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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 08:03:46 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180921150351.20898-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180921150351.20898-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

The shadow stack for clone/fork is handled as the following:

(1) If ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM),
    the kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new SHSTK
    for the child.

    It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall
    and set the child's SHSTK pointer to NULL and let the child
    thread allocate a SHSTK for itself.  There are two issues
    in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code
    that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before
    the child can successfully allocate a SHSTK.

(2) For (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK), the child uses the existing
    SHSTK.

(3) For all other cases, the SHSTK is copied/reused whenever the
    parent or the child does a call/ret.

This patch handles cases (1) & (2).  Case (3) is handled in
the SHSTK page fault patches.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h         |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c              | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       |  7 ++++++
 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index d9ae3d86cdd7..b7b33e1026bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ struct cet_status {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
 int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 void cet_disable_shstk(void);
 void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp);
 int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp);
 #else
 static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; }
 static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
 static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index eeeb9289c764..8da7c999b7ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
 #include <asm/mpx.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
 
@@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ do {						\
 #else
 #define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm)			\
 do {						\
+	if (!tsk->vfork_done)			\
+		cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);	\
 	load_gs_index(0);			\
 	loadsegment(fs, 0);			\
 } while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index 5cc4be6e0982..ce0b3b7b1160 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -134,6 +134,40 @@ int cet_setup_shstk(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+	struct cet_user_state *state;
+
+	if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
+			       XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER);
+
+	if (!state)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	size = tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size;
+	if (size == 0)
+		size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
+
+	addr = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ,
+			      MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK);
+
+	if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) {
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size - sizeof(u64));
+	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
+	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void cet_disable_shstk(void)
 {
 	u64 r;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 4a776da4c28c..440f012ef925 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	free_vm86(t);
 
+	cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);
 	fpu__drop(fpu);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index ea5ea850348d..9cdbd87bb908 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -325,6 +325,13 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
 	if (sp)
 		childregs->sp = sp;
 
+	/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */
+	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM) {
+		err = cet_setup_thread_shstk(p);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	err = -ENOMEM;
 	if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(me, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) {
 		p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr,
-- 
2.17.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>Peter
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
Date: Fri, 21 Sep 2018 08:03:46 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180921150351.20898-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180921150351.20898-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

The shadow stack for clone/fork is handled as the following:

(1) If ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM),
    the kernel allocates (and frees on thread exit) a new SHSTK
    for the child.

    It is possible for the kernel to complete the clone syscall
    and set the child's SHSTK pointer to NULL and let the child
    thread allocate a SHSTK for itself.  There are two issues
    in this approach: It is not compatible with existing code
    that does inline syscall and it cannot handle signals before
    the child can successfully allocate a SHSTK.

(2) For (clone_flags & CLONE_VFORK), the child uses the existing
    SHSTK.

(3) For all other cases, the SHSTK is copied/reused whenever the
    parent or the child does a call/ret.

This patch handles cases (1) & (2).  Case (3) is handled in
the SHSTK page fault patches.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h         |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c              | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c          |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c       |  7 ++++++
 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
index d9ae3d86cdd7..b7b33e1026bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h
@@ -17,12 +17,14 @@ struct cet_status {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_CET
 int cet_setup_shstk(void);
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 void cet_disable_shstk(void);
 void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p);
 int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp);
 int cet_setup_signal(bool ia32, unsigned long rstor, unsigned long *new_ssp);
 #else
 static inline int cet_setup_shstk(void) { return 0; }
+static inline int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *p) { return 0; }
 static inline void cet_disable_shstk(void) {}
 static inline void cet_disable_free_shstk(struct task_struct *p) {}
 static inline int cet_restore_signal(unsigned long ssp) { return 0; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index eeeb9289c764..8da7c999b7ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
 #include <asm/mpx.h>
+#include <asm/cet.h>
 
 extern atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id;
 
@@ -223,6 +224,8 @@ do {						\
 #else
 #define deactivate_mm(tsk, mm)			\
 do {						\
+	if (!tsk->vfork_done)			\
+		cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);	\
 	load_gs_index(0);			\
 	loadsegment(fs, 0);			\
 } while (0)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
index 5cc4be6e0982..ce0b3b7b1160 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
@@ -134,6 +134,40 @@ int cet_setup_shstk(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int cet_setup_thread_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	unsigned long addr, size;
+	struct cet_user_state *state;
+
+	if (!current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	state = get_xsave_addr(&tsk->thread.fpu.state.xsave,
+			       XFEATURE_MASK_SHSTK_USER);
+
+	if (!state)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	size = tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size;
+	if (size == 0)
+		size = rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK);
+
+	addr = do_mmap_locked(0, size, PROT_READ,
+			      MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, VM_SHSTK);
+
+	if (addr >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) {
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0;
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0;
+		tsk->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0;
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	state->user_ssp = (u64)(addr + size - sizeof(u64));
+	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_base = addr;
+	tsk->thread.cet.shstk_size = size;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 void cet_disable_shstk(void)
 {
 	u64 r;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index 4a776da4c28c..440f012ef925 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
 
 	free_vm86(t);
 
+	cet_disable_free_shstk(tsk);
 	fpu__drop(fpu);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
index ea5ea850348d..9cdbd87bb908 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c
@@ -325,6 +325,13 @@ int copy_thread_tls(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long sp,
 	if (sp)
 		childregs->sp = sp;
 
+	/* Allocate a new shadow stack for pthread */
+	if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM)) == CLONE_VM) {
+		err = cet_setup_thread_shstk(p);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
 	err = -ENOMEM;
 	if (unlikely(test_tsk_thread_flag(me, TIF_IO_BITMAP))) {
 		p->thread.io_bitmap_ptr = kmemdup(me->thread.io_bitmap_ptr,
-- 
2.17.1

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-09-21 15:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 145+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-21 15:03 [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 16:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 16:27     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 16:29     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 16:29       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-28 16:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-28 16:51     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-09-28 16:56     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-28 16:56       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 02/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 16:37   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 16:37     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-10-02 15:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 15:29     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 16:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 16:21       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 16:21       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 16:30       ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:30         ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:30         ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:37         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 16:37           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 16:39           ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:39             ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-02 16:43             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 16:43               ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 03/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 17:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 17:03     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-09-25 17:23     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-25 17:23       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-02 17:15   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-02 17:15     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-10-04 15:47     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-04 15:47       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 04/27] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 05/27] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 06/27] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 10:39   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 10:39     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:11     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:11       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 07/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 08/27] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 09/27] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 13:38   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-03 13:38     ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-10-03 14:05     ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-03 14:05       ` Dave Hansen
2018-10-03 16:07     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:07       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 10/27] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 13:19   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 13:19     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 11/27] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 12/27] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 13/27] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 14/27] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 15/27] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 16/27] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 17/27] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 18/27] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 15:08   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 15:08     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 15:12     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 15:12       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 19/27] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03  4:15   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03  4:15     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 20/27] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 14:36   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 14:36     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:46   ` Jann Horn
2018-10-03 16:46     ` Jann Horn
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 21/27] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 23:27   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 23:27     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-09 21:15     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-09 21:15       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-15 23:40   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-15 23:40     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-16 17:23     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-16 17:23       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2018-09-21 15:03   ` [RFC PATCH v4 22/27] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 23/27] mm/map: Add Shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 16:55   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-21 16:55     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-09-21 17:21     ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 17:21       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 24/27] mm/mmap: Create a guard area between VMAs Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03  4:56   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03  4:56     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03  5:36     ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03  5:36       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03 16:00       ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:00         ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:18         ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03 16:18           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-10-03 16:32         ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:32           ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 16:40           ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:40             ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 16:52           ` Jann Horn
2018-10-03 16:52             ` Jann Horn
2018-10-03 21:21             ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 21:21               ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 25/27] mm/mmap: Prevent Shadow Stack VMA merges Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 26/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-10-03 17:57   ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-10-03 17:57     ` Eugene Syromiatnikov
2018-09-21 15:03 ` [RFC PATCH v4 27/27] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 15:03   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-21 22:53 ` [RFC PATCH v4 00/27] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Dave Hansen
2018-09-21 22:53   ` Dave Hansen
2018-09-24 15:25   ` Yu-cheng Yu
2018-09-24 15:25     ` Yu-cheng Yu

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