[PATCH 1/4] linux-firmware: Bump revision to 44d4fca

[PATCH 1/4] linux-firmware: Bump revision to 44d4fca

[Otavio Salvador]

44d4fca Merge https://github.com/pmachata/linux-firmware
253a573 brcm: update firmware for bcm43362 sdio
3cee728 Mellanox: Add new mlxsw_spectrum firmware 13.1703.4
ccab6c7 rtl_bt: Add firmware and configuration files for the Bluetooth part of RTL8822CU
75d2b12 Mellanox: Add new mlxsw_spectrum firmware 13.1703.4
85c5d90 nvidia: switch GP10[2467] to newer scrubber/ACR firmware (from GP108)

License-Update: new firmware files additions
Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
---

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_git.bb | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_git.bb b/meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_git.bb
index 1b6be054a2..7829c24579 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_git.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-kernel/linux-firmware/linux-firmware_git.bb
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "\
     file://LICENCE.xc4000;md5=0ff51d2dc49fce04814c9155081092f0 \
     file://LICENCE.xc5000;md5=1e170c13175323c32c7f4d0998d53f66 \
     file://LICENCE.xc5000c;md5=12b02efa3049db65d524aeb418dd87ca \
-    file://WHENCE;md5=feb25f3efdbe10fcc121005d02d407d6 \
+    file://WHENCE;md5=36ef3e9887bb8b38ff265c602de6740e \
 "
 
 # These are not common licenses, set NO_GENERIC_LICENSE for them
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-xc5000] = "LICENCE.xc5000"
 NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[Firmware-xc5000c] = "LICENCE.xc5000c"
 NO_GENERIC_LICENSE[WHENCE] = "WHENCE"
 
-SRCREV = "fea76a04f25fd0a217c0d566ff5ff8f23ad3e648"
+SRCREV = "44d4fca9922a252a0bd81f6307bcc072a78da54a"
 PE = "1"
 PV = "0.0+git${SRCPV}"
 
-- 
2.19.0

[PATCH 2/4] libarchive: Update 3.3.2 -> 3.3.3

[Otavio Salvador]

This upgrades to 3.3.3 release and drop the backported patches when
doing the recipe update.

Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
---

 .../libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch           | 37 ---------
 .../libarchive/CVE-2017-14501.patch           | 79 -------------------
 .../libarchive/CVE-2017-14502.patch           | 37 ---------
 .../libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch           | 33 --------
 .../libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch        | 38 ---------
 ...ibarchive_3.3.2.bb => libarchive_3.3.3.bb} | 11 +--
 6 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 232 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14501.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14502.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch
 rename meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/{libarchive_3.3.2.bb => libarchive_3.3.3.bb} (86%)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e85fec40aa..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14166.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-libarchive-3.3.2: Fix CVE-2017-14166
-
-[No upstream tracking] -- https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/935
-
-archive_read_support_format_xar: heap-based buffer overflow in xml_data
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/fa7438a0ff4033e4741c807394a9af6207940d71]
-CVE: CVE-2017-14166
-Bug: 935
-Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
-
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c
-index 7a22beb..93eeacc 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c
-+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_xar.c
-@@ -1040,6 +1040,9 @@ atol10(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
- 	uint64_t l;
- 	int digit;
- 
-+	if (char_cnt == 0)
-+		return (0);
-+
- 	l = 0;
- 	digit = *p - '0';
- 	while (digit >= 0 && digit < 10  && char_cnt-- > 0) {
-@@ -1054,7 +1057,10 @@ atol8(const char *p, size_t char_cnt)
- {
- 	int64_t l;
- 	int digit;
--        
-+
-+	if (char_cnt == 0)
-+		return (0);
-+
- 	l = 0;
- 	while (char_cnt-- > 0) {
- 		if (*p >= '0' && *p <= '7')
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14501.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14501.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1038102e6b..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14501.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-From f9569c086ff29259c73790db9cbf39fe8fb9d862 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Starks <jostarks@microsoft.com>
-Date: Wed, 25 Jul 2018 12:16:34 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] iso9660: validate directory record length
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-14501
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/mmatuska/libarchive/commit/13e87dcd9c37b533127cceb9f3e1e5a38d95e784]
-
-Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com>
----
- libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 17 +++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
-index f01d37bf..089bb723 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
-+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
-@@ -409,7 +409,8 @@ static int	next_entry_seek(struct archive_read *, struct iso9660 *,
- 		    struct file_info **);
- static struct file_info *
- 		parse_file_info(struct archive_read *a,
--		    struct file_info *parent, const unsigned char *isodirrec);
-+		    struct file_info *parent, const unsigned char *isodirrec,
-+		    size_t reclen);
- static int	parse_rockridge(struct archive_read *a,
- 		    struct file_info *file, const unsigned char *start,
- 		    const unsigned char *end);
-@@ -1022,7 +1023,7 @@ read_children(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *parent)
- 			if (*(p + DR_name_len_offset) == 1
- 			    && *(p + DR_name_offset) == '\001')
- 				continue;
--			child = parse_file_info(a, parent, p);
-+			child = parse_file_info(a, parent, p, b - p);
- 			if (child == NULL) {
- 				__archive_read_consume(a, skip_size);
- 				return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
-@@ -1112,7 +1113,7 @@ choose_volume(struct archive_read *a, struct iso9660 *iso9660)
- 	 */
- 	seenJoliet = iso9660->seenJoliet;/* Save flag. */
- 	iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
--	file = parse_file_info(a, NULL, block);
-+	file = parse_file_info(a, NULL, block, vd->size);
- 	if (file == NULL)
- 		return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
- 	iso9660->seenJoliet = seenJoliet;
-@@ -1144,7 +1145,7 @@ choose_volume(struct archive_read *a, struct iso9660 *iso9660)
- 			return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
- 		}
- 		iso9660->seenJoliet = 0;
--		file = parse_file_info(a, NULL, block);
-+		file = parse_file_info(a, NULL, block, vd->size);
- 		if (file == NULL)
- 			return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
- 		iso9660->seenJoliet = seenJoliet;
-@@ -1749,7 +1750,7 @@ archive_read_format_iso9660_cleanup(struct archive_read *a)
-  */
- static struct file_info *
- parse_file_info(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *parent,
--    const unsigned char *isodirrec)
-+    const unsigned char *isodirrec, size_t reclen)
- {
- 	struct iso9660 *iso9660;
- 	struct file_info *file, *filep;
-@@ -1763,7 +1764,11 @@ parse_file_info(struct archive_read *a, struct file_info *parent,
- 
- 	iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)(a->format->data);
- 
--	dr_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_length_offset];
-+	if (reclen == 0 || reclen < (dr_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_length_offset])) {
-+		archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
-+			"Invalid directory record length");
-+		return (NULL);
-+	}
- 	name_len = (size_t)isodirrec[DR_name_len_offset];
- 	location = archive_le32dec(isodirrec + DR_extent_offset);
- 	fsize = toi(isodirrec + DR_size_offset, DR_size_size);
--- 
-2.13.3
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14502.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14502.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 72e1546435..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14502.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 5562545b5562f6d12a4ef991fae158bf4ccf92b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Joerg Sonnenberger <joerg@bec.de>
-Date: Sat, 9 Sep 2017 17:47:32 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Avoid a read off-by-one error for UTF16 names in RAR
- archives.
-
-Reported-By: OSS-Fuzz issue 573
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-14502
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Signed-off-by: Zhixiong Chi <zhixiong.chi@windriver.com>
----
- libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c | 6 +++++-
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
-index cbb14c3..751de69 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
-+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_rar.c
-@@ -1496,7 +1496,11 @@ read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
-         return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
-       }
-       filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
--      filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
-+      /*
-+       * Do not increment filename_size here as the computations below
-+       * add the space for the terminating NUL explicitly.
-+       */
-+      filename[filename_size] = '\0';
- 
-       /* Decoded unicode form is UTF-16BE, so we have to update a string
-        * conversion object for it. */
--- 
-1.9.1
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 779ca854eb..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2017-14503.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 2c8c83b9731ff822fad6cc8c670ea5519c366a14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Joerg Sonnenberger <joerg@bec.de>
-Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2018 21:14:53 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Reject LHA archive entries with negative size.
-
-CVE: CVE-2017-14503
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/2c8c83b9731ff822fad6cc8c670ea5519c366a14]
-
-Signed-off-by: Jagadeesh Krishnanjanappa <jkrishnanjanappa@mvista.com> 
----
- libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
-index b8ef4ae1..95c99bb1 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
-+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_lha.c
-@@ -701,6 +701,12 @@ archive_read_format_lha_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
- 	 * Prepare variables used to read a file content.
- 	 */
- 	lha->entry_bytes_remaining = lha->compsize;
-+	if (lha->entry_bytes_remaining < 0) {
-+		archive_set_error(&a->archive,
-+		    ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
-+		    "Invalid LHa entry size");
-+		return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
-+	}
- 	lha->entry_offset = 0;
- 	lha->entry_crc_calculated = 0;
- 
--- 
-2.13.3
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2f3254c8dc..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/bug929.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-libarchive-3.3.2: Fix bug929
-
-[No upstream tracking] -- https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/pull/929
-
-archive_read_support_format_cpio: header_newc(): Avoid overflow when reading corrupt
-cpio archive
-
-A cpio "newc" archive with a namelength of "FFFFFFFF", if read on a
-system with a 32-bit size_t, would result in namelength + name_pad
-overflowing 32 bits and libarchive attempting to copy 2^32-1 bytes
-from a 2-byte buffer, with appropriately hilarious results.
-
-Check for this overflow and fail; there's no legitimate reason for a
-cpio archive to contain a file with a name over 4 billion characters
-in length.
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/bac4659e0b970990e7e3f3a3d239294e96311630]
-Bug: 929
-Signed-off-by: Andrej Valek <andrej.valek@siemens.com>
-
-diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c
-index ad9f782..1faa64d 100644
---- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c
-+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_cpio.c
-@@ -633,6 +633,13 @@ header_newc(struct archive_read *a, struct cpio *cpio,
- 	/* Pad name to 2 more than a multiple of 4. */
- 	*name_pad = (2 - *namelength) & 3;
- 
-+	/* Make sure that the padded name length fits into size_t. */
-+	if ((size_t)(*namelength + *name_pad) < *namelength) {
-+		archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
-+		    "cpio archive has invalid namelength");
-+		return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Note: entry_bytes_remaining is at least 64 bits and
- 	 * therefore guaranteed to be big enough for a 33-bit file
diff --git a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.3.bb
similarity index 86%
rename from meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb
rename to meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.3.bb
index e3d90b276a..eabab16770 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.2.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.3.3.bb
@@ -32,16 +32,11 @@ PACKAGECONFIG[lz4] = "--with-lz4,--without-lz4,lz4,"
 EXTRA_OECONF += "--enable-largefile"
 
 SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
-           file://bug929.patch \
-           file://CVE-2017-14166.patch \
-           file://CVE-2017-14502.patch \
            file://non-recursive-extract-and-list.patch \
-           file://CVE-2017-14503.patch \
-           file://CVE-2017-14501.patch \
-          "
+"
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4583bd6b2ebf7e0e8963d90879eb1b27"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ed2dbd6954792b2c054ccf8ec4b330a54b85904a80cef477a1c74643ddafa0ce"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "4038e366ca5b659dae3efcc744e72120"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ba7eb1781c9fbbae178c4c6bad1c6eb08edab9a1496c64833d1715d022b30e2e"
 
 inherit autotools update-alternatives pkgconfig
 
-- 
2.19.0

[PATCH 3/4] cmake: Upgrade 3.12.1 -> 3.12.2

[Otavio Salvador]

Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
---

 .../cmake/{cmake-native_3.12.1.bb => cmake-native_3.12.2.bb}  | 0
 meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake.inc                         | 4 ++--
 .../cmake/{cmake_3.12.1.bb => cmake_3.12.2.bb}                | 0
 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/{cmake-native_3.12.1.bb => cmake-native_3.12.2.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/{cmake_3.12.1.bb => cmake_3.12.2.bb} (100%)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake-native_3.12.1.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake-native_3.12.2.bb
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake-native_3.12.1.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake-native_3.12.2.bb
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake.inc b/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake.inc
index 4c30162c19..09e28b73dd 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake.inc
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://cmake.org/files/v${CMAKE_MAJOR_VERSION}/cmake-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0004-Fail-silently-if-system-Qt-installation-is-broken.patch \
 "
 
-SRC_URI[md5sum] = "10109246a51102bfda45ff3935275fbf"
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c53d5c2ce81d7a957ee83e3e635c8cda5dfe20c9d501a4828ee28e1615e57ab2"
+SRC_URI[md5sum] = "6e7c550cfa1c2e216b35903dc70d80af"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "0f97485799e51a7070cc11494f3e02349b0fc3a24cc12b082e737bf67a0581a4"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_REGEX = "cmake-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)\.tar"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake_3.12.1.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake_3.12.2.bb
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake_3.12.1.bb
rename to meta/recipes-devtools/cmake/cmake_3.12.2.bb
-- 
2.19.0

[U-Boot] [PATCH 4/4] u-boot: Upgrade 2018.07 -> 2018.09

[Otavio Salvador]

This upgrades U-Boot to 2018.09 release and drop the backported
security fixes which are now included upstream.

Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
---

 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch     |  59 --------
 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch     | 143 ------------------
 ..._2018.07.inc => u-boot-common_2018.09.inc} |   7 +-
 ..._2018.07.bb => u-boot-fw-utils_2018.09.bb} |   0
 ...e_2018.07.bb => u-boot-mkimage_2018.09.bb} |   0
 .../{u-boot_2018.07.bb => u-boot_2018.09.bb}  |   0
 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 207 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch
 rename meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/{u-boot-common_2018.07.inc => u-boot-common_2018.09.inc} (64%)
 rename meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/{u-boot-fw-utils_2018.07.bb => u-boot-fw-utils_2018.09.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/{u-boot-mkimage_2018.07.bb => u-boot-mkimage_2018.09.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/{u-boot_2018.07.bb => u-boot_2018.09.bb} (100%)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fed3c3dcb9..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 7346c1e192d63cd35f99c7e845e53c5d4d0bdc24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2018 11:45:20 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] vboot: Do not use hashed-strings offset
-
-The hashed-strings signature property includes two uint32_t values.
-The first is unneeded as there should never be a start offset into the
-strings region. The second, the size, is needed because the added
-signature node appends to this region.
-
-See tools/image-host.c, where a static 0 value is used for the offset.
-
-Signed-off-by: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport[http://git.denx.de/?p=u-boot.git;a=commit;
-                 h=7346c1e192d63cd35f99c7e845e53c5d4d0bdc24]
-
-CVE: CVE-2018-1000205
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
----
- common/image-sig.c | 7 +++++--
- tools/image-host.c | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/common/image-sig.c b/common/image-sig.c
-index 8d2fd10..5a269d3 100644
---- a/common/image-sig.c
-+++ b/common/image-sig.c
-@@ -377,8 +377,11 @@ int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int required_keynode,
- 	/* Add the strings */
- 	strings = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-strings", NULL);
- 	if (strings) {
--		fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit) +
--				fdt32_to_cpu(strings[0]);
-+		/*
-+		 * The strings region offset must be a static 0x0.
-+		 * This is set in tool/image-host.c
-+		 */
-+		fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit);
- 		fdt_regions[count].size = fdt32_to_cpu(strings[1]);
- 		count++;
- 	}
-diff --git a/tools/image-host.c b/tools/image-host.c
-index 8e43671..be2d59b 100644
---- a/tools/image-host.c
-+++ b/tools/image-host.c
-@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static int fit_image_write_sig(void *fit, int noffset, uint8_t *value,
- 
- 		ret = fdt_setprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-nodes",
- 				   region_prop, region_proplen);
-+		/* This is a legacy offset, it is unused, and must remain 0. */
- 		strdata[0] = 0;
- 		strdata[1] = cpu_to_fdt32(string_size);
- 		if (!ret) {
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bb79af1c7b..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-From 72239fc85f3eda078547956608c063ab965e90e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2018 11:38:05 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] vboot: Add FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE protection
-
-This adds a new config value FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE, which controls the
-max size of a FIT header's totalsize field. The field is checked before
-signature checks are applied to protect from reading past the intended
-FIT regions.
-
-This field is not part of the vboot signature so it should be sanity
-checked. If the field is corrupted then the structure or string region
-reads may have unintended behavior, such as reading from device memory.
-A default value of 256MB is set and intended to support most max storage
-sizes.
-
-Suggested-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
-Signed-off-by: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport[http://git.denx.de/?p=u-boot.git;a=commit;
-                 h=72239fc85f3eda078547956608c063ab965e90e9]
-
-CVE: CVE-2018-1000205
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
----
- Kconfig                     | 10 ++++++++++
- common/image-sig.c          |  5 +++++
- test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- tools/Makefile              |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Kconfig b/Kconfig
-index 5a82c95..c8b86cd 100644
---- a/Kconfig
-+++ b/Kconfig
-@@ -267,6 +267,16 @@ config FIT_SIGNATURE
- 	  format support in this case, enable it using
- 	  CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.
- 
-+config FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
-+	hex "Max size of signed FIT structures"
-+	depends on FIT_SIGNATURE
-+	default 0x10000000
-+	help
-+	  This option sets a max size in bytes for verified FIT uImages.
-+	  A sane value of 256MB protects corrupted DTB structures from overlapping
-+	  device memory. Assure this size does not extend past expected storage
-+	  space.
-+
- config FIT_VERBOSE
- 	bool "Show verbose messages when FIT images fail"
- 	help
-diff --git a/common/image-sig.c b/common/image-sig.c
-index f65d883..8d2fd10 100644
---- a/common/image-sig.c
-+++ b/common/image-sig.c
-@@ -156,6 +156,11 @@ static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
- {
- 	char *algo_name;
- 
-+	if (fdt_totalsize(fit) > CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
-+		*err_msgp = "Total size too large";
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (fit_image_hash_get_algo(fit, noffset, &algo_name)) {
- 		*err_msgp = "Can't get hash algo property";
- 		return -1;
-diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_vboot.py b/test/py/tests/test_vboot.py
-index ee939f2..3d25ec3 100644
---- a/test/py/tests/test_vboot.py
-+++ b/test/py/tests/test_vboot.py
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Tests run with both SHA1 and SHA256 hashing.
- 
- import pytest
- import sys
-+import struct
- import u_boot_utils as util
- 
- @pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox')
-@@ -105,6 +106,26 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console):
-         util.run_and_log(cons, [mkimage, '-F', '-k', tmpdir, '-K', dtb,
-                                 '-r', fit])
- 
-+    def replace_fit_totalsize(size):
-+        """Replace FIT header's totalsize with something greater.
-+
-+        The totalsize must be less than or equal to FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE.
-+        If the size is greater, the signature verification should return false.
-+
-+        Args:
-+            size: The new totalsize of the header
-+
-+        Returns:
-+            prev_size: The previous totalsize read from the header
-+        """
-+        total_size = 0
-+        with open(fit, 'r+b') as handle:
-+            handle.seek(4)
-+            total_size = handle.read(4)
-+            handle.seek(4)
-+            handle.write(struct.pack(">I", size))
-+        return struct.unpack(">I", total_size)[0]
-+
-     def test_with_algo(sha_algo):
-         """Test verified boot with the given hash algorithm.
- 
-@@ -146,6 +167,18 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console):
-         util.run_and_log(cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', tmpdir,
-                                 '-k', dtb])
- 
-+        # Replace header bytes
-+        bcfg = u_boot_console.config.buildconfig
-+        max_size = int(bcfg.get('config_fit_signature_max_size', 0x10000000), 0)
-+        existing_size = replace_fit_totalsize(max_size + 1)
-+        run_bootm(sha_algo, 'Signed config with bad hash', 'Bad Data Hash', False)
-+        cons.log.action('%s: Check overflowed FIT header totalsize' % sha_algo)
-+
-+        # Replace with existing header bytes
-+        replace_fit_totalsize(existing_size)
-+        run_bootm(sha_algo, 'signed config', 'dev+', True)
-+        cons.log.action('%s: Check default FIT header totalsize' % sha_algo)
-+
-         # Increment the first byte of the signature, which should cause failure
-         sig = util.run_and_log(cons, 'fdtget -t bx %s %s value' %
-                                (fit, sig_node))
-diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
-index 5dd33ed..0c3341e 100644
---- a/tools/Makefile
-+++ b/tools/Makefile
-@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
- # This affects include/image.h, but including the board config file
- # is tricky, so manually define this options here.
- HOST_EXTRACFLAGS	+= -DCONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
-+HOST_EXTRACFLAGS	+= -DCONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE=$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)
- endif
- 
- ifdef CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.07.inc b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.09.inc
similarity index 64%
rename from meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.07.inc
rename to meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.09.inc
index 22b44dccc6..3a991ae8fc 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.07.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.09.inc
@@ -8,11 +8,8 @@ PE = "1"
 
 # We use the revision in order to avoid having to fetch it from the
 # repo during parse
-SRCREV = "8c5d4fd0ec222701598a27b26ab7265d4cee45a3"
+SRCREV = "f88b6facb87dc4a52f1630eb9d858c0f54c6628e"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://git.denx.de/u-boot.git \
-           file://CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch \
-           file://CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch \
-"
+SRC_URI = "git://git.denx.de/u-boot.git"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-fw-utils_2018.07.bb b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-fw-utils_2018.09.bb
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-fw-utils_2018.07.bb
rename to meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-fw-utils_2018.09.bb
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-mkimage_2018.07.bb b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-mkimage_2018.09.bb
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-mkimage_2018.07.bb
rename to meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-mkimage_2018.09.bb
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2018.07.bb b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2018.09.bb
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2018.07.bb
rename to meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2018.09.bb
-- 
2.19.0

[PATCH 4/4] u-boot: Upgrade 2018.07 -> 2018.09

[Otavio Salvador]

This upgrades U-Boot to 2018.09 release and drop the backported
security fixes which are now included upstream.

Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
---

 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch     |  59 --------
 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch     | 143 ------------------
 ..._2018.07.inc => u-boot-common_2018.09.inc} |   7 +-
 ..._2018.07.bb => u-boot-fw-utils_2018.09.bb} |   0
 ...e_2018.07.bb => u-boot-mkimage_2018.09.bb} |   0
 .../{u-boot_2018.07.bb => u-boot_2018.09.bb}  |   0
 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 207 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch
 rename meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/{u-boot-common_2018.07.inc => u-boot-common_2018.09.inc} (64%)
 rename meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/{u-boot-fw-utils_2018.07.bb => u-boot-fw-utils_2018.09.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/{u-boot-mkimage_2018.07.bb => u-boot-mkimage_2018.09.bb} (100%)
 rename meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/{u-boot_2018.07.bb => u-boot_2018.09.bb} (100%)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fed3c3dcb9..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 7346c1e192d63cd35f99c7e845e53c5d4d0bdc24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2018 11:45:20 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] vboot: Do not use hashed-strings offset
-
-The hashed-strings signature property includes two uint32_t values.
-The first is unneeded as there should never be a start offset into the
-strings region. The second, the size, is needed because the added
-signature node appends to this region.
-
-See tools/image-host.c, where a static 0 value is used for the offset.
-
-Signed-off-by: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport[http://git.denx.de/?p=u-boot.git;a=commit;
-                 h=7346c1e192d63cd35f99c7e845e53c5d4d0bdc24]
-
-CVE: CVE-2018-1000205
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
----
- common/image-sig.c | 7 +++++--
- tools/image-host.c | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/common/image-sig.c b/common/image-sig.c
-index 8d2fd10..5a269d3 100644
---- a/common/image-sig.c
-+++ b/common/image-sig.c
-@@ -377,8 +377,11 @@ int fit_config_check_sig(const void *fit, int noffset, int required_keynode,
- 	/* Add the strings */
- 	strings = fdt_getprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-strings", NULL);
- 	if (strings) {
--		fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit) +
--				fdt32_to_cpu(strings[0]);
-+		/*
-+		 * The strings region offset must be a static 0x0.
-+		 * This is set in tool/image-host.c
-+		 */
-+		fdt_regions[count].offset = fdt_off_dt_strings(fit);
- 		fdt_regions[count].size = fdt32_to_cpu(strings[1]);
- 		count++;
- 	}
-diff --git a/tools/image-host.c b/tools/image-host.c
-index 8e43671..be2d59b 100644
---- a/tools/image-host.c
-+++ b/tools/image-host.c
-@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static int fit_image_write_sig(void *fit, int noffset, uint8_t *value,
- 
- 		ret = fdt_setprop(fit, noffset, "hashed-nodes",
- 				   region_prop, region_proplen);
-+		/* This is a legacy offset, it is unused, and must remain 0. */
- 		strdata[0] = 0;
- 		strdata[1] = cpu_to_fdt32(string_size);
- 		if (!ret) {
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bb79af1c7b..0000000000
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-From 72239fc85f3eda078547956608c063ab965e90e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2018 11:38:05 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] vboot: Add FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE protection
-
-This adds a new config value FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE, which controls the
-max size of a FIT header's totalsize field. The field is checked before
-signature checks are applied to protect from reading past the intended
-FIT regions.
-
-This field is not part of the vboot signature so it should be sanity
-checked. If the field is corrupted then the structure or string region
-reads may have unintended behavior, such as reading from device memory.
-A default value of 256MB is set and intended to support most max storage
-sizes.
-
-Suggested-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
-Signed-off-by: Teddy Reed <teddy.reed@gmail.com>
-Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport[http://git.denx.de/?p=u-boot.git;a=commit;
-                 h=72239fc85f3eda078547956608c063ab965e90e9]
-
-CVE: CVE-2018-1000205
-
-Signed-off-by: Changqing Li <changqing.li@windriver.com>
----
- Kconfig                     | 10 ++++++++++
- common/image-sig.c          |  5 +++++
- test/py/tests/test_vboot.py | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- tools/Makefile              |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Kconfig b/Kconfig
-index 5a82c95..c8b86cd 100644
---- a/Kconfig
-+++ b/Kconfig
-@@ -267,6 +267,16 @@ config FIT_SIGNATURE
- 	  format support in this case, enable it using
- 	  CONFIG_IMAGE_FORMAT_LEGACY.
- 
-+config FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE
-+	hex "Max size of signed FIT structures"
-+	depends on FIT_SIGNATURE
-+	default 0x10000000
-+	help
-+	  This option sets a max size in bytes for verified FIT uImages.
-+	  A sane value of 256MB protects corrupted DTB structures from overlapping
-+	  device memory. Assure this size does not extend past expected storage
-+	  space.
-+
- config FIT_VERBOSE
- 	bool "Show verbose messages when FIT images fail"
- 	help
-diff --git a/common/image-sig.c b/common/image-sig.c
-index f65d883..8d2fd10 100644
---- a/common/image-sig.c
-+++ b/common/image-sig.c
-@@ -156,6 +156,11 @@ static int fit_image_setup_verify(struct image_sign_info *info,
- {
- 	char *algo_name;
- 
-+	if (fdt_totalsize(fit) > CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE) {
-+		*err_msgp = "Total size too large";
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (fit_image_hash_get_algo(fit, noffset, &algo_name)) {
- 		*err_msgp = "Can't get hash algo property";
- 		return -1;
-diff --git a/test/py/tests/test_vboot.py b/test/py/tests/test_vboot.py
-index ee939f2..3d25ec3 100644
---- a/test/py/tests/test_vboot.py
-+++ b/test/py/tests/test_vboot.py
-@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ Tests run with both SHA1 and SHA256 hashing.
- 
- import pytest
- import sys
-+import struct
- import u_boot_utils as util
- 
- @pytest.mark.boardspec('sandbox')
-@@ -105,6 +106,26 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console):
-         util.run_and_log(cons, [mkimage, '-F', '-k', tmpdir, '-K', dtb,
-                                 '-r', fit])
- 
-+    def replace_fit_totalsize(size):
-+        """Replace FIT header's totalsize with something greater.
-+
-+        The totalsize must be less than or equal to FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE.
-+        If the size is greater, the signature verification should return false.
-+
-+        Args:
-+            size: The new totalsize of the header
-+
-+        Returns:
-+            prev_size: The previous totalsize read from the header
-+        """
-+        total_size = 0
-+        with open(fit, 'r+b') as handle:
-+            handle.seek(4)
-+            total_size = handle.read(4)
-+            handle.seek(4)
-+            handle.write(struct.pack(">I", size))
-+        return struct.unpack(">I", total_size)[0]
-+
-     def test_with_algo(sha_algo):
-         """Test verified boot with the given hash algorithm.
- 
-@@ -146,6 +167,18 @@ def test_vboot(u_boot_console):
-         util.run_and_log(cons, [fit_check_sign, '-f', fit, '-k', tmpdir,
-                                 '-k', dtb])
- 
-+        # Replace header bytes
-+        bcfg = u_boot_console.config.buildconfig
-+        max_size = int(bcfg.get('config_fit_signature_max_size', 0x10000000), 0)
-+        existing_size = replace_fit_totalsize(max_size + 1)
-+        run_bootm(sha_algo, 'Signed config with bad hash', 'Bad Data Hash', False)
-+        cons.log.action('%s: Check overflowed FIT header totalsize' % sha_algo)
-+
-+        # Replace with existing header bytes
-+        replace_fit_totalsize(existing_size)
-+        run_bootm(sha_algo, 'signed config', 'dev+', True)
-+        cons.log.action('%s: Check default FIT header totalsize' % sha_algo)
-+
-         # Increment the first byte of the signature, which should cause failure
-         sig = util.run_and_log(cons, 'fdtget -t bx %s %s value' %
-                                (fit, sig_node))
-diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
-index 5dd33ed..0c3341e 100644
---- a/tools/Makefile
-+++ b/tools/Makefile
-@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
- # This affects include/image.h, but including the board config file
- # is tricky, so manually define this options here.
- HOST_EXTRACFLAGS	+= -DCONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE
-+HOST_EXTRACFLAGS	+= -DCONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE=$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE)
- endif
- 
- ifdef CONFIG_SYS_U_BOOT_OFFS
--- 
-2.7.4
-
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.07.inc b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.09.inc
similarity index 64%
rename from meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.07.inc
rename to meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.09.inc
index 22b44dccc6..3a991ae8fc 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.07.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-common_2018.09.inc
@@ -8,11 +8,8 @@ PE = "1"
 
 # We use the revision in order to avoid having to fetch it from the
 # repo during parse
-SRCREV = "8c5d4fd0ec222701598a27b26ab7265d4cee45a3"
+SRCREV = "f88b6facb87dc4a52f1630eb9d858c0f54c6628e"
 
-SRC_URI = "git://git.denx.de/u-boot.git \
-           file://CVE-2018-1000205-1.patch \
-           file://CVE-2018-1000205-2.patch \
-"
+SRC_URI = "git://git.denx.de/u-boot.git"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/git"
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-fw-utils_2018.07.bb b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-fw-utils_2018.09.bb
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-fw-utils_2018.07.bb
rename to meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-fw-utils_2018.09.bb
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-mkimage_2018.07.bb b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-mkimage_2018.09.bb
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-mkimage_2018.07.bb
rename to meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot-mkimage_2018.09.bb
diff --git a/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2018.07.bb b/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2018.09.bb
similarity index 100%
rename from meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2018.07.bb
rename to meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2018.09.bb
-- 
2.19.0

[U-Boot] [PATCH 4/4] u-boot: Upgrade 2018.07 -> 2018.09

[Otavio Salvador]

On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 6:16 PM Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> wrote:
>
> This upgrades U-Boot to 2018.09 release and drop the backported
> security fixes which are now included upstream.
>
> Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>

When I mentioned, on IRC, about this bump to Marek, he mentioned that
there is a regression on x86 being worked on upstream so this patch
should wait for this to be sorted out before we update it.

-- 
Otavio Salvador                             O.S. Systems
http://www.ossystems.com.br        http://code.ossystems.com.br
Mobile: +55 (53) 9 9981-7854          Mobile: +1 (347) 903-9750

Re: [PATCH 4/4] u-boot: Upgrade 2018.07 -> 2018.09

[Otavio Salvador]

On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 6:16 PM Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> wrote:
>
> This upgrades U-Boot to 2018.09 release and drop the backported
> security fixes which are now included upstream.
>
> Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>

When I mentioned, on IRC, about this bump to Marek, he mentioned that
there is a regression on x86 being worked on upstream so this patch
should wait for this to be sorted out before we update it.

-- 
Otavio Salvador                             O.S. Systems
http://www.ossystems.com.br        http://code.ossystems.com.br
Mobile: +55 (53) 9 9981-7854          Mobile: +1 (347) 903-9750

[U-Boot] [OE-core] [PATCH 4/4] u-boot: Upgrade 2018.07 -> 2018.09

[akuster808]

On 09/16/2018 06:14 PM, Otavio Salvador wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 6:16 PM Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> wrote:
>> This upgrades U-Boot to 2018.09 release and drop the backported
>> security fixes which are now included upstream.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
> When I mentioned, on IRC, about this bump to Marek, he mentioned that
> there is a regression on x86 being worked on upstream so this patch
> should wait for this to be sorted out before we update it.

What is the difference in regression when there is a kernel issue
identified after they release or any other package update?

Granted this most likely wont make 2.6 so is a moot point in 6 months. 
Is there a benefit to the many over the few with this?

- armin
>

Re: [PATCH 4/4] u-boot: Upgrade 2018.07 -> 2018.09

[akuster808]

On 09/16/2018 06:14 PM, Otavio Salvador wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 6:16 PM Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> wrote:
>> This upgrades U-Boot to 2018.09 release and drop the backported
>> security fixes which are now included upstream.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
> When I mentioned, on IRC, about this bump to Marek, he mentioned that
> there is a regression on x86 being worked on upstream so this patch
> should wait for this to be sorted out before we update it.

What is the difference in regression when there is a kernel issue
identified after they release or any other package update?

Granted this most likely wont make 2.6 so is a moot point in 6 months. 
Is there a benefit to the many over the few with this?

- armin
>

[U-Boot] [OE-core] [PATCH 4/4] u-boot: Upgrade 2018.07 -> 2018.09

[Marek Vasut]

On 09/17/2018 03:57 AM, akuster808 wrote:
> 
> 
> On 09/16/2018 06:14 PM, Otavio Salvador wrote:
>> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 6:16 PM Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> wrote:
>>> This upgrades U-Boot to 2018.09 release and drop the backported
>>> security fixes which are now included upstream.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
>> When I mentioned, on IRC, about this bump to Marek, he mentioned that
>> there is a regression on x86 being worked on upstream so this patch
>> should wait for this to be sorted out before we update it.
> 
> What is the difference in regression when there is a kernel issue
> identified after they release or any other package update?
> 
> Granted this most likely wont make 2.6 so is a moot point in 6 months. 
> Is there a benefit to the many over the few with this?

Nah, 2018.07 is fine.

-- 
Best regards,
Marek Vasut

Re: [PATCH 4/4] u-boot: Upgrade 2018.07 -> 2018.09

[Marek Vasut]

On 09/17/2018 03:57 AM, akuster808 wrote:
> 
> 
> On 09/16/2018 06:14 PM, Otavio Salvador wrote:
>> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 6:16 PM Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> wrote:
>>> This upgrades U-Boot to 2018.09 release and drop the backported
>>> security fixes which are now included upstream.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br>
>> When I mentioned, on IRC, about this bump to Marek, he mentioned that
>> there is a regression on x86 being worked on upstream so this patch
>> should wait for this to be sorted out before we update it.
> 
> What is the difference in regression when there is a kernel issue
> identified after they release or any other package update?
> 
> Granted this most likely wont make 2.6 so is a moot point in 6 months. 
> Is there a benefit to the many over the few with this?

Nah, 2018.07 is fine.

-- 
Best regards,
Marek Vasut