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From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] x86: KASAN: Sanitize unauthorized irq stack access
Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2018 11:00:18 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180208190016.GC9524@bombadil.infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180208172026.6kqimndwyekyzzvl@treble>

On Thu, Feb 08, 2018 at 11:20:26AM -0600, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> The patch description is confusing.  It talks about "crappy drivers irq
> handlers when they access wrong memory on the stack".  But if I
> understand correctly, the patch doesn't actually protect against that
> case, because irq handlers run on the irq stack, and this patch only
> affects code which *isn't* running on the irq stack.

This would catch a crappy driver which allocates some memory on the
irq stack, squirrels the pointer to it away in a data structure, then
returns to process (or softirq) context and dereferences the pointer.

I have no idea if that's the case that Kirill is tracking down, but it's
something I can imagine someone doing.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] x86: KASAN: Sanitize unauthorized irq stack access
Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2018 11:00:18 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180208190016.GC9524@bombadil.infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180208172026.6kqimndwyekyzzvl@treble>

On Thu, Feb 08, 2018 at 11:20:26AM -0600, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> The patch description is confusing.  It talks about "crappy drivers irq
> handlers when they access wrong memory on the stack".  But if I
> understand correctly, the patch doesn't actually protect against that
> case, because irq handlers run on the irq stack, and this patch only
> affects code which *isn't* running on the irq stack.

This would catch a crappy driver which allocates some memory on the
irq stack, squirrels the pointer to it away in a data structure, then
returns to process (or softirq) context and dereferences the pointer.

I have no idea if that's the case that Kirill is tracking down, but it's
something I can imagine someone doing.

--
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  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-08 19:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-07 16:14 [PATCH RFC] x86: KASAN: Sanitize unauthorized irq stack access Kirill Tkhai
2018-02-07 16:14 ` Kirill Tkhai
2018-02-07 18:38 ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-07 18:38   ` Dave Hansen
2018-02-07 19:31   ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-02-07 19:31     ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-02-08 10:03   ` Kirill Tkhai
2018-02-08 10:03     ` Kirill Tkhai
2018-02-08 16:30     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-08 16:30       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-08 16:41       ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-02-08 16:41         ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-02-08 17:20         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-08 17:20           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-02-08 19:00           ` Matthew Wilcox [this message]
2018-02-08 19:00             ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-02-09  8:53             ` Kirill Tkhai
2018-02-09  8:53               ` Kirill Tkhai

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