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* [RFC PATCH v4 0/5] ima: Namespacing IMA
@ 2018-05-11 14:42 ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	zohar, ebiederm, john.johansen, Stefan Berger

This patch set implements an IMA namespace data structure that gets
created by first writing a '1' into IMA's securityfs unshare file at
/sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare and then by clone(). This patch set
lays down the foundation for namespacing the different aspects of IMA
(eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

The original PoC patches created a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag to explicitly
control when a new IMA namespace should be created. The previously posted
version 2 of this series had it hooked on the mount namespace, which was
regarded as inappropriate. The subsequent v3 tied it to the creation of a
user namespace. Based on comments, we elected to now again create an
independent IMA namespace through the above mentioned securityfs file.

The first patch creates the ima_namespace data, while the second patch
puts the iint->flags in the namespace. The third patch introduces an
audit message type for  IMA policy rules. The fourth patch introduces
a new IMA policy rule attribute 'ns' making rules only applicable to child
IMA namespaces. The last patch uses the flags for namespacing the
IMA-audit messages, enabling the same file to be audited each time it
is accessed in a new namespace.

   Stefan

Mehmet Kayaalp (2):
  ima: Add ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
  ima: namespace audit status flags

Mimi Zohar (1):
  ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions

Stefan Berger (1):
  ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces

Yuqiong Sun (1):
  ima: Add IMA namespace support

 fs/proc/namespaces.c                     |   3 +
 include/linux/ima.h                      |  53 +++++++++
 include/linux/nsproxy.h                  |   2 +
 include/linux/proc_ns.h                  |   1 +
 include/linux/sched.h                    |   6 +
 include/linux/user_namespace.h           |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h               |   3 +-
 init/Kconfig                             |  11 ++
 kernel/fork.c                            |   5 +
 kernel/nsproxy.c                         |  25 ++++-
 kernel/ucount.c                          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  82 +++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c         |  14 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c    |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c          |  55 ++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   4 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  51 +++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c        |  18 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 183 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c   | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c      |  77 ++++++++++++-
 22 files changed, 712 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c

-- 
2.14.3


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 0/5] ima: Namespacing IMA
@ 2018-05-11 14:42 ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

This patch set implements an IMA namespace data structure that gets
created by first writing a '1' into IMA's securityfs unshare file at
/sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare and then by clone(). This patch set
lays down the foundation for namespacing the different aspects of IMA
(eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

The original PoC patches created a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag to explicitly
control when a new IMA namespace should be created. The previously posted
version 2 of this series had it hooked on the mount namespace, which was
regarded as inappropriate. The subsequent v3 tied it to the creation of a
user namespace. Based on comments, we elected to now again create an
independent IMA namespace through the above mentioned securityfs file.

The first patch creates the ima_namespace data, while the second patch
puts the iint->flags in the namespace. The third patch introduces an
audit message type for  IMA policy rules. The fourth patch introduces
a new IMA policy rule attribute 'ns' making rules only applicable to child
IMA namespaces. The last patch uses the flags for namespacing the
IMA-audit messages, enabling the same file to be audited each time it
is accessed in a new namespace.

   Stefan

Mehmet Kayaalp (2):
  ima: Add ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
  ima: namespace audit status flags

Mimi Zohar (1):
  ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions

Stefan Berger (1):
  ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces

Yuqiong Sun (1):
  ima: Add IMA namespace support

 fs/proc/namespaces.c                     |   3 +
 include/linux/ima.h                      |  53 +++++++++
 include/linux/nsproxy.h                  |   2 +
 include/linux/proc_ns.h                  |   1 +
 include/linux/sched.h                    |   6 +
 include/linux/user_namespace.h           |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h               |   3 +-
 init/Kconfig                             |  11 ++
 kernel/fork.c                            |   5 +
 kernel/nsproxy.c                         |  25 ++++-
 kernel/ucount.c                          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  82 +++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c         |  14 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c    |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c          |  55 ++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   4 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  51 +++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c        |  18 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 183 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c   | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c      |  77 ++++++++++++-
 22 files changed, 712 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c

-- 
2.14.3

--
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 1/5] ima: Add IMA namespace support
  2018-05-11 14:42 ` Stefan Berger
  (?)
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO, Mehmet Kayaalp,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w, Yuqiong Sun,
	zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8

From: Yuqiong Sun <suny-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>

Add a new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option that enables one to create a new IMA
namespace. We do this by writing a file into IMA's new securityfs 'unshare'
file, which will have a new child process get the IMA namespace. We create
the IMA namespace when a user writes a boolean '1' into this file and
we cache the IMA namespace on the task_struct and take it from there upon
the next clone().

Currently, the iam_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy inter-
face. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different as-
pects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

At this point one can create and activate a new IMA namespace by writing
a '1' into IMA's unshare file and subsequently creating a new process.
The 'ls -l' shows that the IMA namespace inode number temporarily changes
while the new IMA namespace is active after it was set up.

ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare
ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima
ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima

Changelog:
v4:
* Use IMA's securityfs to spawn a new namespace using unshare file

v3:
* Use CLONE_NEWUSER instead of CLONE_NEWNS flag

v2:
* Moved ima_init_ns and related functions into own file that is
  always compiled; init_ima_ns will always be there
* Fixed putting of imans->parent
* Move IMA namespace creation from nsproxy into mount namespace
  code; get rid of procfs operations for IMA namespace

v1:
* Use CLONE_NEWNS instead of a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag
* Use existing ima.h headers
* Move the ima_namespace.c to security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
* Fix typo INFO->INO
* Each namespace free's itself, removed recursively free'ing
  until init_ima_ns from free_ima_ns()

Signed-off-by: Yuqiong Sun <suny-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
---
 fs/proc/namespaces.c                     |   3 +
 include/linux/ima.h                      |  50 ++++++++++
 include/linux/nsproxy.h                  |   2 +
 include/linux/proc_ns.h                  |   1 +
 include/linux/sched.h                    |   6 ++
 include/linux/user_namespace.h           |   1 +
 init/Kconfig                             |   8 ++
 kernel/fork.c                            |   5 +
 kernel/nsproxy.c                         |  25 ++++-
 kernel/ucount.c                          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  32 ++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c          |  55 +++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   4 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  40 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 16 files changed, 396 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c

diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index 59b17e509f46..cc5e8e217412 100644
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ static const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_entries[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
 	&cgroupns_operations,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	&imans_operations,
+#endif
 };
 
 static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 0e4647e0eb60..27a332cd0438 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -105,4 +105,54 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+
+struct ima_namespace {
+	struct kref kref;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+	struct ucounts *ucounts;
+	struct ns_common ns;
+	struct ima_namespace *parent;
+};
+
+extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+				  struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref);
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		kref_get(&ns->kref);
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		kref_put(&ns->kref, free_ima_ns);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy,
+						struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+						struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	return old_ns;
+}
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/nsproxy.h b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
index 2ae1b1a4d84d..9d49f0a0cc97 100644
--- a/include/linux/nsproxy.h
+++ b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ struct uts_namespace;
 struct ipc_namespace;
 struct pid_namespace;
 struct cgroup_namespace;
+struct ima_namespace;
 struct fs_struct;
 
 /*
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ struct nsproxy {
 	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns_for_children;
 	struct net 	     *net_ns;
 	struct cgroup_namespace *cgroup_ns;
+	struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
 };
 extern struct nsproxy init_nsproxy;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
index d31cb6215905..5be4411ecccc 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations mntns_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations cgroupns_operations;
+extern const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations;
 
 /*
  * We always define these enumerators
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index b161ef8a902e..8a1f1b60959d 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct sighand_struct;
 struct signal_struct;
 struct task_delay_info;
 struct task_group;
+struct ima_namespace;
 
 /*
  * Task state bitmask. NOTE! These bits are also
@@ -1100,6 +1101,11 @@ struct task_struct {
 	void				*security;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	/* child process will spawn a new IMA namespace */
+	bool                            ima_ns_for_child;
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * New fields for task_struct should be added above here, so that
 	 * they are included in the randomized portion of task_struct.
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index d6b74b91096b..d6def79eb0d1 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ enum ucount_type {
 	UCOUNT_INOTIFY_INSTANCES,
 	UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES,
 #endif
+	UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES,
 	UCOUNT_COUNTS,
 };
 
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index e37f4b2a6445..2ae532aa12a0 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -932,6 +932,14 @@ config NET_NS
 	  Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances
 	  of the network stack.
 
+config IMA_NS
+	bool "IMA namespace"
+	depends on IMA
+	default n
+	help
+	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces. Namespaced IMA data
+          enables having IMA features work separately in each IMA namespace.
+
 endif # NAMESPACES
 
 config SCHED_AUTOGROUP
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index e5d9d405ae4e..a0715ccf897e 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
 #include <linux/kcov.h>
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -834,6 +835,10 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
 	tsk->fail_nth = 0;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	orig->ima_ns_for_child = false;
+#endif
+
 	return tsk;
 
 free_stack:
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index f6c5d330059a..495f4a561d2a 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep;
 
@@ -44,6 +45,9 @@ struct nsproxy init_nsproxy = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
 	.cgroup_ns		= &init_cgroup_ns,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	.ima_ns			= &init_ima_ns,
+#endif
 };
 
 static inline struct nsproxy *create_nsproxy(void)
@@ -67,6 +71,7 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
 {
 	struct nsproxy *new_nsp;
 	int err;
+	bool copy_ima = false;
 
 	new_nsp = create_nsproxy();
 	if (!new_nsp)
@@ -110,8 +115,21 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
 		goto out_net;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	copy_ima = tsk->ima_ns_for_child;
+	tsk->ima_ns_for_child = false;
+#endif
+	new_nsp->ima_ns = copy_ima_ns(copy_ima, user_ns,
+				      tsk->nsproxy->ima_ns);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_nsp->ima_ns)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(new_nsp->ima_ns);
+		goto out_ima;
+	}
+
 	return new_nsp;
 
+out_ima:
+	put_net(new_nsp->net_ns);
 out_net:
 	put_cgroup_ns(new_nsp->cgroup_ns);
 out_cgroup:
@@ -143,7 +161,11 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
 			      CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
-			      CLONE_NEWCGROUP)))) {
+			      CLONE_NEWCGROUP)))
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	    && likely(!tsk->ima_ns_for_child)
+#endif
+	) {
 		get_nsproxy(old_ns);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -182,6 +204,7 @@ void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns)
 		put_pid_ns(ns->pid_ns_for_children);
 	put_cgroup_ns(ns->cgroup_ns);
 	put_net(ns->net_ns);
+	put_ima_ns(ns->ima_ns);
 	kmem_cache_free(nsproxy_cachep, ns);
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
index b4eeee03934f..bdd02e2e36cf 100644
--- a/kernel/ucount.c
+++ b/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static struct ctl_table user_table[] = {
 	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_instances"),
 	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"),
 #endif
+	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_ima_namespaces"),
 	{ }
 };
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index d921dc4f9eb0..cc60f726e651 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d52b487ad259..f999328e5b49 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "../integrity.h"
@@ -291,6 +292,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+int ima_ns_init(void);
+struct ima_namespace;
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
@@ -313,6 +318,33 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
 
+static inline struct ima_namespace *to_ima_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return container_of(ns, struct ima_namespace, ns);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+
+extern const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations;
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			       struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
+
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	return current->nsproxy->ima_ns;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	return &init_ima_ns;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
+
 #ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
 #define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	(S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
 #else
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index fa540c0469da..9ebf97e29344 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -361,6 +361,9 @@ static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements;
 static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
 static struct dentry *violations;
 static struct dentry *ima_policy;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+static struct dentry *unshare;
+#endif
 
 enum ima_fs_flags {
 	IMA_FS_BUSY,
@@ -446,6 +449,47 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
 	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+static int ima_open_unshare(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_write_unshare(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *page;
+	bool set;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (kstrtobool(page, &set))
+		goto out;
+
+	current->ima_ns_for_child = set;
+
+	length = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_unshare_ops = {
+	.open = ima_open_unshare,
+	.write = ima_write_unshare,
+};
+#endif
+
 int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 {
 	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
@@ -485,6 +529,14 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
 		goto out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	unshare = securityfs_create_file("unshare", 0200,
+					 ima_dir, NULL,
+					 &ima_unshare_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(unshare))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 out:
 	securityfs_remove(violations);
@@ -493,5 +545,8 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 	securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	securityfs_remove(unshare);
+#endif
 	return -1;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 29b72cd2502e..091e5fdee5fc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -137,5 +137,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 
 	ima_init_policy();
 
+	rc = ima_ns_init();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	return ima_fs_init();
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0bd6c418b8e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *   Yuqiong Sun <suny-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
+ *   Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
+	return ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int __init ima_ns_init(void)
+{
+	return ima_init_namespace(&init_ima_ns);
+}
+
+struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = {
+	.kref = KREF_INIT(1),
+	.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
+	.ucounts = NULL,
+	.parent = NULL,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8e37d7ac5d34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *  Yuqiong Sun <suny-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
+ *  Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct ucounts *inc_ima_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return inc_ucount(ns, current_euid(), UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES);
+}
+
+static void dec_ima_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
+{
+	return dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clone a new ns copying an original ima namespace, setting refcount to 1
+ *
+ * @user_ns: user namespace that current task runs in
+ * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
+ * Return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise
+ */
+static struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+					   struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns;
+	struct ucounts *ucounts;
+	int err;
+
+	err = -ENOSPC;
+	ucounts = inc_ima_namespaces(user_ns);
+	if (!ucounts)
+		goto fail;
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	ns = kmalloc(sizeof(*ns), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ns)
+		goto fail_dec;
+
+	err = ima_init_namespace(ns);
+	if (err)
+		goto fail_free;
+
+	kref_init(&ns->kref);
+	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
+	ns->parent = get_ima_ns(old_ns);
+	ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
+	ns->ucounts = ucounts;
+
+	return ns;
+
+fail_free:
+	kfree(ns);
+fail_dec:
+	dec_ima_namespaces(ucounts);
+fail:
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Copy task's ima namespace, or clone it if flags specifies CLONE_NEWNS.
+ *
+ * @bool: whether to copy or just get a reference to it
+ * @user_ns: user namespace that current task runs in
+ * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
+ */
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy,
+				  struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+				  struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *new_ns;
+
+	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
+	if (!copy)
+		return old_ns;
+
+	new_ns = create_ima_ns(user_ns, old_ns);
+	put_ima_ns(old_ns);
+
+	return new_ns;
+}
+
+static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	put_ima_ns(ns->parent);
+	put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
+	ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
+	dec_ima_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
+	kfree(ns);
+}
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns;
+
+	ns = container_of(kref, struct ima_namespace, kref);
+
+	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
+}
+
+static struct ns_common *imans_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = NULL;
+	struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
+
+	task_lock(task);
+	nsproxy = task->nsproxy;
+	if (nsproxy) {
+		ns = nsproxy->ima_ns;
+		get_ima_ns(ns);
+	}
+	task_unlock(task);
+
+	return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
+}
+
+static void imans_put(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	put_ima_ns(to_ima_ns(ns));
+}
+
+static int imans_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *new)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = to_ima_ns(new);
+
+	if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	put_ima_ns(nsproxy->ima_ns);
+	nsproxy->ima_ns = get_ima_ns(ns);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct user_namespace *imans_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return to_ima_ns(ns)->user_ns;
+}
+
+const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.get = imans_get,
+	.put = imans_put,
+	.install = imans_install,
+	.owner = imans_owner,
+};
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 1/5] ima: Add IMA namespace support
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	zohar, ebiederm, john.johansen, Yuqiong Sun, Mehmet Kayaalp,
	Stefan Berger

From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>

Add a new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option that enables one to create a new IMA
namespace. We do this by writing a file into IMA's new securityfs 'unshare'
file, which will have a new child process get the IMA namespace. We create
the IMA namespace when a user writes a boolean '1' into this file and
we cache the IMA namespace on the task_struct and take it from there upon
the next clone().

Currently, the iam_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy inter-
face. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different as-
pects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

At this point one can create and activate a new IMA namespace by writing
a '1' into IMA's unshare file and subsequently creating a new process.
The 'ls -l' shows that the IMA namespace inode number temporarily changes
while the new IMA namespace is active after it was set up.

ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare
ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima
ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima

Changelog:
v4:
* Use IMA's securityfs to spawn a new namespace using unshare file

v3:
* Use CLONE_NEWUSER instead of CLONE_NEWNS flag

v2:
* Moved ima_init_ns and related functions into own file that is
  always compiled; init_ima_ns will always be there
* Fixed putting of imans->parent
* Move IMA namespace creation from nsproxy into mount namespace
  code; get rid of procfs operations for IMA namespace

v1:
* Use CLONE_NEWNS instead of a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag
* Use existing ima.h headers
* Move the ima_namespace.c to security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
* Fix typo INFO->INO
* Each namespace free's itself, removed recursively free'ing
  until init_ima_ns from free_ima_ns()

Signed-off-by: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 fs/proc/namespaces.c                     |   3 +
 include/linux/ima.h                      |  50 ++++++++++
 include/linux/nsproxy.h                  |   2 +
 include/linux/proc_ns.h                  |   1 +
 include/linux/sched.h                    |   6 ++
 include/linux/user_namespace.h           |   1 +
 init/Kconfig                             |   8 ++
 kernel/fork.c                            |   5 +
 kernel/nsproxy.c                         |  25 ++++-
 kernel/ucount.c                          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  32 ++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c          |  55 +++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   4 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  40 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 16 files changed, 396 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c

diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index 59b17e509f46..cc5e8e217412 100644
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ static const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_entries[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
 	&cgroupns_operations,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	&imans_operations,
+#endif
 };
 
 static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 0e4647e0eb60..27a332cd0438 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -105,4 +105,54 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+
+struct ima_namespace {
+	struct kref kref;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+	struct ucounts *ucounts;
+	struct ns_common ns;
+	struct ima_namespace *parent;
+};
+
+extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+				  struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref);
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		kref_get(&ns->kref);
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		kref_put(&ns->kref, free_ima_ns);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy,
+						struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+						struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	return old_ns;
+}
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/nsproxy.h b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
index 2ae1b1a4d84d..9d49f0a0cc97 100644
--- a/include/linux/nsproxy.h
+++ b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ struct uts_namespace;
 struct ipc_namespace;
 struct pid_namespace;
 struct cgroup_namespace;
+struct ima_namespace;
 struct fs_struct;
 
 /*
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ struct nsproxy {
 	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns_for_children;
 	struct net 	     *net_ns;
 	struct cgroup_namespace *cgroup_ns;
+	struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
 };
 extern struct nsproxy init_nsproxy;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
index d31cb6215905..5be4411ecccc 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations mntns_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations cgroupns_operations;
+extern const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations;
 
 /*
  * We always define these enumerators
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index b161ef8a902e..8a1f1b60959d 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct sighand_struct;
 struct signal_struct;
 struct task_delay_info;
 struct task_group;
+struct ima_namespace;
 
 /*
  * Task state bitmask. NOTE! These bits are also
@@ -1100,6 +1101,11 @@ struct task_struct {
 	void				*security;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	/* child process will spawn a new IMA namespace */
+	bool                            ima_ns_for_child;
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * New fields for task_struct should be added above here, so that
 	 * they are included in the randomized portion of task_struct.
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index d6b74b91096b..d6def79eb0d1 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ enum ucount_type {
 	UCOUNT_INOTIFY_INSTANCES,
 	UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES,
 #endif
+	UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES,
 	UCOUNT_COUNTS,
 };
 
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index e37f4b2a6445..2ae532aa12a0 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -932,6 +932,14 @@ config NET_NS
 	  Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances
 	  of the network stack.
 
+config IMA_NS
+	bool "IMA namespace"
+	depends on IMA
+	default n
+	help
+	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces. Namespaced IMA data
+          enables having IMA features work separately in each IMA namespace.
+
 endif # NAMESPACES
 
 config SCHED_AUTOGROUP
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index e5d9d405ae4e..a0715ccf897e 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
 #include <linux/kcov.h>
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -834,6 +835,10 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
 	tsk->fail_nth = 0;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	orig->ima_ns_for_child = false;
+#endif
+
 	return tsk;
 
 free_stack:
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index f6c5d330059a..495f4a561d2a 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep;
 
@@ -44,6 +45,9 @@ struct nsproxy init_nsproxy = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
 	.cgroup_ns		= &init_cgroup_ns,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	.ima_ns			= &init_ima_ns,
+#endif
 };
 
 static inline struct nsproxy *create_nsproxy(void)
@@ -67,6 +71,7 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
 {
 	struct nsproxy *new_nsp;
 	int err;
+	bool copy_ima = false;
 
 	new_nsp = create_nsproxy();
 	if (!new_nsp)
@@ -110,8 +115,21 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
 		goto out_net;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	copy_ima = tsk->ima_ns_for_child;
+	tsk->ima_ns_for_child = false;
+#endif
+	new_nsp->ima_ns = copy_ima_ns(copy_ima, user_ns,
+				      tsk->nsproxy->ima_ns);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_nsp->ima_ns)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(new_nsp->ima_ns);
+		goto out_ima;
+	}
+
 	return new_nsp;
 
+out_ima:
+	put_net(new_nsp->net_ns);
 out_net:
 	put_cgroup_ns(new_nsp->cgroup_ns);
 out_cgroup:
@@ -143,7 +161,11 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
 			      CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
-			      CLONE_NEWCGROUP)))) {
+			      CLONE_NEWCGROUP)))
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	    && likely(!tsk->ima_ns_for_child)
+#endif
+	) {
 		get_nsproxy(old_ns);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -182,6 +204,7 @@ void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns)
 		put_pid_ns(ns->pid_ns_for_children);
 	put_cgroup_ns(ns->cgroup_ns);
 	put_net(ns->net_ns);
+	put_ima_ns(ns->ima_ns);
 	kmem_cache_free(nsproxy_cachep, ns);
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
index b4eeee03934f..bdd02e2e36cf 100644
--- a/kernel/ucount.c
+++ b/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static struct ctl_table user_table[] = {
 	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_instances"),
 	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"),
 #endif
+	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_ima_namespaces"),
 	{ }
 };
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index d921dc4f9eb0..cc60f726e651 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d52b487ad259..f999328e5b49 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "../integrity.h"
@@ -291,6 +292,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+int ima_ns_init(void);
+struct ima_namespace;
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
@@ -313,6 +318,33 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
 
+static inline struct ima_namespace *to_ima_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return container_of(ns, struct ima_namespace, ns);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+
+extern const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations;
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			       struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
+
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	return current->nsproxy->ima_ns;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	return &init_ima_ns;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
+
 #ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
 #define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	(S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
 #else
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index fa540c0469da..9ebf97e29344 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -361,6 +361,9 @@ static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements;
 static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
 static struct dentry *violations;
 static struct dentry *ima_policy;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+static struct dentry *unshare;
+#endif
 
 enum ima_fs_flags {
 	IMA_FS_BUSY,
@@ -446,6 +449,47 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
 	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+static int ima_open_unshare(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_write_unshare(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *page;
+	bool set;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (kstrtobool(page, &set))
+		goto out;
+
+	current->ima_ns_for_child = set;
+
+	length = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_unshare_ops = {
+	.open = ima_open_unshare,
+	.write = ima_write_unshare,
+};
+#endif
+
 int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 {
 	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
@@ -485,6 +529,14 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
 		goto out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	unshare = securityfs_create_file("unshare", 0200,
+					 ima_dir, NULL,
+					 &ima_unshare_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(unshare))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 out:
 	securityfs_remove(violations);
@@ -493,5 +545,8 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 	securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	securityfs_remove(unshare);
+#endif
 	return -1;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 29b72cd2502e..091e5fdee5fc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -137,5 +137,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 
 	ima_init_policy();
 
+	rc = ima_ns_init();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	return ima_fs_init();
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0bd6c418b8e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *   Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ *   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
+	return ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int __init ima_ns_init(void)
+{
+	return ima_init_namespace(&init_ima_ns);
+}
+
+struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = {
+	.kref = KREF_INIT(1),
+	.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
+	.ucounts = NULL,
+	.parent = NULL,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8e37d7ac5d34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *  Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ *  Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct ucounts *inc_ima_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return inc_ucount(ns, current_euid(), UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES);
+}
+
+static void dec_ima_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
+{
+	return dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clone a new ns copying an original ima namespace, setting refcount to 1
+ *
+ * @user_ns: user namespace that current task runs in
+ * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
+ * Return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise
+ */
+static struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+					   struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns;
+	struct ucounts *ucounts;
+	int err;
+
+	err = -ENOSPC;
+	ucounts = inc_ima_namespaces(user_ns);
+	if (!ucounts)
+		goto fail;
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	ns = kmalloc(sizeof(*ns), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ns)
+		goto fail_dec;
+
+	err = ima_init_namespace(ns);
+	if (err)
+		goto fail_free;
+
+	kref_init(&ns->kref);
+	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
+	ns->parent = get_ima_ns(old_ns);
+	ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
+	ns->ucounts = ucounts;
+
+	return ns;
+
+fail_free:
+	kfree(ns);
+fail_dec:
+	dec_ima_namespaces(ucounts);
+fail:
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Copy task's ima namespace, or clone it if flags specifies CLONE_NEWNS.
+ *
+ * @bool: whether to copy or just get a reference to it
+ * @user_ns: user namespace that current task runs in
+ * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
+ */
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy,
+				  struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+				  struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *new_ns;
+
+	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
+	if (!copy)
+		return old_ns;
+
+	new_ns = create_ima_ns(user_ns, old_ns);
+	put_ima_ns(old_ns);
+
+	return new_ns;
+}
+
+static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	put_ima_ns(ns->parent);
+	put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
+	ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
+	dec_ima_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
+	kfree(ns);
+}
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns;
+
+	ns = container_of(kref, struct ima_namespace, kref);
+
+	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
+}
+
+static struct ns_common *imans_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = NULL;
+	struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
+
+	task_lock(task);
+	nsproxy = task->nsproxy;
+	if (nsproxy) {
+		ns = nsproxy->ima_ns;
+		get_ima_ns(ns);
+	}
+	task_unlock(task);
+
+	return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
+}
+
+static void imans_put(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	put_ima_ns(to_ima_ns(ns));
+}
+
+static int imans_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *new)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = to_ima_ns(new);
+
+	if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	put_ima_ns(nsproxy->ima_ns);
+	nsproxy->ima_ns = get_ima_ns(ns);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct user_namespace *imans_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return to_ima_ns(ns)->user_ns;
+}
+
+const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.get = imans_get,
+	.put = imans_put,
+	.install = imans_install,
+	.owner = imans_owner,
+};
-- 
2.14.3


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 1/5] ima: Add IMA namespace support
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

From: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>

Add a new CONFIG_IMA_NS config option that enables one to create a new IMA
namespace. We do this by writing a file into IMA's new securityfs 'unshare'
file, which will have a new child process get the IMA namespace. We create
the IMA namespace when a user writes a boolean '1' into this file and
we cache the IMA namespace on the task_struct and take it from there upon
the next clone().

Currently, the iam_ns contains no useful IMA data but only a dummy inter-
face. This patch creates the framework for namespacing the different as-
pects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

At this point one can create and activate a new IMA namespace by writing
a '1' into IMA's unshare file and subsequently creating a new process.
The 'ls -l' shows that the IMA namespace inode number temporarily changes
while the new IMA namespace is active after it was set up.

ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare
ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima
ls -l /proc/self/ns/ima

Changelog:
v4:
* Use IMA's securityfs to spawn a new namespace using unshare file

v3:
* Use CLONE_NEWUSER instead of CLONE_NEWNS flag

v2:
* Moved ima_init_ns and related functions into own file that is
  always compiled; init_ima_ns will always be there
* Fixed putting of imans->parent
* Move IMA namespace creation from nsproxy into mount namespace
  code; get rid of procfs operations for IMA namespace

v1:
* Use CLONE_NEWNS instead of a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag
* Use existing ima.h headers
* Move the ima_namespace.c to security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
* Fix typo INFO->INO
* Each namespace free's itself, removed recursively free'ing
  until init_ima_ns from free_ima_ns()

Signed-off-by: Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 fs/proc/namespaces.c                     |   3 +
 include/linux/ima.h                      |  50 ++++++++++
 include/linux/nsproxy.h                  |   2 +
 include/linux/proc_ns.h                  |   1 +
 include/linux/sched.h                    |   6 ++
 include/linux/user_namespace.h           |   1 +
 init/Kconfig                             |   8 ++
 kernel/fork.c                            |   5 +
 kernel/nsproxy.c                         |  25 ++++-
 kernel/ucount.c                          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  32 ++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c          |  55 +++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   4 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  40 ++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 16 files changed, 396 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c

diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
index 59b17e509f46..cc5e8e217412 100644
--- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c
+++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ static const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_entries[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
 	&cgroupns_operations,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	&imans_operations,
+#endif
 };
 
 static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 0e4647e0eb60..27a332cd0438 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -105,4 +105,54 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
+
+struct ima_namespace {
+	struct kref kref;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+	struct ucounts *ucounts;
+	struct ns_common ns;
+	struct ima_namespace *parent;
+};
+
+extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy, struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+				  struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref);
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		kref_get(&ns->kref);
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (ns)
+		kref_put(&ns->kref, free_ima_ns);
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy,
+						struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+						struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	return old_ns;
+}
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return ns;
+}
+
+static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
 #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/nsproxy.h b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
index 2ae1b1a4d84d..9d49f0a0cc97 100644
--- a/include/linux/nsproxy.h
+++ b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ struct uts_namespace;
 struct ipc_namespace;
 struct pid_namespace;
 struct cgroup_namespace;
+struct ima_namespace;
 struct fs_struct;
 
 /*
@@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ struct nsproxy {
 	struct pid_namespace *pid_ns_for_children;
 	struct net 	     *net_ns;
 	struct cgroup_namespace *cgroup_ns;
+	struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;
 };
 extern struct nsproxy init_nsproxy;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
index d31cb6215905..5be4411ecccc 100644
--- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h
+++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations pidns_for_children_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations userns_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations mntns_operations;
 extern const struct proc_ns_operations cgroupns_operations;
+extern const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations;
 
 /*
  * We always define these enumerators
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index b161ef8a902e..8a1f1b60959d 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ struct sighand_struct;
 struct signal_struct;
 struct task_delay_info;
 struct task_group;
+struct ima_namespace;
 
 /*
  * Task state bitmask. NOTE! These bits are also
@@ -1100,6 +1101,11 @@ struct task_struct {
 	void				*security;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	/* child process will spawn a new IMA namespace */
+	bool                            ima_ns_for_child;
+#endif
+
 	/*
 	 * New fields for task_struct should be added above here, so that
 	 * they are included in the randomized portion of task_struct.
diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
index d6b74b91096b..d6def79eb0d1 100644
--- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
+++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ enum ucount_type {
 	UCOUNT_INOTIFY_INSTANCES,
 	UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES,
 #endif
+	UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES,
 	UCOUNT_COUNTS,
 };
 
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index e37f4b2a6445..2ae532aa12a0 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -932,6 +932,14 @@ config NET_NS
 	  Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances
 	  of the network stack.
 
+config IMA_NS
+	bool "IMA namespace"
+	depends on IMA
+	default n
+	help
+	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces. Namespaced IMA data
+          enables having IMA features work separately in each IMA namespace.
+
 endif # NAMESPACES
 
 config SCHED_AUTOGROUP
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index e5d9d405ae4e..a0715ccf897e 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
 #include <linux/kcov.h>
 #include <linux/livepatch.h>
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -834,6 +835,10 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
 	tsk->fail_nth = 0;
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	orig->ima_ns_for_child = false;
+#endif
+
 	return tsk;
 
 free_stack:
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index f6c5d330059a..495f4a561d2a 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 
 static struct kmem_cache *nsproxy_cachep;
 
@@ -44,6 +45,9 @@ struct nsproxy init_nsproxy = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS
 	.cgroup_ns		= &init_cgroup_ns,
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	.ima_ns			= &init_ima_ns,
+#endif
 };
 
 static inline struct nsproxy *create_nsproxy(void)
@@ -67,6 +71,7 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
 {
 	struct nsproxy *new_nsp;
 	int err;
+	bool copy_ima = false;
 
 	new_nsp = create_nsproxy();
 	if (!new_nsp)
@@ -110,8 +115,21 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
 		goto out_net;
 	}
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	copy_ima = tsk->ima_ns_for_child;
+	tsk->ima_ns_for_child = false;
+#endif
+	new_nsp->ima_ns = copy_ima_ns(copy_ima, user_ns,
+				      tsk->nsproxy->ima_ns);
+	if (IS_ERR(new_nsp->ima_ns)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(new_nsp->ima_ns);
+		goto out_ima;
+	}
+
 	return new_nsp;
 
+out_ima:
+	put_net(new_nsp->net_ns);
 out_net:
 	put_cgroup_ns(new_nsp->cgroup_ns);
 out_cgroup:
@@ -143,7 +161,11 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
 			      CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
-			      CLONE_NEWCGROUP)))) {
+			      CLONE_NEWCGROUP)))
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	    && likely(!tsk->ima_ns_for_child)
+#endif
+	) {
 		get_nsproxy(old_ns);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -182,6 +204,7 @@ void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns)
 		put_pid_ns(ns->pid_ns_for_children);
 	put_cgroup_ns(ns->cgroup_ns);
 	put_net(ns->net_ns);
+	put_ima_ns(ns->ima_ns);
 	kmem_cache_free(nsproxy_cachep, ns);
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c
index b4eeee03934f..bdd02e2e36cf 100644
--- a/kernel/ucount.c
+++ b/kernel/ucount.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static struct ctl_table user_table[] = {
 	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_instances"),
 	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"),
 #endif
+	UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_ima_namespaces"),
 	{ }
 };
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index d921dc4f9eb0..cc60f726e651 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
-	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o
+	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d52b487ad259..f999328e5b49 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/hash.h>
 #include <linux/tpm.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
 
 #include "../integrity.h"
@@ -291,6 +292,10 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+int ima_ns_init(void);
+struct ima_namespace;
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
@@ -313,6 +318,33 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
 
+static inline struct ima_namespace *to_ima_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return container_of(ns, struct ima_namespace, ns);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+
+extern const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations;
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+			       struct ima_namespace *old_ns);
+
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	return current->nsproxy->ima_ns;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
+{
+	return &init_ima_ns;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
+
 #ifdef	CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
 #define	POLICY_FILE_FLAGS	(S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
 #else
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index fa540c0469da..9ebf97e29344 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -361,6 +361,9 @@ static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements;
 static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
 static struct dentry *violations;
 static struct dentry *ima_policy;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+static struct dentry *unshare;
+#endif
 
 enum ima_fs_flags {
 	IMA_FS_BUSY,
@@ -446,6 +449,47 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
 	.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+static int ima_open_unshare(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_write_unshare(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	ssize_t length;
+	char *page;
+	bool set;
+
+	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	page = memdup_user_nul(buf, count);
+	if (IS_ERR(page))
+		return PTR_ERR(page);
+
+	length = -EINVAL;
+	if (kstrtobool(page, &set))
+		goto out;
+
+	current->ima_ns_for_child = set;
+
+	length = count;
+out:
+	kfree(page);
+
+	return length;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations ima_unshare_ops = {
+	.open = ima_open_unshare,
+	.write = ima_write_unshare,
+};
+#endif
+
 int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 {
 	ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
@@ -485,6 +529,14 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
 		goto out;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	unshare = securityfs_create_file("unshare", 0200,
+					 ima_dir, NULL,
+					 &ima_unshare_ops);
+	if (IS_ERR(unshare))
+		goto out;
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 out:
 	securityfs_remove(violations);
@@ -493,5 +545,8 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
 	securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
 	securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	securityfs_remove(unshare);
+#endif
 	return -1;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 29b72cd2502e..091e5fdee5fc 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -137,5 +137,9 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 
 	ima_init_policy();
 
+	rc = ima_ns_init();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
 	return ima_fs_init();
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0bd6c418b8e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *   Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ *   Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
+	return ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int __init ima_ns_init(void)
+{
+	return ima_init_namespace(&init_ima_ns);
+}
+
+struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = {
+	.kref = KREF_INIT(1),
+	.user_ns = &init_user_ns,
+	.ucounts = NULL,
+	.parent = NULL,
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8e37d7ac5d34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *  Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ *  Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static struct ucounts *inc_ima_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	return inc_ucount(ns, current_euid(), UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES);
+}
+
+static void dec_ima_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts)
+{
+	return dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Clone a new ns copying an original ima namespace, setting refcount to 1
+ *
+ * @user_ns: user namespace that current task runs in
+ * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
+ * Return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise
+ */
+static struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+					   struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns;
+	struct ucounts *ucounts;
+	int err;
+
+	err = -ENOSPC;
+	ucounts = inc_ima_namespaces(user_ns);
+	if (!ucounts)
+		goto fail;
+
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	ns = kmalloc(sizeof(*ns), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ns)
+		goto fail_dec;
+
+	err = ima_init_namespace(ns);
+	if (err)
+		goto fail_free;
+
+	kref_init(&ns->kref);
+	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
+	ns->parent = get_ima_ns(old_ns);
+	ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
+	ns->ucounts = ucounts;
+
+	return ns;
+
+fail_free:
+	kfree(ns);
+fail_dec:
+	dec_ima_namespaces(ucounts);
+fail:
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Copy task's ima namespace, or clone it if flags specifies CLONE_NEWNS.
+ *
+ * @bool: whether to copy or just get a reference to it
+ * @user_ns: user namespace that current task runs in
+ * @old_ns: old ima namespace to clone
+ */
+
+struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(bool copy,
+				  struct user_namespace *user_ns,
+				  struct ima_namespace *old_ns)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *new_ns;
+
+	get_ima_ns(old_ns);
+	if (!copy)
+		return old_ns;
+
+	new_ns = create_ima_ns(user_ns, old_ns);
+	put_ima_ns(old_ns);
+
+	return new_ns;
+}
+
+static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	put_ima_ns(ns->parent);
+	put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
+	ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
+	dec_ima_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
+	kfree(ns);
+}
+
+void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns;
+
+	ns = container_of(kref, struct ima_namespace, kref);
+
+	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
+}
+
+static struct ns_common *imans_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = NULL;
+	struct nsproxy *nsproxy;
+
+	task_lock(task);
+	nsproxy = task->nsproxy;
+	if (nsproxy) {
+		ns = nsproxy->ima_ns;
+		get_ima_ns(ns);
+	}
+	task_unlock(task);
+
+	return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL;
+}
+
+static void imans_put(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	put_ima_ns(to_ima_ns(ns));
+}
+
+static int imans_install(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct ns_common *new)
+{
+	struct ima_namespace *ns = to_ima_ns(new);
+
+	if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+	    !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	put_ima_ns(nsproxy->ima_ns);
+	nsproxy->ima_ns = get_ima_ns(ns);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct user_namespace *imans_owner(struct ns_common *ns)
+{
+	return to_ima_ns(ns)->user_ns;
+}
+
+const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations = {
+	.name = "ima",
+	.get = imans_get,
+	.put = imans_put,
+	.install = imans_install,
+	.owner = imans_owner,
+};
-- 
2.14.3

--
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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 2/5] ima: Add ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
  2018-05-11 14:42 ` Stefan Berger
  (?)
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO, Mehmet Kayaalp,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w,
	zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8

From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>

This patch adds an rbtree to the IMA namespace structure that stores a
namespaced version of iint->flags in ns_status struct. Similar to the
integrity_iint_cache, both the iint ns_struct are looked up using the
inode pointer value. The lookup, allocate, and insertion code is also
similar, except ns_struct is not free'd when the inode is free'd.
Instead, the lookup verifies the i_ino and i_generation fields are also a
match. This could be replaced by a lazy clean up of the rbtree.

Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>

Changelog:
v2:
 * fixed tree traversal in __ima_ns_status_find()
---
 include/linux/ima.h                      |   3 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  21 +++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  17 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c   | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 27a332cd0438..f0cc74c698e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ struct ima_namespace {
 	struct ucounts *ucounts;
 	struct ns_common ns;
 	struct ima_namespace *parent;
+	struct rb_root ns_status_tree;
+	rwlock_t ns_status_lock;
+	struct kmem_cache *ns_status_cache;
 };
 
 extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index cc60f726e651..b2a68940dd22 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o ima_ns_status.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f999328e5b49..0a644922c6e7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -129,6 +129,14 @@ static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
  */
 extern bool ima_canonical_fmt;
 
+struct ns_status {
+	struct rb_node rb_node;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	ino_t i_ino;
+	u32 i_generation;
+	unsigned long flags;
+};
+
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
@@ -296,6 +304,17 @@ int ima_ns_init(void);
 struct ima_namespace;
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+				    struct inode *inode);
+#else
+static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+						  struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
@@ -336,6 +355,8 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
 	return current->nsproxy->ima_ns;
 }
 
+void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
 #else
 
 static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index 0bd6c418b8e3..6c2830f61afe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -13,17 +13,28 @@
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
+	rwlock_init(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	ns->ns_status_cache = KMEM_CACHE(ns_status, SLAB_PANIC);
+	if (!ns->ns_status_cache)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
 	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
-	return ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
-#else
-	return 0;
+	ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
+	if (ret)
+		kmem_cache_destroy(ns->ns_status_cache);
 #endif
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int __init ima_ns_init(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index 8e37d7ac5d34..e0c4d66aab79 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 	put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
 	ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
 	dec_ima_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
+	free_ns_status_cache(ns);
 	kfree(ns);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c432d1b70d6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *  Yuqiong Sun <suny-r/Jw6+rmf7HQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
+ *  Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status, *next;
+
+	write_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(status, next,
+					     &ns->ns_status_tree, rb_node)
+		kmem_cache_free(ns->ns_status_cache, status);
+	ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
+	write_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(ns->ns_status_cache);
+}
+
+/*
+ * __ima_ns_status_find - return the ns_status associated with an inode
+ */
+static struct ns_status *__ima_ns_status_find(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+					      struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+	struct rb_node *n = ns->ns_status_tree.rb_node;
+
+	while (n) {
+		status = rb_entry(n, struct ns_status, rb_node);
+
+		if (inode < status->inode)
+			n = n->rb_left;
+		else if (inode > status->inode)
+			n = n->rb_right;
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	if (!n)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_ns_status_find - return the ns_status associated with an inode
+ */
+static struct ns_status *ima_ns_status_find(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+					    struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+
+	read_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	status = __ima_ns_status_find(ns, inode);
+	read_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+void insert_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns, struct inode *inode,
+		      struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	struct rb_node **p;
+	struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
+	struct ns_status *test_status;
+
+	p = &ns->ns_status_tree.rb_node;
+	while (*p) {
+		parent = *p;
+		test_status = rb_entry(parent, struct ns_status, rb_node);
+		if (inode < test_status->inode)
+			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
+		else
+			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+	}
+	node = &status->rb_node;
+	rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
+	rb_insert_color(node, &ns->ns_status_tree);
+}
+
+struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+	int skip_insert = 0;
+
+	status = ima_ns_status_find(ns, inode);
+	if (status) {
+		/*
+		 * Unlike integrity_iint_cache we are not free'ing the
+		 * ns_status data when the inode is free'd. So, in addition to
+		 * checking the inode pointer, we need to make sure the
+		 * (i_generation, i_ino) pair matches as well. In the future
+		 * we might want to add support for lazily walking the rbtree
+		 * to clean it up.
+		 */
+		if (inode->i_ino == status->i_ino &&
+		    inode->i_generation == status->i_generation)
+			return status;
+
+		/* Same inode number is reused, overwrite the ns_status */
+		skip_insert = 1;
+	} else {
+		status = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->ns_status_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!status)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	write_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	if (!skip_insert)
+		insert_ns_status(ns, inode, status);
+
+	status->inode = inode;
+	status->i_ino = inode->i_ino;
+	status->i_generation = inode->i_generation;
+	status->flags = 0UL;
+
+	write_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	return status;
+}
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 2/5] ima: Add ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	zohar, ebiederm, john.johansen, Mehmet Kayaalp

From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

This patch adds an rbtree to the IMA namespace structure that stores a
namespaced version of iint->flags in ns_status struct. Similar to the
integrity_iint_cache, both the iint ns_struct are looked up using the
inode pointer value. The lookup, allocate, and insertion code is also
similar, except ns_struct is not free'd when the inode is free'd.
Instead, the lookup verifies the i_ino and i_generation fields are also a
match. This could be replaced by a lazy clean up of the rbtree.

Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Changelog:
v2:
 * fixed tree traversal in __ima_ns_status_find()
---
 include/linux/ima.h                      |   3 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  21 +++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  17 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c   | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 27a332cd0438..f0cc74c698e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ struct ima_namespace {
 	struct ucounts *ucounts;
 	struct ns_common ns;
 	struct ima_namespace *parent;
+	struct rb_root ns_status_tree;
+	rwlock_t ns_status_lock;
+	struct kmem_cache *ns_status_cache;
 };
 
 extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index cc60f726e651..b2a68940dd22 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o ima_ns_status.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f999328e5b49..0a644922c6e7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -129,6 +129,14 @@ static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
  */
 extern bool ima_canonical_fmt;
 
+struct ns_status {
+	struct rb_node rb_node;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	ino_t i_ino;
+	u32 i_generation;
+	unsigned long flags;
+};
+
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
@@ -296,6 +304,17 @@ int ima_ns_init(void);
 struct ima_namespace;
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+				    struct inode *inode);
+#else
+static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+						  struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
@@ -336,6 +355,8 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
 	return current->nsproxy->ima_ns;
 }
 
+void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
 #else
 
 static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index 0bd6c418b8e3..6c2830f61afe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -13,17 +13,28 @@
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
+	rwlock_init(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	ns->ns_status_cache = KMEM_CACHE(ns_status, SLAB_PANIC);
+	if (!ns->ns_status_cache)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
 	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
-	return ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
-#else
-	return 0;
+	ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
+	if (ret)
+		kmem_cache_destroy(ns->ns_status_cache);
 #endif
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int __init ima_ns_init(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index 8e37d7ac5d34..e0c4d66aab79 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 	put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
 	ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
 	dec_ima_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
+	free_ns_status_cache(ns);
 	kfree(ns);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c432d1b70d6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *  Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ *  Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status, *next;
+
+	write_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(status, next,
+					     &ns->ns_status_tree, rb_node)
+		kmem_cache_free(ns->ns_status_cache, status);
+	ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
+	write_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(ns->ns_status_cache);
+}
+
+/*
+ * __ima_ns_status_find - return the ns_status associated with an inode
+ */
+static struct ns_status *__ima_ns_status_find(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+					      struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+	struct rb_node *n = ns->ns_status_tree.rb_node;
+
+	while (n) {
+		status = rb_entry(n, struct ns_status, rb_node);
+
+		if (inode < status->inode)
+			n = n->rb_left;
+		else if (inode > status->inode)
+			n = n->rb_right;
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	if (!n)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_ns_status_find - return the ns_status associated with an inode
+ */
+static struct ns_status *ima_ns_status_find(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+					    struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+
+	read_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	status = __ima_ns_status_find(ns, inode);
+	read_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+void insert_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns, struct inode *inode,
+		      struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	struct rb_node **p;
+	struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
+	struct ns_status *test_status;
+
+	p = &ns->ns_status_tree.rb_node;
+	while (*p) {
+		parent = *p;
+		test_status = rb_entry(parent, struct ns_status, rb_node);
+		if (inode < test_status->inode)
+			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
+		else
+			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+	}
+	node = &status->rb_node;
+	rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
+	rb_insert_color(node, &ns->ns_status_tree);
+}
+
+struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+	int skip_insert = 0;
+
+	status = ima_ns_status_find(ns, inode);
+	if (status) {
+		/*
+		 * Unlike integrity_iint_cache we are not free'ing the
+		 * ns_status data when the inode is free'd. So, in addition to
+		 * checking the inode pointer, we need to make sure the
+		 * (i_generation, i_ino) pair matches as well. In the future
+		 * we might want to add support for lazily walking the rbtree
+		 * to clean it up.
+		 */
+		if (inode->i_ino == status->i_ino &&
+		    inode->i_generation == status->i_generation)
+			return status;
+
+		/* Same inode number is reused, overwrite the ns_status */
+		skip_insert = 1;
+	} else {
+		status = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->ns_status_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!status)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	write_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	if (!skip_insert)
+		insert_ns_status(ns, inode, status);
+
+	status->inode = inode;
+	status->i_ino = inode->i_ino;
+	status->i_generation = inode->i_generation;
+	status->flags = 0UL;
+
+	write_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	return status;
+}
-- 
2.14.3


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 2/5] ima: Add ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

This patch adds an rbtree to the IMA namespace structure that stores a
namespaced version of iint->flags in ns_status struct. Similar to the
integrity_iint_cache, both the iint ns_struct are looked up using the
inode pointer value. The lookup, allocate, and insertion code is also
similar, except ns_struct is not free'd when the inode is free'd.
Instead, the lookup verifies the i_ino and i_generation fields are also a
match. This could be replaced by a lazy clean up of the rbtree.

Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Changelog:
v2:
 * fixed tree traversal in __ima_ns_status_find()
---
 include/linux/ima.h                      |   3 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  21 +++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  17 +++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c   | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 27a332cd0438..f0cc74c698e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ struct ima_namespace {
 	struct ucounts *ucounts;
 	struct ns_common ns;
 	struct ima_namespace *parent;
+	struct rb_root ns_status_tree;
+	rwlock_t ns_status_lock;
+	struct kmem_cache *ns_status_cache;
 };
 
 extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index cc60f726e651..b2a68940dd22 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o ima_template.o ima_template_lib.o ima_init_ima_ns.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o ima_ns_status.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index f999328e5b49..0a644922c6e7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -129,6 +129,14 @@ static inline void ima_load_kexec_buffer(void) {}
  */
 extern bool ima_canonical_fmt;
 
+struct ns_status {
+	struct rb_node rb_node;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	ino_t i_ino;
+	u32 i_generation;
+	unsigned long flags;
+};
+
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
 int ima_fs_init(void);
@@ -296,6 +304,17 @@ int ima_ns_init(void);
 struct ima_namespace;
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
+struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+				    struct inode *inode);
+#else
+static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+						  struct inode *inode)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
+
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
 
@@ -336,6 +355,8 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
 	return current->nsproxy->ima_ns;
 }
 
+void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns);
+
 #else
 
 static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
index 0bd6c418b8e3..6c2830f61afe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
@@ -13,17 +13,28 @@
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 
 #include "ima.h"
 
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
+	rwlock_init(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	ns->ns_status_cache = KMEM_CACHE(ns_status, SLAB_PANIC);
+	if (!ns->ns_status_cache)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
 	ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations;
-	return ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
-#else
-	return 0;
+	ret = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns);
+	if (ret)
+		kmem_cache_destroy(ns->ns_status_cache);
 #endif
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int __init ima_ns_init(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index 8e37d7ac5d34..e0c4d66aab79 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns)
 	put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
 	ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
 	dec_ima_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
+	free_ns_status_cache(ns);
 	kfree(ns);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c432d1b70d6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2018 IBM Corporation
+ * Author:
+ *  Yuqiong Sun <suny@us.ibm.com>
+ *  Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+void free_ns_status_cache(struct ima_namespace *ns)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status, *next;
+
+	write_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(status, next,
+					     &ns->ns_status_tree, rb_node)
+		kmem_cache_free(ns->ns_status_cache, status);
+	ns->ns_status_tree = RB_ROOT;
+	write_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	kmem_cache_destroy(ns->ns_status_cache);
+}
+
+/*
+ * __ima_ns_status_find - return the ns_status associated with an inode
+ */
+static struct ns_status *__ima_ns_status_find(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+					      struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+	struct rb_node *n = ns->ns_status_tree.rb_node;
+
+	while (n) {
+		status = rb_entry(n, struct ns_status, rb_node);
+
+		if (inode < status->inode)
+			n = n->rb_left;
+		else if (inode > status->inode)
+			n = n->rb_right;
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	if (!n)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_ns_status_find - return the ns_status associated with an inode
+ */
+static struct ns_status *ima_ns_status_find(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+					    struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+
+	read_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+	status = __ima_ns_status_find(ns, inode);
+	read_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+void insert_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns, struct inode *inode,
+		      struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	struct rb_node **p;
+	struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL;
+	struct ns_status *test_status;
+
+	p = &ns->ns_status_tree.rb_node;
+	while (*p) {
+		parent = *p;
+		test_status = rb_entry(parent, struct ns_status, rb_node);
+		if (inode < test_status->inode)
+			p = &(*p)->rb_left;
+		else
+			p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+	}
+	node = &status->rb_node;
+	rb_link_node(node, parent, p);
+	rb_insert_color(node, &ns->ns_status_tree);
+}
+
+struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
+				    struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ns_status *status;
+	int skip_insert = 0;
+
+	status = ima_ns_status_find(ns, inode);
+	if (status) {
+		/*
+		 * Unlike integrity_iint_cache we are not free'ing the
+		 * ns_status data when the inode is free'd. So, in addition to
+		 * checking the inode pointer, we need to make sure the
+		 * (i_generation, i_ino) pair matches as well. In the future
+		 * we might want to add support for lazily walking the rbtree
+		 * to clean it up.
+		 */
+		if (inode->i_ino == status->i_ino &&
+		    inode->i_generation == status->i_generation)
+			return status;
+
+		/* Same inode number is reused, overwrite the ns_status */
+		skip_insert = 1;
+	} else {
+		status = kmem_cache_alloc(ns->ns_status_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (!status)
+			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	}
+
+	write_lock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	if (!skip_insert)
+		insert_ns_status(ns, inode, status);
+
+	status->inode = inode;
+	status->i_ino = inode->i_ino;
+	status->i_generation = inode->i_generation;
+	status->flags = 0UL;
+
+	write_unlock(&ns->ns_status_lock);
+
+	return status;
+}
-- 
2.14.3

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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
  2018-05-11 14:42 ` Stefan Berger
  (?)
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w,
	zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>

The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
to reflect the IMA policy rules.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
---
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
-#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
 
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	bool uid_token;
 	int result = 0;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
 
 	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
 	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	zohar, ebiederm, john.johansen

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
to reflect the IMA policy rules.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
-#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
 
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	bool uid_token;
 	int result = 0;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
 
 	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
 	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
@ 2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
to reflect the IMA policy rules.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
 #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
-#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
 
 #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	bool uid_token;
 	int result = 0;
 
-	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
 
 	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
 	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
-- 
2.14.3

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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 4/5] ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces
       [not found] ` <20180511144230.75384-1-stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
                     ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
@ 2018-05-11 14:42   ` Stefan Berger
  2018-05-11 14:42   ` [RFC PATCH v4 5/5] ima: namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w,
	zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8

Introduce a policy rule attribute called 'ns' that indicates that a rule
is supposed to apply to child namespaces of an IMA namespace. We support
this 'ns' attribute only for IMA-audit for now. IMA-measurement will get
support for this in a future version.

If 'uid=...' appears in a policy rule that has the 'ns' attribute, the uid
in that rule is relative to the current user namespace. If it is missing,
then the uid is relative to the user namespace that owns the IMA namespace
the policy is in. So we have to now map the uid's and do that with the
appropriate user namespace depending on the availability of the 'ns'
attribute. After that we can use the mapped uid for uid comparisons.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  5 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  6 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 0a644922c6e7..a23f4b0b21f4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask,
-		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_namespace *ns);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -222,7 +223,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags, int *pcr);
+		     int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_namespace *ns);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 08fe405338e1..85ca995b9bb7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
  * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
+ * @ns: the IMA namespace we are currently in
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -173,13 +174,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
  *
  */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr, ns);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index f2803a40ff82..4d744a6aaaf1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 		return 0;
 
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH,
-				NULL);
+				NULL, get_current_ns());
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2cfb0c714967..ad9acac98526 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr);
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr, get_current_ns());
+
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3a1412db02a3..768941a8e90c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #define IMA_INMASK	0x0040
 #define IMA_EUID	0x0080
 #define IMA_PCR		0x0100
+#define IMA_NS		0x0200  /* rule applies only to child namespaces */
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -239,6 +240,48 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static bool ima_uid_op(const struct cred *cred, struct ima_rule_entry *rule)
+{
+	kuid_t right;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+	/*
+	 * The 'ns' attribute makes the uid in the rule relative to the
+	 * current user namespace. So '... ns uid=123' applies to uid=123
+	 * in the current user namespace.
+	 * Without an 'ns' attribute 'uid=123' refers to the
+	 * uid = 123 of the user namespace where the policy resides in.
+	 * (currently init_ima_ns.user_ns == &init_user_ns)
+	 */
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_NS)
+		user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	else
+		user_ns = init_ima_ns.user_ns;
+
+	right = make_kuid(user_ns, __kuid_val(rule->uid));
+	if (!uid_valid(right))
+		return false;
+
+	return rule->uid_op(cred->uid, right);
+}
+
+static bool ima_fowner_op(kuid_t left, struct ima_rule_entry *rule)
+{
+	kuid_t right;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_NS)
+		user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	else
+		user_ns = init_ima_ns.user_ns;
+
+	right = make_kuid(user_ns, __kuid_val(rule->uid));
+	if (!uid_valid(right))
+		return false;
+
+	return rule->fowner_op(left, right);
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
@@ -270,7 +313,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
 	    !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
 		return false;
-	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !ima_uid_op(cred, rule))
 		return false;
 	if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
 		if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
@@ -283,7 +326,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	}
 
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
-	    !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner))
+	    ima_fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule))
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
@@ -356,6 +399,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
+ * @ns: the IMA namespace
  *
  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
  * conditions.
@@ -365,7 +409,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags, int *pcr)
+		     int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -376,6 +420,19 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
+		switch (entry->action) {
+		case AUDIT:
+			/*
+			 * A rule with 'ns' attribute does not
+			 * apply to the namespace the policy is in
+			 * (here: init_ima_ns)
+			 */
+			if (ns == &init_ima_ns &&
+			    entry->flags & IMA_NS)
+				continue;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
 			continue;
 
@@ -533,7 +590,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
 	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
-	Opt_pcr
+	Opt_pcr, Opt_ns,
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -566,6 +623,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
 	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
+	{Opt_ns, "ns"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -881,6 +939,13 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
 			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
 			break;
+		case Opt_ns:
+			if (entry->action != AUDIT) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			entry->flags |= IMA_NS;
+			break;
 		case Opt_pcr:
 			if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1168,6 +1233,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
 		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_NS)
+		seq_puts(m, "ns ");
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	seq_puts(m, "\n");
 	return 0;
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 4/5] ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces
  2018-05-11 14:42 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2018-05-11 14:42   ` Stefan Berger
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	zohar, ebiederm, john.johansen, Stefan Berger

Introduce a policy rule attribute called 'ns' that indicates that a rule
is supposed to apply to child namespaces of an IMA namespace. We support
this 'ns' attribute only for IMA-audit for now. IMA-measurement will get
support for this in a future version.

If 'uid=...' appears in a policy rule that has the 'ns' attribute, the uid
in that rule is relative to the current user namespace. If it is missing,
then the uid is relative to the user namespace that owns the IMA namespace
the policy is in. So we have to now map the uid's and do that with the
appropriate user namespace depending on the availability of the 'ns'
attribute. After that we can use the mapped uid for uid comparisons.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  5 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  6 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 0a644922c6e7..a23f4b0b21f4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask,
-		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_namespace *ns);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -222,7 +223,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags, int *pcr);
+		     int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_namespace *ns);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 08fe405338e1..85ca995b9bb7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
  * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
+ * @ns: the IMA namespace we are currently in
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -173,13 +174,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
  *
  */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr, ns);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index f2803a40ff82..4d744a6aaaf1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 		return 0;
 
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH,
-				NULL);
+				NULL, get_current_ns());
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2cfb0c714967..ad9acac98526 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr);
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr, get_current_ns());
+
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3a1412db02a3..768941a8e90c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #define IMA_INMASK	0x0040
 #define IMA_EUID	0x0080
 #define IMA_PCR		0x0100
+#define IMA_NS		0x0200  /* rule applies only to child namespaces */
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -239,6 +240,48 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static bool ima_uid_op(const struct cred *cred, struct ima_rule_entry *rule)
+{
+	kuid_t right;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+	/*
+	 * The 'ns' attribute makes the uid in the rule relative to the
+	 * current user namespace. So '... ns uid=123' applies to uid=123
+	 * in the current user namespace.
+	 * Without an 'ns' attribute 'uid=123' refers to the
+	 * uid = 123 of the user namespace where the policy resides in.
+	 * (currently init_ima_ns.user_ns == &init_user_ns)
+	 */
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_NS)
+		user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	else
+		user_ns = init_ima_ns.user_ns;
+
+	right = make_kuid(user_ns, __kuid_val(rule->uid));
+	if (!uid_valid(right))
+		return false;
+
+	return rule->uid_op(cred->uid, right);
+}
+
+static bool ima_fowner_op(kuid_t left, struct ima_rule_entry *rule)
+{
+	kuid_t right;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_NS)
+		user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	else
+		user_ns = init_ima_ns.user_ns;
+
+	right = make_kuid(user_ns, __kuid_val(rule->uid));
+	if (!uid_valid(right))
+		return false;
+
+	return rule->fowner_op(left, right);
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
@@ -270,7 +313,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
 	    !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
 		return false;
-	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !ima_uid_op(cred, rule))
 		return false;
 	if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
 		if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
@@ -283,7 +326,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	}
 
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
-	    !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner))
+	    ima_fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule))
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
@@ -356,6 +399,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
+ * @ns: the IMA namespace
  *
  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
  * conditions.
@@ -365,7 +409,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags, int *pcr)
+		     int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -376,6 +420,19 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
+		switch (entry->action) {
+		case AUDIT:
+			/*
+			 * A rule with 'ns' attribute does not
+			 * apply to the namespace the policy is in
+			 * (here: init_ima_ns)
+			 */
+			if (ns == &init_ima_ns &&
+			    entry->flags & IMA_NS)
+				continue;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
 			continue;
 
@@ -533,7 +590,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
 	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
-	Opt_pcr
+	Opt_pcr, Opt_ns,
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -566,6 +623,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
 	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
+	{Opt_ns, "ns"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -881,6 +939,13 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
 			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
 			break;
+		case Opt_ns:
+			if (entry->action != AUDIT) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			entry->flags |= IMA_NS;
+			break;
 		case Opt_pcr:
 			if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1168,6 +1233,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
 		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_NS)
+		seq_puts(m, "ns ");
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	seq_puts(m, "\n");
 	return 0;
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 4/5] ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces
@ 2018-05-11 14:42   ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

Introduce a policy rule attribute called 'ns' that indicates that a rule
is supposed to apply to child namespaces of an IMA namespace. We support
this 'ns' attribute only for IMA-audit for now. IMA-measurement will get
support for this in a future version.

If 'uid=...' appears in a policy rule that has the 'ns' attribute, the uid
in that rule is relative to the current user namespace. If it is missing,
then the uid is relative to the user namespace that owns the IMA namespace
the policy is in. So we have to now map the uid's and do that with the
appropriate user namespace depending on the availability of the 'ns'
attribute. After that we can use the mapped uid for uid comparisons.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h          |  5 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c      |  6 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     |  3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 0a644922c6e7..a23f4b0b21f4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -201,7 +201,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask,
-		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
+		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_namespace *ns);
 int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
 int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 			    struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -222,7 +223,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags, int *pcr);
+		     int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_namespace *ns);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy(void);
 void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 08fe405338e1..85ca995b9bb7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -162,6 +162,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
  * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
+ * @ns: the IMA namespace we are currently in
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *		subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -173,13 +174,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
  *
  */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
+		   struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
 	int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr);
+	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr, ns);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index f2803a40ff82..4d744a6aaaf1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 		return 0;
 
 	return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH,
-				NULL);
+				NULL, get_current_ns());
 }
 
 static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 2cfb0c714967..ad9acac98526 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr);
+	action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr, get_current_ns());
+
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
 			   (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
 	if (!action && !violation_check)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 3a1412db02a3..768941a8e90c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #define IMA_INMASK	0x0040
 #define IMA_EUID	0x0080
 #define IMA_PCR		0x0100
+#define IMA_NS		0x0200  /* rule applies only to child namespaces */
 
 #define UNKNOWN		0
 #define MEASURE		0x0001	/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -239,6 +240,48 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
 	}
 }
 
+static bool ima_uid_op(const struct cred *cred, struct ima_rule_entry *rule)
+{
+	kuid_t right;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+	/*
+	 * The 'ns' attribute makes the uid in the rule relative to the
+	 * current user namespace. So '... ns uid=123' applies to uid=123
+	 * in the current user namespace.
+	 * Without an 'ns' attribute 'uid=123' refers to the
+	 * uid = 123 of the user namespace where the policy resides in.
+	 * (currently init_ima_ns.user_ns == &init_user_ns)
+	 */
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_NS)
+		user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	else
+		user_ns = init_ima_ns.user_ns;
+
+	right = make_kuid(user_ns, __kuid_val(rule->uid));
+	if (!uid_valid(right))
+		return false;
+
+	return rule->uid_op(cred->uid, right);
+}
+
+static bool ima_fowner_op(kuid_t left, struct ima_rule_entry *rule)
+{
+	kuid_t right;
+	struct user_namespace *user_ns;
+
+	if (rule->flags & IMA_NS)
+		user_ns = current_user_ns();
+	else
+		user_ns = init_ima_ns.user_ns;
+
+	right = make_kuid(user_ns, __kuid_val(rule->uid));
+	if (!uid_valid(right))
+		return false;
+
+	return rule->fowner_op(left, right);
+}
+
 /**
  * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
  * @rule: a pointer to a rule
@@ -270,7 +313,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
 	    !uuid_equal(&rule->fsuuid, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid))
 		return false;
-	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
+	if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !ima_uid_op(cred, rule))
 		return false;
 	if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
 		if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
@@ -283,7 +326,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
 	}
 
 	if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) &&
-	    !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner))
+	    ima_fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule))
 		return false;
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
 		int rc = 0;
@@ -356,6 +399,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
+ * @ns: the IMA namespace
  *
  * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
  * conditions.
@@ -365,7 +409,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
-		     int flags, int *pcr)
+		     int flags, int *pcr, struct ima_namespace *ns)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
 	int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -376,6 +420,19 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
+		switch (entry->action) {
+		case AUDIT:
+			/*
+			 * A rule with 'ns' attribute does not
+			 * apply to the namespace the policy is in
+			 * (here: init_ima_ns)
+			 */
+			if (ns == &init_ima_ns &&
+			    entry->flags & IMA_NS)
+				continue;
+			break;
+		}
+
 		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
 			continue;
 
@@ -533,7 +590,7 @@ enum {
 	Opt_uid_gt, Opt_euid_gt, Opt_fowner_gt,
 	Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt,
 	Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
-	Opt_pcr
+	Opt_pcr, Opt_ns,
 };
 
 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -566,6 +623,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
 	{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
 	{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
 	{Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
+	{Opt_ns, "ns"},
 	{Opt_err, NULL}
 };
 
@@ -881,6 +939,13 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 		case Opt_permit_directio:
 			entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
 			break;
+		case Opt_ns:
+			if (entry->action != AUDIT) {
+				result = -EINVAL;
+				break;
+			}
+			entry->flags |= IMA_NS;
+			break;
 		case Opt_pcr:
 			if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
 				result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1168,6 +1233,8 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
 		seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=imasig ");
 	if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)
 		seq_puts(m, "permit_directio ");
+	if (entry->flags & IMA_NS)
+		seq_puts(m, "ns ");
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	seq_puts(m, "\n");
 	return 0;
-- 
2.14.3

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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 5/5] ima: namespace audit status flags
       [not found] ` <20180511144230.75384-1-stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
                     ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2018-05-11 14:42   ` [RFC PATCH v4 4/5] ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces Stefan Berger
@ 2018-05-11 14:42   ` Stefan Berger
  4 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO, Mehmet Kayaalp,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w,
	zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8

From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>

The iint cache stores whether the file is measured, appraised, audited
etc. This patch moves the IMA_AUDITED flag into the per-namespace
ns_status, enabling IMA audit mechanism to audit the same file each time
it is accessed in a new namespace.

The ns_status is not looked up if the CONFIG_IMA_NS is disabled or if
any of the IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS (currently only IMA_AUDIT) is not
enabled.

Read and write operations on the iint flags is replaced with function
calls. For reading, iint_flags() returns the bitwise AND of iint->flags
and ns_status->flags. The ns_status flags are masked with
IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS (currently only IMA_AUDITED). Similarly
set_iint_flags() only writes the masked portion to the ns_status flags,
while the iint flags is set as before. The ns_status parameter added to
ima_audit_measurement() is used with the above functions to query and
set the ns_status flags.

Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>

Changelog:
v2:
 * fixed flag calculation in iint_flags()
---
 init/Kconfig                      |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  |  8 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c   | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 2ae532aa12a0..a71a2901dac3 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -939,6 +939,9 @@ config IMA_NS
 	help
 	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces. Namespaced IMA data
           enables having IMA features work separately in each IMA namespace.
+	  Currently, only the audit status flags are stored in the namespace,
+	  which allows the same file to be audited each time it is accessed
+	  in a new namespace.
 
 endif # NAMESPACES
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a23f4b0b21f4..d73757984563 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -212,7 +212,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, int pcr);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   const unsigned char *filename);
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct ns_status *status);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
@@ -301,6 +302,9 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS   IMA_AUDIT
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS     IMA_AUDITED
+
 int ima_ns_init(void);
 struct ima_namespace;
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
@@ -308,12 +312,30 @@ int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
 struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
 				    struct inode *inode);
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			 struct ns_status *status);
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags);
 #else
 static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
 						  struct inode *inode)
 {
 	return NULL;
 }
+
+static inline unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				       struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	return iint->flags;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					   struct ns_status *status,
+					   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	iint->flags = flags;
+	return flags;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 85ca995b9bb7..0b302d829554 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -307,15 +307,17 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 }
 
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   const unsigned char *filename)
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct ns_status *status)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
 	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
 	char algo_hash[sizeof(hash) + strlen(algo_name) + 2];
 	int i;
+	unsigned long flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
 
-	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
+	if (flags & IMA_AUDITED)
 		return;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
@@ -336,7 +338,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 
-	iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+	set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | IMA_AUDITED);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index ad9acac98526..1d1f5dffb186 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	struct ns_status *status = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	int xattr_len = 0;
 	bool violation_check;
 	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
@@ -209,6 +211,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 		iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
 		if (!iint)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (!rc && (action & IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS)) {
+			status = ima_get_ns_status(get_current_ns(), inode);
+			if (IS_ERR(status))
+				rc = PTR_ERR(status);
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (!rc && violation_check)
@@ -238,9 +246,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
 	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
 	 */
-	iint->flags |= action;
+	flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
+	flags = set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | action);
 	action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
-	action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
+	action &= ~((flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
 
 	/* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
 	if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
@@ -290,7 +299,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
-		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname, status);
 
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
 		rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index e0c4d66aab79..cbd0c33c8107 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -114,6 +114,26 @@ void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
 	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
 }
 
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			 struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	if (!status)
+		return iint->flags;
+
+	return (iint->flags & ~IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS) |
+	       (status->flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS);
+}
+
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	iint->flags = flags;
+	if (status)
+		status->flags = flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS;
+
+	return flags;
+}
+
 static struct ns_common *imans_get(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct ima_namespace *ns = NULL;
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 5/5] ima: namespace audit status flags
  2018-05-11 14:42 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2018-05-11 14:42   ` Stefan Berger
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel, linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	zohar, ebiederm, john.johansen, Mehmet Kayaalp

From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

The iint cache stores whether the file is measured, appraised, audited
etc. This patch moves the IMA_AUDITED flag into the per-namespace
ns_status, enabling IMA audit mechanism to audit the same file each time
it is accessed in a new namespace.

The ns_status is not looked up if the CONFIG_IMA_NS is disabled or if
any of the IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS (currently only IMA_AUDIT) is not
enabled.

Read and write operations on the iint flags is replaced with function
calls. For reading, iint_flags() returns the bitwise AND of iint->flags
and ns_status->flags. The ns_status flags are masked with
IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS (currently only IMA_AUDITED). Similarly
set_iint_flags() only writes the masked portion to the ns_status flags,
while the iint flags is set as before. The ns_status parameter added to
ima_audit_measurement() is used with the above functions to query and
set the ns_status flags.

Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Changelog:
v2:
 * fixed flag calculation in iint_flags()
---
 init/Kconfig                      |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  |  8 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c   | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 2ae532aa12a0..a71a2901dac3 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -939,6 +939,9 @@ config IMA_NS
 	help
 	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces. Namespaced IMA data
           enables having IMA features work separately in each IMA namespace.
+	  Currently, only the audit status flags are stored in the namespace,
+	  which allows the same file to be audited each time it is accessed
+	  in a new namespace.
 
 endif # NAMESPACES
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a23f4b0b21f4..d73757984563 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -212,7 +212,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, int pcr);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   const unsigned char *filename);
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct ns_status *status);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
@@ -301,6 +302,9 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS   IMA_AUDIT
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS     IMA_AUDITED
+
 int ima_ns_init(void);
 struct ima_namespace;
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
@@ -308,12 +312,30 @@ int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
 struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
 				    struct inode *inode);
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			 struct ns_status *status);
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags);
 #else
 static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
 						  struct inode *inode)
 {
 	return NULL;
 }
+
+static inline unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				       struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	return iint->flags;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					   struct ns_status *status,
+					   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	iint->flags = flags;
+	return flags;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 85ca995b9bb7..0b302d829554 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -307,15 +307,17 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 }
 
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   const unsigned char *filename)
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct ns_status *status)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
 	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
 	char algo_hash[sizeof(hash) + strlen(algo_name) + 2];
 	int i;
+	unsigned long flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
 
-	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
+	if (flags & IMA_AUDITED)
 		return;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
@@ -336,7 +338,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 
-	iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+	set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | IMA_AUDITED);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index ad9acac98526..1d1f5dffb186 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	struct ns_status *status = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	int xattr_len = 0;
 	bool violation_check;
 	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
@@ -209,6 +211,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 		iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
 		if (!iint)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (!rc && (action & IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS)) {
+			status = ima_get_ns_status(get_current_ns(), inode);
+			if (IS_ERR(status))
+				rc = PTR_ERR(status);
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (!rc && violation_check)
@@ -238,9 +246,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
 	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
 	 */
-	iint->flags |= action;
+	flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
+	flags = set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | action);
 	action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
-	action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
+	action &= ~((flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
 
 	/* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
 	if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
@@ -290,7 +299,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
-		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname, status);
 
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
 		rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index e0c4d66aab79..cbd0c33c8107 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -114,6 +114,26 @@ void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
 	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
 }
 
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			 struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	if (!status)
+		return iint->flags;
+
+	return (iint->flags & ~IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS) |
+	       (status->flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS);
+}
+
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	iint->flags = flags;
+	if (status)
+		status->flags = flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS;
+
+	return flags;
+}
+
 static struct ns_common *imans_get(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct ima_namespace *ns = NULL;
-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 5/5] ima: namespace audit status flags
@ 2018-05-11 14:42   ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

From: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

The iint cache stores whether the file is measured, appraised, audited
etc. This patch moves the IMA_AUDITED flag into the per-namespace
ns_status, enabling IMA audit mechanism to audit the same file each time
it is accessed in a new namespace.

The ns_status is not looked up if the CONFIG_IMA_NS is disabled or if
any of the IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS (currently only IMA_AUDIT) is not
enabled.

Read and write operations on the iint flags is replaced with function
calls. For reading, iint_flags() returns the bitwise AND of iint->flags
and ns_status->flags. The ns_status flags are masked with
IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS (currently only IMA_AUDITED). Similarly
set_iint_flags() only writes the masked portion to the ns_status flags,
while the iint flags is set as before. The ns_status parameter added to
ima_audit_measurement() is used with the above functions to query and
set the ns_status flags.

Signed-off-by: Mehmet Kayaalp <mkayaalp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Changelog:
v2:
 * fixed flag calculation in iint_flags()
---
 init/Kconfig                      |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h      | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c  |  8 +++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c   | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 2ae532aa12a0..a71a2901dac3 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -939,6 +939,9 @@ config IMA_NS
 	help
 	  Allow the creation of IMA namespaces. Namespaced IMA data
           enables having IMA features work separately in each IMA namespace.
+	  Currently, only the audit status flags are stored in the namespace,
+	  which allows the same file to be audited each time it is accessed
+	  in a new namespace.
 
 endif # NAMESPACES
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a23f4b0b21f4..d73757984563 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -212,7 +212,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
 			   struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
 			   int xattr_len, int pcr);
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   const unsigned char *filename);
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct ns_status *status);
 int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
 			    struct ima_template_entry **entry);
 int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
@@ -301,6 +302,9 @@ static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */
 
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS   IMA_AUDIT
+#define IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS     IMA_AUDITED
+
 int ima_ns_init(void);
 struct ima_namespace;
 int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
@@ -308,12 +312,30 @@ int ima_init_namespace(struct ima_namespace *ns);
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS
 struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
 				    struct inode *inode);
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			 struct ns_status *status);
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags);
 #else
 static inline struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,
 						  struct inode *inode)
 {
 	return NULL;
 }
+
+static inline unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+				       struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	return iint->flags;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+					   struct ns_status *status,
+					   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	iint->flags = flags;
+	return flags;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */
 
 /* LSM based policy rules require audit */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 85ca995b9bb7..0b302d829554 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -307,15 +307,17 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 }
 
 void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
-			   const unsigned char *filename)
+			   const unsigned char *filename,
+			   struct ns_status *status)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 	char hash[(iint->ima_hash->length * 2) + 1];
 	const char *algo_name = hash_algo_name[iint->ima_hash->algo];
 	char algo_hash[sizeof(hash) + strlen(algo_name) + 2];
 	int i;
+	unsigned long flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
 
-	if (iint->flags & IMA_AUDITED)
+	if (flags & IMA_AUDITED)
 		return;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < iint->ima_hash->length; i++)
@@ -336,7 +338,7 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
 	audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
 	audit_log_end(ab);
 
-	iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
+	set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | IMA_AUDITED);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index ad9acac98526..1d1f5dffb186 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+	struct ns_status *status = NULL;
 	struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	char filename[NAME_MAX];
@@ -182,6 +183,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	int xattr_len = 0;
 	bool violation_check;
 	enum hash_algo hash_algo;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return 0;
@@ -209,6 +211,12 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 		iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
 		if (!iint)
 			rc = -ENOMEM;
+
+		if (!rc && (action & IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS)) {
+			status = ima_get_ns_status(get_current_ns(), inode);
+			if (IS_ERR(status))
+				rc = PTR_ERR(status);
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (!rc && violation_check)
@@ -238,9 +246,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
 	 *  IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
 	 */
-	iint->flags |= action;
+	flags = iint_flags(iint, status);
+	flags = set_iint_flags(iint, status, flags | action);
 	action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
-	action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
+	action &= ~((flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
 
 	/* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
 	if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
@@ -290,7 +299,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
 	if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
-		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
+		ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname, status);
 
 	if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
 		rc = 0;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index e0c4d66aab79..cbd0c33c8107 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
@@ -114,6 +114,26 @@ void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref)
 	destroy_ima_ns(ns);
 }
 
+unsigned long iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			 struct ns_status *status)
+{
+	if (!status)
+		return iint->flags;
+
+	return (iint->flags & ~IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS) |
+	       (status->flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS);
+}
+
+unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
+			     struct ns_status *status, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	iint->flags = flags;
+	if (status)
+		status->flags = flags & IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS;
+
+	return flags;
+}
+
 static struct ns_common *imans_get(struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	struct ima_namespace *ns = NULL;
-- 
2.14.3

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
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^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
       [not found]     ` <20180511144230.75384-4-stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
@ 2018-05-15 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-05-15 13:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w

Hi Stefan,

On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> 
> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
"IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.

This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
this change and upstream it, the better.

[1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html

thanks,

Mimi

> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
> 
>  #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  	bool uid_token;
>  	int result = 0;
> 
> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
> 
>  	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
>  	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;

_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
  2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
  (?)
@ 2018-05-15 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-05-15 13:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	ebiederm, john.johansen

Hi Stefan,

On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> 
> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
"IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.

This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
this change and upstream it, the better.

[1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html

thanks,

Mimi

> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
> 
>  #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  	bool uid_token;
>  	int result = 0;
> 
> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
> 
>  	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
>  	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
@ 2018-05-15 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-05-15 13:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

Hi Stefan,

On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> 
> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
"IMA-audit" messages. ?Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
discussions [1], ?I would really appreciate if you could work with
Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.

This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets. ?The sooner we make
this change and upstream it, the better.

[1]?https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html

thanks,

Mimi

> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
> 
>  #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  	bool uid_token;
>  	int result = 0;
> 
> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
> 
>  	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
>  	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
@ 2018-05-15 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-05-15 13:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	ebiederm, john.johansen

Hi Stefan,

On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> 
> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
"IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.

This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
this change and upstream it, the better.

[1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html

thanks,

Mimi

> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
>  #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
> 
>  #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>  	bool uid_token;
>  	int result = 0;
> 
> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
> 
>  	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
>  	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
       [not found]       ` <1526391655.3937.151.camel-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
@ 2018-05-16 20:28         ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-16 20:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w

On 05/15/2018 09:40 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Stefan,
>
> On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>
>> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
>> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
>> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
> "IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
> discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
> Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.
Is your patch below still valid for splitting it up into 'two distinct 
audit record types' ?

>
> This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
> namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
> this change and upstream it, the better.
>
> [1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
>> ---
>>   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
>>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
>> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
>>
>>   #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
>>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>>   	bool uid_token;
>>   	int result = 0;
>>
>> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
>> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
>>
>>   	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
>>   	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;


_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
  2018-05-15 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
  (?)
@ 2018-05-16 20:28         ` Stefan Berger
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-16 20:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	ebiederm, john.johansen

On 05/15/2018 09:40 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Stefan,
>
> On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>
>> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
>> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
>> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
> "IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
> discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
> Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.
Is your patch below still valid for splitting it up into 'two distinct 
audit record types' ?

>
> This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
> namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
> this change and upstream it, the better.
>
> [1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
>> ---
>>   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
>>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
>> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
>>
>>   #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
>>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>>   	bool uid_token;
>>   	int result = 0;
>>
>> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
>> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
>>
>>   	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
>>   	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;



^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
@ 2018-05-16 20:28         ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-16 20:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

On 05/15/2018 09:40 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Stefan,
>
> On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>
>> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
>> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
>> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
> "IMA-audit" messages. ?Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
> discussions [1], ?I would really appreciate if you could work with
> Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.
Is your patch below still valid for splitting it up into 'two distinct 
audit record types' ?

>
> This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
> namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets. ?The sooner we make
> this change and upstream it, the better.
>
> [1]?https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
>> ---
>>   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
>>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
>> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
>>
>>   #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
>>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>>   	bool uid_token;
>>   	int result = 0;
>>
>> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
>> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
>>
>>   	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
>>   	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;


--
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^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
@ 2018-05-16 20:28         ` Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-16 20:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Mimi Zohar, linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	ebiederm, john.johansen

On 05/15/2018 09:40 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Stefan,
>
> On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
>>
>> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
>> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
>> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
> "IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
> discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
> Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.
Is your patch below still valid for splitting it up into 'two distinct 
audit record types' ?

>
> This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
> namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
> this change and upstream it, the better.
>
> [1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html
>
> thanks,
>
> Mimi
>
>> ---
>>   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
>>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
>>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
>> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
>> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
>>
>>   #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
>>
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
>> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
>>   	bool uid_token;
>>   	int result = 0;
>>
>> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
>> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
>>
>>   	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
>>   	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
       [not found]         ` <2496f165-67f7-304d-08a0-ea8eedd3c3d4-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
@ 2018-05-16 21:40           ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-05-16 21:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w, Steve Grubb

On Wed, 2018-05-16 at 16:28 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 05/15/2018 09:40 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Stefan,
> >
> > On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >>
> >> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> >> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
> >> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
> > "IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
> > discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
> > Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.

> Is your patch below still valid for splitting it up into 'two distinct 
> audit record types' ?

We need to separate the IMA policy audit rules from the IMA-audit
messages.  As we're changing the audit numbers, we need to take into
account Richard's and Steve's comments about the IMA policy record
format at the same time.

This patch is incomplete and needs to address their comments.

Mimi

> >
> > This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
> > namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
> > this change and upstream it, the better.
> >
> > [1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi
> >
> >> ---
> >>   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
> >>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
> >>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
> >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> >> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
> >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
> >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
> >>
> >>   #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> >>
> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> >>   	bool uid_token;
> >>   	int result = 0;
> >>
> >> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> >> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
> >>
> >>   	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> >>   	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> 
> 

_______________________________________________
Containers mailing list
Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
  2018-05-16 20:28         ` Stefan Berger
  (?)
@ 2018-05-16 21:40           ` Mimi Zohar
  -1 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-05-16 21:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	ebiederm, john.johansen, Richard Guy Briggs, Steve Grubb

On Wed, 2018-05-16 at 16:28 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 05/15/2018 09:40 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Stefan,
> >
> > On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >>
> >> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> >> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
> >> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
> > "IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
> > discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
> > Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.

> Is your patch below still valid for splitting it up into 'two distinct 
> audit record types' ?

We need to separate the IMA policy audit rules from the IMA-audit
messages.  As we're changing the audit numbers, we need to take into
account Richard's and Steve's comments about the IMA policy record
format at the same time.

This patch is incomplete and needs to address their comments.

Mimi

> >
> > This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
> > namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
> > this change and upstream it, the better.
> >
> > [1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi
> >
> >> ---
> >>   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
> >>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
> >>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
> >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> >> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
> >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
> >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
> >>
> >>   #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> >>
> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> >>   	bool uid_token;
> >>   	int result = 0;
> >>
> >> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> >> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
> >>
> >>   	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> >>   	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> 
> 


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
@ 2018-05-16 21:40           ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-05-16 21:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-security-module

On Wed, 2018-05-16 at 16:28 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 05/15/2018 09:40 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Stefan,
> >
> > On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >>
> >> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> >> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
> >> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
> > "IMA-audit" messages. ?Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
> > discussions [1], ?I would really appreciate if you could work with
> > Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.

> Is your patch below still valid for splitting it up into 'two distinct 
> audit record types' ?

We need to separate the IMA policy audit rules from the IMA-audit
messages. ?As we're changing the audit numbers, we need to take into
account Richard's and Steve's comments about the IMA policy record
format at the same time.

This patch is incomplete and needs to address their comments.

Mimi

> >
> > This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
> > namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets. ?The sooner we make
> > this change and upstream it, the better.
> >
> > [1]?https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi
> >
> >> ---
> >>   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
> >>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
> >>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
> >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> >> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
> >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
> >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
> >>
> >>   #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> >>
> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> >>   	bool uid_token;
> >>   	int result = 0;
> >>
> >> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> >> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
> >>
> >>   	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> >>   	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> 
> 

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* Re: [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions
@ 2018-05-16 21:40           ` Mimi Zohar
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2018-05-16 21:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Stefan Berger, linux-integrity, containers, linux-kernel,
	linux-security-module
  Cc: serge, sunyuqiong1988, david.safford, mkayaalp, James.Bottomley,
	ebiederm, john.johansen, Richard Guy Briggs, Steve Grubb

On Wed, 2018-05-16 at 16:28 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 05/15/2018 09:40 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > Hi Stefan,
> >
> > On Fri, 2018-05-11 at 10:42 -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >> From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> >>
> >> The AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE is used for auditing IMA policy rules and
> >> the IMA "audit" policy action.  This patch defines AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY
> >> to reflect the IMA policy rules.
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> > We do need to separate out auditing the IMA policy rules from the
> > "IMA-audit" messages.  Based on the IMA policy rule aspect of the
> > discussions [1],  I would really appreciate if you could work with
> > Richard and Steve on the new IMA policy rule audit format.

> Is your patch below still valid for splitting it up into 'two distinct 
> audit record types' ?

We need to separate the IMA policy audit rules from the IMA-audit
messages.  As we're changing the audit numbers, we need to take into
account Richard's and Steve's comments about the IMA policy record
format at the same time.

This patch is incomplete and needs to address their comments.

Mimi

> >
> > This change can be upstreamed independently of either the IMA
> > namespacing or the audit containerid patch sets.  The sooner we make
> > this change and upstream it, the better.
> >
> > [1] https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2018-March/msg00092.html
> >
> > thanks,
> >
> > Mimi
> >
> >> ---
> >>   include/uapi/linux/audit.h          | 3 ++-
> >>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 +-
> >>   2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>
> >> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> index 4e61a9e05132..8966e7ff1c4c 100644
> >> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> >> @@ -146,7 +146,8 @@
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS	    1802 /* Integrity enable status */
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH	    1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
> >>   #define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR	    1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
> >> -#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* policy rule */
> >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE	    1805 /* IMA "audit" action policy msgs  */
> >> +#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY	    1806 /* IMA policy rules */
> >>
> >>   #define AUDIT_KERNEL		2000	/* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
> >>
> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> index 915f5572c6ff..3a1412db02a3 100644
> >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> >> @@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
> >>   	bool uid_token;
> >>   	int result = 0;
> >>
> >> -	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
> >> +	ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY);
> >>
> >>   	entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
> >>   	entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
> 
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
* [RFC PATCH v4 0/5] ima: Namespacing IMA
@ 2018-05-11 14:42 Stefan Berger
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 30+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2018-05-11 14:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-integrity-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
	linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
  Cc: mkayaalp-4hyTIkVWTs8LubxHQvXPfYdd74u8MsAO,
	sunyuqiong1988-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w, david.safford-JJi787mZWgc,
	James.Bottomley-d9PhHud1JfjCXq6kfMZ53/egYHeGw8Jk,
	john.johansen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw,
	ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w,
	zohar-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8

This patch set implements an IMA namespace data structure that gets
created by first writing a '1' into IMA's securityfs unshare file at
/sys/kernel/security/ima/unshare and then by clone(). This patch set
lays down the foundation for namespacing the different aspects of IMA
(eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal).

The original PoC patches created a new CLONE_NEWIMA flag to explicitly
control when a new IMA namespace should be created. The previously posted
version 2 of this series had it hooked on the mount namespace, which was
regarded as inappropriate. The subsequent v3 tied it to the creation of a
user namespace. Based on comments, we elected to now again create an
independent IMA namespace through the above mentioned securityfs file.

The first patch creates the ima_namespace data, while the second patch
puts the iint->flags in the namespace. The third patch introduces an
audit message type for  IMA policy rules. The fourth patch introduces
a new IMA policy rule attribute 'ns' making rules only applicable to child
IMA namespaces. The last patch uses the flags for namespacing the
IMA-audit messages, enabling the same file to be audited each time it
is accessed in a new namespace.

   Stefan

Mehmet Kayaalp (2):
  ima: Add ns_status for storing namespaced iint data
  ima: namespace audit status flags

Mimi Zohar (1):
  ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions

Stefan Berger (1):
  ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces

Yuqiong Sun (1):
  ima: Add IMA namespace support

 fs/proc/namespaces.c                     |   3 +
 include/linux/ima.h                      |  53 +++++++++
 include/linux/nsproxy.h                  |   2 +
 include/linux/proc_ns.h                  |   1 +
 include/linux/sched.h                    |   6 +
 include/linux/user_namespace.h           |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/audit.h               |   3 +-
 init/Kconfig                             |  11 ++
 kernel/fork.c                            |   5 +
 kernel/nsproxy.c                         |  25 ++++-
 kernel/ucount.c                          |   1 +
 security/integrity/ima/Makefile          |   3 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima.h             |  82 +++++++++++++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c         |  14 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c    |   2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c          |  55 ++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c        |   4 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c |  51 +++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c        |  18 ++-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c          | 183 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c   | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c      |  77 ++++++++++++-
 22 files changed, 712 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
 create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns_status.c

-- 
2.14.3

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 30+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2018-05-16 21:40 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-05-11 14:42 [RFC PATCH v4 0/5] ima: Namespacing IMA Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42 ` Stefan Berger
     [not found] ` <20180511144230.75384-1-stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2018-05-11 14:42   ` [RFC PATCH v4 1/5] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42   ` [RFC PATCH v4 2/5] ima: Add ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42   ` [RFC PATCH v4 3/5] ima: differentiate auditing policy rules from "audit" actions Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42     ` Stefan Berger
     [not found]     ` <20180511144230.75384-4-stefanb-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2018-05-15 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-15 13:40     ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-15 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-15 13:40       ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-16 20:28       ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-16 20:28         ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-16 20:28         ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-16 21:40         ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-16 21:40           ` Mimi Zohar
2018-05-16 21:40           ` Mimi Zohar
     [not found]         ` <2496f165-67f7-304d-08a0-ea8eedd3c3d4-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2018-05-16 21:40           ` Mimi Zohar
     [not found]       ` <1526391655.3937.151.camel-23VcF4HTsmIX0ybBhKVfKdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org>
2018-05-16 20:28         ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42   ` [RFC PATCH v4 4/5] ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42   ` [RFC PATCH v4 5/5] ima: namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 4/5] ima: extend IMA audit policy rules with attribute to audit namespaces Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42   ` Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42 ` [RFC PATCH v4 5/5] ima: namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2018-05-11 14:42   ` Stefan Berger
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-05-11 14:42 [RFC PATCH v4 0/5] ima: Namespacing IMA Stefan Berger

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