From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to nameidata
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 00:57:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180227005721.GK30522@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180227004121.3633-2-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 01:41:11AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The function current_nameidata_security(struct inode *) can be used to
> retrieve a blob's pointer address tied to the inode being walk through.
> This enable to follow a path lookup and know where an inode access come
> from. This is needed for the Landlock LSM to be able to restrict access
> to file path.
>
> The LSM hook nameidata_free_security(struct inode *) is called before
> freeing the associated nameidata.
NAK. Not without well-defined semantics and "some Linux S&M uses that for
something, don't ask what" does not count.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to nameidata
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 00:57:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180227005721.GK30522@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180227004121.3633-2-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 01:41:11AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The function current_nameidata_security(struct inode *) can be used to
> retrieve a blob's pointer address tied to the inode being walk through.
> This enable to follow a path lookup and know where an inode access come
> from. This is needed for the Landlock LSM to be able to restrict access
> to file path.
>
> The LSM hook nameidata_free_security(struct inode *) is called before
> freeing the associated nameidata.
NAK. Not without well-defined semantics and "some Linux S&M uses that for
something, don't ask what" does not count.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to nameidata
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 00:57:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180227005721.GK30522@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180227004121.3633-2-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 01:41:11AM +0100, Micka�l Sala�n wrote:
> The function current_nameidata_security(struct inode *) can be used to
> retrieve a blob's pointer address tied to the inode being walk through.
> This enable to follow a path lookup and know where an inode access come
> from. This is needed for the Landlock LSM to be able to restrict access
> to file path.
>
> The LSM hook nameidata_free_security(struct inode *) is called before
> freeing the associated nameidata.
NAK. Not without well-defined semantics and "some Linux S&M uses that for
something, don't ask what" does not count.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to nameidata
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 00:57:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180227005721.GK30522@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180227004121.3633-2-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 01:41:11AM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> The function current_nameidata_security(struct inode *) can be used to
> retrieve a blob's pointer address tied to the inode being walk through.
> This enable to follow a path lookup and know where an inode access come
> from. This is needed for the Landlock LSM to be able to restrict access
> to file path.
>
> The LSM hook nameidata_free_security(struct inode *) is called before
> freeing the associated nameidata.
NAK. Not without well-defined semantics and "some Linux S&M uses that for
something, don't ask what" does not count.
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk (Al Viro)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to nameidata
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2018 00:57:21 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180227005721.GK30522@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180227004121.3633-2-mic@digikod.net>
On Tue, Feb 27, 2018 at 01:41:11AM +0100, Micka?l Sala?n wrote:
> The function current_nameidata_security(struct inode *) can be used to
> retrieve a blob's pointer address tied to the inode being walk through.
> This enable to follow a path lookup and know where an inode access come
> from. This is needed for the Landlock LSM to be able to restrict access
> to file path.
>
> The LSM hook nameidata_free_security(struct inode *) is called before
> freeing the associated nameidata.
NAK. Not without well-defined semantics and "some Linux S&M uses that for
something, don't ask what" does not count.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-27 0:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 191+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-27 0:41 [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to nameidata Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs, security: " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:57 ` Al Viro [this message]
2018-02-27 0:57 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 0:57 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 0:57 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 0:57 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 1:23 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 1:23 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 1:23 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 1:23 ` Al Viro
2018-02-27 1:23 ` Al Viro
2018-03-11 20:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-11 20:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-11 20:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-28 16:27 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:27 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:27 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:27 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:27 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:27 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:58 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:58 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:58 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:58 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:58 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 16:58 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 02/11] fs,security: Add a new file access type: MAY_CHROOT Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 02/11] fs, security: " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 02/11] fs,security: " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 03/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 04/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 04/11] bpf, landlock: " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 04/11] bpf,landlock: " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp, landlock: " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 2:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 2:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 2:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 2:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 4:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 4:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 4:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 5:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:32 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 5:32 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 5:32 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-02-27 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 16:39 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 17:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-02-27 17:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-02-27 17:30 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-02-27 17:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 17:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 17:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 18:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-02-27 18:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-02-27 18:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-02-27 21:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 21:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 21:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-08 13:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-08 13:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-08 13:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-08 21:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-08 21:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-08 21:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-08 21:06 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-08 22:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-08 22:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-08 22:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-10 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-10 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-10 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-10 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-10 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-04-11 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-11 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-11 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 06/11] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-28 17:35 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 17:35 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 17:35 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 06/11] bpf, landlock: " kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 17:35 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 06/11] bpf,landlock: " kbuild test robot
2018-02-28 17:35 ` kbuild test robot
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 07/11] landlock: Handle filesystem access control Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 4:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 5:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 23:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:02 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-28 0:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-28 0:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-28 0:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-28 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-28 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-28 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-28 0:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-06 22:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-06 22:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-01 22:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-01 22:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-01 22:48 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 22:18 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 09/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 11/11] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation " Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 0:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 4:36 ` [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 4:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 22:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 22:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 22:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-02-27 23:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-27 23:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-06 22:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-06 22:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-06 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-06 22:46 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-03-06 22:46 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-03-06 22:46 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-03-06 23:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-06 23:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-06 23:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-07 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-07 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-07 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-07 1:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-08 23:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-08 23:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-08 23:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-03-08 23:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-08 23:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-08 23:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-08 23:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-04-01 22:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-01 22:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-01 22:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2018-04-02 0:39 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-02 0:39 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-02 0:39 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-04-02 0:39 ` Tycho Andersen
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