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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: arnd@arndb.de, catalin.marinas@arm.com, cdall@kernel.org,
	drjones@redhat.com, kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, ramana.radhakrishnan@arm.com,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, awallis@codeaurora.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCHv3 10/11] arm64: enable pointer authentication
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 19:37:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180417183735.56985-11-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180417183735.56985-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>

Now that all the necessary bits are in place for userspace, add the
necessary Kconfig logic to allow this to be enabled.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index eb2cf4938f6d..d6ce16b1ee47 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1127,6 +1127,29 @@ config ARM64_RAS_EXTN
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
+
+config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
+	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
+	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
+	  keys, which can be used to mitigate Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
+	  and other attacks.
+
+	  This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace).
+
+	  Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys
+	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
+	  context-switched along with the process.
+
+	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
+	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
+	  enabled.
+
+endmenu
+
 config ARM64_SVE
 	bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support"
 	default y
-- 
2.11.0

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: mark.rutland@arm.com (Mark Rutland)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCHv3 10/11] arm64: enable pointer authentication
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 19:37:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180417183735.56985-11-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180417183735.56985-1-mark.rutland@arm.com>

Now that all the necessary bits are in place for userspace, add the
necessary Kconfig logic to allow this to be enabled.

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index eb2cf4938f6d..d6ce16b1ee47 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1127,6 +1127,29 @@ config ARM64_RAS_EXTN
 
 endmenu
 
+menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
+
+config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
+	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
+	default y
+	help
+	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
+	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
+	  keys, which can be used to mitigate Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
+	  and other attacks.
+
+	  This option enables these instructions at EL0 (i.e. for userspace).
+
+	  Choosing this option will cause the kernel to initialise secret keys
+	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
+	  context-switched along with the process.
+
+	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
+	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace nor will it be
+	  enabled.
+
+endmenu
+
 config ARM64_SVE
 	bool "ARM Scalable Vector Extension support"
 	default y
-- 
2.11.0

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-04-17 18:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-17 18:37 [PATCHv3 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 01/11] arm64: add pointer authentication register bits Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 02/11] arm64/kvm: consistently handle host HCR_EL2 flags Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-27  9:51   ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-27  9:51     ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-27 10:13     ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-27 10:13       ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 03/11] arm64/kvm: hide ptrauth from guests Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-18 13:19   ` Andrew Jones
2018-04-18 13:19     ` Andrew Jones
2018-04-18 13:47     ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-18 13:47       ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-27  9:51   ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-27  9:51     ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 04/11] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2 Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-27  9:52   ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-27  9:52     ` Christoffer Dall
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 05/11] arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 06/11] asm-generic: mm_hooks: allow hooks to be overridden individually Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 19:56   ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-04-17 19:56     ` Arnd Bergmann
2018-04-18 11:38     ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-18 11:38       ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 07/11] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-25 11:23   ` Catalin Marinas
2018-04-25 11:23     ` Catalin Marinas
2018-04-27 10:27     ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-27 10:27       ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 08/11] arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 09/11] arm64: perf: strip PAC when unwinding userspace Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2018-04-17 18:37   ` [PATCHv3 10/11] arm64: enable pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37 ` [PATCHv3 11/11] arm64: docs: document " Mark Rutland
2018-04-17 18:37   ` Mark Rutland
2018-04-22  8:05   ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-22  8:05     ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-22  8:47     ` Marc Zyngier
2018-04-22  8:47       ` Marc Zyngier
2018-04-22  8:47       ` Marc Zyngier
2018-04-22  9:00       ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-22  9:00         ` Pavel Machek
2018-04-25 12:27   ` Catalin Marinas
2018-04-25 12:27     ` Catalin Marinas

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