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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: arjan@linux.intel.com, tglx@linutronix.de, karahmed@amazon.de,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com, bp@alien8.de, pbonzini@redhat.com,
	ak@linux.intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	gregkh@linux-foundation.org, dave.hansen@intel.com,
	gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, ashok.raj@intel.com,
	mingo@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2018 10:42:58 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180125094258.GZ2228@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516872189-16577-6-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk>

On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 09:23:07AM +0000, David Woodhouse wrote:
> +static bool __init early_cpu_vulnerable_meltdown(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
> +{
> +	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
> +
> +	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
> +                return false;
> +
> +	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
> +		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);

I think it was suggested a while back to write this like:

	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES) &&
	    !rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap))

to deal with funny virt scenarios where they accidentally advertise the
CPUID bit but don't in fact provide the MSR.

> +
> +	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
> +	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
> +		return false;
> +
> +	return true;
> +}

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-25  9:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-25  9:23 [PATCH v4 0/7] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on processors which are not vulnerable to Meltdown David Woodhouse
2018-01-25  9:42   ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2018-01-25  9:56     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:01       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 15:12   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL on early Spectre v2 microcodes David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:43   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 10:54     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 11:20       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:34         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 13:41           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 14:58             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 16:16             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-25 16:24               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-25 16:35                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-26  9:40             ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-25  9:23 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier) support David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 11:47     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 11:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 11:58         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 12:03           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-25 12:11             ` David Woodhouse

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