* [Part2 PATCH v8 01/38] Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 02/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
` (27 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Jonathan Corbet, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
Create a Documentation entry to describe the AMD Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) feature.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
Documentation/virtual/kvm/00-INDEX | 3 ++
.../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/00-INDEX b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/00-INDEX
index 69fe1a8b7ad1..3da73aabff5a 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/00-INDEX
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/00-INDEX
@@ -26,3 +26,6 @@ s390-diag.txt
- Diagnose hypercall description (for IBM S/390)
timekeeping.txt
- timekeeping virtualization for x86-based architectures.
+amd-memory-encryption.txt
+ - notes on AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization feature and SEV firmware
+ command description
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..a8ef21e737db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+======================================
+Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
+======================================
+
+Overview
+========
+
+Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+
+SEV is an extension to the AMD-V architecture which supports running
+virtual machines (VMs) under the control of a hypervisor. When enabled,
+the memory contents of a VM will be transparently encrypted with a key
+unique to that VM.
+
+The hypervisor can determine the SEV support through the CPUID
+instruction. The CPUID function 0x8000001f reports information related
+to SEV::
+
+ 0x8000001f[eax]:
+ Bit[1] indicates support for SEV
+ ...
+ [ecx]:
+ Bits[31:0] Number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously
+
+If support for SEV is present, MSR 0xc001_0010 (MSR_K8_SYSCFG) and MSR 0xc001_0015
+(MSR_K7_HWCR) can be used to determine if it can be enabled::
+
+ 0xc001_0010:
+ Bit[23] 1 = memory encryption can be enabled
+ 0 = memory encryption can not be enabled
+
+ 0xc001_0015:
+ Bit[0] 1 = memory encryption can be enabled
+ 0 = memory encryption can not be enabled
+
+When SEV support is available, it can be enabled in a specific VM by
+setting the SEV bit before executing VMRUN.::
+
+ VMCB[0x90]:
+ Bit[1] 1 = SEV is enabled
+ 0 = SEV is disabled
+
+SEV hardware uses ASIDs to associate a memory encryption key with a VM.
+Hence, the ASID for the SEV-enabled guests must be from 1 to a maximum value
+defined in the CPUID 0x8000001f[ecx] field.
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 02/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 01/38] Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 03/38] kvm: svm: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
` (26 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Tom Lendacky, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, x86, Brijesh Singh
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature. SEV is identified by
CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of
MSR_K8_SYSCFG and set bit 0 of MSR_K7_HWCR). Only show the SEV feature
as available if reported by CPUID and enabled by BIOS.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 2519c6c801c9..759d29c37686 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SEV ( 7*32+11) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT ( 7*32+15) /* Intel Processor Trace */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 17f5c12e1afd..e399d68029a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -378,6 +378,8 @@
#define MSR_K7_PERFCTR3 0xc0010007
#define MSR_K7_CLK_CTL 0xc001001b
#define MSR_K7_HWCR 0xc0010015
+#define MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK_BIT 0
+#define MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK BIT_ULL(MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK_BIT)
#define MSR_K7_FID_VID_CTL 0xc0010041
#define MSR_K7_FID_VID_STATUS 0xc0010042
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index d58184b7cd44..c1234aa0550c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -556,6 +556,51 @@ static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
}
+static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ /*
+ * BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
+ * For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
+ * the SME physical address space reduction value.
+ * If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
+ * SME feature (set in scattered.c).
+ * For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
+ * SEV feature (set in scattered.c).
+ *
+ * In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
+ * don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
+ /* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ goto clear_all;
+
+ /*
+ * Always adjust physical address bits. Even though this
+ * will be a value above 32-bits this is still done for
+ * CONFIG_X86_32 so that accurate values are reported.
+ */
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ goto clear_all;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, msr);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
+ goto clear_sev;
+
+ return;
+
+clear_all:
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
+clear_sev:
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV);
+ }
+}
+
static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
u32 dummy;
@@ -627,26 +672,7 @@ static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400))
set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
- /*
- * BIOS support is required for SME. If BIOS has enabled SME then
- * adjust x86_phys_bits by the SME physical address space reduction
- * value. If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
- * feature (set in scattered.c). Also, since the SME support requires
- * long mode, don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
- */
- if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME)) {
- u64 msr;
-
- /* Check if SME is enabled */
- rdmsrl(MSR_K8_SYSCFG, msr);
- if (msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT) {
- c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
- clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
- } else {
- clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SME);
- }
- }
+ early_detect_mem_encrypt(c);
}
static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
index 05459ad3db46..63a78d5fe505 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
{ X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
{ X86_FEATURE_SME, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x8000001f, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SEV, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x8000001f, 0 },
{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
};
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 03/38] kvm: svm: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 01/38] Documentation/virtual/kvm: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 02/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Encrypted Virtualization CPU feature Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 04/38] kvm: svm: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
` (25 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Tom Lendacky, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, x86, Brijesh Singh
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Currently the nested_ctl variable in the vmcb_control_area structure is
used to indicate nested paging support. The nested paging support field
is actually defined as bit 0 of the field. In order to support a new
feature flag the usage of the nested_ctl and nested paging support must
be converted to operate on a single bit.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 7 ++++---
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 14835dd205a5..5e3244724c9d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
#define SVM_VM_CR_SVM_LOCK_MASK 0x0008ULL
#define SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK 0x0010ULL
+#define SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE BIT(0)
+
struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_seg {
u16 selector;
u16 attrib;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index b71daed3cca2..93c1b2e77d76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
if (npt_enabled) {
/* Setup VMCB for Nested Paging */
- control->nested_ctl = 1;
+ control->nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE;
clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_INVLPG);
clr_exception_intercept(svm, PF_VECTOR);
clr_cr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR3_READ);
@@ -2918,7 +2918,8 @@ static bool nested_vmcb_checks(struct vmcb *vmcb)
if (vmcb->control.asid == 0)
return false;
- if (vmcb->control.nested_ctl && !npt_enabled)
+ if ((vmcb->control.nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE) &&
+ !npt_enabled)
return false;
return true;
@@ -2932,7 +2933,7 @@ static void enter_svm_guest_mode(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 vmcb_gpa,
else
svm->vcpu.arch.hflags &= ~HF_HIF_MASK;
- if (nested_vmcb->control.nested_ctl) {
+ if (nested_vmcb->control.nested_ctl & SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE) {
kvm_mmu_unload(&svm->vcpu);
svm->nested.nested_cr3 = nested_vmcb->control.nested_cr3;
nested_svm_init_mmu_context(&svm->vcpu);
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 04/38] kvm: svm: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 03/38] kvm: svm: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 05/38] KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
` (24 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Tom Lendacky, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, x86, Brijesh Singh
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Define the SEV enable bit for the VMCB control structure. The hypervisor
will use this bit to enable SEV in the guest.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 5e3244724c9d..e9899ed67c70 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {
#define SVM_VM_CR_SVM_DIS_MASK 0x0010ULL
#define SVM_NESTED_CTL_NP_ENABLE BIT(0)
+#define SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE BIT(1)
struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_seg {
u16 selector;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 05/38] KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 04/38] kvm: svm: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 06/38] KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf Brijesh Singh
` (23 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
Currently, ASID allocation start at 1. Add a svm_vcpu_data.min_asid
which allows supplying a dynamic start ASID.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 93c1b2e77d76..f51462b782d5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
u64 asid_generation;
u32 max_asid;
u32 next_asid;
+ u32 min_asid;
struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
struct page *save_area;
@@ -782,6 +783,7 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
sd->asid_generation = 1;
sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
+ sd->min_asid = 1;
gdt = get_current_gdt_rw();
sd->tss_desc = (struct kvm_ldttss_desc *)(gdt + GDT_ENTRY_TSS);
@@ -2088,7 +2090,7 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
{
if (sd->next_asid > sd->max_asid) {
++sd->asid_generation;
- sd->next_asid = 1;
+ sd->next_asid = sd->min_asid;
svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID;
}
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 06/38] KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 05/38] KVM: SVM: Prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 07/38] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
` (22 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
This CPUID leaf provides the memory encryption support information on
AMD Platform. Its complete description is available in APM volume 2,
Section 15.34
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 6 ++++++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 0099e10eb045..c6473ca825cd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
entry->edx = 0;
break;
case 0x80000000:
- entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x8000001a);
+ entry->eax = min(entry->eax, 0x8000001f);
break;
case 0x80000001:
entry->edx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0001_edx_x86_features;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index f51462b782d5..91f859efddc0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -5163,6 +5163,12 @@ static void svm_set_supported_cpuid(u32 func, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
entry->edx |= SVM_FEATURE_NPT;
break;
+ case 0x8000001F:
+ /* Support memory encryption cpuid if host supports it */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
+ cpuid(0x8000001f, &entry->eax, &entry->ebx,
+ &entry->ecx, &entry->edx);
+
}
}
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 07/38] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 06/38] KVM: X86: Extend CPUID range to include new leaf Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:10 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 08/38] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl Brijesh Singh
` (21 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
If the hardware supports memory encryption then the
KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl can be used by qemu to issue a platform
specific memory encryption commands.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 16 ++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 2 ++
4 files changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
index dd2dd96927b8..e3e29892167e 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
@@ -3394,6 +3394,22 @@ invalid, if invalid pages are written to (e.g. after the end of memory)
or if no page table is present for the addresses (e.g. when using
hugepages).
+4.109 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: an opaque platform specific structure (in/out)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+If the platform supports creating encrypted VMs then this ioctl can be used
+for issuing platform-specific memory encryption commands to manage those
+encrypted VMs.
+
+Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
+(SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
+Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt.
+
5. The kvm_run structure
------------------------
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 7233445a20bd..f7f68c1e6162 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1066,6 +1066,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*pre_enter_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate);
int (*pre_leave_smm)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 smbase);
int (*enable_smi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+ int (*mem_enc_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
};
struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 34c85aa2e2d1..7bbed0c0ba79 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4281,6 +4281,12 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(kvm, &cap);
break;
}
+ case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP: {
+ r = -ENOTTY;
+ if (kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_op)
+ r = kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_op(kvm, argp);
+ break;
+ }
default:
r = -ENOTTY;
}
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 838887587411..4a39d99c5f99 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1356,6 +1356,8 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
/* Available with KVM_CAP_S390_CMMA_MIGRATION */
#define KVM_S390_GET_CMMA_BITS _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, struct kvm_s390_cmma_log)
#define KVM_S390_SET_CMMA_BITS _IOW(KVMIO, 0xb9, struct kvm_s390_cmma_log)
+/* Memory Encryption Commands */
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xba, unsigned long)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 08/38] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:10 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 07/38] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 09/38] crypto: ccp: Build the AMD secure processor driver only with AMD CPU support Brijesh Singh
` (20 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
If hardware supports memory encryption then KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
and KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION ioctl's can be used by userspace to
register/unregister the guest memory regions which may contain the encrypted
data (e.g guest RAM, PCI BAR, SMRAM etc).
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 8 ++++++++
4 files changed, 68 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
index e3e29892167e..2f13260fcc7c 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/api.txt
@@ -3410,6 +3410,40 @@ Currently, this ioctl is used for issuing Secure Encrypted Virtualization
(SEV) commands on AMD Processors. The SEV commands are defined in
Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt.
+4.110 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: struct kvm_enc_region (in)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This ioctl can be used to register a guest memory region which may
+contain encrypted data (e.g. guest RAM, SMRAM etc).
+
+It is used in the SEV-enabled guest. When encryption is enabled, a guest
+memory region may contain encrypted data. The SEV memory encryption
+engine uses a tweak such that two identical plaintext pages, each at
+different locations will have differing ciphertexts. So swapping or
+moving ciphertext of those pages will not result in plaintext being
+swapped. So relocating (or migrating) physical backing pages for the SEV
+guest will require some additional steps.
+
+Note: The current SEV key management spec does not provide commands to
+swap or migrate (move) ciphertext pages. Hence, for now we pin the guest
+memory region registered with the ioctl.
+
+4.111 KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION
+
+Capability: basic
+Architectures: x86
+Type: system
+Parameters: struct kvm_enc_region (in)
+Returns: 0 on success; -1 on error
+
+This ioctl can be used to unregister the guest memory region registered
+with KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION ioctl above.
+
5. The kvm_run structure
------------------------
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index f7f68c1e6162..1be6f17499de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1068,6 +1068,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
int (*enable_smi_window)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
int (*mem_enc_op)(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp);
+ int (*mem_enc_reg_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
+ int (*mem_enc_unreg_region)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *argp);
};
struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 7bbed0c0ba79..926f55cecf2e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4287,6 +4287,30 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
r = kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_op(kvm, argp);
break;
}
+ case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION: {
+ struct kvm_enc_region region;
+
+ r = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(®ion, argp, sizeof(region)))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = -ENOTTY;
+ if (kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_reg_region)
+ r = kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_reg_region(kvm, ®ion);
+ break;
+ }
+ case KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION: {
+ struct kvm_enc_region region;
+
+ r = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_from_user(®ion, argp, sizeof(region)))
+ goto out;
+
+ r = -ENOTTY;
+ if (kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_unreg_region)
+ r = kvm_x86_ops->mem_enc_unreg_region(kvm, ®ion);
+ break;
+ }
default:
r = -ENOTTY;
}
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 4a39d99c5f99..1f9f26a8e111 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1359,6 +1359,14 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
/* Memory Encryption Commands */
#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP _IOWR(KVMIO, 0xba, unsigned long)
+struct kvm_enc_region {
+ __u64 addr;
+ __u64 size;
+};
+
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbb, struct kvm_enc_region)
+#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbc, struct kvm_enc_region)
+
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 09/38] crypto: ccp: Build the AMD secure processor driver only with AMD CPU support
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 08/38] KVM: Introduce KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_{UN,}REG_REGION ioctl Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 10/38] crypto: ccp: Define SEV userspace ioctl and command id Brijesh Singh
` (19 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Borislav Petkov, Brijesh Singh, Tom Lendacky, Gary Hook,
Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, linux-crypto
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
This is AMD-specific hardware so present it in Kconfig only when AMD
CPU support is enabled or on ARM64 where it is also used.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
index 6d626606b9c5..9c84f9838931 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
config CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD
tristate "Secure Processor device driver"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD || ARM64
default m
help
Provides AMD Secure Processor device driver.
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 10/38] crypto: ccp: Define SEV userspace ioctl and command id
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 09/38] crypto: ccp: Build the AMD secure processor driver only with AMD CPU support Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 11/38] crypto: ccp: Define SEV key management " Brijesh Singh
` (18 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
Add a include file which defines the ioctl and command id used for
issuing SEV platform management specific commands.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h | 142 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 142 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3d77fe91239a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * Userspace interface for AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV)
+ * platform management commands.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+ *
+ * SEV spec 0.14 is available at:
+ * http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PSP_SEV_USER_H__
+#define __PSP_SEV_USER_H__
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/**
+ * SEV platform commands
+ */
+enum {
+ SEV_FACTORY_RESET = 0,
+ SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS,
+ SEV_PEK_GEN,
+ SEV_PEK_CSR,
+ SEV_PDH_GEN,
+ SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT,
+ SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT,
+
+ SEV_MAX,
+};
+
+/**
+ * SEV Firmware status code
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ SEV_RET_SUCCESS = 0,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_PLATFORM_STATE,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST_STATE,
+ SEV_RET_INAVLID_CONFIG,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_len,
+ SEV_RET_ALREADY_OWNED,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_CERTIFICATE,
+ SEV_RET_POLICY_FAILURE,
+ SEV_RET_INACTIVE,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS,
+ SEV_RET_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+ SEV_RET_BAD_MEASUREMENT,
+ SEV_RET_ASID_OWNED,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_ASID,
+ SEV_RET_WBINVD_REQUIRED,
+ SEV_RET_DFFLUSH_REQUIRED,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST,
+ SEV_RET_INVALID_COMMAND,
+ SEV_RET_ACTIVE,
+ SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_PLATFORM,
+ SEV_RET_HWSEV_RET_UNSAFE,
+ SEV_RET_UNSUPPORTED,
+ SEV_RET_MAX,
+} sev_ret_code;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_status - PLATFORM_STATUS command parameters
+ *
+ * @major: major API version
+ * @minor: minor API version
+ * @state: platform state
+ * @flags: platform config flags
+ * @build: firmware build id for API version
+ * @guest_count: number of active guests
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_status {
+ __u8 api_major; /* Out */
+ __u8 api_minor; /* Out */
+ __u8 state; /* Out */
+ __u32 flags; /* Out */
+ __u8 build; /* Out */
+ __u32 guest_count; /* Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_pek_csr - PEK_CSR command parameters
+ *
+ * @address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @length: length of certificate
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pek_csr {
+ __u64 address; /* In */
+ __u32 length; /* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_cert_import - PEK_CERT_IMPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pek_address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @pek_len: length of PEK certificate
+ * @oca_address: OCA certificate chain
+ * @oca_len: length of OCA certificate
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pek_cert_import {
+ __u64 pek_cert_address; /* In */
+ __u32 pek_cert_len; /* In */
+ __u64 oca_cert_address; /* In */
+ __u32 oca_cert_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export - PDH_CERT_EXPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pdh_address: PDH certificate address
+ * @pdh_len: length of PDH certificate
+ * @cert_chain_address: PDH certificate chain
+ * @cert_chain_len: length of PDH certificate chain
+ */
+struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export {
+ __u64 pdh_cert_address; /* In */
+ __u32 pdh_cert_len; /* In/Out */
+ __u64 cert_chain_address; /* In */
+ __u32 cert_chain_len; /* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_issue_cmd - SEV ioctl parameters
+ *
+ * @cmd: SEV commands to execute
+ * @opaque: pointer to the command structure
+ * @error: SEV FW return code on failure
+ */
+struct sev_issue_cmd {
+ __u32 cmd; /* In */
+ __u64 data; /* In */
+ __u32 error; /* Out */
+} __packed;
+
+#define SEV_IOC_TYPE 'S'
+#define SEV_ISSUE_CMD _IOWR(SEV_IOC_TYPE, 0x0, struct sev_issue_cmd)
+
+#endif /* __PSP_USER_SEV_H */
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 11/38] crypto: ccp: Define SEV key management command id
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 10/38] crypto: ccp: Define SEV userspace ioctl and command id Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 12/38] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support Brijesh Singh
` (17 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
Define Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) key management command id
and structure. The command definition is available in SEV KM spec
0.14 (http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf)
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
---
include/linux/psp-sev.h | 465 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 465 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 include/linux/psp-sev.h
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4a150d17d537
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,465 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) driver interface
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+ *
+ * SEV spec 0.14 is available at:
+ * http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PSP_SEV_H__
+#define __PSP_SEV_H__
+
+#include <uapi/linux/psp-sev.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#define __psp_pa(x) __sme_pa(x)
+#else
+#define __psp_pa(x) __pa(x)
+#endif
+
+#define SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE 0x4000 /* 16KB */
+
+/**
+ * SEV platform state
+ */
+enum sev_state {
+ SEV_STATE_UNINIT = 0x0,
+ SEV_STATE_INIT = 0x1,
+ SEV_STATE_WORKING = 0x2,
+
+ SEV_STATE_MAX
+};
+
+/**
+ * SEV platform and guest management commands
+ */
+enum sev_cmd {
+ /* platform commands */
+ SEV_CMD_INIT = 0x001,
+ SEV_CMD_SHUTDOWN = 0x002,
+ SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET = 0x003,
+ SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS = 0x004,
+ SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN = 0x005,
+ SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR = 0x006,
+ SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT = 0x007,
+ SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT = 0x008,
+ SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN = 0x009,
+ SEV_CMD_DF_FLUSH = 0x00A,
+
+ /* Guest commands */
+ SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION = 0x020,
+ SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE = 0x021,
+ SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE = 0x022,
+ SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS = 0x023,
+
+ /* Guest launch commands */
+ SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START = 0x030,
+ SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA = 0x031,
+ SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA = 0x032,
+ SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE = 0x033,
+ SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET = 0x034,
+ SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH = 0x035,
+
+ /* Guest migration commands (outgoing) */
+ SEV_CMD_SEND_START = 0x040,
+ SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA = 0x041,
+ SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA = 0x042,
+ SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH = 0x043,
+
+ /* Guest migration commands (incoming) */
+ SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START = 0x050,
+ SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA = 0x051,
+ SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA = 0x052,
+ SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH = 0x053,
+
+ /* Guest debug commands */
+ SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT = 0x060,
+ SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT = 0x061,
+
+ SEV_CMD_MAX,
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_init - INIT command parameters
+ *
+ * @flags: processing flags
+ * @tmr_address: system physical address used for SEV-ES
+ * @tmr_len: len of tmr_address
+ */
+struct sev_data_init {
+ u32 flags; /* In */
+ u32 reserved; /* In */
+ u64 tmr_address; /* In */
+ u32 tmr_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_pek_csr - PEK_CSR command parameters
+ *
+ * @address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @len: len of certificate
+ */
+struct sev_data_pek_csr {
+ u64 address; /* In */
+ u32 len; /* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_cert_import - PEK_CERT_IMPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pek_address: PEK certificate chain
+ * @pek_len: len of PEK certificate
+ * @oca_address: OCA certificate chain
+ * @oca_len: len of OCA certificate
+ */
+struct sev_data_pek_cert_import {
+ u64 pek_cert_address; /* In */
+ u32 pek_cert_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved; /* In */
+ u64 oca_cert_address; /* In */
+ u32 oca_cert_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export - PDH_CERT_EXPORT command parameters
+ *
+ * @pdh_address: PDH certificate address
+ * @pdh_len: len of PDH certificate
+ * @cert_chain_address: PDH certificate chain
+ * @cert_chain_len: len of PDH certificate chain
+ */
+struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export {
+ u64 pdh_cert_address; /* In */
+ u32 pdh_cert_len; /* In/Out */
+ u32 reserved; /* In */
+ u64 cert_chain_address; /* In */
+ u32 cert_chain_len; /* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_decommission - DECOMMISSION command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to decommission
+ */
+struct sev_data_decommission {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_activate - ACTIVATE command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to activate
+ * @asid: asid assigned to the VM
+ */
+struct sev_data_activate {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 asid; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_deactivate - DEACTIVATE command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to deactivate
+ */
+struct sev_data_deactivate {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_guest_status - SEV GUEST_STATUS command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to retrieve status
+ * @policy: policy information for the VM
+ * @asid: current ASID of the VM
+ * @state: current state of the VM
+ */
+struct sev_data_guest_status {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 policy; /* Out */
+ u32 asid; /* Out */
+ u8 state; /* Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_start - LAUNCH_START command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle assigned to the VM
+ * @policy: guest launch policy
+ * @dh_cert_address: physical address of DH certificate blob
+ * @dh_cert_len: len of DH certificate blob
+ * @session_address: physical address of session parameters
+ * @session_len: len of session parameters
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_start {
+ u32 handle; /* In/Out */
+ u32 policy; /* In */
+ u64 dh_cert_address; /* In */
+ u32 dh_cert_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved; /* In */
+ u64 session_address; /* In */
+ u32 session_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_update_data - LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command parameter
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to update
+ * @len: len of memory to be encrypted
+ * @address: physical address of memory region to encrypt
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_update_data {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 reserved;
+ u64 address; /* In */
+ u32 len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa - LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM
+ * @address: physical address of memory region to encrypt
+ * @len: len of memory region to encrypt
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 reserved;
+ u64 address; /* In */
+ u32 len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_measure - LAUNCH_MEASURE command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @address: physical address containing the measurement blob
+ * @len: len of measurement blob
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_measure {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 reserved;
+ u64 address; /* In */
+ u32 len; /* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_secret - LAUNCH_SECRET command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing the packet header
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: system physical address of guest memory region
+ * @guest_len: len of guest_paddr
+ * @trans_address: physical address of transport memory buffer
+ * @trans_len: len of transport memory buffer
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_secret {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 reserved1;
+ u64 hdr_address; /* In */
+ u32 hdr_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved2;
+ u64 guest_address; /* In */
+ u32 guest_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved3;
+ u64 trans_address; /* In */
+ u32 trans_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_launch_finish - LAUNCH_FINISH command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ */
+struct sev_data_launch_finish {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_send_start - SEND_START command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @policy: policy information for the VM
+ * @pdh_cert_address: physical address containing PDH certificate
+ * @pdh_cert_len: len of PDH certificate
+ * @plat_certs_address: physical address containing platform certificate
+ * @plat_certs_len: len of platform certificate
+ * @amd_certs_address: physical address containing AMD certificate
+ * @amd_certs_len: len of AMD certificate
+ * @session_address: physical address containing Session data
+ * @session_len: len of session data
+ */
+struct sev_data_send_start {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 policy; /* Out */
+ u64 pdh_cert_address; /* In */
+ u32 pdh_cert_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved1;
+ u64 plat_cert_address; /* In */
+ u32 plat_cert_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved2;
+ u64 amd_cert_address; /* In */
+ u32 amd_cert_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved3;
+ u64 session_address; /* In */
+ u32 session_len; /* In/Out */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_send_update - SEND_UPDATE_DATA command
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing packet header
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: physical address of guest memory region to send
+ * @guest_len: len of guest memory region to send
+ * @trans_address: physical address of host memory region
+ * @trans_len: len of host memory region
+ */
+struct sev_data_send_update_data {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 reserved1;
+ u64 hdr_address; /* In */
+ u32 hdr_len; /* In/Out */
+ u32 reserved2;
+ u64 guest_address; /* In */
+ u32 guest_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved3;
+ u64 trans_address; /* In */
+ u32 trans_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_send_update - SEND_UPDATE_VMSA command
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing packet header
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: physical address of guest memory region to send
+ * @guest_len: len of guest memory region to send
+ * @trans_address: physical address of host memory region
+ * @trans_len: len of host memory region
+ */
+struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u64 hdr_address; /* In */
+ u32 hdr_len; /* In/Out */
+ u32 reserved2;
+ u64 guest_address; /* In */
+ u32 guest_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved3;
+ u64 trans_address; /* In */
+ u32 trans_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_send_finish - SEND_FINISH command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to process
+ */
+struct sev_data_send_finish {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_receive_start - RECEIVE_START command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to perform receive operation
+ * @pdh_cert_address: system physical address containing PDH certificate blob
+ * @pdh_cert_len: len of PDH certificate blob
+ * @session_address: system physical address containing session blob
+ * @session_len: len of session blob
+ */
+struct sev_data_receive_start {
+ u32 handle; /* In/Out */
+ u32 policy; /* In */
+ u64 pdh_cert_address; /* In */
+ u32 pdh_cert_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved1;
+ u64 session_address; /* In */
+ u32 session_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_receive_update_data - RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to update
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing packet header blob
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: system physical address of guest memory region
+ * @guest_len: len of guest memory region
+ * @trans_address: system physical address of transport buffer
+ * @trans_len: len of transport buffer
+ */
+struct sev_data_receive_update_data {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 reserved1;
+ u64 hdr_address; /* In */
+ u32 hdr_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved2;
+ u64 guest_address; /* In */
+ u32 guest_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved3;
+ u64 trans_address; /* In */
+ u32 trans_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa - RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to update
+ * @hdr_address: physical address containing packet header blob
+ * @hdr_len: len of packet header
+ * @guest_address: system physical address of guest memory region
+ * @guest_len: len of guest memory region
+ * @trans_address: system physical address of transport buffer
+ * @trans_len: len of transport buffer
+ */
+struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 reserved1;
+ u64 hdr_address; /* In */
+ u32 hdr_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved2;
+ u64 guest_address; /* In */
+ u32 guest_len; /* In */
+ u32 reserved3;
+ u64 trans_address; /* In */
+ u32 trans_len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_receive_finish - RECEIVE_FINISH command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to finish
+ */
+struct sev_data_receive_finish {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+/**
+ * struct sev_data_dbg - DBG_ENCRYPT/DBG_DECRYPT command parameters
+ *
+ * @handle: handle of the VM to perform debug operation
+ * @src_addr: source address of data to operate on
+ * @dst_addr: destination address of data to operate on
+ * @len: len of data to operate on
+ */
+struct sev_data_dbg {
+ u32 handle; /* In */
+ u32 reserved;
+ u64 src_addr; /* In */
+ u64 dst_addr; /* In */
+ u32 len; /* In */
+} __packed;
+
+#endif /* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 12/38] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 11/38] crypto: ccp: Define SEV key management " Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 15:42 ` Gary R Hook
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 13/38] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support Brijesh Singh
` (16 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 1 reply; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
The Platform Security Processor (PSP) is part of the AMD Secure
Processor (AMD-SP) functionality. The PSP is a dedicated processor
that provides support for key management commands in Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) mode, along with software-based Trusted Execution
Environment (TEE) to enable third-party trusted applications.
Note that the key management functionality provided by the SEV firmware
can be used outside of the kvm-amd driver hence it doesn't need to
depend on CONFIG_KVM_AMD.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig | 11 +++++
drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c | 26 +++++++++++
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h | 24 +++++++++-
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
index 9c84f9838931..b9dfae47aefd 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
@@ -33,3 +33,14 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_CRYPTO
Support for using the cryptographic API with the AMD Cryptographic
Coprocessor. This module supports offload of SHA and AES algorithms.
If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called ccp_crypto.
+
+config CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+ bool "Platform Security Processor (PSP) device"
+ default y
+ depends on CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD && X86_64
+ help
+ Provide support for the AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP).
+ The PSP is a dedicated processor that provides support for key
+ management commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode,
+ along with software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to
+ enable third-party trusted applications.
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
index 57f8debfcfb3..008bae7e26ec 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP) += ccp-dev.o \
ccp-dmaengine.o \
ccp-debugfs.o
ccp-$(CONFIG_PCI) += sp-pci.o
+ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP) += psp-dev.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_CRYPTO) += ccp-crypto.o
ccp-crypto-objs := ccp-crypto-main.o \
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b5789f878560
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/hw_random.h>
+#include <linux/ccp.h>
+
+#include "sp-dev.h"
+#include "psp-dev.h"
+
+static struct psp_device *psp_alloc_struct(struct sp_device *sp)
+{
+ struct device *dev = sp->dev;
+ struct psp_device *psp;
+
+ psp = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*psp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!psp)
+ return NULL;
+
+ psp->dev = dev;
+ psp->sp = sp;
+
+ snprintf(psp->name, sizeof(psp->name), "psp-%u", sp->ord);
+
+ return psp;
+}
+
+static irqreturn_t psp_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
+{
+ return IRQ_HANDLED;
+}
+
+int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
+{
+ struct device *dev = sp->dev;
+ struct psp_device *psp;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ psp = psp_alloc_struct(sp);
+ if (!psp)
+ goto e_err;
+
+ sp->psp_data = psp;
+
+ psp->vdata = (struct psp_vdata *)sp->dev_vdata->psp_vdata;
+ if (!psp->vdata) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ dev_err(dev, "missing driver data\n");
+ goto e_err;
+ }
+
+ psp->io_regs = sp->io_map + psp->vdata->offset;
+
+ /* Disable and clear interrupts until ready */
+ iowrite32(0, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN);
+ iowrite32(-1, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS);
+
+ /* Request an irq */
+ ret = sp_request_psp_irq(psp->sp, psp_irq_handler, psp->name, psp);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(dev, "psp: unable to allocate an IRQ\n");
+ goto e_err;
+ }
+
+ if (sp->set_psp_master_device)
+ sp->set_psp_master_device(sp);
+
+ /* Enable interrupt */
+ iowrite32(-1, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN);
+
+ return 0;
+
+e_err:
+ sp->psp_data = NULL;
+
+ dev_notice(dev, "psp initialization failed\n");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
+{
+ struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;
+
+ sp_free_psp_irq(sp, psp);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..55b7808367c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface driver
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __PSP_DEV_H__
+#define __PSP_DEV_H__
+
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/dmapool.h>
+#include <linux/hw_random.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irqreturn.h>
+#include <linux/dmaengine.h>
+
+#include "sp-dev.h"
+
+#define PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN 0x0110
+#define PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS 0x0114
+
+#define PSP_C2PMSG_ATTR_0 0x0118
+#define PSP_C2PMSG_ATTR_1 0x011c
+#define PSP_C2PMSG_ATTR_2 0x0120
+#define PSP_C2PMSG_ATTR_3 0x0124
+#define PSP_P2CMSG_ATTR_0 0x0128
+
+#define PSP_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16
+#define PSP_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0)
+#define PSP_CMDRESP_RESP BIT(31)
+#define PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK 0xffff
+
+#define MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN 16
+
+struct psp_device {
+ struct list_head entry;
+
+ struct psp_vdata *vdata;
+ char name[MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN];
+
+ struct device *dev;
+ struct sp_device *sp;
+
+ void __iomem *io_regs;
+};
+
+#endif /* __PSP_DEV_H */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
index bef387c8abfd..cf101c039c8f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
@@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ int sp_init(struct sp_device *sp)
if (sp->dev_vdata->ccp_vdata)
ccp_dev_init(sp);
+ if (sp->dev_vdata->psp_vdata)
+ psp_dev_init(sp);
return 0;
}
@@ -206,6 +208,9 @@ void sp_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
if (sp->dev_vdata->ccp_vdata)
ccp_dev_destroy(sp);
+ if (sp->dev_vdata->psp_vdata)
+ psp_dev_destroy(sp);
+
sp_del_device(sp);
}
@@ -237,6 +242,27 @@ int sp_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
}
#endif
+struct sp_device *sp_get_psp_master_device(void)
+{
+ struct sp_device *i, *ret = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ write_lock_irqsave(&sp_unit_lock, flags);
+ if (list_empty(&sp_units))
+ goto unlock;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(i, &sp_units, entry) {
+ if (i->psp_data)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i->get_psp_master_device)
+ ret = i->get_psp_master_device();
+unlock:
+ write_unlock_irqrestore(&sp_unit_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
index 5ab486ade1ad..909cf3e436b4 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
@@ -42,12 +42,17 @@ struct ccp_vdata {
const unsigned int offset;
const unsigned int rsamax;
};
+
+struct psp_vdata {
+ const unsigned int offset;
+};
+
/* Structure to hold SP device data */
struct sp_dev_vdata {
const unsigned int bar;
const struct ccp_vdata *ccp_vdata;
- void *psp_vdata;
+ const struct psp_vdata *psp_vdata;
};
struct sp_device {
@@ -68,6 +73,10 @@ struct sp_device {
/* DMA caching attribute support */
unsigned int axcache;
+ /* get and set master device */
+ struct sp_device*(*get_psp_master_device)(void);
+ void (*set_psp_master_device)(struct sp_device *);
+
bool irq_registered;
bool use_tasklet;
@@ -103,6 +112,7 @@ void sp_free_ccp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, void *data);
int sp_request_psp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, irq_handler_t handler,
const char *name, void *data);
void sp_free_psp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, void *data);
+struct sp_device *sp_get_psp_master_device(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
@@ -130,4 +140,16 @@ static inline int ccp_dev_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+
+int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp);
+void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp);
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
+
+static inline int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp) { return 0; }
+static inline void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp) { }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
+
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
index 9859aa683a28..f5f43c50698a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/ccp.h>
#include "ccp-dev.h"
+#include "psp-dev.h"
#define MSIX_VECTORS 2
@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ struct sp_pci {
int msix_count;
struct msix_entry msix_entry[MSIX_VECTORS];
};
+static struct sp_device *sp_dev_master;
static int sp_get_msix_irqs(struct sp_device *sp)
{
@@ -108,6 +110,45 @@ static void sp_free_irqs(struct sp_device *sp)
sp->psp_irq = 0;
}
+static bool sp_pci_is_master(struct sp_device *sp)
+{
+ struct device *dev_cur, *dev_new;
+ struct pci_dev *pdev_cur, *pdev_new;
+
+ dev_new = sp->dev;
+ dev_cur = sp_dev_master->dev;
+
+ pdev_new = to_pci_dev(dev_new);
+ pdev_cur = to_pci_dev(dev_cur);
+
+ if (pdev_new->bus->number < pdev_cur->bus->number)
+ return true;
+
+ if (PCI_SLOT(pdev_new->devfn) < PCI_SLOT(pdev_cur->devfn))
+ return true;
+
+ if (PCI_FUNC(pdev_new->devfn) < PCI_FUNC(pdev_cur->devfn))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void psp_set_master(struct sp_device *sp)
+{
+ if (!sp_dev_master) {
+ sp_dev_master = sp;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (sp_pci_is_master(sp))
+ sp_dev_master = sp;
+}
+
+static struct sp_device *psp_get_master(void)
+{
+ return sp_dev_master;
+}
+
static int sp_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
{
struct sp_device *sp;
@@ -166,6 +207,8 @@ static int sp_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
goto e_err;
pci_set_master(pdev);
+ sp->set_psp_master_device = psp_set_master;
+ sp->get_psp_master_device = psp_get_master;
ret = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(48));
if (ret) {
@@ -225,6 +268,12 @@ static int sp_pci_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+static const struct psp_vdata psp_entry = {
+ .offset = 0x10500,
+};
+#endif
+
static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
{
.bar = 2,
@@ -237,6 +286,9 @@ static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
.ccp_vdata = &ccpv5a,
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+ .psp_vdata = &psp_entry
+#endif
},
{
.bar = 2,
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* Re: [Part2 PATCH v8 12/38] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 12/38] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-07 15:42 ` Gary R Hook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Gary R Hook @ 2017-11-07 15:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Brijesh Singh, kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Tom Lendacky, linux-crypto
On 11/06/2017 12:11 PM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The Platform Security Processor (PSP) is part of the AMD Secure
> Processor (AMD-SP) functionality. The PSP is a dedicated processor
> that provides support for key management commands in Secure Encrypted
> Virtualization (SEV) mode, along with software-based Trusted Execution
> Environment (TEE) to enable third-party trusted applications.
>
> Note that the key management functionality provided by the SEV firmware
> can be used outside of the kvm-amd driver hence it doesn't need to
> depend on CONFIG_KVM_AMD.
>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig | 11 +++++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile | 1 +
> drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c | 26 +++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h | 24 +++++++++-
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 7 files changed, 277 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
> index 9c84f9838931..b9dfae47aefd 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Kconfig
> @@ -33,3 +33,14 @@ config CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_CRYPTO
> Support for using the cryptographic API with the AMD Cryptographic
> Coprocessor. This module supports offload of SHA and AES algorithms.
> If you choose 'M' here, this module will be called ccp_crypto.
> +
> +config CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> + bool "Platform Security Processor (PSP) device"
> + default y
> + depends on CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD && X86_64
> + help
> + Provide support for the AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP).
> + The PSP is a dedicated processor that provides support for key
> + management commands in Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) mode,
> + along with software-based Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to
> + enable third-party trusted applications.
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
> index 57f8debfcfb3..008bae7e26ec 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/Makefile
> @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP) += ccp-dev.o \
> ccp-dmaengine.o \
> ccp-debugfs.o
> ccp-$(CONFIG_PCI) += sp-pci.o
> +ccp-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP) += psp-dev.o
>
> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_CRYPTO) += ccp-crypto.o
> ccp-crypto-objs := ccp-crypto-main.o \
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b5789f878560
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
> +/*
> + * AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
> + *
> + * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/kthread.h>
> +#include <linux/sched.h>
> +#include <linux/interrupt.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
> +#include <linux/types.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +#include <linux/delay.h>
> +#include <linux/hw_random.h>
> +#include <linux/ccp.h>
> +
> +#include "sp-dev.h"
> +#include "psp-dev.h"
> +
> +static struct psp_device *psp_alloc_struct(struct sp_device *sp)
> +{
> + struct device *dev = sp->dev;
> + struct psp_device *psp;
> +
> + psp = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*psp), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!psp)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + psp->dev = dev;
> + psp->sp = sp;
> +
> + snprintf(psp->name, sizeof(psp->name), "psp-%u", sp->ord);
> +
> + return psp;
> +}
> +
> +static irqreturn_t psp_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
> +{
> + return IRQ_HANDLED;
> +}
> +
> +int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
> +{
> + struct device *dev = sp->dev;
> + struct psp_device *psp;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + psp = psp_alloc_struct(sp);
> + if (!psp)
> + goto e_err;
> +
> + sp->psp_data = psp;
> +
> + psp->vdata = (struct psp_vdata *)sp->dev_vdata->psp_vdata;
> + if (!psp->vdata) {
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + dev_err(dev, "missing driver data\n");
> + goto e_err;
> + }
> +
> + psp->io_regs = sp->io_map + psp->vdata->offset;
> +
> + /* Disable and clear interrupts until ready */
> + iowrite32(0, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN);
> + iowrite32(-1, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS);
> +
> + /* Request an irq */
> + ret = sp_request_psp_irq(psp->sp, psp_irq_handler, psp->name, psp);
> + if (ret) {
> + dev_err(dev, "psp: unable to allocate an IRQ\n");
> + goto e_err;
> + }
> +
> + if (sp->set_psp_master_device)
> + sp->set_psp_master_device(sp);
> +
> + /* Enable interrupt */
> + iowrite32(-1, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN);
> +
> + return 0;
> +
> +e_err:
> + sp->psp_data = NULL;
> +
> + dev_notice(dev, "psp initialization failed\n");
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
> +{
> + struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;
> +
> + sp_free_psp_irq(sp, psp);
> +}
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..55b7808367c3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
> +/*
> + * AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP) interface driver
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2017 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
> + *
> + * Author: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> + *
> + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
> + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
> + * published by the Free Software Foundation.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef __PSP_DEV_H__
> +#define __PSP_DEV_H__
> +
> +#include <linux/device.h>
> +#include <linux/pci.h>
> +#include <linux/spinlock.h>
> +#include <linux/mutex.h>
> +#include <linux/list.h>
> +#include <linux/wait.h>
> +#include <linux/dmapool.h>
> +#include <linux/hw_random.h>
> +#include <linux/bitops.h>
> +#include <linux/interrupt.h>
> +#include <linux/irqreturn.h>
> +#include <linux/dmaengine.h>
> +
> +#include "sp-dev.h"
> +
> +#define PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN 0x0110
> +#define PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS 0x0114
> +
> +#define PSP_C2PMSG_ATTR_0 0x0118
> +#define PSP_C2PMSG_ATTR_1 0x011c
> +#define PSP_C2PMSG_ATTR_2 0x0120
> +#define PSP_C2PMSG_ATTR_3 0x0124
> +#define PSP_P2CMSG_ATTR_0 0x0128
> +
> +#define PSP_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT 16
> +#define PSP_CMDRESP_IOC BIT(0)
> +#define PSP_CMDRESP_RESP BIT(31)
> +#define PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK 0xffff
> +
> +#define MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN 16
> +
> +struct psp_device {
> + struct list_head entry;
> +
> + struct psp_vdata *vdata;
> + char name[MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN];
> +
> + struct device *dev;
> + struct sp_device *sp;
> +
> + void __iomem *io_regs;
> +};
> +
> +#endif /* __PSP_DEV_H */
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
> index bef387c8abfd..cf101c039c8f 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
> @@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ int sp_init(struct sp_device *sp)
> if (sp->dev_vdata->ccp_vdata)
> ccp_dev_init(sp);
>
> + if (sp->dev_vdata->psp_vdata)
> + psp_dev_init(sp);
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -206,6 +208,9 @@ void sp_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
> if (sp->dev_vdata->ccp_vdata)
> ccp_dev_destroy(sp);
>
> + if (sp->dev_vdata->psp_vdata)
> + psp_dev_destroy(sp);
> +
> sp_del_device(sp);
> }
>
> @@ -237,6 +242,27 @@ int sp_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
> }
> #endif
>
> +struct sp_device *sp_get_psp_master_device(void)
> +{
> + struct sp_device *i, *ret = NULL;
> + unsigned long flags;
> +
> + write_lock_irqsave(&sp_unit_lock, flags);
> + if (list_empty(&sp_units))
> + goto unlock;
> +
> + list_for_each_entry(i, &sp_units, entry) {
> + if (i->psp_data)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + if (i->get_psp_master_device)
> + ret = i->get_psp_master_device();
> +unlock:
> + write_unlock_irqrestore(&sp_unit_lock, flags);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
> index 5ab486ade1ad..909cf3e436b4 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
> @@ -42,12 +42,17 @@ struct ccp_vdata {
> const unsigned int offset;
> const unsigned int rsamax;
> };
> +
> +struct psp_vdata {
> + const unsigned int offset;
> +};
> +
> /* Structure to hold SP device data */
> struct sp_dev_vdata {
> const unsigned int bar;
>
> const struct ccp_vdata *ccp_vdata;
> - void *psp_vdata;
> + const struct psp_vdata *psp_vdata;
> };
>
> struct sp_device {
> @@ -68,6 +73,10 @@ struct sp_device {
> /* DMA caching attribute support */
> unsigned int axcache;
>
> + /* get and set master device */
> + struct sp_device*(*get_psp_master_device)(void);
> + void (*set_psp_master_device)(struct sp_device *);
> +
> bool irq_registered;
> bool use_tasklet;
>
> @@ -103,6 +112,7 @@ void sp_free_ccp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, void *data);
> int sp_request_psp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, irq_handler_t handler,
> const char *name, void *data);
> void sp_free_psp_irq(struct sp_device *sp, void *data);
> +struct sp_device *sp_get_psp_master_device(void);
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
>
> @@ -130,4 +140,16 @@ static inline int ccp_dev_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP */
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> +
> +int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp);
> +void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp);
> +
> +#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
> +
> +static inline int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp) { return 0; }
> +static inline void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp) { }
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
> +
> #endif
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
> index 9859aa683a28..f5f43c50698a 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-pci.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
> #include <linux/ccp.h>
>
> #include "ccp-dev.h"
> +#include "psp-dev.h"
>
> #define MSIX_VECTORS 2
>
> @@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ struct sp_pci {
> int msix_count;
> struct msix_entry msix_entry[MSIX_VECTORS];
> };
> +static struct sp_device *sp_dev_master;
>
> static int sp_get_msix_irqs(struct sp_device *sp)
> {
> @@ -108,6 +110,45 @@ static void sp_free_irqs(struct sp_device *sp)
> sp->psp_irq = 0;
> }
>
> +static bool sp_pci_is_master(struct sp_device *sp)
> +{
> + struct device *dev_cur, *dev_new;
> + struct pci_dev *pdev_cur, *pdev_new;
> +
> + dev_new = sp->dev;
> + dev_cur = sp_dev_master->dev;
> +
> + pdev_new = to_pci_dev(dev_new);
> + pdev_cur = to_pci_dev(dev_cur);
> +
> + if (pdev_new->bus->number < pdev_cur->bus->number)
> + return true;
> +
> + if (PCI_SLOT(pdev_new->devfn) < PCI_SLOT(pdev_cur->devfn))
> + return true;
> +
> + if (PCI_FUNC(pdev_new->devfn) < PCI_FUNC(pdev_cur->devfn))
> + return true;
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static void psp_set_master(struct sp_device *sp)
> +{
> + if (!sp_dev_master) {
> + sp_dev_master = sp;
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (sp_pci_is_master(sp))
> + sp_dev_master = sp;
> +}
> +
> +static struct sp_device *psp_get_master(void)
> +{
> + return sp_dev_master;
> +}
> +
> static int sp_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
> {
> struct sp_device *sp;
> @@ -166,6 +207,8 @@ static int sp_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
> goto e_err;
>
> pci_set_master(pdev);
> + sp->set_psp_master_device = psp_set_master;
> + sp->get_psp_master_device = psp_get_master;
>
> ret = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(48));
> if (ret) {
> @@ -225,6 +268,12 @@ static int sp_pci_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> }
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> +static const struct psp_vdata psp_entry = {
> + .offset = 0x10500,
> +};
> +#endif
> +
> static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
> {
> .bar = 2,
> @@ -237,6 +286,9 @@ static const struct sp_dev_vdata dev_vdata[] = {
> #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_CCP
> .ccp_vdata = &ccpv5a,
> #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> + .psp_vdata = &psp_entry
> +#endif
> },
> {
> .bar = 2,
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread
* [Part2 PATCH v8 13/38] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 12/38] crypto: ccp: Add Platform Security Processor (PSP) device support Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 15:47 ` Gary R Hook
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 14/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_FACTORY_RESET ioctl command Brijesh Singh
` (15 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 1 reply; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
AMD's new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature allows the
memory contents of virtual machines to be transparently encrypted with a
key unique to the VM. The programming and management of the encryption
keys are handled by the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) which exposes the
commands for these tasks. The complete spec is available at:
http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
Extend the AMD-SP driver to provide the following support:
- an in-kernel API to communicate with the SEV firmware. The API can be
used by the hypervisor to create encryption context for a SEV guest.
- a userspace IOCTL to manage the platform certificates.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 344 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h | 24 +++
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c | 9 ++
drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h | 4 +
include/linux/psp-sev.h | 137 +++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 518 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index b5789f878560..9915a6c604a3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
#include "sp-dev.h"
#include "psp-dev.h"
+#define DEVICE_NAME "sev"
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_cmd_mutex);
+static struct sev_misc_dev *misc_dev;
+static struct psp_device *psp_master;
+
static struct psp_device *psp_alloc_struct(struct sp_device *sp)
{
struct device *dev = sp->dev;
@@ -45,9 +51,285 @@ static struct psp_device *psp_alloc_struct(struct sp_device *sp)
static irqreturn_t psp_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
{
+ struct psp_device *psp = data;
+ unsigned int status;
+ int reg;
+
+ /* Read the interrupt status: */
+ status = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS);
+
+ /* Check if it is command completion: */
+ if (!(status & BIT(PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG)))
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Check if it is SEV command completion: */
+ reg = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
+ if (reg & PSP_CMDRESP_RESP) {
+ psp->sev_int_rcvd = 1;
+ wake_up(&psp->sev_int_queue);
+ }
+
+done:
+ /* Clear the interrupt status by writing the same value we read. */
+ iowrite32(status, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS);
+
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
+static void sev_wait_cmd_ioc(struct psp_device *psp, unsigned int *reg)
+{
+ psp->sev_int_rcvd = 0;
+
+ wait_event(psp->sev_int_queue, psp->sev_int_rcvd);
+ *reg = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
+}
+
+static int sev_cmd_buffer_len(int cmd)
+{
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SEV_CMD_INIT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_init);
+ case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: return sizeof(struct sev_user_data_status);
+ case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_csr);
+ case SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_cert_import);
+ case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export);
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_start);
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_update_data);
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa);
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_finish);
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_measure);
+ case SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_activate);
+ case SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_deactivate);
+ case SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION: return sizeof(struct sev_data_decommission);
+ case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: return sizeof(struct sev_data_guest_status);
+ case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_dbg);
+ case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_dbg);
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_start);
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_update_data);
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa);
+ case SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_finish);
+ case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_start);
+ case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH: return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_finish);
+ case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_update_data);
+ case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa);
+ case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_secret);
+ default: return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
+{
+ struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
+ unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb;
+ unsigned int reg, ret = 0;
+
+ if (!psp)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */
+ phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
+ phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
+
+ dev_dbg(psp->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x\n",
+ cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb);
+
+ print_hex_dump_debug("(in): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
+ sev_cmd_buffer_len(cmd), false);
+
+ iowrite32(phys_lsb, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_LO);
+ iowrite32(phys_msb, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_HI);
+
+ reg = cmd;
+ reg <<= PSP_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT;
+ reg |= PSP_CMDRESP_IOC;
+ iowrite32(reg, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
+
+ /* wait for command completion */
+ sev_wait_cmd_ioc(psp, ®);
+
+ if (psp_ret)
+ *psp_ret = reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK;
+
+ if (reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK) {
+ dev_dbg(psp->dev, "sev command %#x failed (%#010x)\n",
+ cmd, reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK);
+ ret = -EIO;
+ }
+
+ print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
+ sev_cmd_buffer_len(cmd), false);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+ rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, data, psp_ret);
+ mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
+{
+ struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!psp)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (psp->sev_state == SEV_STATE_INIT)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, &psp->init_cmd_buf, error);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ psp->sev_state = SEV_STATE_INIT;
+ dev_dbg(psp->dev, "SEV firmware initialized\n");
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int sev_platform_init(int *error)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+ rc = __sev_platform_init_locked(error);
+ mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
+
+static int __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(int *error)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SHUTDOWN, 0, error);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ psp_master->sev_state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT;
+ dev_dbg(psp_master->dev, "SEV firmware shutdown\n");
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+ rc = __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(NULL);
+ mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return -ENOTTY;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sev_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = sev_ioctl,
+};
+
+int sev_platform_status(struct sev_user_data_status *data, int *error)
+{
+ return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_status);
+
+int sev_guest_deactivate(struct sev_data_deactivate *data, int *error)
+{
+ return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_deactivate);
+
+int sev_guest_activate(struct sev_data_activate *data, int *error)
+{
+ return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_activate);
+
+int sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error)
+{
+ return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_decommission);
+
+int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error)
+{
+ return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DF_FLUSH, 0, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_df_flush);
+
+static void sev_exit(struct kref *ref)
+{
+ struct sev_misc_dev *misc_dev = container_of(ref, struct sev_misc_dev, refcount);
+
+ misc_deregister(&misc_dev->misc);
+}
+
+static int sev_misc_init(struct psp_device *psp)
+{
+ struct device *dev = psp->dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * SEV feature support can be detected on multiple devices but the SEV
+ * FW commands must be issued on the master. During probe, we do not
+ * know the master hence we create /dev/sev on the first device probe.
+ * sev_do_cmd() finds the right master device to which to issue the
+ * command to the firmware.
+ */
+ if (!misc_dev) {
+ struct miscdevice *misc;
+
+ misc_dev = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*misc_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!misc_dev)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ misc = &misc_dev->misc;
+ misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
+ misc->name = DEVICE_NAME;
+ misc->fops = &sev_fops;
+
+ ret = misc_register(misc);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ kref_init(&misc_dev->refcount);
+ } else {
+ kref_get(&misc_dev->refcount);
+ }
+
+ init_waitqueue_head(&psp->sev_int_queue);
+ psp->sev_misc = misc_dev;
+ dev_dbg(dev, "registered SEV device\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
+{
+ /* Check if device supports SEV feature */
+ if (!(ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_FEATURE_REG) & 1)) {
+ dev_dbg(psp->dev, "device does not support SEV\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return sev_misc_init(psp);
+}
+
int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
{
struct device *dev = sp->dev;
@@ -81,6 +363,10 @@ int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
goto e_err;
}
+ ret = sev_init(psp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_irq;
+
if (sp->set_psp_master_device)
sp->set_psp_master_device(sp);
@@ -89,6 +375,8 @@ int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
return 0;
+e_irq:
+ sp_free_psp_irq(psp->sp, psp);
e_err:
sp->psp_data = NULL;
@@ -101,5 +389,61 @@ void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
{
struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;
+ if (psp->sev_misc)
+ kref_put(&misc_dev->refcount, sev_exit);
+
sp_free_psp_irq(sp, psp);
}
+
+int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
+ void *data, int *error)
+{
+ if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
+ return -EBADF;
+
+ return sev_do_cmd(cmd, data, error);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_issue_cmd_external_user);
+
+void psp_pci_init(void)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_status *status;
+ struct sp_device *sp;
+ int error, rc;
+
+ sp = sp_get_psp_master_device();
+ if (!sp)
+ return;
+
+ psp_master = sp->psp_data;
+
+ /* Initialize the platform */
+ rc = sev_platform_init(&error);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(sp->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Display SEV firmware version */
+ status = &psp_master->status_cmd_buf;
+ rc = sev_platform_status(status, &error);
+ if (rc) {
+ dev_err(sp->dev, "SEV: failed to get status error %#x\n", error);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ dev_info(sp->dev, "SEV API:%d.%d build:%d\n", status->api_major,
+ status->api_minor, status->build);
+ return;
+
+err:
+ psp_master = NULL;
+}
+
+void psp_pci_exit(void)
+{
+ if (!psp_master)
+ return;
+
+ sev_platform_shutdown(NULL);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
index 55b7808367c3..c81f0b11287a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
@@ -25,9 +25,21 @@
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/irqreturn.h>
#include <linux/dmaengine.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include "sp-dev.h"
+#define PSP_C2PMSG(_num) ((_num) << 2)
+#define PSP_CMDRESP PSP_C2PMSG(32)
+#define PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_LO PSP_C2PMSG(56)
+#define PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_HI PSP_C2PMSG(57)
+#define PSP_FEATURE_REG PSP_C2PMSG(63)
+
+#define PSP_P2CMSG(_num) ((_num) << 2)
+#define PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG 1
+#define PSP_CMD_COMPLETE PSP_P2CMSG(PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG)
+
#define PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN 0x0110
#define PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS 0x0114
@@ -44,6 +56,11 @@
#define MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN 16
+struct sev_misc_dev {
+ struct kref refcount;
+ struct miscdevice misc;
+};
+
struct psp_device {
struct list_head entry;
@@ -54,6 +71,13 @@ struct psp_device {
struct sp_device *sp;
void __iomem *io_regs;
+
+ int sev_state;
+ unsigned int sev_int_rcvd;
+ wait_queue_head_t sev_int_queue;
+ struct sev_misc_dev *sev_misc;
+ struct sev_user_data_status status_cmd_buf;
+ struct sev_data_init init_cmd_buf;
};
#endif /* __PSP_DEV_H */
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
index cf101c039c8f..eb0da6572720 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
@@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
if (ret)
return ret;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+ psp_pci_init();
+#endif
+
return 0;
#endif
@@ -291,6 +295,11 @@ static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
static void __exit sp_mod_exit(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_X86
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+ psp_pci_exit();
+#endif
+
sp_pci_exit();
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
index 909cf3e436b4..acb197b66ced 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
@@ -143,12 +143,16 @@ static inline int ccp_dev_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp);
+void psp_pci_init(void);
void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp);
+void psp_pci_exit(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
static inline int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp) { return 0; }
+static inline void psp_pci_init(void) { }
static inline void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp) { }
+static inline void psp_pci_exit(void) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
index 4a150d17d537..0b6dd306d88b 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -462,4 +462,141 @@ struct sev_data_dbg {
u32 len; /* In */
} __packed;
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+
+/**
+ * sev_platform_init - perform SEV INIT command
+ *
+ * @error: SEV command return code
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 if the SEV successfully processed the command
+ * -%ENODEV if the SEV device is not available
+ * -%ENOTSUPP if the SEV does not support SEV
+ * -%ETIMEDOUT if the SEV command timed out
+ * -%EIO if the SEV returned a non-zero return code
+ */
+int sev_platform_init(int *error);
+
+/**
+ * sev_platform_status - perform SEV PLATFORM_STATUS command
+ *
+ * @status: sev_user_data_status structure to be processed
+ * @error: SEV command return code
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 if the SEV successfully processed the command
+ * -%ENODEV if the SEV device is not available
+ * -%ENOTSUPP if the SEV does not support SEV
+ * -%ETIMEDOUT if the SEV command timed out
+ * -%EIO if the SEV returned a non-zero return code
+ */
+int sev_platform_status(struct sev_user_data_status *status, int *error);
+
+/**
+ * sev_issue_cmd_external_user - issue SEV command by other driver with a file
+ * handle.
+ *
+ * This function can be used by other drivers to issue a SEV command on
+ * behalf of userspace. The caller must pass a valid SEV file descriptor
+ * so that we know that it has access to SEV device.
+ *
+ * @filep - SEV device file pointer
+ * @cmd - command to issue
+ * @data - command buffer
+ * @error: SEV command return code
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 if the SEV successfully processed the command
+ * -%ENODEV if the SEV device is not available
+ * -%ENOTSUPP if the SEV does not support SEV
+ * -%ETIMEDOUT if the SEV command timed out
+ * -%EIO if the SEV returned a non-zero return code
+ * -%EINVAL if the SEV file descriptor is not valid
+ */
+int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int id,
+ void *data, int *error);
+
+/**
+ * sev_guest_deactivate - perform SEV DEACTIVATE command
+ *
+ * @deactivate: sev_data_deactivate structure to be processed
+ * @sev_ret: sev command return code
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
+ * -%ENODEV if the sev device is not available
+ * -%ENOTSUPP if the sev does not support SEV
+ * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
+ * -%EIO if the sev returned a non-zero return code
+ */
+int sev_guest_deactivate(struct sev_data_deactivate *data, int *error);
+
+/**
+ * sev_guest_activate - perform SEV ACTIVATE command
+ *
+ * @activate: sev_data_activate structure to be processed
+ * @sev_ret: sev command return code
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
+ * -%ENODEV if the sev device is not available
+ * -%ENOTSUPP if the sev does not support SEV
+ * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
+ * -%EIO if the sev returned a non-zero return code
+ */
+int sev_guest_activate(struct sev_data_activate *data, int *error);
+
+/**
+ * sev_guest_df_flush - perform SEV DF_FLUSH command
+ *
+ * @sev_ret: sev command return code
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
+ * -%ENODEV if the sev device is not available
+ * -%ENOTSUPP if the sev does not support SEV
+ * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
+ * -%EIO if the sev returned a non-zero return code
+ */
+int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error);
+
+/**
+ * sev_guest_decommission - perform SEV DECOMMISSION command
+ *
+ * @decommission: sev_data_decommission structure to be processed
+ * @sev_ret: sev command return code
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
+ * -%ENODEV if the sev device is not available
+ * -%ENOTSUPP if the sev does not support SEV
+ * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
+ * -%EIO if the sev returned a non-zero return code
+ */
+int sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error);
+
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
+
+static inline int
+sev_platform_status(struct sev_user_data_status *status, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
+
+static inline int sev_platform_init(int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
+
+static inline int
+sev_guest_deactivate(struct sev_data_deactivate *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
+
+static inline int
+sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
+
+static inline int
+sev_guest_activate(struct sev_data_activate *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
+
+static inline int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
+
+static inline int
+sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int id, void *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
+
#endif /* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* Re: [Part2 PATCH v8 13/38] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 13/38] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-07 15:47 ` Gary R Hook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Gary R Hook @ 2017-11-07 15:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Brijesh Singh, kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Tom Lendacky, linux-crypto
On 11/06/2017 12:11 PM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> AMD's new Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) feature allows the
> memory contents of virtual machines to be transparently encrypted with a
> key unique to the VM. The programming and management of the encryption
> keys are handled by the AMD Secure Processor (AMD-SP) which exposes the
> commands for these tasks. The complete spec is available at:
>
> http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
>
> Extend the AMD-SP driver to provide the following support:
>
> - an in-kernel API to communicate with the SEV firmware. The API can be
> used by the hypervisor to create encryption context for a SEV guest.
>
> - a userspace IOCTL to manage the platform certificates.
>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 344 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h | 24 +++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c | 9 ++
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h | 4 +
> include/linux/psp-sev.h | 137 +++++++++++++++++
> 5 files changed, 518 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> index b5789f878560..9915a6c604a3 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> @@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
> #include "sp-dev.h"
> #include "psp-dev.h"
>
> +#define DEVICE_NAME "sev"
> +
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_cmd_mutex);
> +static struct sev_misc_dev *misc_dev;
> +static struct psp_device *psp_master;
> +
> static struct psp_device *psp_alloc_struct(struct sp_device *sp)
> {
> struct device *dev = sp->dev;
> @@ -45,9 +51,285 @@ static struct psp_device *psp_alloc_struct(struct sp_device *sp)
>
> static irqreturn_t psp_irq_handler(int irq, void *data)
> {
> + struct psp_device *psp = data;
> + unsigned int status;
> + int reg;
> +
> + /* Read the interrupt status: */
> + status = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS);
> +
> + /* Check if it is command completion: */
> + if (!(status & BIT(PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG)))
> + goto done;
> +
> + /* Check if it is SEV command completion: */
> + reg = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
> + if (reg & PSP_CMDRESP_RESP) {
> + psp->sev_int_rcvd = 1;
> + wake_up(&psp->sev_int_queue);
> + }
> +
> +done:
> + /* Clear the interrupt status by writing the same value we read. */
> + iowrite32(status, psp->io_regs + PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS);
> +
> return IRQ_HANDLED;
> }
>
> +static void sev_wait_cmd_ioc(struct psp_device *psp, unsigned int *reg)
> +{
> + psp->sev_int_rcvd = 0;
> +
> + wait_event(psp->sev_int_queue, psp->sev_int_rcvd);
> + *reg = ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_cmd_buffer_len(int cmd)
> +{
> + switch (cmd) {
> + case SEV_CMD_INIT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_init);
> + case SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS: return sizeof(struct sev_user_data_status);
> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_csr);
> + case SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pek_cert_import);
> + case SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export);
> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_start);
> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_update_data);
> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa);
> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_finish);
> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_measure);
> + case SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_activate);
> + case SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE: return sizeof(struct sev_data_deactivate);
> + case SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION: return sizeof(struct sev_data_decommission);
> + case SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS: return sizeof(struct sev_data_guest_status);
> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_dbg);
> + case SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT: return sizeof(struct sev_data_dbg);
> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_START: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_start);
> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_update_data);
> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_update_vmsa);
> + case SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH: return sizeof(struct sev_data_send_finish);
> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START: return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_start);
> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH: return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_finish);
> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_update_data);
> + case SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA: return sizeof(struct sev_data_receive_update_vmsa);
> + case SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET: return sizeof(struct sev_data_launch_secret);
> + default: return 0;
> + }
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
> +{
> + struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
> + unsigned int phys_lsb, phys_msb;
> + unsigned int reg, ret = 0;
> +
> + if (!psp)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + /* Get the physical address of the command buffer */
> + phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
> + phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
> +
> + dev_dbg(psp->dev, "sev command id %#x buffer 0x%08x%08x\n",
> + cmd, phys_msb, phys_lsb);
> +
> + print_hex_dump_debug("(in): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
> + sev_cmd_buffer_len(cmd), false);
> +
> + iowrite32(phys_lsb, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_LO);
> + iowrite32(phys_msb, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_HI);
> +
> + reg = cmd;
> + reg <<= PSP_CMDRESP_CMD_SHIFT;
> + reg |= PSP_CMDRESP_IOC;
> + iowrite32(reg, psp->io_regs + PSP_CMDRESP);
> +
> + /* wait for command completion */
> + sev_wait_cmd_ioc(psp, ®);
> +
> + if (psp_ret)
> + *psp_ret = reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK;
> +
> + if (reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK) {
> + dev_dbg(psp->dev, "sev command %#x failed (%#010x)\n",
> + cmd, reg & PSP_CMDRESP_ERR_MASK);
> + ret = -EIO;
> + }
> +
> + print_hex_dump_debug("(out): ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 16, 2, data,
> + sev_cmd_buffer_len(cmd), false);
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_do_cmd(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> + rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, data, psp_ret);
> + mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int __sev_platform_init_locked(int *error)
> +{
> + struct psp_device *psp = psp_master;
> + int rc = 0;
> +
> + if (!psp)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + if (psp->sev_state == SEV_STATE_INIT)
> + return 0;
> +
> + rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_INIT, &psp->init_cmd_buf, error);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + psp->sev_state = SEV_STATE_INIT;
> + dev_dbg(psp->dev, "SEV firmware initialized\n");
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +int sev_platform_init(int *error)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> + rc = __sev_platform_init_locked(error);
> + mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_init);
> +
> +static int __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(int *error)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_SHUTDOWN, 0, error);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + psp_master->sev_state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT;
> + dev_dbg(psp_master->dev, "SEV firmware shutdown\n");
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> + rc = __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(NULL);
> + mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> +
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
> +{
> + return -ENOTTY;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct file_operations sev_fops = {
> + .owner = THIS_MODULE,
> + .unlocked_ioctl = sev_ioctl,
> +};
> +
> +int sev_platform_status(struct sev_user_data_status *data, int *error)
> +{
> + return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS, data, error);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_platform_status);
> +
> +int sev_guest_deactivate(struct sev_data_deactivate *data, int *error)
> +{
> + return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DEACTIVATE, data, error);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_deactivate);
> +
> +int sev_guest_activate(struct sev_data_activate *data, int *error)
> +{
> + return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE, data, error);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_activate);
> +
> +int sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error)
> +{
> + return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DECOMMISSION, data, error);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_decommission);
> +
> +int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error)
> +{
> + return sev_do_cmd(SEV_CMD_DF_FLUSH, 0, error);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_guest_df_flush);
> +
> +static void sev_exit(struct kref *ref)
> +{
> + struct sev_misc_dev *misc_dev = container_of(ref, struct sev_misc_dev, refcount);
> +
> + misc_deregister(&misc_dev->misc);
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_misc_init(struct psp_device *psp)
> +{
> + struct device *dev = psp->dev;
> + int ret;
> +
> + /*
> + * SEV feature support can be detected on multiple devices but the SEV
> + * FW commands must be issued on the master. During probe, we do not
> + * know the master hence we create /dev/sev on the first device probe.
> + * sev_do_cmd() finds the right master device to which to issue the
> + * command to the firmware.
> + */
> + if (!misc_dev) {
> + struct miscdevice *misc;
> +
> + misc_dev = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*misc_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!misc_dev)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + misc = &misc_dev->misc;
> + misc->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
> + misc->name = DEVICE_NAME;
> + misc->fops = &sev_fops;
> +
> + ret = misc_register(misc);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + kref_init(&misc_dev->refcount);
> + } else {
> + kref_get(&misc_dev->refcount);
> + }
> +
> + init_waitqueue_head(&psp->sev_int_queue);
> + psp->sev_misc = misc_dev;
> + dev_dbg(dev, "registered SEV device\n");
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_init(struct psp_device *psp)
> +{
> + /* Check if device supports SEV feature */
> + if (!(ioread32(psp->io_regs + PSP_FEATURE_REG) & 1)) {
> + dev_dbg(psp->dev, "device does not support SEV\n");
> + return 1;
> + }
> +
> + return sev_misc_init(psp);
> +}
> +
> int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
> {
> struct device *dev = sp->dev;
> @@ -81,6 +363,10 @@ int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
> goto e_err;
> }
>
> + ret = sev_init(psp);
> + if (ret)
> + goto e_irq;
> +
> if (sp->set_psp_master_device)
> sp->set_psp_master_device(sp);
>
> @@ -89,6 +375,8 @@ int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp)
>
> return 0;
>
> +e_irq:
> + sp_free_psp_irq(psp->sp, psp);
> e_err:
> sp->psp_data = NULL;
>
> @@ -101,5 +389,61 @@ void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp)
> {
> struct psp_device *psp = sp->psp_data;
>
> + if (psp->sev_misc)
> + kref_put(&misc_dev->refcount, sev_exit);
> +
> sp_free_psp_irq(sp, psp);
> }
> +
> +int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
> + void *data, int *error)
> +{
> + if (!filep || filep->f_op != &sev_fops)
> + return -EBADF;
> +
> + return sev_do_cmd(cmd, data, error);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_issue_cmd_external_user);
> +
> +void psp_pci_init(void)
> +{
> + struct sev_user_data_status *status;
> + struct sp_device *sp;
> + int error, rc;
> +
> + sp = sp_get_psp_master_device();
> + if (!sp)
> + return;
> +
> + psp_master = sp->psp_data;
> +
> + /* Initialize the platform */
> + rc = sev_platform_init(&error);
> + if (rc) {
> + dev_err(sp->dev, "SEV: failed to INIT error %#x\n", error);
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + /* Display SEV firmware version */
> + status = &psp_master->status_cmd_buf;
> + rc = sev_platform_status(status, &error);
> + if (rc) {
> + dev_err(sp->dev, "SEV: failed to get status error %#x\n", error);
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + dev_info(sp->dev, "SEV API:%d.%d build:%d\n", status->api_major,
> + status->api_minor, status->build);
> + return;
> +
> +err:
> + psp_master = NULL;
> +}
> +
> +void psp_pci_exit(void)
> +{
> + if (!psp_master)
> + return;
> +
> + sev_platform_shutdown(NULL);
> +}
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
> index 55b7808367c3..c81f0b11287a 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.h
> @@ -25,9 +25,21 @@
> #include <linux/interrupt.h>
> #include <linux/irqreturn.h>
> #include <linux/dmaengine.h>
> +#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
> +#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
>
> #include "sp-dev.h"
>
> +#define PSP_C2PMSG(_num) ((_num) << 2)
> +#define PSP_CMDRESP PSP_C2PMSG(32)
> +#define PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_LO PSP_C2PMSG(56)
> +#define PSP_CMDBUFF_ADDR_HI PSP_C2PMSG(57)
> +#define PSP_FEATURE_REG PSP_C2PMSG(63)
> +
> +#define PSP_P2CMSG(_num) ((_num) << 2)
> +#define PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG 1
> +#define PSP_CMD_COMPLETE PSP_P2CMSG(PSP_CMD_COMPLETE_REG)
> +
> #define PSP_P2CMSG_INTEN 0x0110
> #define PSP_P2CMSG_INTSTS 0x0114
>
> @@ -44,6 +56,11 @@
>
> #define MAX_PSP_NAME_LEN 16
>
> +struct sev_misc_dev {
> + struct kref refcount;
> + struct miscdevice misc;
> +};
> +
> struct psp_device {
> struct list_head entry;
>
> @@ -54,6 +71,13 @@ struct psp_device {
> struct sp_device *sp;
>
> void __iomem *io_regs;
> +
> + int sev_state;
> + unsigned int sev_int_rcvd;
> + wait_queue_head_t sev_int_queue;
> + struct sev_misc_dev *sev_misc;
> + struct sev_user_data_status status_cmd_buf;
> + struct sev_data_init init_cmd_buf;
> };
>
> #endif /* __PSP_DEV_H */
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
> index cf101c039c8f..eb0da6572720 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.c
> @@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
> if (ret)
> return ret;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> + psp_pci_init();
> +#endif
> +
> return 0;
> #endif
>
> @@ -291,6 +295,11 @@ static int __init sp_mod_init(void)
> static void __exit sp_mod_exit(void)
> {
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> + psp_pci_exit();
> +#endif
> +
> sp_pci_exit();
> #endif
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
> index 909cf3e436b4..acb197b66ced 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sp-dev.h
> @@ -143,12 +143,16 @@ static inline int ccp_dev_resume(struct sp_device *sp)
> #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
>
> int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp);
> +void psp_pci_init(void);
> void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp);
> +void psp_pci_exit(void);
>
> #else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
>
> static inline int psp_dev_init(struct sp_device *sp) { return 0; }
> +static inline void psp_pci_init(void) { }
> static inline void psp_dev_destroy(struct sp_device *sp) { }
> +static inline void psp_pci_exit(void) { }
>
> #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> index 4a150d17d537..0b6dd306d88b 100644
> --- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> +++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
> @@ -462,4 +462,141 @@ struct sev_data_dbg {
> u32 len; /* In */
> } __packed;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
> +
> +/**
> + * sev_platform_init - perform SEV INIT command
> + *
> + * @error: SEV command return code
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 if the SEV successfully processed the command
> + * -%ENODEV if the SEV device is not available
> + * -%ENOTSUPP if the SEV does not support SEV
> + * -%ETIMEDOUT if the SEV command timed out
> + * -%EIO if the SEV returned a non-zero return code
> + */
> +int sev_platform_init(int *error);
> +
> +/**
> + * sev_platform_status - perform SEV PLATFORM_STATUS command
> + *
> + * @status: sev_user_data_status structure to be processed
> + * @error: SEV command return code
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 if the SEV successfully processed the command
> + * -%ENODEV if the SEV device is not available
> + * -%ENOTSUPP if the SEV does not support SEV
> + * -%ETIMEDOUT if the SEV command timed out
> + * -%EIO if the SEV returned a non-zero return code
> + */
> +int sev_platform_status(struct sev_user_data_status *status, int *error);
> +
> +/**
> + * sev_issue_cmd_external_user - issue SEV command by other driver with a file
> + * handle.
> + *
> + * This function can be used by other drivers to issue a SEV command on
> + * behalf of userspace. The caller must pass a valid SEV file descriptor
> + * so that we know that it has access to SEV device.
> + *
> + * @filep - SEV device file pointer
> + * @cmd - command to issue
> + * @data - command buffer
> + * @error: SEV command return code
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 if the SEV successfully processed the command
> + * -%ENODEV if the SEV device is not available
> + * -%ENOTSUPP if the SEV does not support SEV
> + * -%ETIMEDOUT if the SEV command timed out
> + * -%EIO if the SEV returned a non-zero return code
> + * -%EINVAL if the SEV file descriptor is not valid
> + */
> +int sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int id,
> + void *data, int *error);
> +
> +/**
> + * sev_guest_deactivate - perform SEV DEACTIVATE command
> + *
> + * @deactivate: sev_data_deactivate structure to be processed
> + * @sev_ret: sev command return code
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
> + * -%ENODEV if the sev device is not available
> + * -%ENOTSUPP if the sev does not support SEV
> + * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
> + * -%EIO if the sev returned a non-zero return code
> + */
> +int sev_guest_deactivate(struct sev_data_deactivate *data, int *error);
> +
> +/**
> + * sev_guest_activate - perform SEV ACTIVATE command
> + *
> + * @activate: sev_data_activate structure to be processed
> + * @sev_ret: sev command return code
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
> + * -%ENODEV if the sev device is not available
> + * -%ENOTSUPP if the sev does not support SEV
> + * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
> + * -%EIO if the sev returned a non-zero return code
> + */
> +int sev_guest_activate(struct sev_data_activate *data, int *error);
> +
> +/**
> + * sev_guest_df_flush - perform SEV DF_FLUSH command
> + *
> + * @sev_ret: sev command return code
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
> + * -%ENODEV if the sev device is not available
> + * -%ENOTSUPP if the sev does not support SEV
> + * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
> + * -%EIO if the sev returned a non-zero return code
> + */
> +int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error);
> +
> +/**
> + * sev_guest_decommission - perform SEV DECOMMISSION command
> + *
> + * @decommission: sev_data_decommission structure to be processed
> + * @sev_ret: sev command return code
> + *
> + * Returns:
> + * 0 if the sev successfully processed the command
> + * -%ENODEV if the sev device is not available
> + * -%ENOTSUPP if the sev does not support SEV
> + * -%ETIMEDOUT if the sev command timed out
> + * -%EIO if the sev returned a non-zero return code
> + */
> +int sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error);
> +
> +#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
> +
> +static inline int
> +sev_platform_status(struct sev_user_data_status *status, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
> +
> +static inline int sev_platform_init(int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
> +
> +static inline int
> +sev_guest_deactivate(struct sev_data_deactivate *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
> +
> +static inline int
> +sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
> +
> +static inline int
> +sev_guest_activate(struct sev_data_activate *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
> +
> +static inline int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
> +
> +static inline int
> +sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int id, void *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
> +
> +#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
> +
> #endif /* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread
* [Part2 PATCH v8 14/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_FACTORY_RESET ioctl command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 13/38] crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-07 15:47 ` Gary R Hook
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 15/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS " Brijesh Singh
` (14 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 1 reply; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
The SEV_FACTORY_RESET command can be used by the platform owner to
reset the non-volatile SEV related data. The command is defined in
SEV spec section 5.4
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index 9915a6c604a3..b49583a45a55 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -232,9 +232,84 @@ static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error)
return rc;
}
+static int sev_get_platform_state(int *state, int *error)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS,
+ &psp_master->status_cmd_buf, error);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *state = psp_master->status_cmd_buf.state;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+ int state, rc;
+
+ /*
+ * The SEV spec requires that FACTORY_RESET must be issued in
+ * UNINIT state. Before we go further lets check if any guest is
+ * active.
+ *
+ * If FW is in WORKING state then deny the request otherwise issue
+ * SHUTDOWN command do INIT -> UNINIT before issuing the FACTORY_RESET.
+ *
+ */
+ rc = sev_get_platform_state(&state, &argp->error);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (state == SEV_STATE_WORKING)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ if (state == SEV_STATE_INIT) {
+ rc = __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(&argp->error);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET, 0, &argp->error);
+}
+
static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
- return -ENOTTY;
+ void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+ struct sev_issue_cmd input;
+ int ret = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!psp_master)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (ioctl != SEV_ISSUE_CMD)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(struct sev_issue_cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (input.cmd > SEV_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+ switch (input.cmd) {
+
+ case SEV_FACTORY_RESET:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_reset(&input);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(struct sev_issue_cmd)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
}
static const struct file_operations sev_fops = {
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* Re: [Part2 PATCH v8 14/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_FACTORY_RESET ioctl command
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 14/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_FACTORY_RESET ioctl command Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-07 15:47 ` Gary R Hook
0 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Gary R Hook @ 2017-11-07 15:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Brijesh Singh, kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Tom Lendacky, linux-crypto
On 11/06/2017 12:11 PM, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The SEV_FACTORY_RESET command can be used by the platform owner to
> reset the non-volatile SEV related data. The command is defined in
> SEV spec section 5.4
>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> index 9915a6c604a3..b49583a45a55 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
> @@ -232,9 +232,84 @@ static int sev_platform_shutdown(int *error)
> return rc;
> }
>
> +static int sev_get_platform_state(int *state, int *error)
> +{
> + int rc;
> +
> + rc = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS,
> + &psp_master->status_cmd_buf, error);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + *state = psp_master->status_cmd_buf.state;
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + int state, rc;
> +
> + /*
> + * The SEV spec requires that FACTORY_RESET must be issued in
> + * UNINIT state. Before we go further lets check if any guest is
> + * active.
> + *
> + * If FW is in WORKING state then deny the request otherwise issue
> + * SHUTDOWN command do INIT -> UNINIT before issuing the FACTORY_RESET.
> + *
> + */
> + rc = sev_get_platform_state(&state, &argp->error);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + if (state == SEV_STATE_WORKING)
> + return -EBUSY;
> +
> + if (state == SEV_STATE_INIT) {
> + rc = __sev_platform_shutdown_locked(&argp->error);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET, 0, &argp->error);
> +}
> +
> static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
> {
> - return -ENOTTY;
> + void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
> + struct sev_issue_cmd input;
> + int ret = -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (!psp_master)
> + return -ENODEV;
> +
> + if (ioctl != SEV_ISSUE_CMD)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(&input, argp, sizeof(struct sev_issue_cmd)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + if (input.cmd > SEV_MAX)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> +
> + switch (input.cmd) {
> +
> + case SEV_FACTORY_RESET:
> + ret = sev_ioctl_do_reset(&input);
> + break;
> + default:
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(struct sev_issue_cmd)))
> + ret = -EFAULT;
> +out:
> + mutex_unlock(&sev_cmd_mutex);
> +
> + return ret;
> }
>
> static const struct file_operations sev_fops = {
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread
* [Part2 PATCH v8 15/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS ioctl command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 14/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_FACTORY_RESET ioctl command Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 16/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_GEN " Brijesh Singh
` (13 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
The SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS command can be used by the platform owner to
get the current status of the platform. The command is defined in
SEV spec section 5.5.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index b49583a45a55..a5072b166ab8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -274,6 +274,21 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_reset(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
return __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_FACTORY_RESET, 0, &argp->error);
}
+static int sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_status *data = &psp_master->status_cmd_buf;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PLATFORM_STATUS, data, &argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, data, sizeof(*data)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -299,6 +314,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
case SEV_FACTORY_RESET:
ret = sev_ioctl_do_reset(&input);
break;
+ case SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(&input);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 16/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_GEN ioctl command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 15/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS " Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 17/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_GEN " Brijesh Singh
` (12 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
The SEV_PEK_GEN command is used to generate a new Platform Endorsement
Key (PEK). The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.6.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index a5072b166ab8..8aa8036023e0 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -289,6 +289,19 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (psp_master->sev_state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+ rc = __sev_platform_init_locked(&argp->error);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, 0, &argp->error);
+}
+
static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -317,6 +330,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
case SEV_PLATFORM_STATUS:
ret = sev_ioctl_do_platform_status(&input);
break;
+ case SEV_PEK_GEN:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN, &input);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 17/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_GEN ioctl command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 16/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_GEN " Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 18/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR " Brijesh Singh
` (11 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
The SEV_PDH_GEN command is used to re-generate the Platform
Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key. The command is defined in SEV spec section
5.6.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index 8aa8036023e0..fd3daf0a1176 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -333,6 +333,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
case SEV_PEK_GEN:
ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PEK_GEN, &input);
break;
+ case SEV_PDH_GEN:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN, &input);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 18/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR ioctl command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 17/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_GEN " Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 19/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT " Brijesh Singh
` (10 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
The SEV_PEK_CSR command can be used to generate a PEK certificate
signing request. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.7.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 66 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index fd3daf0a1176..c3906bbdb69b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -302,6 +302,69 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(int cmd, struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
return __sev_do_cmd_locked(cmd, 0, &argp->error);
}
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_pek_csr input;
+ struct sev_data_pek_csr *data;
+ void *blob = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* userspace wants to query CSR length */
+ if (!input.address || !input.length)
+ goto cmd;
+
+ /* allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the CSR blob */
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.address, input.length) ||
+ input.length > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ blob = kmalloc(input.length, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!blob) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
+ data->len = input.length;
+
+cmd:
+ if (psp_master->sev_state == SEV_STATE_UNINIT) {
+ ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(&argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_blob;
+ }
+
+ ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PEK_CSR, data, &argp->error);
+
+ /* If we query the CSR length, FW responded with expected data. */
+ input.length = data->len;
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &input, sizeof(input))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free_blob;
+ }
+
+ if (blob) {
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)input.address, blob, input.length))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+e_free_blob:
+ kfree(blob);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -336,6 +399,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
case SEV_PDH_GEN:
ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_pdh_gen(SEV_CMD_PDH_GEN, &input);
break;
+ case SEV_PEK_CSR:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(&input);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 19/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT ioctl command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 18/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CSR " Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 20/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT " Brijesh Singh
` (9 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
The SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT command can be used to import the signed PEK
certificate. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.8.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/psp-sev.h | 4 +++
2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index c3906bbdb69b..9d1c4600db19 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -365,6 +365,84 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 __user uaddr, u32 len)
+{
+ void *data;
+
+ if (!uaddr || !len)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ /* verify that blob length does not exceed our limit */
+ if (len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)uaddr, len))
+ goto e_free;
+
+ return data;
+
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(psp_copy_user_blob);
+
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_pek_cert_import input;
+ struct sev_data_pek_cert_import *data;
+ void *pek_blob, *oca_blob;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* copy PEK certificate blobs from userspace */
+ pek_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(input.pek_cert_address, input.pek_cert_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(pek_blob)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(pek_blob);
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ data->pek_cert_address = __psp_pa(pek_blob);
+ data->pek_cert_len = input.pek_cert_len;
+
+ /* copy PEK certificate blobs from userspace */
+ oca_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(input.oca_cert_address, input.oca_cert_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(oca_blob)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(oca_blob);
+ goto e_free_pek;
+ }
+
+ data->oca_cert_address = __psp_pa(oca_blob);
+ data->oca_cert_len = input.oca_cert_len;
+
+ /* If platform is not in INIT state then transition it to INIT */
+ if (psp_master->sev_state != SEV_STATE_INIT) {
+ ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(&argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_oca;
+ }
+
+ ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PEK_CERT_IMPORT, data, &argp->error);
+
+e_free_oca:
+ kfree(oca_blob);
+e_free_pek:
+ kfree(pek_blob);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -402,6 +480,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
case SEV_PEK_CSR:
ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr(&input);
break;
+ case SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(&input);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
index 0b6dd306d88b..93addfa34061 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -576,6 +576,8 @@ int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error);
*/
int sev_guest_decommission(struct sev_data_decommission *data, int *error);
+void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 __user uaddr, u32 len);
+
#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
static inline int
@@ -597,6 +599,8 @@ static inline int sev_guest_df_flush(int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
static inline int
sev_issue_cmd_external_user(struct file *filep, unsigned int id, void *data, int *error) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline void *psp_copy_user_blob(u64 __user uaddr, u32 len) { return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); }
+
#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP */
#endif /* __PSP_SEV_H__ */
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 20/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT ioctl command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 19/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT " Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 21/38] KVM: X86: Add CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV Brijesh Singh
` (8 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Borislav Petkov, Herbert Xu, Gary Hook, Tom Lendacky,
linux-crypto
The SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT command can be used to export the PDH and its
certificate chain. The command is defined in SEV spec section 5.10.
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
---
drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c | 97 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 97 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
index 9d1c4600db19..fcfa5b1eae61 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/psp-dev.c
@@ -443,6 +443,100 @@ static int sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+static int sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(struct sev_issue_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct sev_user_data_pdh_cert_export input;
+ void *pdh_blob = NULL, *cert_blob = NULL;
+ struct sev_data_pdh_cert_export *data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&input, (void __user *)argp->data, sizeof(input)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Userspace wants to query the certificate length. */
+ if (!input.pdh_cert_address ||
+ !input.pdh_cert_len ||
+ !input.cert_chain_address)
+ goto cmd;
+
+ /* Allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the PDH blob. */
+ if ((input.pdh_cert_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) ||
+ !access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.pdh_cert_address, input.pdh_cert_len)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate a physically contiguous buffer to store the cert chain blob. */
+ if ((input.cert_chain_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) ||
+ !access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, input.cert_chain_address, input.cert_chain_len)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ pdh_blob = kmalloc(input.pdh_cert_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pdh_blob) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_blob);
+ data->pdh_cert_len = input.pdh_cert_len;
+
+ cert_blob = kmalloc(input.cert_chain_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cert_blob) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto e_free_pdh;
+ }
+
+ data->cert_chain_address = __psp_pa(cert_blob);
+ data->cert_chain_len = input.cert_chain_len;
+
+cmd:
+ /* If platform is not in INIT state then transition it to INIT. */
+ if (psp_master->sev_state != SEV_STATE_INIT) {
+ ret = __sev_platform_init_locked(&argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_cert;
+ }
+
+ ret = __sev_do_cmd_locked(SEV_CMD_PDH_CERT_EXPORT, data, &argp->error);
+
+ /* If we query the length, FW responded with expected data. */
+ input.cert_chain_len = data->cert_chain_len;
+ input.pdh_cert_len = data->pdh_cert_len;
+
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)argp->data, &input, sizeof(input))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free_cert;
+ }
+
+ if (pdh_blob) {
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)input.pdh_cert_address,
+ pdh_blob, input.pdh_cert_len)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free_cert;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cert_blob) {
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)input.cert_chain_address,
+ cert_blob, input.cert_chain_len))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+e_free_cert:
+ kfree(cert_blob);
+e_free_pdh:
+ kfree(pdh_blob);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
@@ -483,6 +577,9 @@ static long sev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
case SEV_PEK_CERT_IMPORT:
ret = sev_ioctl_do_pek_import(&input);
break;
+ case SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT:
+ ret = sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export(&input);
+ break;
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 21/38] KVM: X86: Add CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 20/38] crypto: ccp: Implement SEV_PDH_CERT_EXPORT " Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 22/38] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
` (7 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
The config option can be used to enable SEV support on AMD Processors.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 3c48bc8bf08c..86273a0f981a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -80,6 +80,16 @@ config KVM_AMD
To compile this as a module, choose M here: the module
will be called kvm-amd.
+config KVM_AMD_SEV
+ def_bool y
+ bool "AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support"
+ depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64
+ select CRYPTO_DEV_CCP
+ select CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD
+ select CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP
+ ---help---
+ Provides support for launching Encrypted VMs on AMD processors.
+
config KVM_MMU_AUDIT
bool "Audit KVM MMU"
depends on KVM && TRACEPOINTS
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 22/38] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range for SEV guest
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 21/38] KVM: X86: Add CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 23/38] KVM: SVM: Add sev module_param Brijesh Singh
` (6 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
A SEV-enabled guest must use ASIDs from the defined subset, while non-SEV
guests can use the remaining ASID range. The range of allowed SEV guest
ASIDs is [1 - CPUID_8000_001F[ECX][31:0]].
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 91f859efddc0..7e46aea59615 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -319,6 +319,8 @@ enum {
#define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
+static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+
static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
{
vmcb->control.clean = 0;
@@ -783,7 +785,7 @@ static int svm_hardware_enable(void)
sd->asid_generation = 1;
sd->max_asid = cpuid_ebx(SVM_CPUID_FUNC) - 1;
sd->next_asid = sd->max_asid + 1;
- sd->min_asid = 1;
+ sd->min_asid = max_sev_asid + 1;
gdt = get_current_gdt_rw();
sd->tss_desc = (struct kvm_ldttss_desc *)(gdt + GDT_ENTRY_TSS);
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 23/38] KVM: SVM: Add sev module_param
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 22/38] KVM: SVM: Reserve ASID range for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 24/38] KVM: Define SEV key management command id Brijesh Singh
` (5 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
The module parameter can be used to control the SEV feature support.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 7e46aea59615..59abb9fe2f13 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -284,6 +284,10 @@ module_param(vls, int, 0444);
static int vgif = true;
module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
+/* enable/disable SEV support */
+static int sev = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT);
+module_param(sev, int, 0444);
+
static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static void svm_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
@@ -1049,6 +1053,15 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Get the maximum number of encrypted guests:
+ * Fn8001_001F[ECX][31:0]: Number of supported guests.
+ */
+static __init void sev_hardware_setup(void)
+{
+ max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
+}
+
static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
{
int cpu;
@@ -1084,6 +1097,16 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_SVME | EFER_LMSLE);
}
+ if (sev) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV)) {
+ sev_hardware_setup();
+ pr_info("SEV supported\n");
+ } else {
+ sev = false;
+ }
+ }
+
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
r = svm_cpu_init(cpu);
if (r)
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 24/38] KVM: Define SEV key management command id
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 23/38] KVM: SVM: Add sev module_param Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 25/38] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command Brijesh Singh
` (4 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, Jonathan Corbet,
x86
Define Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) key management command id
and structure. The command definition is available in SEV KM spec
0.14 (http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM API_Specification.pdf)
and Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.txt.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
.../virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst | 202 +++++++++++++++++++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 80 ++++++++
2 files changed, 282 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index a8ef21e737db..71d6d257074f 100644
--- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -43,3 +43,205 @@ setting the SEV bit before executing VMRUN.::
SEV hardware uses ASIDs to associate a memory encryption key with a VM.
Hence, the ASID for the SEV-enabled guests must be from 1 to a maximum value
defined in the CPUID 0x8000001f[ecx] field.
+
+SEV Key Management
+==================
+
+The SEV guest key management is handled by a separate processor called the AMD
+Secure Processor (AMD-SP). Firmware running inside the AMD-SP provides a secure
+key management interface to perform common hypervisor activities such as
+encrypting bootstrap code, snapshot, migrating and debugging the guest. For more
+information, see the SEV Key Management spec [api-spec]_
+
+KVM implements the following commands to support common lifecycle events of SEV
+guests, such as launching, running, snapshotting, migrating and decommissioning.
+
+1. KVM_SEV_INIT
+---------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_INIT command is used by the hypervisor to initialize the SEV platform
+context. In a typical workflow, this command should be the first command issued.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+2. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START
+-----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command is used for creating the memory encryption
+context. To create the encryption context, user must provide a guest policy,
+the owner's public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key and session information.
+
+Parameters: struct kvm_sev_launch_start (in/out)
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
+ __u32 handle; /* if zero then firmware creates a new handle */
+ __u32 policy; /* guest's policy */
+
+ __u64 dh_uaddr; /* userspace address pointing to the guest owner's PDH key */
+ __u32 dh_len;
+
+ __u64 session_addr; /* userspace address which points to the guest session information */
+ __u32 session_len;
+ };
+
+On success, the 'handle' field contains a new handle and on error, a negative value.
+
+For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.2.
+
+3. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA
+-----------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA is used for encrypting a memory region. It also
+calculates a measurement of the memory contents. The measurement is a signature
+of the memory contents that can be sent to the guest owner as an attestation
+that the memory was encrypted correctly by the firmware.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_update {
+ __u64 uaddr; /* userspace address to be encrypted (must be 16-byte aligned) */
+ __u32 len; /* length of the data to be encrypted (must be 16-byte aligned) */
+ };
+
+For more details, see SEV spec Section 6.3.
+
+4. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE
+-------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command is used to retrieve the measurement of the
+data encrypted by the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command. The guest owner may
+wait to provide the guest with confidential information until it can verify the
+measurement. Since the guest owner knows the initial contents of the guest at
+boot, the measurement can be verified by comparing it to what the guest owner
+expects.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_measure
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_measure {
+ __u64 uaddr; /* where to copy the measurement */
+ __u32 len; /* length of measurement blob */
+ };
+
+For more details on the measurement verification flow, see SEV spec Section 6.4.
+
+5. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH
+------------------------
+
+After completion of the launch flow, the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command can be
+issued to make the guest ready for the execution.
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+6. KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS
+-----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command is used to retrieve status information about a
+SEV-enabled guest.
+
+Parameters (out): struct kvm_sev_guest_status
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
+ __u32 handle; /* guest handle */
+ __u32 policy; /* guest policy */
+ __u8 state; /* guest state (see enum below) */
+ };
+
+SEV guest state:
+
+::
+
+ enum {
+ SEV_STATE_INVALID = 0;
+ SEV_STATE_LAUNCHING, /* guest is currently being launched */
+ SEV_STATE_SECRET, /* guest is being launched and ready to accept the ciphertext data */
+ SEV_STATE_RUNNING, /* guest is fully launched and running */
+ SEV_STATE_RECEIVING, /* guest is being migrated in from another SEV machine */
+ SEV_STATE_SENDING /* guest is getting migrated out to another SEV machine */
+ };
+
+7. KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command can be used by the hypervisor to request the
+firmware to decrypt the data at the given memory region.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_dbg
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+ __u64 src_uaddr; /* userspace address of data to decrypt */
+ __u64 dst_uaddr; /* userspace address of destination */
+ __u32 len; /* length of memory region to decrypt */
+ };
+
+The command returns an error if the guest policy does not allow debugging.
+
+8. KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command can be used by the hypervisor to request the
+firmware to encrypt the data at the given memory region.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_dbg
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+ __u64 src_uaddr; /* userspace address of data to encrypt */
+ __u64 dst_uaddr; /* userspace address of destination */
+ __u32 len; /* length of memory region to encrypt */
+ };
+
+The command returns an error if the guest policy does not allow debugging.
+
+9. KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET
+------------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET command can be used by the hypervisor to inject secret
+data after the measurement has been validated by the guest owner.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_launch_secret
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_secret {
+ __u64 hdr_uaddr; /* userspace address containing the packet header */
+ __u32 hdr_len;
+
+ __u64 guest_uaddr; /* the guest memory region where the secret should be injected */
+ __u32 guest_len;
+
+ __u64 trans_uaddr; /* the hypervisor memory region which contains the secret */
+ __u32 trans_len;
+ };
+
+References
+==========
+
+.. [white-paper] http://amd-dev.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wordpress/media/2013/12/AMD_Memory_Encryption_Whitepaper_v7-Public.pdf
+.. [api-spec] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/55766_SEV-KM%20API_Specification.pdf
+.. [amd-apm] http://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.34)
+.. [kvm-forum] http://www.linux-kvm.org/images/7/74/02x08A-Thomas_Lendacky-AMDs_Virtualizatoin_Memory_Encryption_Technology.pdf
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 1f9f26a8e111..027153971c97 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1367,6 +1367,86 @@ struct kvm_enc_region {
#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_REG_REGION _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbb, struct kvm_enc_region)
#define KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_UNREG_REGION _IOR(KVMIO, 0xbc, struct kvm_enc_region)
+/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization command */
+enum sev_cmd_id {
+ /* Guest initialization commands */
+ KVM_SEV_INIT = 0,
+ KVM_SEV_ES_INIT,
+ /* Guest launch commands */
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START,
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA,
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA,
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET,
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE,
+ KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH,
+ /* Guest migration commands (outgoing) */
+ KVM_SEV_SEND_START,
+ KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA,
+ KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_VMSA,
+ KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH,
+ /* Guest migration commands (incoming) */
+ KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START,
+ KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA,
+ KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_VMSA,
+ KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH,
+ /* Guest status and debug commands */
+ KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS,
+ KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT,
+ KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT,
+ /* Guest certificates commands */
+ KVM_SEV_CERT_EXPORT,
+
+ KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_cmd {
+ __u32 id;
+ __u64 data;
+ __u32 error;
+ __u32 sev_fd;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
+ __u32 handle;
+ __u32 policy;
+ __u64 dh_uaddr;
+ __u32 dh_len;
+ __u64 session_uaddr;
+ __u32 session_len;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data {
+ __u64 uaddr;
+ __u32 len;
+};
+
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_secret {
+ __u64 hdr_uaddr;
+ __u32 hdr_len;
+ __u64 guest_uaddr;
+ __u32 guest_len;
+ __u64 trans_uaddr;
+ __u32 trans_len;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_measure {
+ __u64 uaddr;
+ __u32 len;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
+ __u32 handle;
+ __u32 policy;
+ __u32 state;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_dbg {
+ __u64 src_uaddr;
+ __u64 dst_uaddr;
+ __u32 len;
+};
+
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)
#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 25/38] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 24/38] KVM: Define SEV key management command id Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 26/38] KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
` (3 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
The command initializes the SEV platform context and allocates a new ASID
for this guest from the SEV ASID pool. The firmware must be initialized
before we issue any guest launch commands to create a new memory encryption
context.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 7 +++
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 1be6f17499de..1841fe960888 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -747,6 +747,11 @@ enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
KVM_IRQCHIP_SPLIT, /* created with KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP */
};
+struct kvm_sev_info {
+ bool active; /* SEV enabled guest */
+ unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */
+};
+
struct kvm_arch {
unsigned int n_used_mmu_pages;
unsigned int n_requested_mmu_pages;
@@ -834,6 +839,8 @@ struct kvm_arch {
bool x2apic_format;
bool x2apic_broadcast_quirk_disabled;
+
+ struct kvm_sev_info sev_info;
};
struct kvm_vm_stat {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 59abb9fe2f13..7379fc218128 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
#include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
#include <linux/hashtable.h>
#include <linux/frame.h>
+#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -324,6 +326,19 @@ enum {
#define VMCB_AVIC_APIC_BAR_MASK 0xFFFFFFFFFF000ULL
static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
+static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
+
+static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
+{
+ return max_sev_asid;
+}
+
+static inline bool sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+
+ return sev->active;
+}
static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
{
@@ -1060,6 +1075,11 @@ static int avic_ga_log_notifier(u32 ga_tag)
static __init void sev_hardware_setup(void)
{
max_sev_asid = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001F);
+
+ /* Initialize SEV ASID bitmap */
+ if (max_sev_asid)
+ sev_asid_bitmap = kcalloc(BITS_TO_LONGS(max_sev_asid),
+ sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL);
}
static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
@@ -1168,6 +1188,9 @@ static __exit void svm_hardware_unsetup(void)
{
int cpu;
+ if (svm_sev_enabled())
+ kfree(sev_asid_bitmap);
+
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
svm_cpu_uninit(cpu);
@@ -1358,6 +1381,9 @@ static void init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
svm->vmcb->control.int_ctl |= V_GIF_ENABLE_MASK;
}
+ if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+ svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
+
mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
enable_gif(svm);
@@ -1440,6 +1466,29 @@ static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}
+static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
+{
+ int pos;
+
+ pos = asid - 1;
+ clear_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
+}
+
+static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+
+ __sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
+}
+
+static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return;
+
+ sev_asid_free(kvm);
+}
+
static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -1458,6 +1507,12 @@ static void avic_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&svm_vm_data_hash_lock, flags);
}
+static void svm_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ avic_vm_destroy(kvm);
+ sev_vm_destroy(kvm);
+}
+
static int avic_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -5523,6 +5578,72 @@ static int enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 0;
}
+static int sev_asid_new(void)
+{
+ int pos;
+
+ pos = find_first_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_sev_asid);
+ if (pos >= max_sev_asid)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ set_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
+ return pos + 1;
+}
+
+static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+ int asid, ret;
+
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ asid = sev_asid_new();
+ if (asid < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ sev->active = true;
+ sev->asid = asid;
+
+ return 0;
+
+e_free:
+ __sev_asid_free(asid);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!svm_sev_enabled())
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
+
+ switch (sev_cmd.id) {
+ case KVM_SEV_INIT:
+ r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
+ r = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
+ return r;
+}
+
static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.cpu_has_kvm_support = has_svm,
.disabled_by_bios = is_disabled,
@@ -5539,7 +5660,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.vcpu_reset = svm_vcpu_reset,
.vm_init = avic_vm_init,
- .vm_destroy = avic_vm_destroy,
+ .vm_destroy = svm_vm_destroy,
.prepare_guest_switch = svm_prepare_guest_switch,
.vcpu_load = svm_vcpu_load,
@@ -5638,6 +5759,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
.pre_enter_smm = svm_pre_enter_smm,
.pre_leave_smm = svm_pre_leave_smm,
.enable_smi_window = enable_smi_window,
+
+ .mem_enc_op = svm_mem_enc_op,
};
static int __init svm_init(void)
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 26/38] KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 25/38] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_INIT command Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 27/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
` (2 subsequent siblings)
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
SEV hardware uses ASIDs to associate a memory encryption key with a
guest VM. During guest creation, a SEV VM uses the SEV_CMD_ACTIVATE
command to bind a particular ASID to the guest. Lets make sure that the
VMCB is programmed with the bound ASID before a VMRUN.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 7379fc218128..9d04cc8fbbf9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -213,6 +213,9 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
*/
struct list_head ir_list;
spinlock_t ir_list_lock;
+
+ /* which host CPU was used for running this vcpu */
+ unsigned int last_cpu;
};
/*
@@ -340,6 +343,13 @@ static inline bool sev_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
return sev->active;
}
+static inline int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+
+ return sev->asid;
+}
+
static inline void mark_all_dirty(struct vmcb *vmcb)
{
vmcb->control.clean = 0;
@@ -550,6 +560,9 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
struct page *save_area;
+
+ /* index = sev_asid, value = vmcb pointer */
+ struct vmcb **sev_vmcbs;
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -863,6 +876,7 @@ static void svm_cpu_uninit(int cpu)
return;
per_cpu(svm_data, raw_smp_processor_id()) = NULL;
+ kfree(sd->sev_vmcbs);
__free_page(sd->save_area);
kfree(sd);
}
@@ -876,11 +890,18 @@ static int svm_cpu_init(int cpu)
if (!sd)
return -ENOMEM;
sd->cpu = cpu;
- sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
r = -ENOMEM;
+ sd->save_area = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sd->save_area)
goto err_1;
+ if (svm_sev_enabled()) {
+ r = -ENOMEM;
+ sd->sev_vmcbs = kmalloc((max_sev_asid + 1) * sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sd->sev_vmcbs)
+ goto err_1;
+ }
+
per_cpu(svm_data, cpu) = sd;
return 0;
@@ -1468,10 +1489,16 @@ static int avic_init_backing_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
{
- int pos;
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
+ int cpu, pos;
pos = asid - 1;
clear_bit(pos, sev_asid_bitmap);
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+ sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
+ }
}
static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
@@ -4429,12 +4456,39 @@ static void reload_tss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
load_TR_desc();
}
+static void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
+{
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+ int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
+
+ /* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
+ svm->vmcb->control.asid = asid;
+
+ /*
+ * Flush guest TLB:
+ *
+ * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
+ * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
+ */
+ if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
+ svm->last_cpu == cpu)
+ return;
+
+ svm->last_cpu = cpu;
+ sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
+ svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
+ mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
+}
+
static void pre_svm_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
+ if (sev_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
+ return pre_sev_run(svm, cpu);
+
/* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */
if (svm->asid_generation != sd->asid_generation)
new_asid(svm, sd);
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 27/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 26/38] KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 28/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 29/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
The KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command is used to create a memory encryption
context within the SEV firmware. In order to do so, the guest owner
should provide the guest's policy, its public Diffie-Hellman (PDH) key
and session information. The command implements the LAUNCH_START flow
defined in SEV spec Section 6.2.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 155 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 1841fe960888..b58d9ebc2081 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -750,6 +750,8 @@ enum kvm_irqchip_mode {
struct kvm_sev_info {
bool active; /* SEV enabled guest */
unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */
+ unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */
+ int fd; /* SEV device fd */
};
struct kvm_arch {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 9d04cc8fbbf9..aa90a27976f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1508,11 +1508,45 @@ static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm *kvm)
__sev_asid_free(sev->asid);
}
+static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
+{
+ struct sev_data_decommission *decommission;
+ struct sev_data_deactivate *data;
+
+ if (!handle)
+ return;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return;
+
+ /* deactivate handle */
+ data->handle = handle;
+ sev_guest_deactivate(data, NULL);
+
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+ sev_guest_df_flush(NULL);
+ kfree(data);
+
+ decommission = kzalloc(sizeof(*decommission), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!decommission)
+ return;
+
+ /* decommission handle */
+ decommission->handle = handle;
+ sev_guest_decommission(decommission, NULL);
+
+ kfree(decommission);
+}
+
static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+
if (!sev_guest(kvm))
return;
+ sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
sev_asid_free(kvm);
}
@@ -5668,6 +5702,122 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
+{
+ struct sev_data_activate *data;
+ int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
+ int ret;
+
+ wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
+
+ ret = sev_guest_df_flush(error);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* activate ASID on the given handle */
+ data->handle = handle;
+ data->asid = asid;
+ ret = sev_guest_activate(data, error);
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+ struct fd f;
+ int ret;
+
+ f = fdget(fd);
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
+
+ fdput(f);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_launch_start *start;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
+ void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
+ int *error = &argp->error;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ start = kzalloc(sizeof(*start), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!start)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ dh_blob = NULL;
+ if (params.dh_uaddr) {
+ dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(dh_blob)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ start->dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
+ start->dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
+ }
+
+ session_blob = NULL;
+ if (params.session_uaddr) {
+ session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
+ if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
+ goto e_free_dh;
+ }
+
+ start->session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
+ start->session_len = params.session_len;
+ }
+
+ start->handle = params.handle;
+ start->policy = params.policy;
+
+ /* create memory encryption context */
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_session;
+
+ /* Bind ASID to this guest */
+ ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start->handle, error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_session;
+
+ /* return handle to userspace */
+ params.handle = start->handle;
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
+ sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start->handle);
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free_session;
+ }
+
+ sev->handle = start->handle;
+ sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
+
+e_free_session:
+ kfree(session_blob);
+e_free_dh:
+ kfree(dh_blob);
+e_free:
+ kfree(start);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -5685,6 +5835,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
case KVM_SEV_INIT:
r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
break;
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
+ r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 28/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 27/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START command Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 29/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the VM
encryption key (VEK) created during KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Improvements-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 191 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 190 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index b58d9ebc2081..85fa530f9dd5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -752,6 +752,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
unsigned int asid; /* ASID used for this guest */
unsigned int handle; /* SEV firmware handle */
int fd; /* SEV device fd */
+ unsigned long pages_locked; /* Number of pages locked */
};
struct kvm_arch {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index aa90a27976f6..8f2a676b5553 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
#include <linux/frame.h>
#include <linux/psp-sev.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <asm/apic.h>
#include <asm/perf_event.h>
@@ -330,6 +332,7 @@ enum {
static unsigned int max_sev_asid;
static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
+#define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
static inline bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
{
@@ -1539,6 +1542,83 @@ static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
kfree(decommission);
}
+static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
+ unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
+ int write)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+ unsigned long npages, npinned, size;
+ unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
+ struct page **pages;
+ int first, last;
+
+ /* Calculate number of pages. */
+ first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ npages = (last - first + 1);
+
+ locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
+ lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
+ pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
+ size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
+ if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
+ pages = vmalloc(size);
+ else
+ pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!pages)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Pin the user virtual address. */
+ npinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
+ if (npinned != npages) {
+ pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *n = npages;
+ sev->pages_locked = locked;
+
+ return pages;
+
+err:
+ if (npinned > 0)
+ release_pages(pages, npinned, 0);
+
+ kvfree(pages);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
+ unsigned long npages)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+
+ release_pages(pages, npages, 0);
+ kvfree(pages);
+ sev->pages_locked -= npages;
+}
+
+static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
+{
+ uint8_t *page_virtual;
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+ page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
+ clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
+ kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
+ }
+}
+
static void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
{
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
@@ -5727,7 +5807,7 @@ static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
return ret;
}
-static int sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
+static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
{
struct fd f;
int ret;
@@ -5742,6 +5822,13 @@ static int sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
return ret;
}
+static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+
+ return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
+}
+
static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
{
struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
@@ -5789,7 +5876,7 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
start->policy = params.policy;
/* create memory encryption context */
- ret = sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
+ ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, start, error);
if (ret)
goto e_free_session;
@@ -5818,6 +5905,103 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+static int get_num_contig_pages(int idx, struct page **inpages,
+ unsigned long npages)
+{
+ unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
+ int i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
+
+ /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
+ paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
+ while (i < npages) {
+ next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
+ if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
+ pages++;
+ paddr = next_paddr;
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return pages;
+}
+
+static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, size;
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
+ struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
+ struct page **inpages;
+ int i, ret, pages;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ vaddr = params.uaddr;
+ size = params.len;
+ vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
+
+ /* Lock the user memory. */
+ inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
+ if (!inpages) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The LAUNCH_UPDATE command will perform in-place encryption of the
+ * memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region with C=1).
+ * It's possible that the cache may contain the data with C=0, i.e.,
+ * unencrypted so invalidate it first.
+ */
+ sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
+
+ for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
+ int offset, len;
+
+ /*
+ * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
+ * within the page.
+ */
+ offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+ /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
+ pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
+
+ len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
+
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+ data->len = len;
+ data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data, &argp->error);
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_unpin;
+
+ size -= len;
+ next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
+ }
+
+e_unpin:
+ /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
+ for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
+ set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
+ mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
+ }
+ /* unlock the user pages */
+ sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -5838,6 +6022,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
break;
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
+ r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread* [Part2 PATCH v8 29/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE command
2017-11-06 18:10 [Part2 PATCH v8 00/38] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2017-11-06 18:11 ` [Part2 PATCH v8 28/38] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command Brijesh Singh
@ 2017-11-06 18:11 ` Brijesh Singh
28 siblings, 0 replies; 33+ messages in thread
From: Brijesh Singh @ 2017-11-06 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kvm, linux-kernel
Cc: bp, Brijesh Singh, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, H. Peter Anvin,
Paolo Bonzini, Radim Krčmář,
Joerg Roedel, Borislav Petkov, Tom Lendacky, x86
The command is used to retrieve the measurement of contents encrypted
through the KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command.
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 8f2a676b5553..3a5ae4fd7103 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -6002,6 +6002,77 @@ static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
return ret;
}
+static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &kvm->arch.sev_info;
+ struct sev_data_launch_measure *data;
+ struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
+ void *blob = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+ return -ENOTTY;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* User wants to query the blob length */
+ if (!params.len)
+ goto cmd;
+
+ if (params.uaddr) {
+ if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, params.uaddr, params.len)) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto e_free;
+ }
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ blob = kmalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!blob)
+ goto e_free;
+
+ data->address = __psp_pa(blob);
+ data->len = params.len;
+ }
+
+cmd:
+ data->handle = sev->handle;
+ ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, data, &argp->error);
+
+ /*
+ * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
+ */
+ if (!params.len)
+ goto done;
+
+ if (ret)
+ goto e_free_blob;
+
+ if (blob) {
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr, blob, params.len))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+done:
+ params.len = data->len;
+ if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+e_free_blob:
+ kfree(blob);
+e_free:
+ kfree(data);
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
{
struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -6025,6 +6096,9 @@ static int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
break;
+ case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
+ r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+ break;
default:
r = -EINVAL;
goto out;
--
2.9.5
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 33+ messages in thread