[MODERATED] Re: ***UNCHECKED*** [patch 2/8] [PATCH v1.3.1 2/7] Linux Patch 2

[MODERATED] Re: ***UNCHECKED*** [patch 2/8] [PATCH v1.3.1 2/7] Linux Patch 2

[Borislav Petkov]

On Thu, Apr 12, 2018 at 10:26:51PM -0400, speck for konrad.wilk_at_oracle.com wrote:
>  Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h              |  1 +
>  arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            |  6 ++
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c                     |  1 +
>  5 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 1d1d53f85ddd..2c22ca7e90a6 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2173,6 +2173,15 @@
>  	md=		[HW] RAID subsystems devices and level
>  			See Documentation/admin-guide/md.rst.
>  
> +	mdd=		[X86] Control memory disambiguation disable mitigation.
> +
> +			auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
> +			       vulnerable and picks the most appropiate way

"appropriate"

> +			userspace - disable memory disambiguation in userspace,
> +                               and enable it in the kernel.
> +			boot  - disable memory disambiguation all the time (default).
> +			off  - do not control memory disambiguation (insecure)
> +
>  	mdacon=		[MDA]
>  			Format: <first>,<last>
>  			Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
> @@ -2647,6 +2656,8 @@
>  			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
>  			to spectre_v2=off.
>  
> +	nomdd		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the memory disambiguation vulnerability.
> +
>  	noxsave		[BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save
>  			and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to
>  			enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 4393c10fcc6f..7490798a70e9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -333,6 +333,7 @@
>  #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP		(18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
>  #define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	(18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_MDD			(18*32+31) /* Intel Memory Disambiguation Disable. */

No need for the "Intel" in the comment - the whole leaf is Intel's.

>  /*
>   * BUG word(s)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index f928ad9b143f..2c098a3250eb 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -216,6 +216,12 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
>  	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
>  	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
>  };
> +/* The MD mitigation variants */
> +enum md_mitigation {
> +	MD_NONE,
> +	MD_BOOT_ON,
> +	MD_KERNEL_ON,
> +};
>  
>  extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
>  extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 79dfc80c4b9c..561cb228605a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
>  #include <asm/intel-family.h>
>  
>  static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
> +static void __init md_select_mitigation(void);
>  
>  void __init check_bugs(void)
>  {
> @@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
>  	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
>  	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
>  
> +	md_select_mitigation();
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>  	/*
>  	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
> @@ -311,6 +314,94 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +#undef pr_fmt
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "MDD: " fmt
> +
> +static enum md_mitigation md_mode = MD_NONE;
> +
> +/* The kernel command line selection */
> +enum md_mitigation_cmd {
> +	MD_CMD_NONE,
> +	MD_CMD_AUTO,
> +	MD_CMD_BOOT_ON,
> +	MD_CMD_KERNEL_ON,
> +};
> +
> +static const char *md_strings[] = {
> +	[MD_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
> +	[MD_BOOT_ON]			= "Mitigation: Memory disambiguation disabled at boot",
> +	[MD_KERNEL_ON]			= "Mitigation: Memory disambiguation disabled in userspace",
> +};
> +
> +static const struct {
> +	const char *option;
> +	enum md_mitigation_cmd cmd;
> +} md_mitigation_options[] = {
> +	{ "off",               MD_CMD_NONE },
> +	{ "auto",              MD_CMD_AUTO },
> +	{ "boot",              MD_CMD_BOOT_ON },
> +	{ "userspace",         MD_CMD_KERNEL_ON },
> +};
> +
> +static enum md_mitigation_cmd __init md_parse_cmdline(void)
> +{
> +	char arg[20];
> +	int ret, i;
> +	enum md_mitigation_cmd cmd = MD_CMD_AUTO;
> +
> +	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nomdd"))
> +		return MD_CMD_NONE;
> +	else {
> +		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "mdd", arg, sizeof(arg));
> +		if (ret < 0)
> +			return MD_CMD_AUTO;
> +
> +		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(md_mitigation_options); i++) {
> +			if (!match_option(arg, ret, md_mitigation_options[i].option))
> +				continue;

<---- newline here.

> +			cmd = md_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
> +			break;
> +		}
> +
> +		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(md_mitigation_options)) {
> +			pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
> +			return MD_CMD_AUTO;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	return cmd;
> +}
> +
> +static void __init md_select_mitigation(void)
> +{
> +	enum md_mitigation_cmd cmd = md_parse_cmdline();
> +	enum md_mitigation mode = MD_NONE;
> +
> +	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MD) &&
> +	    (cmd == MD_CMD_NONE || cmd == MD_CMD_AUTO))
> +		return;
> +
> +	switch (cmd) {
> +	case MD_CMD_AUTO:
> +	case MD_CMD_BOOT_ON:
> +		mode = MD_BOOT_ON;
> +		break;
> +	case MD_CMD_KERNEL_ON:
> +		mode = MD_KERNEL_ON;
> +		break;
> +	case MD_CMD_NONE:
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MDD))
> +		return;

This check should happen as the very first thing on function entry.
Actually, it should go into md_parse_cmdline() because all the parsing
is useless without X86_FEATURE_MDD present and there it should do:

	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MDD))
		return MD_CMD_NONE;

> +
> +	md_mode = mode;
> +	pr_info("%s\n", md_strings[mode]);
> +
> +	if (mode == MD_NONE)
> +		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MDD);
> +}
>  #undef pr_fmt
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
> @@ -346,6 +437,6 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_md(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf
>  	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MD))
>  		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
>  
> -	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
> +	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", md_strings[md_mode]);
>  }
>  #endif

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG Nürnberg)
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