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From: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
To: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption
Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 10:01:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180114080108.GA69022@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180114014801.GC1701@tigerII.localdomain>

On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 10:48:01AM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> Ccing Kees, Peter, Andrew, Steven
> 
> On (01/13/18 23:34), Dan Aloni wrote:
> > This commit enables the kernel to encrypt the free-form text that
> > is generated by printk() before it is brought up to `dmesg` in
> > userspace.
> > 
> > The encryption is made using one of the trusted public keys which
> > are kept built-in inside the kernel. These keys are presently
> > also used for verifying kernel modules and userspace-supplied
> > firmwares.
> 
> OK, this is the first time I'm receiving it, yet it's v2 already.
> I'm Cc-ed on only this particular patch, not the entire patch set;
> so it's hard to tell what else is being touched and why, so I'm
> going to start with the basic questions.

Sorry, here the link to cover letter:

    https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org/msg1585442.html

I guess --cc-cover && --to-cover should be default.

> are you fixing the real problem? that's because you see unhashed
> kernel pointers in dmesg or is there anything else?

In brief, the problem is that any information leak has the potential
to make exploitation easier. The changes include documentation for
the feature, where more details are provided.

-- 
Dan Aloni

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
To: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption
Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2018 10:01:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180114080108.GA69022@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180114014801.GC1701@tigerII.localdomain>

On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 10:48:01AM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> Ccing Kees, Peter, Andrew, Steven
> 
> On (01/13/18 23:34), Dan Aloni wrote:
> > This commit enables the kernel to encrypt the free-form text that
> > is generated by printk() before it is brought up to `dmesg` in
> > userspace.
> > 
> > The encryption is made using one of the trusted public keys which
> > are kept built-in inside the kernel. These keys are presently
> > also used for verifying kernel modules and userspace-supplied
> > firmwares.
> 
> OK, this is the first time I'm receiving it, yet it's v2 already.
> I'm Cc-ed on only this particular patch, not the entire patch set;
> so it's hard to tell what else is being touched and why, so I'm
> going to start with the basic questions.

Sorry, here the link to cover letter:

    https://www.mail-archive.com/linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org/msg1585442.html

I guess --cc-cover && --to-cover should be default.

> are you fixing the real problem? that's because you see unhashed
> kernel pointers in dmesg or is there anything else?

In brief, the problem is that any information leak has the potential
to make exploitation easier. The changes include documentation for
the feature, where more details are provided.

-- 
Dan Aloni

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-14  8:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-13 21:34 [PATCHv2 0/7] RFC: Public key encryption of dmesg by the kernel Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 1/7] crypto: fix memory leak in rsa-kcs1pad encryption Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 2/7] Move net/ceph/armor to lib/ and add docs Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 3/7] base64-armor: add bounds checking Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 4/7] certs: allow in-kernel access of trusted keys Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 5/7] printk: allow kmsg to be encrypted using public key encryption Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Aloni
2018-01-14  1:48   ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2018-01-14  1:48     ` [kernel-hardening] " Sergey Senozhatsky
2018-01-14  8:01     ` Dan Aloni [this message]
2018-01-14  8:01       ` Dan Aloni
2018-01-15 12:52       ` Steven Rostedt
2018-01-15 12:52         ` [kernel-hardening] " Steven Rostedt
2018-01-16  2:09         ` Sergey Senozhatsky
2018-01-16  2:09           ` [kernel-hardening] " Sergey Senozhatsky
2018-01-16 23:44         ` Daniel Micay
2018-01-17 15:01           ` Steven Rostedt
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 6/7] tools: add dmesg decryption program Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34 ` [PATCHv2 7/7] docs: add dmesg encryption doc Dan Aloni
2018-01-13 21:34   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Aloni
2018-01-15  9:11 ` [PATCHv2 4/7] certs: allow in-kernel access of trusted keys David Howells
2018-01-15  9:11   ` [kernel-hardening] " David Howells

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