From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>, "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>, LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:23:19 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180920162338.21060-8-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-1-keescook@chromium.org> Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++-- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 +++- security/integrity/iint.c | 4 +++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 4 +++- 6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index ad04761e5587..02ec717189f9 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -2045,11 +2045,13 @@ struct lsm_info { extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[]; -#define security_initcall(lsm) \ +#define DEFINE_LSM(lsm) \ static struct lsm_info __lsm_##lsm \ __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) \ - = { .init = lsm, } + = { \ + +#define END_LSM } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE /* diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8b8b70620bbe..7fa7b4464cf4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1606,4 +1606,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) return error; } -security_initcall(apparmor_init); +DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) + .init = apparmor_init, +END_LSM; diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 70d21b566955..20e60df929a3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -175,7 +175,9 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once); return 0; } -security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init); +DEFINE_LSM(integrity) + .init = integrity_iintcache_init, +END_LSM; /* diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index ad9a9b8e9979..469a90806bc6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7202,7 +7202,9 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void) /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label all processes and objects when they are created. */ -security_initcall(selinux_init); +DEFINE_LSM(selinux) + .init = selinux_init, +END_LSM; #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 340fc30ad85d..1e1ace718e75 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4882,4 +4882,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) * Smack requires early initialization in order to label * all processes and objects when they are created. */ -security_initcall(smack_init); +DEFINE_LSM(smack) + .init = smack_init, +END_LSM; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 9f932e2d6852..a280d4eab456 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -550,4 +550,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) return 0; } -security_initcall(tomoyo_init); +DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) + .init = tomoyo_init, +END_LSM; -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:23:19 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180920162338.21060-8-keescook@chromium.org> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-1-keescook@chromium.org> Instead of using argument-based initializers, switch to defining the contents of struct lsm_info on a per-LSM basis. This also drops the final use of the now inaccurate "initcall" naming. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> --- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 ++++-- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 4 +++- security/integrity/iint.c | 4 +++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 4 +++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 4 +++- 6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index ad04761e5587..02ec717189f9 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -2045,11 +2045,13 @@ struct lsm_info { extern struct lsm_info __start_lsm_info[], __end_lsm_info[]; -#define security_initcall(lsm) \ +#define DEFINE_LSM(lsm) \ static struct lsm_info __lsm_##lsm \ __used __section(.lsm_info.init) \ __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long)) \ - = { .init = lsm, } + = { \ + +#define END_LSM } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE /* diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8b8b70620bbe..7fa7b4464cf4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -1606,4 +1606,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) return error; } -security_initcall(apparmor_init); +DEFINE_LSM(apparmor) + .init = apparmor_init, +END_LSM; diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 70d21b566955..20e60df929a3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -175,7 +175,9 @@ static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) 0, SLAB_PANIC, init_once); return 0; } -security_initcall(integrity_iintcache_init); +DEFINE_LSM(integrity) + .init = integrity_iintcache_init, +END_LSM; /* diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index ad9a9b8e9979..469a90806bc6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -7202,7 +7202,9 @@ void selinux_complete_init(void) /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label all processes and objects when they are created. */ -security_initcall(selinux_init); +DEFINE_LSM(selinux) + .init = selinux_init, +END_LSM; #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 340fc30ad85d..1e1ace718e75 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -4882,4 +4882,6 @@ static __init int smack_init(void) * Smack requires early initialization in order to label * all processes and objects when they are created. */ -security_initcall(smack_init); +DEFINE_LSM(smack) + .init = smack_init, +END_LSM; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index 9f932e2d6852..a280d4eab456 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -550,4 +550,6 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void) return 0; } -security_initcall(tomoyo_init); +DEFINE_LSM(tomoyo) + .init = tomoyo_init, +END_LSM; -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-20 16:23 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook [this message] 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook 2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen 2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald 2018-09-20 20:14 ` Martin Steigerwald 2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook 2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
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