
+libxl_static_shm = Struct("static_shm", [
+ ("id", string),
+ ("offset", uint64, {'init_val': 'LIBXL_SSHM_RANGE_UNKNOWN'}),
+ ("begin", uint64, {'init_val': 'LIBXL_SSHM_RANGE_UNKNOWN'}),
+ ("end", uint64, {'init_val': 'LIBXL_SSHM_RANGE_UNKNOWN'}),
+ ("prot", libxl_sshm_prot, {'init_val': 'LIBXL_SSHM_PROT_UNKNOWN'}),
+ ("cache_policy", libxl_sshm_cachepolicy, {'init_val': 'LIBXL_SSHM_CACHEPOLICY_UNKNOWN'}),
+ ("role", libxl_sshm_role, {'init_val': 'LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_UNKNOWN'}),
+])
+
libxl_domain_config = Struct("domain_config", [
("c_info", libxl_domain_create_info),
("b_info", libxl_domain_build_info),
@@ -797,6 +824,7 @@ libxl_domain_config = Struct("domain_config", [
("channels", Array(libxl_device_channel, "num_channels")),
("usbctrls", Array(libxl_device_usbctrl, "num_usbctrls")),
("usbdevs", Array(libxl_device_usbdev, "num_usbdevs")),
+ ("sshms", Array(libxl_static_shm, "num_sshms")),
("on_poweroff", libxl_action_on_shutdown),
("on_reboot", libxl_action_on_shutdown),
--
2.13.3
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [RFC PATCH 2/4] libxl:xl: add parsing code to parse "libxl_static_sshm" from xl config files
2017-08-04 2:20 [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] libxl: introduce a new structure to represent static shared memory regions Zhongze Liu
@ 2017-08-04 2:20 ` Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] x86/p2m : remove checks that forbid adding foreign pages between HVM guests Zhongze Liu
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-04 2:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Zhongze Liu, George Dunlap,
Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, Tim Deegan, Julien Grall,
Jan Beulich
Add the parsing utils for the newly introduced libxl_static_sshm struct
to the libxl/libxlu_* family. And add realated parsing code in xl to
parse the struct from xl config files. This is for the proposal "Allow
setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config file" (see [1]).
[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-07/msg03047.html
Signed-off-by: Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@gmail.com>
---
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
---
tools/libxl/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/libxl/libxlu_sshm.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/libxl/libxlutil.h | 6 ++
tools/xl/xl_parse.c | 24 ++++-
4 files changed, 258 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 tools/libxl/libxlu_sshm.c
diff --git a/tools/libxl/Makefile b/tools/libxl/Makefile
index 082af8f716..3b63fb2cad 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/Makefile
+++ b/tools/libxl/Makefile
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ AUTOINCS= libxlu_cfg_y.h libxlu_cfg_l.h _libxl_list.h _paths.h \
AUTOSRCS= libxlu_cfg_y.c libxlu_cfg_l.c
AUTOSRCS += _libxl_save_msgs_callout.c _libxl_save_msgs_helper.c
LIBXLU_OBJS = libxlu_cfg_y.o libxlu_cfg_l.o libxlu_cfg.o \
- libxlu_disk_l.o libxlu_disk.o libxlu_vif.o libxlu_pci.o
+ libxlu_disk_l.o libxlu_disk.o libxlu_vif.o libxlu_pci.o libxlu_sshm.o
$(LIBXLU_OBJS): CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxenctrl) # For xentoollog.h
$(TEST_PROG_OBJS) _libxl.api-for-check: CFLAGS += $(CFLAGS_libxentoollog)
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxlu_sshm.c b/tools/libxl/libxlu_sshm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f2e6f3866
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxlu_sshm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+#include "libxl_osdeps.h" /* must come before any other headers */
+#include "libxlu_internal.h"
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#define PARAM_RE(EXPR) "^\\s*" EXPR "\\s*(,|$)"
+#define WORD_RE "([_a-zA-Z0-9]+)"
+#define EQU_RE PARAM_RE(WORD_RE "\\s*=\\s*" WORD_RE)
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE_MASK ((uint64_t)0xfff)
+
+#define RET_INVAL(msg, curr_str) do { \
+ xlu__sshm_err(cfg, msg, curr_str); \
+ rc = EINVAL; \
+ goto out; \
+ } while(0)
+
+/* set a member in libxl_static_shm and report an error if it's respecified,
+ * @curr_str indicates the head of the remaining string. */
+#define SET_VAL(var, name, type, value, curr_str) do { \
+ if ((var) != LIBXL_SSHM_##type##_UNKNOWN && (var) != value) { \
+ RET_INVAL("\"" name "\" respecified", curr_str); \
+ } \
+ (var) = value; \
+ } while(0)
+
+
+static void xlu__sshm_err(XLU_Config *cfg, const char *msg,
+ const char *curr_str) {
+ fprintf(cfg->report,
+ "%s: config parsing error in shared_memory: %s at '%s'\n",
+ cfg->config_source, msg, curr_str);
+}
+
+static int parse_prot(XLU_Config *cfg, char *str, libxl_sshm_prot *prot)
+{
+ int rc;
+ libxl_sshm_prot new_prot;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "rw")) {
+ new_prot = LIBXL_SSHM_PROT_RW;
+ } else {
+ RET_INVAL("invalid permission flags", str);
+ }
+
+ SET_VAL(*prot, "permission flags", PROT, new_prot, str);
+
+ rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int parse_cachepolicy(XLU_Config *cfg, char *str,
+ libxl_sshm_cachepolicy *policy)
+{
+ int rc;
+ libxl_sshm_cachepolicy new_policy;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "ARM_normal")) {
+ new_policy = LIBXL_SSHM_CACHEPOLICY_ARM_NORMAL;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "x86_normal")) {
+ new_policy = LIBXL_SSHM_CACHEPOLICY_X86_NORMAL;
+ } else {
+ RET_INVAL("invalid cache policy", str);
+ }
+
+ SET_VAL(*policy, "cache policy", CACHEPOLICY, new_policy, str);
+ rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* handle key = value pairs */
+static int handle_equ(XLU_Config *cfg, char *key, char *val,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshm)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!strcmp(key, "id")) {
+ if (strlen(val) > LIBXL_SSHM_ID_MAXLEN) { RET_INVAL("id too long", val); }
+ if (sshm->id && !strcmp(sshm->id, val)) {
+ RET_INVAL("id respecified", val);
+ }
+
+ if (NULL == (sshm->id = strdup(val))) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "sshm parser out of memory\n");
+ rc = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else if (!strcmp(key, "role")) {
+ libxl_sshm_role new_role;
+
+ if (!strcmp("master", val)) {
+ new_role = LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_MASTER;
+ } else if (!strcmp("slave", val)) {
+ new_role = LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_SLAVE;
+ } else {
+ RET_INVAL("invalid role", val);
+ }
+
+ SET_VAL(sshm->role, "role", ROLE, new_role, val);
+ } else if (!strcmp(key, "begin") ||
+ !strcmp(key, "end") ||
+ !strcmp(key, "offset")) {
+ char *endptr;
+ int base = 10;
+ uint64_t new_addr;
+
+ /* Could be in hex form. Note that we don't need to check the length here,
+ * for val[] is NULL-terminated */
+ if ('0' == val[0] && 'x' == val[1]) { base = 16; }
+ new_addr = strtoull(val, &endptr, base);
+ if (ERANGE == errno || *endptr) {
+ RET_INVAL("invalid begin/end/offset", val);
+ }
+ if (new_addr & PAGE_SIZE_MASK)
+ RET_INVAL("begin/end/offset is not a multiple of 4K", val);
+
+ /* begin or end */
+ if ('b' == key[0]) {
+ SET_VAL(sshm->begin, "beginning address", RANGE, new_addr, val);
+ } else if('e' == key[0]){
+ SET_VAL(sshm->end, "ending address", RANGE, new_addr, val);
+ } else {
+ SET_VAL(sshm->offset, "offset", RANGE, new_addr, val);
+ }
+ } else if (!strcmp(key, "prot")) {
+ rc = parse_prot(cfg, val, &sshm->prot);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+ } else if (!strcmp(key, "cache_policy")) {
+ rc = parse_cachepolicy(cfg, val, &sshm->cache_policy);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+ } else {
+ RET_INVAL("invalid option", key);
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int xlu_sshm_parse(XLU_Config *cfg, const char *spec,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshm)
+{
+ int rc;
+ regex_t equ_rec;
+ char *buf2 = NULL, *ptr = NULL;
+ regmatch_t pmatch[3];
+
+ rc = regcomp(&equ_rec, EQU_RE, REG_EXTENDED);
+ if (rc) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "sshm parser failed to initialize\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (NULL == (buf2 = ptr = strdup(spec))) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "sshm parser out of memory\n");
+ rc = ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* main parsing loop */
+ while (true) {
+ if (!*ptr) { break; }
+ if (regexec(&equ_rec, ptr, 3, pmatch, 0))
+ RET_INVAL("unrecognized token", ptr);
+
+ ptr[pmatch[1].rm_eo] = '\0';
+ ptr[pmatch[2].rm_eo] = '\0';
+ rc = handle_equ(cfg, ptr + pmatch[1].rm_so,
+ ptr + pmatch[2].rm_so, sshm);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+
+ ptr += pmatch[0].rm_eo;
+ }
+
+ if (*ptr) { RET_INVAL("invalid syntax", ptr); }
+
+ /* do some early checks and set defaults */
+ if (!sshm->id) {
+ RET_INVAL("id not specified", spec);
+ }
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_UNKNOWN == sshm->role) {
+ sshm->role = LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_SLAVE;
+ }
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_PROT_UNKNOWN == sshm->prot) {
+ sshm->prot = LIBXL_SSHM_PROT_RW;
+ }
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_RANGE_UNKNOWN == sshm->begin) {
+ RET_INVAL("begin address not specified", spec);
+ }
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_RANGE_UNKNOWN == sshm->end) {
+ RET_INVAL("end address not specified", spec);
+ }
+ if (sshm->begin > sshm->end) {
+ RET_INVAL("begin address larger that end address", spec);
+ }
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_SLAVE != sshm->role &&
+ LIBXL_SSHM_RANGE_UNKNOWN != sshm->offset) {
+ RET_INVAL("offset is only applicable to slave domains", spec);
+ sshm->offset = 0;
+ }
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_RANGE_UNKNOWN == sshm->offset) {
+ sshm->offset = 0;
+ }
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_MASTER != sshm->role &&
+ LIBXL_SSHM_CACHEPOLICY_UNKNOWN != sshm->cache_policy) {
+ RET_INVAL("cache_policy is only applicable to master domains", spec);
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+ if (buf2) { free(buf2); }
+ regfree(&equ_rec);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxlutil.h b/tools/libxl/libxlutil.h
index e81b644c01..ee39cb5bdc 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxlutil.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxlutil.h
@@ -118,6 +118,12 @@ int xlu_rdm_parse(XLU_Config *cfg, libxl_rdm_reserve *rdm, const char *str);
int xlu_vif_parse_rate(XLU_Config *cfg, const char *rate,
libxl_device_nic *nic);
+/*
+ * static shared memory specification parsing
+ */
+int xlu_sshm_parse(XLU_Config *cfg, const char *spec,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshm);
+
#endif /* LIBXLUTIL_H */
/*
diff --git a/tools/xl/xl_parse.c b/tools/xl/xl_parse.c
index 5c2bf17222..82d955b8b9 100644
--- a/tools/xl/xl_parse.c
+++ b/tools/xl/xl_parse.c
@@ -813,7 +813,7 @@ void parse_config_data(const char *config_source,
long l, vcpus = 0;
XLU_Config *config;
XLU_ConfigList *cpus, *vbds, *nics, *pcis, *cvfbs, *cpuids, *vtpms,
- *usbctrls, *usbdevs, *p9devs;
+ *usbctrls, *usbdevs, *p9devs, *sshms;
XLU_ConfigList *channels, *ioports, *irqs, *iomem, *viridian, *dtdevs,
*mca_caps;
int num_ioports, num_irqs, num_iomem, num_cpus, num_viridian, num_mca_caps;
@@ -1392,6 +1392,28 @@ void parse_config_data(const char *config_source,
}
}
+ if (!xlu_cfg_get_list (config, "static_shm", &sshms, 0, 0)) {
+ d_config->num_sshms = 0;
+ d_config->sshms = NULL;
+ while ((buf = xlu_cfg_get_listitem (sshms, d_config->num_sshms)) != NULL) {
+ libxl_static_shm *sshm;
+ char *buf2 = strdup(buf);
+ int ret;
+
+ sshm = ARRAY_EXTEND_INIT_NODEVID(d_config->sshms,
+ d_config->num_sshms,
+ libxl_static_shm_init);
+ ret = xlu_sshm_parse(config, buf2, sshm);
+ if (ret) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "xl: Invalid argument for static_shm: %s", buf2);
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ free(buf2);
+ }
+ }
+
if (!xlu_cfg_get_list(config, "p9", &p9devs, 0, 0)) {
libxl_device_p9 *p9;
char *security_model = NULL;
--
2.13.3
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [RFC PATCH 3/4] x86/p2m : remove checks that forbid adding foreign pages between HVM guests
2017-08-04 2:20 [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] libxl: introduce a new structure to represent static shared memory regions Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] libxl:xl: add parsing code to parse "libxl_static_sshm" from xl config files Zhongze Liu
@ 2017-08-04 2:20 ` Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 13:27 ` Wei Liu
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 2:33 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files Zhongze Liu
4 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-04 2:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Zhongze Liu, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper,
Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
Two checks in the p2m code forbids sharing physical pages among DomU's by using
xc_add_to_physmap_batch with XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign. Just simply remove them
in this RFC patch to ask for suggestions on how to properly handle this.
This is for the proposal "Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs
from xl config file" (see [1]).
[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-07/msg03047.html
Signed-off-by: Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@gmail.com>
---
Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
---
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
index e8a57d118c..3ee4c14ed4 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
@@ -2531,8 +2531,13 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom, unsigned long fgfn,
* hvm fixme: until support is added to p2m teardown code to cleanup any
* foreign entries, limit this to hardware domain only.
*/
- if ( !is_hardware_domain(tdom) )
- return -EPERM;
+ /* The following check prevents us from doing a XENMEM_add_to_physmap
+ * between two domU's. Asking for suggestions on how to remove or
+ * work around it.
+ *
+ * if ( !is_hardware_domain(tdom) )
+ * return -EPERM;
+ */
if ( foreigndom == DOMID_XEN )
fdom = rcu_lock_domain(dom_xen);
@@ -2545,9 +2550,14 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom, unsigned long fgfn,
if ( tdom == fdom )
goto out;
- rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, tdom, fdom);
- if ( rc )
- goto out;
+ /* The following check prevents us from doing a XENMEM_add_to_physmap
+ * between two domU's. Asking for suggestions on how to remove or
+ * work around it.
+ *
+ * rc = xsm_map_gmfn_foreign(XSM_TARGET, tdom, fdom);
+ * if ( rc )
+ * goto out;
+ */
/*
* Take a refcnt on the mfn. NB: following supported for foreign mapping:
--
2.13.3
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH 3/4] x86/p2m : remove checks that forbid adding foreign pages between HVM guests
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] x86/p2m : remove checks that forbid adding foreign pages between HVM guests Zhongze Liu
@ 2017-08-04 13:27 ` Wei Liu
2017-08-04 13:48 ` Zhongze Liu
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2017-08-04 13:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Zhongze Liu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper,
xen-devel, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:20:24AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
> Two checks in the p2m code forbids sharing physical pages among DomU's by using
> xc_add_to_physmap_batch with XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign. Just simply remove them
> in this RFC patch to ask for suggestions on how to properly handle this.
>
> This is for the proposal "Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs
> from xl config file" (see [1]).
>
> [1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-07/msg03047.html
>
> Signed-off-by: Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@gmail.com>
> ---
> Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
> Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
> ---
> xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> index e8a57d118c..3ee4c14ed4 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> @@ -2531,8 +2531,13 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom, unsigned long fgfn,
> * hvm fixme: until support is added to p2m teardown code to cleanup any
> * foreign entries, limit this to hardware domain only.
This HVM fixme needs to be fixed before the check can go away. This is
going to be a non-trivial project, but it is going to be useful in its
own right.
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH 3/4] x86/p2m : remove checks that forbid adding foreign pages between HVM guests
2017-08-04 13:27 ` Wei Liu
@ 2017-08-04 13:48 ` Zhongze Liu
0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-04 13:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Liu
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper, xen-devel,
Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
Hi Wei,
Yes, indeed. Before the teardown is implemented, even if I simply
remove the first
check, when I try to destroy the master domain, the domain will become a zombie,
because the refcount of the shared pages won't be correctly decreased on slave
destruction.
I don't know why this hasn't been done, so I'm separating this patch
out to serve
as a place to discuss this problem.
For this GSoC project, I would also ask if there is any temporary workaround.
While waiting for any further suggestions and answers, I'll continue
to work on the ARM side.
Cheers,
Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 21:27 GMT+08:00 Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>:
> On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:20:24AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
>> Two checks in the p2m code forbids sharing physical pages among DomU's by using
>> xc_add_to_physmap_batch with XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign. Just simply remove them
>> in this RFC patch to ask for suggestions on how to properly handle this.
>>
>> This is for the proposal "Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs
>> from xl config file" (see [1]).
>>
>> [1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-07/msg03047.html
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@gmail.com>
>> ---
>> Cc: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
>> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
>> Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
>> Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
>> ---
>> xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
>> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
>> index e8a57d118c..3ee4c14ed4 100644
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
>> @@ -2531,8 +2531,13 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom, unsigned long fgfn,
>> * hvm fixme: until support is added to p2m teardown code to cleanup any
>> * foreign entries, limit this to hardware domain only.
>
> This HVM fixme needs to be fixed before the check can go away. This is
> going to be a non-trivial project, but it is going to be useful in its
> own right.
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xen.org
https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas
2017-08-04 2:20 [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files Zhongze Liu
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] x86/p2m : remove checks that forbid adding foreign pages between HVM guests Zhongze Liu
@ 2017-08-04 2:20 ` Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 15:20 ` Wei Liu
2017-08-04 2:33 ` [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files Zhongze Liu
4 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-04 2:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel
Cc: Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, Zhongze Liu, George Dunlap,
Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, Tim Deegan, Julien Grall,
Jan Beulich
creation:
* Check for further errors in the static_shm configs: overlapping
areas, invalid ranges, duplicated master domain, no master domain etc.
* Add code for writing infomations of static shared memory areas
into the appropriate xenstore paths.
* use xc_domain_add_to_physmap_batch to do the page sharing.
destruction:
* Check for errors that try to remove master while there'are still
living slaves.
* Cleanup related xenstore paths.
This is for the proposal "Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs
from xl config file" (see [1]).
[1] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-07/msg03047.html
Signed-off-by: Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@gmail.com>
---
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xen.org
---
tools/libxl/Makefile | 2 +-
tools/libxl/libxl_create.c | 7 +
tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 7 +
tools/libxl/libxl_domain.c | 6 +
tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h | 14 ++
tools/libxl/libxl_sshm.c | 370 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c | 8 +
7 files changed, 413 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tools/libxl/libxl_sshm.c
diff --git a/tools/libxl/Makefile b/tools/libxl/Makefile
index 3b63fb2cad..fd624b28f3 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/Makefile
+++ b/tools/libxl/Makefile
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ LIBXL_OBJS = flexarray.o libxl.o libxl_create.o libxl_dm.o libxl_pci.o \
libxl_dom_suspend.o libxl_dom_save.o libxl_usb.o \
libxl_vtpm.o libxl_nic.o libxl_disk.o libxl_console.o \
libxl_cpupool.o libxl_mem.o libxl_sched.o libxl_tmem.o \
- libxl_9pfs.o libxl_domain.o \
+ libxl_9pfs.o libxl_domain.o libxl_sshm.o \
$(LIBXL_OBJS-y)
LIBXL_OBJS += libxl_genid.o
LIBXL_OBJS += _libxl_types.o libxl_flask.o _libxl_types_internal.o
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
index 1158303e1a..06dba2178d 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_create.c
@@ -918,6 +918,13 @@ static void initiate_domain_create(libxl__egc *egc,
goto error_out;
}
+ if (d_config->c_info.type != LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM &&
+ d_config->num_sshms != 0) {
+ LOGD(ERROR, domid, "static_shm is only applicable to HVM domains");
+ ret = ERROR_INVAL;
+ goto error_out;
+ }
+
ret = libxl__domain_make(gc, d_config, &domid, &state->config);
if (ret) {
LOGD(ERROR, domid, "cannot make domain: %d", ret);
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
index f54fd49a73..1958667344 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c
@@ -1194,6 +1194,13 @@ int libxl__build_hvm(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
goto out;
}
+ /* the p2m has been setup, we could map the static shared memory now. */
+ rc = libxl__sshm_add(gc, domid, d_config->sshms, d_config->num_sshms);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ LOG(ERROR, "failed to map static shared memory");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
rc = hvm_build_set_params(ctx->xch, domid, info, state->store_port,
&state->store_mfn, state->console_port,
&state->console_mfn, state->store_domid,
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_domain.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_domain.c
index 08eccd082b..0702a575f2 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_domain.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_domain.c
@@ -1028,6 +1028,12 @@ void libxl__destroy_domid(libxl__egc *egc, libxl__destroy_domid_state *dis)
goto out;
}
+ rc = libxl__sshm_del(gc, domid);
+ if (rc) {
+ LOGD(ERROR, domid, "Deleting static shm failed.");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if (libxl__device_pci_destroy_all(gc, domid) < 0)
LOGD(ERROR, domid, "Pci shutdown failed");
rc = xc_domain_pause(ctx->xch, domid);
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
index 724750967c..9c9f69c50f 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ _hidden char **libxl__xs_directory(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
const char *path, unsigned int *nb);
/* On error: returns NULL, sets errno (no logging) */
_hidden char *libxl__xs_libxl_path(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid);
+_hidden char *libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(libxl__gc *gc, const char *id);
_hidden int libxl__backendpath_parse_domid(libxl__gc *gc, const char *be_path,
libxl_domid *domid_out);
@@ -4353,6 +4354,19 @@ static inline bool libxl__acpi_defbool_val(const libxl_domain_build_info *b_info
#endif
/*
+ * Set up static shared ram pages for HVM domains to communicate
+ *
+ * This function should only be called after the memory map is constructed
+ * and before any further memory access. */
+int libxl__sshm_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshm, int len);
+
+int libxl__sshm_del(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid);
+
+int libxl__sshm_check_slaves_overlap(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshms, int len);
+
+/*
* Local variables:
* mode: C
* c-basic-offset: 4
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_sshm.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_sshm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c7e9b8c1ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_sshm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+#include "libxl_osdeps.h"
+#include "libxl_internal.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#define TRY_TRANSACTION_OR_FAIL(aborting) do { \
+ if (!xs_transaction_end(CTX->xsh, xt, aborting) && !aborting) { \
+ if (EAGAIN == errno) { \
+ goto retry_transaction; \
+ } else { \
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL; \
+ } \
+ } \
+ }while(0);
+
+#define SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshmid, f, ...) \
+ LOGD(ERROR, domid, "static_shm id = %s:" f, sshmid, ##__VA_ARGS__)
+
+
+/* The caller have to guarentee that {s,m}begin < {s,m}end */
+static int libxl__sshm_do_map(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t mid, uint32_t sid,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshm,
+ uint64_t mbegin, uint64_t mend)
+{
+ int rc;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int num_mpages, num_spages, offset;
+ int *errs;
+ xen_ulong_t *idxs;
+ xen_pfn_t *gpfns;
+
+ num_mpages = (mend - mbegin) >> 12;
+ num_spages = (sshm->end - sshm->begin) >> 12;
+ offset = sshm->offset >> 12;
+
+ /* Check range. Test offset < mpages first to avoid overflow */
+ if ((offset >= num_mpages) || (num_mpages - offset < num_spages)) {
+ SSHM_ERROR(sid, sshm->id, "exceeds master's address space.");
+ rc = ERROR_INVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* fill out the pfn's and do the mapping */
+ errs = libxl__calloc(gc, num_spages, sizeof(int));
+ idxs = libxl__calloc(gc, num_spages, sizeof(xen_ulong_t));
+ gpfns = libxl__calloc(gc, num_spages, sizeof(xen_pfn_t));
+ for (i = 0; i < num_spages; i++) {
+ idxs[i] = (mbegin >> 12) + offset + i;
+ gpfns[i]= (sshm->begin >> 12) + i;
+ }
+ rc = xc_domain_add_to_physmap_batch(CTX->xch,
+ sid, mid,
+ XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign,
+ num_spages,
+ idxs, gpfns, errs);
+
+ for (i = 0; i< num_spages; i++) {
+ if (errs[i]) {
+ SSHM_ERROR(sid, sshm->id,
+ "can't map at address 0x%"PRIx64".",
+ sshm->begin + (offset << 12) );
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+
+ rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int libxl__sshm_add_master(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshm)
+{
+ int rc, aborting;
+ char *sshm_path, *dom_path, *dom_role_path;
+ char *ents[11];
+ struct xs_permissions noperm;
+ xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
+
+ sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, sshm->id);
+ dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
+ /* the domain should be in xenstore by now */
+ assert(dom_path);
+ dom_role_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm/%s/role", dom_path, sshm->id);
+
+
+ retry_transaction:
+ /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
+ aborting = 1;
+ rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+
+ if (NULL == libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, sshm_path)) {
+ rc = libxl__xs_write_checked(gc, xt, dom_role_path, "master");
+ if (rc) { goto out; };
+
+ ents[0] = "master";
+ ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRIu32, domid);
+ ents[2] = "begin";
+ ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->begin);
+ ents[4] = "end";
+ ents[5] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->end);
+ ents[6] = "prot";
+ ents[7] = libxl__strdup(gc, libxl_sshm_prot_to_string(sshm->prot));
+ ents[8] = "cache_policy";
+ ents[9] = libxl__strdup(gc,
+ libxl_sshm_cachepolicy_to_string(sshm->cache_policy));
+ ents[10] = NULL;
+
+ /* could only be accessed by Dom0 */
+ noperm.id = 0;
+ noperm.perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
+ libxl__xs_mknod(gc, xt, sshm_path, &noperm, 1);
+ libxl__xs_writev(gc, xt, sshm_path, ents);
+ } else {
+ SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id, "can only have one master.");
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ aborting = rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+ TRY_TRANSACTION_OR_FAIL(aborting);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int libxl__sshm_add_slave(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshm)
+{
+ int rc, aborting;
+ char *sshm_path, *slave_path, *dom_path, *dom_sshm_path, *dom_role_path;
+ char *ents[9];
+ const char *xs_value;
+ libxl_static_shm master_sshm;
+ uint32_t master_domid;
+ xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
+
+ sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, sshm->id);
+ slave_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/slaves/%"PRIu32, sshm_path, domid);
+ dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
+ /* the domain should be in xenstore by now */
+ assert(dom_path);
+ dom_sshm_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm/%s", dom_path, sshm->id);
+ dom_role_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/role", dom_sshm_path);
+
+ retry_transaction:
+ /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
+ aborting = 1;
+ rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+
+ if (NULL == libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, sshm_path)) {
+ SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id, "no master found.");
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ /* check the master info to see if we could do the mapping */
+ if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path)) {
+ SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id,
+ "domain tried to share the same region twice.");
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = libxl__xs_read_checked(gc, xt,
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/prot", sshm_path),
+ &xs_value);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+ libxl_sshm_prot_from_string(xs_value, &master_sshm.prot);
+
+ rc = libxl__xs_read_checked(gc, xt,
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/begin", sshm_path),
+ &xs_value);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+ master_sshm.begin = strtoull(xs_value, NULL, 16);
+
+ rc = libxl__xs_read_checked(gc, xt,
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/end", sshm_path),
+ &xs_value);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+ master_sshm.end = strtoull(xs_value, NULL, 16);
+
+ rc = libxl__xs_read_checked(gc, xt,
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/master", sshm_path),
+ &xs_value);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+ master_domid = strtoull(xs_value, NULL, 16);
+
+ /* check if the slave is asking too much permission */
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_PROT_UNKNOWN == sshm->prot) {
+ sshm->prot = master_sshm.prot;
+ }
+ if (master_sshm.prot < sshm->prot) {
+ SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id, "slave is asking too much permission.");
+ rc = ERROR_INVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* all checks passed, do the job */
+ rc = libxl__sshm_do_map(gc, master_domid, domid, sshm,
+ master_sshm.begin, master_sshm.end);
+ if (rc) {
+ rc = ERROR_INVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = libxl__xs_write_checked(gc, xt, dom_role_path, "slave");
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+
+ /* fill in slave info */
+ ents[0] = "begin";
+ ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->begin);
+ ents[2] = "end";
+ ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->end);
+ ents[4] = "offset";
+ ents[5] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->offset);
+ ents[6] = "prot";
+ ents[7] = libxl__strdup(gc, libxl_sshm_prot_to_string(sshm->prot));
+ ents[8] = NULL;
+ libxl__xs_writev(gc, xt, slave_path, ents);
+ }
+
+ aborting = rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+ TRY_TRANSACTION_OR_FAIL(aborting);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Compare function for sorting sshm ranges by sshm->begin */
+static int sshm_range_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ libxl_static_shm *const *sshma = a, *const *sshmb = b;
+ return (*sshma)->begin > (*sshmb)->begin ? 1 : -1;
+}
+
+/* check if the sshm slave configs in @sshm overlap */
+static int libxl__sshm_check_overlap(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshms, int len)
+{
+
+ const libxl_static_shm **slave_sshms = NULL;
+ int num_slaves;
+ int i;
+
+ slave_sshms = libxl__calloc(gc, len, sizeof(slave_sshms[0]));
+ num_slaves = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_SLAVE == sshms[i].role)
+ slave_sshms[num_slaves++] = sshms + i;
+ }
+ qsort(slave_sshms, num_slaves, sizeof(slave_sshms[0]), sshm_range_cmp);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_slaves - 1; ++i) {
+ if (slave_sshms[i+1]->begin < slave_sshms[i]->end) {
+ SSHM_ERROR(domid, slave_sshms[i+1]->id, "slave ranges overlap.");
+ return ERROR_INVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int libxl__sshm_del_single(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t xt,
+ uint32_t domid, const char *id, bool master)
+{
+ char *sshm_path, *slaves_path;
+
+ sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, id);
+ slaves_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/slaves", sshm_path);
+
+ if (master) {
+ /* we know that domid can't be both a master and a slave for one id,
+ * so the number of slaves won't change during iteration. Simply check
+ * sshm_path/slavea to tell if there are still living slaves. */
+ if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, slaves_path)) {
+ SSHM_ERROR(domid, id,
+ "can't remove master when there are living slaves.");
+ return ERROR_FAIL;
+ }
+ libxl__xs_path_cleanup(gc, xt, sshm_path);
+ } else {
+ libxl__xs_path_cleanup(gc, xt,
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/%"PRIu32, slaves_path, domid));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Delete an static_shm entry in the xensotre. Will also return success if
+ * the path doesn't exist. */
+int libxl__sshm_del(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid)
+{
+ int rc, aborting;
+ xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
+ char *dom_path, *dom_sshm_path;
+ const char *role;
+ char **sshm_ents;
+ unsigned int sshm_num;
+ int i;
+
+ if (LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM != libxl__domain_type(gc, domid))
+ return 0;
+
+ dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
+ dom_sshm_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm", dom_path);
+
+ retry_transaction:
+ /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
+ aborting = 1;
+ rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+
+ if (NULL == libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path)) {
+ /* no sshms, just do nothing */
+ rc = aborting = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sshm_ents = libxl__xs_directory(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path, &sshm_num);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sshm_num; ++i) {
+ rc = libxl__xs_read_checked(gc, xt,
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/%s/role", dom_sshm_path, sshm_ents[i]), &role);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+
+ rc = libxl__sshm_del_single(gc, xt, domid,
+ sshm_ents[i], role[0] == 'm' ? 1 : 0);
+ if (rc) { goto out; }
+ }
+
+ libxl__xs_path_cleanup(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path);
+
+ aborting = rc = 0;
+
+ out:
+ TRY_TRANSACTION_OR_FAIL(aborting);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int libxl__sshm_add(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
+ libxl_static_shm *sshms, int len)
+{
+ int rc, i;
+
+ if (LIBXL_DOMAIN_TYPE_HVM != libxl__domain_type(gc, domid))
+ return 0;
+ rc = libxl__sshm_check_overlap(gc, domid, sshms, len);
+ if (rc) { return rc; };
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) {
+ if (LIBXL_SSHM_ROLE_SLAVE == sshms[i].role) {
+ rc = libxl__sshm_add_slave(gc, domid, sshms+i);
+ } else {
+ rc = libxl__sshm_add_master(gc, domid, sshms+i);
+ }
+ if (rc) { return rc; };
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+/*
+ * Local variables:
+ * mode: C
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * indent-tabs-mode: nil
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
index c4a18df353..d91fbf5fda 100644
--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
+++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
@@ -193,6 +193,14 @@ char *libxl__xs_libxl_path(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid)
return s;
}
+char *libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(libxl__gc *gc, const char *id)
+{
+ char *s = GCSPRINTF("/local/static_shm/%s", id);
+ if (!s)
+ LOGE(ERROR, "cannot allocate static shm path");
+ return s;
+}
+
int libxl__xs_read_mandatory(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
const char *path, const char **result_out)
{
--
2.13.3
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas Zhongze Liu
@ 2017-08-04 15:20 ` Wei Liu
2017-08-04 17:26 ` Zhongze Liu
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2017-08-04 15:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Zhongze Liu
Cc: Tim Deegan, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, George Dunlap,
Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
I skim through this patch and have some questions.
On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:20:25AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
> +
> +static int libxl__sshm_add_master(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
> + libxl_static_shm *sshm)
> +{
> + int rc, aborting;
> + char *sshm_path, *dom_path, *dom_role_path;
> + char *ents[11];
> + struct xs_permissions noperm;
> + xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
> +
> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, sshm->id);
> + dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
> + /* the domain should be in xenstore by now */
> + assert(dom_path);
> + dom_role_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm/%s/role", dom_path, sshm->id);
> +
> +
> + retry_transaction:
> + /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
> + aborting = 1;
> + rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
> + if (rc) { goto out; }
if (rc) goto out;
> +
> + if (NULL == libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, sshm_path)) {
!libxl__xs_read
We don't use "Yoda conditions".
> + rc = libxl__xs_write_checked(gc, xt, dom_role_path, "master");
> + if (rc) { goto out; };
> +
> + ents[0] = "master";
> + ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRIu32, domid);
> + ents[2] = "begin";
> + ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->begin);
> + ents[4] = "end";
> + ents[5] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->end);
> + ents[6] = "prot";
> + ents[7] = libxl__strdup(gc, libxl_sshm_prot_to_string(sshm->prot));
> + ents[8] = "cache_policy";
> + ents[9] = libxl__strdup(gc,
> + libxl_sshm_cachepolicy_to_string(sshm->cache_policy));
> + ents[10] = NULL;
> +
These aren't going to change from iteration to iteration, so you can
prepare them before entering the loop.
BTW it would be cleaner to use a for (;;) {} or while (1) {} loop to
implement this instead of using goto label. You can then eliminate the
TRY_TRANSACTION_OR_FAIL macro.
> + /* could only be accessed by Dom0 */
> + noperm.id = 0;
> + noperm.perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
> + libxl__xs_mknod(gc, xt, sshm_path, &noperm, 1);
> + libxl__xs_writev(gc, xt, sshm_path, ents);
> + } else {
> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id, "can only have one master.");
> + rc = ERROR_FAIL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + aborting = rc = 0;
> +
> + out:
> + TRY_TRANSACTION_OR_FAIL(aborting);
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
[...]
> +static int libxl__sshm_del_single(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t xt,
> + uint32_t domid, const char *id, bool master)
> +{
> + char *sshm_path, *slaves_path;
> +
> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, id);
> + slaves_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/slaves", sshm_path);
> +
> + if (master) {
> + /* we know that domid can't be both a master and a slave for one id,
Is this enforced in code?
> + * so the number of slaves won't change during iteration. Simply check
> + * sshm_path/slavea to tell if there are still living slaves. */
> + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, slaves_path)) {
> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, id,
> + "can't remove master when there are living slaves.");
> + return ERROR_FAIL;
Isn't this going to leave a half-destructed domain in userspace
components? Maybe we should proceed anyway?
> + }
> + libxl__xs_path_cleanup(gc, xt, sshm_path);
> + } else {
> + libxl__xs_path_cleanup(gc, xt,
> + GCSPRINTF("%s/%"PRIu32, slaves_path, domid));
Is this really enough? What will happen to the mapping? You merely
delete the xenstore node for it but the mapping is still there.
I suppose you're relying on the hypervisor to remove the mapping from
p2m?
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
[...]
> diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
> index c4a18df353..d91fbf5fda 100644
> --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
> +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
> @@ -193,6 +193,14 @@ char *libxl__xs_libxl_path(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid)
> return s;
> }
>
> +char *libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(libxl__gc *gc, const char *id)
> +{
> + char *s = GCSPRINTF("/local/static_shm/%s", id);
> + if (!s)
> + LOGE(ERROR, "cannot allocate static shm path");
GCSPRINTF can't fail. You can eliminate the check.
> + return s;
> +}
> +
> int libxl__xs_read_mandatory(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
> const char *path, const char **result_out)
> {
> --
> 2.13.3
>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas
2017-08-04 15:20 ` Wei Liu
@ 2017-08-04 17:26 ` Zhongze Liu
2017-08-08 10:49 ` Wei Liu
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-04 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Liu
Cc: Tim Deegan, Stefano Stabellini, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper,
Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
Hi Wei,
Thank you for reviewing my patch.
2017-08-04 23:20 GMT+08:00 Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>:
> I skim through this patch and have some questions.
>
> On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:20:25AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
>> +
>> +static int libxl__sshm_add_master(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
>> + libxl_static_shm *sshm)
>> +{
>> + int rc, aborting;
>> + char *sshm_path, *dom_path, *dom_role_path;
>> + char *ents[11];
>> + struct xs_permissions noperm;
>> + xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
>> +
>> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, sshm->id);
>> + dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
>> + /* the domain should be in xenstore by now */
>> + assert(dom_path);
>> + dom_role_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm/%s/role", dom_path, sshm->id);
>> +
>> +
>> + retry_transaction:
>> + /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
>> + aborting = 1;
>> + rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
>> + if (rc) { goto out; }
>
> if (rc) goto out;
OK. Will remove all the {}. BTW, do I have to place "goto out;" in a newline?
>
>> +
>> + if (NULL == libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, sshm_path)) {
>
> !libxl__xs_read
>
> We don't use "Yoda conditions".
I'll turn all the Yoda conditions into "natural" ones.
>
>> + rc = libxl__xs_write_checked(gc, xt, dom_role_path, "master");
>> + if (rc) { goto out; };
>> +
>> + ents[0] = "master";
>> + ents[1] = GCSPRINTF("%"PRIu32, domid);
>> + ents[2] = "begin";
>> + ents[3] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->begin);
>> + ents[4] = "end";
>> + ents[5] = GCSPRINTF("0x%"PRIx64, sshm->end);
>> + ents[6] = "prot";
>> + ents[7] = libxl__strdup(gc, libxl_sshm_prot_to_string(sshm->prot));
>> + ents[8] = "cache_policy";
>> + ents[9] = libxl__strdup(gc,
>> + libxl_sshm_cachepolicy_to_string(sshm->cache_policy));
>> + ents[10] = NULL;
>> +
>
> These aren't going to change from iteration to iteration, so you can
> prepare them before entering the loop.
>
> BTW it would be cleaner to use a for (;;) {} or while (1) {} loop to
> implement this instead of using goto label. You can then eliminate the
> TRY_TRANSACTION_OR_FAIL macro.
OK. I'll move the entries out of the iteration. And yes, using an
infinite loop and
break on appropriate conditions will make it more concise.
>
>> + /* could only be accessed by Dom0 */
>> + noperm.id = 0;
>> + noperm.perms = XS_PERM_NONE;
>> + libxl__xs_mknod(gc, xt, sshm_path, &noperm, 1);
>> + libxl__xs_writev(gc, xt, sshm_path, ents);
>> + } else {
>> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id, "can only have one master.");
>> + rc = ERROR_FAIL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> +
>> + aborting = rc = 0;
>> +
>> + out:
>> + TRY_TRANSACTION_OR_FAIL(aborting);
>> + return rc;
>> +}
>> +
> [...]
>> +static int libxl__sshm_del_single(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t xt,
>> + uint32_t domid, const char *id, bool master)
>> +{
>> + char *sshm_path, *slaves_path;
>> +
>> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, id);
>> + slaves_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/slaves", sshm_path);
>> +
>> + if (master) {
>> + /* we know that domid can't be both a master and a slave for one id,
>
> Is this enforced in code?
Yes...and...no. I've done this in libxl__sshm_add_slave() by doing:
+ if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path)) {
+ SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id,
+ "domain tried to share the same region twice.");
+ rc = ERROR_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
Maybe the comment is a little bit confusing. What I was planning to do is to
place such a check in both *_add_slave() and *_add_master(), so that one
ID can't appear twice within one domain, so that one domain will not be able
to be both a master and a slave.
>
>> + * so the number of slaves won't change during iteration. Simply check
>> + * sshm_path/slavea to tell if there are still living slaves. */
>> + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, slaves_path)) {
>> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, id,
>> + "can't remove master when there are living slaves.");
>> + return ERROR_FAIL;
>
> Isn't this going to leave a half-destructed domain in userspace
> components? Maybe we should proceed anyway?
This is also among the points that I'm not very sure. What is the best way
to handle this type of error during domain destruction?
>
>> + }
>> + libxl__xs_path_cleanup(gc, xt, sshm_path);
>> + } else {
>> + libxl__xs_path_cleanup(gc, xt,
>> + GCSPRINTF("%s/%"PRIu32, slaves_path, domid));
>
> Is this really enough? What will happen to the mapping? You merely
> delete the xenstore node for it but the mapping is still there.
>
> I suppose you're relying on the hypervisor to remove the mapping from
> p2m?
Yes, the "sharing" here simply means adding one physical page to the slave
domains stage-2 mapping. The only thing that's changed is the refcount,
and I rely one the teardown code to decrease the refcount, which is implemented
on ARM but unimplemented on x86.
>
>> + }
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
> [...]
>> diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
>> index c4a18df353..d91fbf5fda 100644
>> --- a/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
>> +++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c
>> @@ -193,6 +193,14 @@ char *libxl__xs_libxl_path(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid)
>> return s;
>> }
>>
>> +char *libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(libxl__gc *gc, const char *id)
>> +{
>> + char *s = GCSPRINTF("/local/static_shm/%s", id);
>> + if (!s)
>> + LOGE(ERROR, "cannot allocate static shm path");
>
> GCSPRINTF can't fail. You can eliminate the check.
I was also confused about the other similar checks around the file
since GCSPRINTF will die on failure. Em...It seems that I've copied
the previous errors.
Then I'll remove this function and replace it with a macro in
libxl_sshm.c instead.
>
>> + return s;
>> +}
>> +
>> int libxl__xs_read_mandatory(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t t,
>> const char *path, const char **result_out)
>> {
>> --
>> 2.13.3
>>
Cheers,
Zhongze Liu.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas
2017-08-04 17:26 ` Zhongze Liu
@ 2017-08-08 10:49 ` Wei Liu
2017-08-08 10:56 ` Wei Liu
2017-08-09 10:51 ` Zhongze Liu
0 siblings, 2 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2017-08-08 10:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Zhongze Liu
Cc: Tim Deegan, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, George Dunlap,
Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
On Sat, Aug 05, 2017 at 01:26:37AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
> Hi Wei,
>
> Thank you for reviewing my patch.
>
> 2017-08-04 23:20 GMT+08:00 Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>:
> > I skim through this patch and have some questions.
> >
> > On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:20:25AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
> >> +
> >> +static int libxl__sshm_add_master(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
> >> + libxl_static_shm *sshm)
> >> +{
> >> + int rc, aborting;
> >> + char *sshm_path, *dom_path, *dom_role_path;
> >> + char *ents[11];
> >> + struct xs_permissions noperm;
> >> + xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
> >> +
> >> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, sshm->id);
> >> + dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
> >> + /* the domain should be in xenstore by now */
> >> + assert(dom_path);
> >> + dom_role_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm/%s/role", dom_path, sshm->id);
> >> +
> >> +
> >> + retry_transaction:
> >> + /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
> >> + aborting = 1;
> >> + rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
> >> + if (rc) { goto out; }
> >
> > if (rc) goto out;
>
> OK. Will remove all the {}. BTW, do I have to place "goto out;" in a newline?
>
Youc can look for examples in existing code and follow those.
[...]
> >> +static int libxl__sshm_del_single(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t xt,
> >> + uint32_t domid, const char *id, bool master)
> >> +{
> >> + char *sshm_path, *slaves_path;
> >> +
> >> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, id);
> >> + slaves_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/slaves", sshm_path);
> >> +
> >> + if (master) {
> >> + /* we know that domid can't be both a master and a slave for one id,
> >
> > Is this enforced in code?
>
> Yes...and...no. I've done this in libxl__sshm_add_slave() by doing:
>
> + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path)) {
> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id,
> + "domain tried to share the same region twice.");
> + rc = ERROR_FAIL;
> + goto out;
> + }
>
> Maybe the comment is a little bit confusing. What I was planning to do is to
> place such a check in both *_add_slave() and *_add_master(), so that one
> ID can't appear twice within one domain, so that one domain will not be able
> to be both a master and a slave.
>
OK this sounds plausible.
> >
> >> + * so the number of slaves won't change during iteration. Simply check
> >> + * sshm_path/slavea to tell if there are still living slaves. */
> >> + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, slaves_path)) {
> >> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, id,
> >> + "can't remove master when there are living slaves.");
> >> + return ERROR_FAIL;
> >
> > Isn't this going to leave a half-destructed domain in userspace
> > components? Maybe we should proceed anyway?
>
> This is also among the points that I'm not very sure. What is the best way
> to handle this type of error during domain destruction?
>
I think we should destroy everything in relation to the guest in Dom0
(or other service domains). Some pages for the master guests might be
referenced by slaves, but they will eventually be freed (hence the
domain struct will be freed) within Xen. Do experiment with this to see
if my prediction is right.
It also occurs to me you need to guard against circular references. That
is, DomA and DomB have a mutual master-slave relationship.
> >> +char *libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(libxl__gc *gc, const char *id)
> >> +{
> >> + char *s = GCSPRINTF("/local/static_shm/%s", id);
> >> + if (!s)
> >> + LOGE(ERROR, "cannot allocate static shm path");
> >
> > GCSPRINTF can't fail. You can eliminate the check.
>
> I was also confused about the other similar checks around the file
> since GCSPRINTF will die on failure. Em...It seems that I've copied
> the previous errors.
>
> Then I'll remove this function and replace it with a macro in
> libxl_sshm.c instead.
>
Using a static inline function is better.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas
2017-08-08 10:49 ` Wei Liu
@ 2017-08-08 10:56 ` Wei Liu
2017-08-09 10:48 ` Zhongze Liu
2017-08-09 10:51 ` Zhongze Liu
1 sibling, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Wei Liu @ 2017-08-08 10:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Zhongze Liu
Cc: Tim Deegan, Stefano Stabellini, Wei Liu, George Dunlap,
Andrew Cooper, Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
On Tue, Aug 08, 2017 at 11:49:35AM +0100, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Sat, Aug 05, 2017 at 01:26:37AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
> > Hi Wei,
> >
> > Thank you for reviewing my patch.
> >
> > 2017-08-04 23:20 GMT+08:00 Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>:
> > > I skim through this patch and have some questions.
> > >
> > > On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:20:25AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
> > >> +
> > >> +static int libxl__sshm_add_master(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
> > >> + libxl_static_shm *sshm)
> > >> +{
> > >> + int rc, aborting;
> > >> + char *sshm_path, *dom_path, *dom_role_path;
> > >> + char *ents[11];
> > >> + struct xs_permissions noperm;
> > >> + xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
> > >> +
> > >> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, sshm->id);
> > >> + dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
> > >> + /* the domain should be in xenstore by now */
> > >> + assert(dom_path);
> > >> + dom_role_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm/%s/role", dom_path, sshm->id);
> > >> +
> > >> +
> > >> + retry_transaction:
> > >> + /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
> > >> + aborting = 1;
> > >> + rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
> > >> + if (rc) { goto out; }
> > >
> > > if (rc) goto out;
> >
> > OK. Will remove all the {}. BTW, do I have to place "goto out;" in a newline?
> >
>
> Youc can look for examples in existing code and follow those.
>
> [...]
> > >> +static int libxl__sshm_del_single(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t xt,
> > >> + uint32_t domid, const char *id, bool master)
> > >> +{
> > >> + char *sshm_path, *slaves_path;
> > >> +
> > >> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, id);
> > >> + slaves_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/slaves", sshm_path);
> > >> +
> > >> + if (master) {
> > >> + /* we know that domid can't be both a master and a slave for one id,
> > >
> > > Is this enforced in code?
> >
> > Yes...and...no. I've done this in libxl__sshm_add_slave() by doing:
> >
> > + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path)) {
> > + SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id,
> > + "domain tried to share the same region twice.");
> > + rc = ERROR_FAIL;
> > + goto out;
> > + }
> >
> > Maybe the comment is a little bit confusing. What I was planning to do is to
> > place such a check in both *_add_slave() and *_add_master(), so that one
> > ID can't appear twice within one domain, so that one domain will not be able
> > to be both a master and a slave.
> >
>
> OK this sounds plausible.
>
> > >
> > >> + * so the number of slaves won't change during iteration. Simply check
> > >> + * sshm_path/slavea to tell if there are still living slaves. */
> > >> + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, slaves_path)) {
> > >> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, id,
> > >> + "can't remove master when there are living slaves.");
> > >> + return ERROR_FAIL;
> > >
> > > Isn't this going to leave a half-destructed domain in userspace
> > > components? Maybe we should proceed anyway?
> >
> > This is also among the points that I'm not very sure. What is the best way
> > to handle this type of error during domain destruction?
> >
>
> I think we should destroy everything in relation to the guest in Dom0
> (or other service domains). Some pages for the master guests might be
> referenced by slaves, but they will eventually be freed (hence the
> domain struct will be freed) within Xen. Do experiment with this to see
> if my prediction is right.
>
> It also occurs to me you need to guard against circular references. That
> is, DomA and DomB have a mutual master-slave relationship.
>
This probably can't happen because you can't construct such pair of
guests in the first place.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas
2017-08-08 10:56 ` Wei Liu
@ 2017-08-09 10:48 ` Zhongze Liu
0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-09 10:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Liu
Cc: Tim Deegan, Stefano Stabellini, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper,
Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
2017-08-08 18:56 GMT+08:00 Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>:
> On Tue, Aug 08, 2017 at 11:49:35AM +0100, Wei Liu wrote:
>> On Sat, Aug 05, 2017 at 01:26:37AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
>> > Hi Wei,
>> >
>> > Thank you for reviewing my patch.
>> >
>> > 2017-08-04 23:20 GMT+08:00 Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>:
>> > > I skim through this patch and have some questions.
>> > >
>> > > On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:20:25AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
>> > >> +
>> > >> +static int libxl__sshm_add_master(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
>> > >> + libxl_static_shm *sshm)
>> > >> +{
>> > >> + int rc, aborting;
>> > >> + char *sshm_path, *dom_path, *dom_role_path;
>> > >> + char *ents[11];
>> > >> + struct xs_permissions noperm;
>> > >> + xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
>> > >> +
>> > >> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, sshm->id);
>> > >> + dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
>> > >> + /* the domain should be in xenstore by now */
>> > >> + assert(dom_path);
>> > >> + dom_role_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm/%s/role", dom_path, sshm->id);
>> > >> +
>> > >> +
>> > >> + retry_transaction:
>> > >> + /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
>> > >> + aborting = 1;
>> > >> + rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
>> > >> + if (rc) { goto out; }
>> > >
>> > > if (rc) goto out;
>> >
>> > OK. Will remove all the {}. BTW, do I have to place "goto out;" in a newline?
>> >
>>
>> Youc can look for examples in existing code and follow those.
>>
>> [...]
>> > >> +static int libxl__sshm_del_single(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t xt,
>> > >> + uint32_t domid, const char *id, bool master)
>> > >> +{
>> > >> + char *sshm_path, *slaves_path;
>> > >> +
>> > >> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, id);
>> > >> + slaves_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/slaves", sshm_path);
>> > >> +
>> > >> + if (master) {
>> > >> + /* we know that domid can't be both a master and a slave for one id,
>> > >
>> > > Is this enforced in code?
>> >
>> > Yes...and...no. I've done this in libxl__sshm_add_slave() by doing:
>> >
>> > + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path)) {
>> > + SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id,
>> > + "domain tried to share the same region twice.");
>> > + rc = ERROR_FAIL;
>> > + goto out;
>> > + }
>> >
>> > Maybe the comment is a little bit confusing. What I was planning to do is to
>> > place such a check in both *_add_slave() and *_add_master(), so that one
>> > ID can't appear twice within one domain, so that one domain will not be able
>> > to be both a master and a slave.
>> >
>>
>> OK this sounds plausible.
>>
>> > >
>> > >> + * so the number of slaves won't change during iteration. Simply check
>> > >> + * sshm_path/slavea to tell if there are still living slaves. */
>> > >> + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, slaves_path)) {
>> > >> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, id,
>> > >> + "can't remove master when there are living slaves.");
>> > >> + return ERROR_FAIL;
>> > >
>> > > Isn't this going to leave a half-destructed domain in userspace
>> > > components? Maybe we should proceed anyway?
>> >
>> > This is also among the points that I'm not very sure. What is the best way
>> > to handle this type of error during domain destruction?
>> >
>>
>> I think we should destroy everything in relation to the guest in Dom0
>> (or other service domains). Some pages for the master guests might be
>> referenced by slaves, but they will eventually be freed (hence the
>> domain struct will be freed) within Xen. Do experiment with this to see
>> if my prediction is right.
>>
>> It also occurs to me you need to guard against circular references. That
>> is, DomA and DomB have a mutual master-slave relationship.
>>
>
> This probably can't happen because you can't construct such pair of
> guests in the first place.
Yes, indeed. Because masters can only be created prior the slaves. So it must
be a forest-like structure.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas
2017-08-08 10:49 ` Wei Liu
2017-08-08 10:56 ` Wei Liu
@ 2017-08-09 10:51 ` Zhongze Liu
1 sibling, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-09 10:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Liu
Cc: Tim Deegan, Stefano Stabellini, George Dunlap, Andrew Cooper,
Ian Jackson, xen-devel, Julien Grall, Jan Beulich
2017-08-08 18:49 GMT+08:00 Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>:
> On Sat, Aug 05, 2017 at 01:26:37AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
>> Hi Wei,
>>
>> Thank you for reviewing my patch.
>>
>> 2017-08-04 23:20 GMT+08:00 Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>:
>> > I skim through this patch and have some questions.
>> >
>> > On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 10:20:25AM +0800, Zhongze Liu wrote:
>> >> +
>> >> +static int libxl__sshm_add_master(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid,
>> >> + libxl_static_shm *sshm)
>> >> +{
>> >> + int rc, aborting;
>> >> + char *sshm_path, *dom_path, *dom_role_path;
>> >> + char *ents[11];
>> >> + struct xs_permissions noperm;
>> >> + xs_transaction_t xt = XBT_NULL;
>> >> +
>> >> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, sshm->id);
>> >> + dom_path = libxl__xs_get_dompath(gc, domid);
>> >> + /* the domain should be in xenstore by now */
>> >> + assert(dom_path);
>> >> + dom_role_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/static_shm/%s/role", dom_path, sshm->id);
>> >> +
>> >> +
>> >> + retry_transaction:
>> >> + /* Within the transaction, goto out by default means aborting */
>> >> + aborting = 1;
>> >> + rc = libxl__xs_transaction_start(gc, &xt);
>> >> + if (rc) { goto out; }
>> >
>> > if (rc) goto out;
>>
>> OK. Will remove all the {}. BTW, do I have to place "goto out;" in a newline?
>>
>
> Youc can look for examples in existing code and follow those.
>
> [...]
>> >> +static int libxl__sshm_del_single(libxl__gc *gc, xs_transaction_t xt,
>> >> + uint32_t domid, const char *id, bool master)
>> >> +{
>> >> + char *sshm_path, *slaves_path;
>> >> +
>> >> + sshm_path = libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(gc, id);
>> >> + slaves_path = GCSPRINTF("%s/slaves", sshm_path);
>> >> +
>> >> + if (master) {
>> >> + /* we know that domid can't be both a master and a slave for one id,
>> >
>> > Is this enforced in code?
>>
>> Yes...and...no. I've done this in libxl__sshm_add_slave() by doing:
>>
>> + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, dom_sshm_path)) {
>> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, sshm->id,
>> + "domain tried to share the same region twice.");
>> + rc = ERROR_FAIL;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>>
>> Maybe the comment is a little bit confusing. What I was planning to do is to
>> place such a check in both *_add_slave() and *_add_master(), so that one
>> ID can't appear twice within one domain, so that one domain will not be able
>> to be both a master and a slave.
>>
>
> OK this sounds plausible.
>
>> >
>> >> + * so the number of slaves won't change during iteration. Simply check
>> >> + * sshm_path/slavea to tell if there are still living slaves. */
>> >> + if (NULL != libxl__xs_read(gc, xt, slaves_path)) {
>> >> + SSHM_ERROR(domid, id,
>> >> + "can't remove master when there are living slaves.");
>> >> + return ERROR_FAIL;
>> >
>> > Isn't this going to leave a half-destructed domain in userspace
>> > components? Maybe we should proceed anyway?
>>
>> This is also among the points that I'm not very sure. What is the best way
>> to handle this type of error during domain destruction?
>>
>
> I think we should destroy everything in relation to the guest in Dom0
> (or other service domains). Some pages for the master guests might be
> referenced by slaves, but they will eventually be freed (hence the
> domain struct will be freed) within Xen. Do experiment with this to see
> if my prediction is right.
Yes, that's right. I'll turn the erros into warnings and proceed anyway.
>
> It also occurs to me you need to guard against circular references. That
> is, DomA and DomB have a mutual master-slave relationship.
>
>> >> +char *libxl__xs_get_sshmpath(libxl__gc *gc, const char *id)
>> >> +{
>> >> + char *s = GCSPRINTF("/local/static_shm/%s", id);
>> >> + if (!s)
>> >> + LOGE(ERROR, "cannot allocate static shm path");
>> >
>> > GCSPRINTF can't fail. You can eliminate the check.
>>
>> I was also confused about the other similar checks around the file
>> since GCSPRINTF will die on failure. Em...It seems that I've copied
>> the previous errors.
>>
>> Then I'll remove this function and replace it with a macro in
>> libxl_sshm.c instead.
>>
>
> Using a static inline function is better.
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files
2017-08-04 2:20 [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files Zhongze Liu
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-08-04 2:20 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas Zhongze Liu
@ 2017-08-04 2:33 ` Zhongze Liu
4 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Zhongze Liu @ 2017-08-04 2:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: xen-devel; +Cc: Julien Grall, Stefano Stabellini, Zhongze Liu
Hi,
I should have mentioned that this RFC only adds support to the x86 side.
Sorry for that.
Cheers,
Zhongze Liu
2017-08-04 10:20 GMT+08:00 Zhongze Liu <blackskygg@gmail.com>:
> This series implements the new xl config entry proposed in [1]. Users can use
> the new config entry to statically setup shared memory areas among VMs so that
> they could communicate with each other through the static shared memory areas.
>
> [1] Proposla to allow setting up shared memory areas between VMs from xl config files:
> https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2017-07/msg03047.html
>
> Cheers,
>
> Zhongze Liu (4):
> libxl: introduce a new structure to represent static shared memory
> regions
> libxl:xl: add parsing code to parse "libxl_static_sshm" from xl config
> files
> x86/p2m : remove checks that forbid adding foreign pages between HVM
> guests
> libxl: support creation and destruction of static shared memory areas
>
> tools/libxl/Makefile | 4 +-
> tools/libxl/libxl.h | 4 +
> tools/libxl/libxl_create.c | 7 +
> tools/libxl/libxl_dom.c | 7 +
> tools/libxl/libxl_domain.c | 6 +
> tools/libxl/libxl_internal.h | 14 ++
> tools/libxl/libxl_sshm.c | 370 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl | 28 ++++
> tools/libxl/libxl_xshelp.c | 8 +
> tools/libxl/libxlu_sshm.c | 228 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> tools/libxl/libxlutil.h | 6 +
> tools/xl/xl_parse.c | 24 ++-
> xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c | 20 ++-
> 13 files changed, 718 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 tools/libxl/libxl_sshm.c
> create mode 100644 tools/libxl/libxlu_sshm.c
>
> --
> 2.13.3
>
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread