From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> To: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org> Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/8] xen: defer call to xen_restrict until after os_setup_post Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 12:40:01 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20171010114001.GF1771@perard.uk.xensource.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <23003.43689.447516.6588@mariner.uk.xensource.com> On Mon, Oct 09, 2017 at 05:58:17PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote: > (My resend has crossed with your review. Sorry about that.) > > Anthony PERARD writes ("Re: [PATCH 3/8] xen: defer call to xen_restrict until after os_setup_post"): > > On Wed, Oct 04, 2017 at 05:18:06PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote: > > > > +void xen_setup_post(void) > > > +{ > > > + int rc; > > > > We probably want to check here if Xen is enable (via xen_enabled()). > > xen_domid_restrict could be true when Xen is not used, even if it does > > not make sense to use -xen-domid-restrict in that case. > > Should -xen-domid-restrict without xen_enabled() not fail ? IMO it is > normally better for an option which requests enhanced security to fail > when it can't do its job, rather than just hoping that its > inapplicability is intentional. I'm tring to find out what does calling xen_restrict_all(0), when running an non-Xen guest. I think it would just lock(), then unlock() then there should not be any handle to restrict, and return 0; is that right? So I think the code is fine like this. I'll put my Reviewed-by to the last version. Thanks. > OTOH I suppose there is an argument that without xen_enabled() the > function of -xen-domid-restrict is achieved, in that without > xen_enabled() qemu is unable (after dropping privileges) to act on > Xen domains at all... > > Thanks, > Ian. -- Anthony PERARD
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com> To: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/8] xen: defer call to xen_restrict until after os_setup_post Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 12:40:01 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20171010114001.GF1771@perard.uk.xensource.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <23003.43689.447516.6588@mariner.uk.xensource.com> On Mon, Oct 09, 2017 at 05:58:17PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote: > (My resend has crossed with your review. Sorry about that.) > > Anthony PERARD writes ("Re: [PATCH 3/8] xen: defer call to xen_restrict until after os_setup_post"): > > On Wed, Oct 04, 2017 at 05:18:06PM +0100, Ian Jackson wrote: > > > > +void xen_setup_post(void) > > > +{ > > > + int rc; > > > > We probably want to check here if Xen is enable (via xen_enabled()). > > xen_domid_restrict could be true when Xen is not used, even if it does > > not make sense to use -xen-domid-restrict in that case. > > Should -xen-domid-restrict without xen_enabled() not fail ? IMO it is > normally better for an option which requests enhanced security to fail > when it can't do its job, rather than just hoping that its > inapplicability is intentional. I'm tring to find out what does calling xen_restrict_all(0), when running an non-Xen guest. I think it would just lock(), then unlock() then there should not be any handle to restrict, and return 0; is that right? So I think the code is fine like this. I'll put my Reviewed-by to the last version. Thanks. > OTOH I suppose there is an argument that without xen_enabled() the > function of -xen-domid-restrict is achieved, in that without > xen_enabled() qemu is unable (after dropping privileges) to act on > Xen domains at all... > > Thanks, > Ian. -- Anthony PERARD _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org https://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-10-10 17:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-10-04 16:18 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 0/*] xen: xen-domid-restrict improvements Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 1/8] xen: link against xentoolcore Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 2/8] xen: restrict: use xentoolcore_restrict_all Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/8] xen: defer call to xen_restrict until after os_setup_post Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 15:50 ` [Qemu-devel] " Anthony PERARD 2017-10-09 15:50 ` Anthony PERARD 2017-10-09 16:58 ` [Qemu-devel] " Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 16:58 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-10 11:40 ` Anthony PERARD [this message] 2017-10-10 11:40 ` Anthony PERARD 2017-10-10 17:16 ` [Qemu-devel] " Ian Jackson 2017-10-10 17:16 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 17:00 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 4/8] xen: destroy_hvm_domain: Move reason into a variable Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 5/8] xen: move xc_interface compatibility fallback further up the file Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 6/8] xen: destroy_hvm_domain: Try xendevicemodel_shutdown Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 7/8] os-posix: Provide new -runasid option Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 12:47 ` [Qemu-devel] " Ross Lagerwall 2017-10-06 12:47 ` Ross Lagerwall 2017-10-06 14:24 ` [Qemu-devel] " Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 14:24 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 14:39 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 12:59 ` [Qemu-devel] " Peter Maydell 2017-10-06 12:59 ` Peter Maydell 2017-10-06 14:24 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 14:24 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 14:39 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 5:46 ` Markus Armbruster 2017-10-09 5:46 ` Markus Armbruster 2017-10-09 15:05 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 15:05 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 15:24 ` Daniel P. Berrange 2017-10-09 15:24 ` Daniel P. Berrange 2017-10-09 16:52 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 16:52 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 16:59 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-10 7:43 ` Markus Armbruster 2017-10-10 7:43 ` Markus Armbruster 2017-10-10 17:11 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-10 17:11 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-11 9:52 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-09 15:14 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 8/8] RFC configure: do_compiler: Dump some extra info under bash Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 16:18 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 12:58 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 0/*] xen: xen-domid-restrict improvements Ross Lagerwall 2017-10-06 12:58 ` Ross Lagerwall 2017-10-06 13:19 ` [Qemu-devel] [Xen-devel] " Paul Durrant 2017-10-06 13:19 ` Paul Durrant 2017-10-10 13:40 ` [Qemu-devel] [Xen-devel] " Ross Lagerwall 2017-10-10 13:40 ` Ross Lagerwall 2017-10-10 17:21 ` [Qemu-devel] [Xen-devel] " Ian Jackson 2017-10-10 17:21 ` Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 14:17 ` [Qemu-devel] " Ian Jackson 2017-10-06 14:17 ` Ian Jackson -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2017-10-04 15:53 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 0/7] " Ian Jackson 2017-10-04 15:53 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH 3/8] xen: defer call to xen_restrict until after os_setup_post Ian Jackson
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=20171010114001.GF1771@perard.uk.xensource.com \ --to=anthony.perard@citrix.com \ --cc=ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com \ --cc=jgross@suse.com \ --cc=qemu-devel@nongnu.org \ --cc=ross.lagerwall@citrix.com \ --cc=sstabellini@kernel.org \ --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.