From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com, deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com, arjan@linux.intel.com Subject: [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:34:42 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180926203446.2004-2-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180926203446.2004-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> A ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED gets called from process switching code. This precludes the use of audit, as the locking is incompatible. Don't do audit in the PTRACE_MODE_SCHED case. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> --- security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +- security/apparmor/include/ipc.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/ipc.c | 8 +++++--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 08c88de0ffda..28300f4c3ef9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label, if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl)) goto out; - error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); + error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, true); out: rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h index 5ffc218d1e74..299d1c45fef0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct aa_profile; "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost" int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, - u32 request); + u32 request, bool audit); int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig); #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 527ea1557120..9ed110afc822 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -121,15 +121,17 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error */ int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, - u32 request) + u32 request, bool audit) { struct aa_profile *profile; u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT; DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE); return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile, - profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa), - profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa)); + profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, + audit ? &sa : NULL), + profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, + audit ? &sa : NULL)); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8b8b70620bbe..da9d0b228857 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, tracee = aa_get_task_label(child); error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ - : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); + : AA_PTRACE_TRACE, + !(mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)); aa_put_label(tracee); end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); @@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section(); tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent); - error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE); + error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE, true); aa_put_label(tracer); end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: casey.schaufler@intel.com (Casey Schaufler) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Date: Wed, 26 Sep 2018 13:34:42 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180926203446.2004-2-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180926203446.2004-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com> From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> A ptrace access check with mode PTRACE_MODE_SCHED gets called from process switching code. This precludes the use of audit, as the locking is incompatible. Don't do audit in the PTRACE_MODE_SCHED case. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> --- security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +- security/apparmor/include/ipc.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/ipc.c | 8 +++++--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 08c88de0ffda..28300f4c3ef9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct aa_label *to_label, if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerl)) goto out; - error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH); + error = aa_may_ptrace(tracerl, to_label, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, true); out: rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h index 5ffc218d1e74..299d1c45fef0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ struct aa_profile; "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost" int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, - u32 request); + u32 request, bool audit); int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig); #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 527ea1557120..9ed110afc822 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -121,15 +121,17 @@ static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error */ int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, - u32 request) + u32 request, bool audit) { struct aa_profile *profile; u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT; DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE); return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile, - profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa), - profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa)); + profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, + audit ? &sa : NULL), + profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, + audit ? &sa : NULL)); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 8b8b70620bbe..da9d0b228857 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, tracee = aa_get_task_label(child); error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) ? AA_PTRACE_READ - : AA_PTRACE_TRACE); + : AA_PTRACE_TRACE, + !(mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED)); aa_put_label(tracee); end_current_label_crit_section(tracer); @@ -132,7 +133,7 @@ static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section(); tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent); - error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE); + error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE, true); aa_put_label(tracer); end_current_label_crit_section(tracee); -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-26 20:35 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-09-26 20:34 [PATCH v5 0/5] LSM: Support ptrace sidechannel access checks Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 20:34 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 20:34 ` Casey Schaufler [this message] 2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] AppArmor: Prepare for PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 21:16 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 21:16 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 21:18 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 21:18 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 22:47 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-26 22:47 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] Smack: " Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 20:34 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 21:30 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 21:30 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 22:53 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-26 22:53 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-26 22:58 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 22:58 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-04 7:47 ` Jiri Kosina 2018-10-04 11:36 ` Jann Horn 2018-10-16 11:44 ` Jiri Kosina 2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] SELinux: " Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 20:34 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-27 1:53 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-27 15:50 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-27 15:50 ` Stephen Smalley 2018-09-27 16:23 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-27 16:23 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-27 16:23 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] Capability: Complete PTRACE_MODE_SCHED Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 20:34 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 21:26 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 21:26 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-26 22:24 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-26 22:24 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-26 20:34 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] sidechannel: Linux Security Module for sidechannel Casey Schaufler 2018-09-26 20:34 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-27 21:45 ` James Morris 2018-09-27 21:45 ` James Morris 2018-09-27 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-27 22:39 ` Casey Schaufler 2018-09-27 22:47 ` James Morris 2018-09-27 22:47 ` James Morris 2018-09-27 23:19 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-27 23:19 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-27 23:19 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-27 23:43 ` James Morris 2018-09-27 23:43 ` James Morris 2018-09-27 23:43 ` James Morris 2018-09-27 23:47 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-27 23:47 ` Jann Horn 2018-09-28 16:33 ` James Morris 2018-09-28 16:33 ` James Morris 2018-09-28 17:40 ` Schaufler, Casey 2018-09-28 17:40 ` Schaufler, Casey
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