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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [patch V9 06/16] SSB 6
Date: Tue, 01 May 2018 17:24:26 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180501152658.553159755@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20180501152420.785133537@linutronix.de

It does not do much except show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86
cores. Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so
are some Atoms and some Xeon Phi.

It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

---
v1.3: Remove AMD
    s/md/mdd/
v1.4: s/mdd/sbb/
v3: s/SSB/SPEC_STORE_BYPASS
  Rework the logic in cpu_set_bug_bits to be inverse.
v4: Expanded the not affected array
  - s/X86_BUG_CPU_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS/X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS/
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |    1 
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h                 |    1 
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                         |    5 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                       |   23 +++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/base/cpu.c                                 |    8 +++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                                |    2 +
 6 files changed, 40 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -478,6 +478,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabi
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -363,5 +363,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN		X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1		X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -404,4 +404,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+}
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -923,10 +923,33 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{}
 };
 
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1 },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2 },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,     6, INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,	5 },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	5 },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_NSC,	5 },
+	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY,	4 },
+	{}
+};
+
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
+	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+
 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
 		return;
 
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -534,14 +534,22 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spectre_v2(struc
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+					  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v1.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
+	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struc
 				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
 				   struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+					  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-01 15:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-01 15:24 [patch V9 00/16] SSB 0 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 01/16] SSB 1 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 02/16] SSB 2 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 03/16] SSB 3 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 04/16] SSB 4 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 05/16] SSB 5 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 07/16] SSB 7 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 08/16] SSB 8 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 09/16] SSB 9 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 10/16] SSB 10 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 11/16] SSB 11 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 19:26   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 12/16] SSB 12 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 13/16] SSB 13 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 14/16] SSB 14 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 15/16] SSB 15 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:24 ` [patch V9 16/16] SSB 16 Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:40 ` [patch V9 00/16] SSB Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 15:51 ` [patch V9 00/16] SSB 0 - Bundle Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 16:11 ` [patch V9 00/16] SSB Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 17:22 ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-05-01 17:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 17:31   ` [MODERATED] " Linus Torvalds
2018-05-01 17:36     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 19:14       ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2018-05-01 19:20   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 19:24   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 19:28     ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2018-05-01 18:12 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-01 18:30   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 22:22     ` [MODERATED] " Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-05-01 19:28   ` Tim Chen
2018-05-01 21:54     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-01 22:33     ` [MODERATED] " Tim Chen
2018-05-01 22:46       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-02  5:08 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters

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