From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mingo@kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, dan.j.williams@intel.com,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/7] Various Spectre-v1 fixes
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 11:33:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180423093321.GV4064@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180423010343.GG16083@dhcp22.suse.cz>
On Sun, Apr 22, 2018 at 07:03:44PM -0600, Michal Hocko wrote:
> On Fri 20-04-18 15:14:07, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> > These fix a number of perf, x86 and sched cases where we have user controlled
> > array dereferences. All were found by Dan's recent Smatch update.
>
> Do we want to mark all of these for stable?
If we all agree that any (speculative) user-controlled array index --
irrespective of the existence of the second load/store that would
complete the gadget -- needs fixing and thus all these patches are
'good', then yes, that makes sense.
Given yours is the only response so far, I suspect we're good on all
that :-)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-04-23 9:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-20 13:14 [PATCH 0/7] Various Spectre-v1 fixes Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-20 13:14 ` [PATCH 1/7] perf: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for aux_pages Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-20 13:14 ` [PATCH 2/7] perf,x86: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for hw_perf_event Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-20 13:14 ` [PATCH 3/7] perf,x86: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for x86_pmu::event_map() Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-20 13:14 ` [PATCH 4/7] perf,x86/msr: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for msr Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-20 13:14 ` [PATCH 5/7] perf,x86/cstate: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for pkg_msr Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-20 13:14 ` [PATCH 6/7] sched: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for sched_prio_to_weight[] Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-20 13:14 ` [PATCH 7/7] sched,autogroup: Fix possible Spectre-v1 for sched_prio_to_weight Peter Zijlstra
2018-04-23 1:03 ` [PATCH 0/7] Various Spectre-v1 fixes Michal Hocko
2018-04-23 9:33 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2018-04-23 13:50 ` Dan Williams
2018-04-23 16:47 ` Michal Hocko
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