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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] kernel: sys: fix potential Spectre v1
Date: Wed, 23 May 2018 16:07:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180523150737.ycuulapggtu3hpc3@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180523090840.GU12217@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net>

On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 11:08:40AM +0200, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> 
> Sorry for being late to the party..

Likewise!

> On Wed, May 23, 2018 at 12:03:57AM -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
> > +#define validate_index_nospec(index, size)                            \
> > +({                                                                    \
> > +       bool ret = true;                                               \
> > +       typeof(index) *ptr = &(index);                                 \
> > +       typeof(size) _s = (size);                                      \
> > +                                                                      \
> > +       BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*ptr) > sizeof(long));                     \
> > +       BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long));                       \
> > +                                                                      \
> > +       if (*ptr >= size)                                              \
> > +               ret = false;                                           \
> > +                                                                      \
> > +       *ptr = array_index_nospec(*ptr, _s);                           \
> > +                                                                      \
> > +       ret;                                                           \
> > +})
> 
> Would not something like:
> 
> 	bool ret = false;
> 
> 	....
> 
> 	if (*ptr < _s) {
> 		*ptr = array_index_nospec(*ptr, _s);
> 		ret = true;
> 	}
> 
> 	ret;
> 
> be more obvious?

I think that either way, we have a potential problem if the compiler
generates a branch dependent on the result of validate_index_nospec().

In that case, we could end up with codegen approximating:

	bool safe = false;

	if (idx < bound) {
		idx = array_index_nospec(idx, bound);
		safe = true;
	}

	// this branch can be mispredicted
	if (safe) {
		foo = array[idx];
	}

... and thus we lose the nospec protection.

I also suspect that compiler transformations mean that this might
already be the case for patterns like:

	if (idx < bound)  {
		safe_idx = array_index_nospec(idx, bound)];
		...
		foo = array[safe_idx];
	}

... if the compiler can transform that to something like:

	if (idx < bound) {
		idx = array_index_nospec(idx, bound);
	}

	// can be mispredicted
	if (idx < bound) {
		foo = array[idx];
	}

... which I think a compiler might be capable of, depending on the rest
of the function body (e.g. if there's a common portion shared with the
else case).

I'll see if I can trigger that in a test case. :/

Thanks,
Mark.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-23 15:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-15  3:00 [PATCH] kernel: sys: fix potential Spectre v1 Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-15 22:08 ` Andrew Morton
2018-05-15 22:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-05-15 22:57     ` Dan Williams
2018-05-18 19:04       ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 19:21         ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 20:38           ` Dan Williams
2018-05-18 20:44             ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 21:27               ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 21:45                 ` Dan Williams
2018-05-18 22:01                   ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-18 22:08                     ` Dan Williams
2018-05-18 22:11                       ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-21  0:50               ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-21  2:00                 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-22 20:50                   ` Dan Williams
2018-05-23  5:03                     ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-23  5:15                       ` Dan Williams
2018-05-23  5:22                         ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
2018-05-23  9:08                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-23 13:55                         ` Dan Williams
2018-05-23 15:07                         ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2018-05-23 15:57                           ` Dan Williams
2018-05-23 16:27                           ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-05-23 16:31                           ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-25 18:11                             ` Gustavo A. R. Silva

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