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From: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
To: Wes Turner <wes.turner@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"jsteckli@amazon.de" <jsteckli@amazon.de>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"juerg.haefliger@hpe.com" <juerg.haefliger@hpe.com>,
	"deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com" <deepa.srinivasan@oracle.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	linux-mm <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"joao.m.martins@oracle.com" <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>,
	"pradeep.vincent@oracle.com" <pradeep.vincent@oracle.com>,
	Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com>,
	"kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com" <kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com>,
	Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@google.com>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"chris.hyser@oracle.com" <chris.hyser@oracle.com>,
	Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
	John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>, Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Redoing eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) with isolated CPUs in mind (for KVM to isolate its guests per CPU)
Date: Mon, 3 Sep 2018 08:36:41 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180903153641.GF27886@tassilo.jf.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACfEFw_h5uup-anKZwfBcWMJB7gHxb9NEPTRSUAY0+t11RiQbg@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Sep 01, 2018 at 06:33:22PM -0400, Wes Turner wrote:
>    Speaking of pages and slowdowns,
>    is there a better place to ask this question:
>    From "'Turning Tables' shared page tables vuln":
>    """
>    'New "Turning Tables" Technique Bypasses All Windows Kernel Mitigations'
>    https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-turning-tables-technique-bypasses-all-windows-kernel-mitigations/
>    > Furthermore, since the concept of page tables is also used by Apple and
>    the Linux project, macOS and Linux are, in theory, also vulnerable to this
>    technique, albeit the researchers have not verified such attacks, as of
>    yet.
>    Slides:
>    https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/487909/Turning%20(Page)%20Tables_Slides.pdf
>    Naturally, I took notice and decided to forward the latest scary headline
>    to this list to see if this is already being addressed?

This essentially just says that if you can change page tables you can subvert kernels.
That's always been the case, always will be, I'm sure has been used forever by root kits,
and I don't know why anybody would pass it off as a "new attack".

-Andi

  reply	other threads:[~2018-09-03 15:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-20 21:25 Redoing eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO) with isolated CPUs in mind (for KVM to isolate its guests per CPU) Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-08-20 21:48 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-08-20 21:52   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-08-20 22:18     ` Kees Cook
2018-08-20 22:18       ` Kees Cook
2018-08-20 22:27     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-08-20 22:35       ` Tycho Andersen
2018-08-20 22:59         ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-20 23:14           ` David Woodhouse
2018-08-20 23:26             ` Dave Hansen
2018-08-20 23:38               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-08-21  9:57       ` David Woodhouse
2018-08-21 14:01         ` Liran Alon
2018-08-21 14:22           ` David Woodhouse
2018-08-21 23:04             ` Liran Alon
2018-08-30 16:00       ` Julian Stecklina
2018-08-31 15:26         ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-01 21:38         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-09-01 22:33           ` Wes Turner
2018-09-03 15:36             ` Andi Kleen [this message]
2018-09-03 14:51           ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-12 15:37             ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-13  6:11               ` Juerg Haefliger
2018-09-17 10:01                 ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-17 10:01                   ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-17 10:19                   ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-17 13:27                   ` Christoph Hellwig
2018-09-14 17:06               ` Khalid Aziz
2018-09-17  9:51                 ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-18 23:00                   ` Khalid Aziz
2018-09-24 14:45                     ` Stecklina, Julian
2018-09-24 14:45                       ` Stecklina, Julian
2018-10-15  8:07                       ` Khalid Aziz
2018-10-15  8:07                         ` Khalid Aziz
2018-10-24 11:00                         ` Khalid Aziz
2018-10-24 11:00                           ` Khalid Aziz
2018-10-24 15:00                           ` Tycho Andersen
2018-10-24 15:00                             ` Tycho Andersen
2018-09-03 15:26           ` Andi Kleen
2018-09-04  9:37             ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-04  9:37               ` Julian Stecklina
2018-09-07 21:30         ` Khalid Aziz
2018-08-31  8:43     ` James Bottomley
2018-08-31  8:43       ` James Bottomley
2018-09-19  1:03     ` Balbir Singh
2018-09-19  1:03       ` Balbir Singh
2018-09-19 15:34       ` Jonathan Adams
2018-09-19 15:38       ` Jonathan Adams
2018-09-19 15:43       ` Jonathan Adams
2018-09-23  2:33         ` Balbir Singh
2018-09-25 14:12           ` Stecklina, Julian
2018-09-25 14:12             ` Stecklina, Julian

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