[PATCH 4.9 V2 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches

[PATCH 4.9 V2 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches

[David Long]

From: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>

V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.

Changes in V2:
1) Fixed bad merge in #11/24 in hyp-entry.S.
2) Incorporated upstream patch to earlier patch where wrong ENDPROC call
   was done in hypervisor code in proc-v7.S.

Marc Zyngier (2):
  ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17
  ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15

Russell King (22):
  ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs
  ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure
  ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths
  ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking
  ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre
  ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches
  ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit
  ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space
  ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening
  ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions
  ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15
  ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling
  ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
  ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros
  ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation
  ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry
  ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user()
  ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state
  ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user()
  ARM: use __inttype() in get_user()
  ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user()
  ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h   |  12 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h     |  32 ++++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h        |   6 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h        |   3 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h     |   8 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h     |   2 -
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  14 ++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h     |  23 +++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h    |   4 +
 arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h |  15 +++
 arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h |   4 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h     |  26 +++--
 arch/arm/kernel/Makefile           |   1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c             |  18 +++
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S     |  18 ++-
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S     |  25 +++++
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c           |  55 ++++-----
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c              |   4 +
 arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c          |   2 +
 arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c  |   8 +-
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S       | 112 ++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S      |   9 ++
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig                |  23 ++++
 arch/arm/mm/Makefile               |   2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                |   3 +
 arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S          |   3 +-
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S       |   6 -
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c         | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S              | 154 +++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c           |  17 ++-
 30 files changed, 674 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c

-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 01/24] ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit f5683e76f35b4ec5891031b6a29036efe0a1ff84 upstream.

Add CPU part numbers for Cortex A53, A57, A72, A73, A75 and the
Broadcom Brahma B15 CPU.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h
index b62eaeb147aa..c55db1e22f0c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h
@@ -76,8 +76,16 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12		0x4100c0d0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17		0x4100c0e0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15		0x4100c0f0
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A53		0x4100d030
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57		0x4100d070
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72		0x4100d080
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73		0x4100d090
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75		0x4100d0a0
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_MASK		0xff00fff0
 
+/* Broadcom cores */
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15		0x420000f0
+
 /* DEC implemented cores */
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_SA1100		0x4400a110
 
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 02/24] ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit a5b9177f69329314721aa7022b7e69dab23fa1f0 upstream.

Prepare the processor bug infrastructure so that it can be expanded to
check for per-processor bugs.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 4 ++--
 arch/arm/kernel/Makefile    | 1 +
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c      | 9 +++++++++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h
index a97f1ea708d1..ed122d294f3f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_BUGS_H
 #define __ASM_BUGS_H
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
 
-#define check_bugs() check_writebuffer_bugs()
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
+extern void check_bugs(void);
 #else
 #define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile
index ad325a8c7e1e..adb9add28b6f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/Makefile
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ else
 obj-y		+= entry-armv.o
 endif
 
+obj-$(CONFIG_MMU)		+= bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_IDLE)		+= cpuidle.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_ISA_DMA_API)	+= dma.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_FIQ)		+= fiq.o fiqasm.o
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..88024028bb70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// SPDX-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
+
+void __init check_bugs(void)
+{
+	check_writebuffer_bugs();
+}
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 03/24] ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 26602161b5ba795928a5a719fe1d5d9f2ab5c3ef upstream.

Check for CPU bugs when secondary processors are being brought online,
and also when CPUs are resuming from a low power mode.  This gives an
opportunity to check that processor specific bug workarounds are
correctly enabled for all paths that a CPU re-enters the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h | 2 ++
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c      | 5 +++++
 arch/arm/kernel/smp.c       | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c   | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h
index ed122d294f3f..73a99c72a930 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h
@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ extern void check_writebuffer_bugs(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 extern void check_bugs(void);
+extern void check_other_bugs(void);
 #else
 #define check_bugs() do { } while (0)
+#define check_other_bugs() do { } while (0)
 #endif
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
index 88024028bb70..16e7ba2a9cc4 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
@@ -3,7 +3,12 @@
 #include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 
+void check_other_bugs(void)
+{
+}
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	check_writebuffer_bugs();
+	check_other_bugs();
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/smp.c b/arch/arm/kernel/smp.c
index 7dd14e8395e6..d2ce37da87d8 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/smp.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/smp.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/irq_work.h>
 
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/smp.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
@@ -400,6 +401,9 @@ asmlinkage void secondary_start_kernel(void)
 	 * before we continue - which happens after __cpu_up returns.
 	 */
 	set_cpu_online(cpu, true);
+
+	check_other_bugs();
+
 	complete(&cpu_running);
 
 	local_irq_enable();
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c b/arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c
index 9a2f882a0a2d..134f0d432610 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 #include <asm/idmap.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ int cpu_suspend(unsigned long arg, int (*fn)(unsigned long))
 		cpu_switch_mm(mm->pgd, mm);
 		local_flush_bp_all();
 		local_flush_tlb_all();
+		check_other_bugs();
 	}
 
 	return ret;
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 04/24] ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 9d3a04925deeabb97c8e26d940b501a2873e8af3 upstream.

Add support for per-processor bug checking - each processor function
descriptor gains a function pointer for this check, which must not be
an __init function.  If non-NULL, this will be called whenever a CPU
enters the kernel via which ever path (boot CPU, secondary CPU startup,
CPU resuming, etc.)

This allows processor specific bug checks to validate that workaround
bits are properly enabled by firmware via all entry paths to the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c          | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S       | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h
index 8877ad5ffe10..f379f5f849a9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ extern struct processor {
 	 * Set up any processor specifics
 	 */
 	void (*_proc_init)(void);
+	/*
+	 * Check for processor bugs
+	 */
+	void (*check_bugs)(void);
 	/*
 	 * Disable any processor specifics
 	 */
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
index 16e7ba2a9cc4..7be511310191 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@
 
 void check_other_bugs(void)
 {
+#ifdef MULTI_CPU
+	if (processor.check_bugs)
+		processor.check_bugs();
+#endif
 }
 
 void __init check_bugs(void)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S
index 0d40c285bd86..7d9176c4a21d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S
@@ -274,13 +274,14 @@
 	mcr	p15, 0, ip, c7, c10, 4		@ data write barrier
 	.endm
 
-.macro define_processor_functions name:req, dabort:req, pabort:req, nommu=0, suspend=0
+.macro define_processor_functions name:req, dabort:req, pabort:req, nommu=0, suspend=0, bugs=0
 	.type	\name\()_processor_functions, #object
 	.align 2
 ENTRY(\name\()_processor_functions)
 	.word	\dabort
 	.word	\pabort
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_proc_init
+	.word	\bugs
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_proc_fin
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_reset
 	.word	cpu_\name\()_do_idle
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 05/24] ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit c58d237d0852a57fde9bc2c310972e8f4e3d155d upstream.

Add a Kconfig symbol for CPUs which are vulnerable to the Spectre
attacks.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index c1799dd1d0d9..d37af5e63411 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -396,6 +396,7 @@ config CPU_V7
 	select CPU_CP15_MPU if !MMU
 	select CPU_HAS_ASID if MMU
 	select CPU_PABRT_V7
+	select CPU_SPECTRE if MMU
 	select CPU_TLB_V7 if MMU
 
 # ARMv7M
@@ -800,6 +801,9 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
 	help
 	  Say Y here to disable branch prediction.  If unsure, say N.
 
+config CPU_SPECTRE
+	bool
+
 config TLS_REG_EMUL
 	bool
 	select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 06/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 06c23f5ffe7ad45b908d0fff604dae08a7e334b9 upstream.

Required manual merge of arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S.

Harden the branch predictor against Spectre v2 attacks on context
switches for ARMv7 and later CPUs.  We do this by:

Cortex A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: invalidating the BTB.
Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidating the instruction cache.

Cortex A57 and Cortex A72 are not addressed in this patch.

Cortex R7 and Cortex R8 are also not addressed as we do not enforce
memory protection on these cores.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig          |  19 ++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S |   6 --
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S        | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 3 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index d37af5e63411..7f3760fa9c15 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -804,6 +804,25 @@ config CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE
 config CPU_SPECTRE
 	bool
 
+config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
+	depends on CPU_SPECTRE
+	default y
+	help
+	   Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely
+	   on being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim
+	   context by executing aliasing branches in the attacker context.
+	   Such attacks can be partially mitigated against by clearing
+	   internal branch predictor state and limiting the prediction
+	   logic in some situations.
+
+	   This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden
+	   the branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on
+	   specific instruction sequences or control bits being set by
+	   the system firmware.
+
+	   If unsure, say Y.
+
 config TLS_REG_EMUL
 	bool
 	select NEED_KUSER_HELPERS
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S
index c6141a5435c3..f8d45ad2a515 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S
@@ -41,11 +41,6 @@
  *	even on Cortex-A8 revisions not affected by 430973.
  *	If IBE is not set, the flush BTAC/BTB won't do anything.
  */
-ENTRY(cpu_ca8_switch_mm)
-#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
-	mov	r2, #0
-	mcr	p15, 0, r2, c7, c5, 6		@ flush BTAC/BTB
-#endif
 ENTRY(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 	mmid	r1, r1				@ get mm->context.id
@@ -66,7 +61,6 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
 #endif
 	bx	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_switch_mm)
-ENDPROC(cpu_ca8_switch_mm)
 
 /*
  *	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext(ptep, pte)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
index d00d52c9de3e..bf632d76d392 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
@@ -88,6 +88,17 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
+	mov	r3, #0
+	mcr	p15, 0, r3, c7, c5, 0		@ ICIALLU
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm)
+	mov	r3, #0
+	mcr	p15, 0, r3, c7, c5, 6		@ flush BTAC/BTB
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm)
+
 	string	cpu_v7_name, "ARMv7 Processor"
 	.align
 
@@ -153,31 +164,6 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_do_resume)
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_do_resume)
 #endif
 
-/*
- * Cortex-A8
- */
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_proc_init,	cpu_v7_proc_init
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_proc_fin,	cpu_v7_proc_fin
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_reset,		cpu_v7_reset
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_idle,	cpu_v7_do_idle
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_dcache_clean_area, cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_suspend_size,	cpu_v7_suspend_size
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_CPU_SUSPEND
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
-#endif
-
-/*
- * Cortex-A9 processor functions
- */
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_proc_init,	cpu_v7_proc_init
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_proc_fin,	cpu_v7_proc_fin
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_reset,	cpu_v7_reset
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_do_idle,	cpu_v7_do_idle
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_dcache_clean_area, cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_switch_mm
-	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
 .globl	cpu_ca9mp_suspend_size
 .equ	cpu_ca9mp_suspend_size, cpu_v7_suspend_size + 4 * 2
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_CPU_SUSPEND
@@ -543,10 +529,75 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 
 	@ define struct processor (see <asm/proc-fns.h> and proc-macros.S)
 	define_processor_functions v7, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	@ generic v7 bpiall on context switch
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_proc_init,	cpu_v7_proc_init
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_proc_fin,		cpu_v7_proc_fin
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_reset,		cpu_v7_reset
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_idle,		cpu_v7_do_idle
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_dcache_clean_area, cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_suspend_size,	cpu_v7_suspend_size
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_CPU_SUSPEND
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
+	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
+#endif
+	define_processor_functions v7_bpiall, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+
+#define HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS v7_bpiall_processor_functions
+#else
+#define HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS v7_processor_functions
+#endif
+
 #ifndef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
+	@ Cortex-A8 - always needs bpiall switch_mm implementation
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_proc_init,	cpu_v7_proc_init
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_proc_fin,	cpu_v7_proc_fin
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_reset,		cpu_v7_reset
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_idle,	cpu_v7_do_idle
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_dcache_clean_area, cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_suspend_size,	cpu_v7_suspend_size
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_CPU_SUSPEND
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
+#endif
 	define_processor_functions ca8, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+
+	@ Cortex-A9 - needs more registers preserved across suspend/resume
+	@ and bpiall switch_mm for hardening
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_proc_init,	cpu_v7_proc_init
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_proc_fin,	cpu_v7_proc_fin
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_reset,	cpu_v7_reset
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_do_idle,	cpu_v7_do_idle
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_dcache_clean_area, cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm
+#else
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+#endif
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
 	define_processor_functions ca9mp, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
 #endif
+
+	@ Cortex-A15 - needs iciallu switch_mm for hardening
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_proc_init,	cpu_v7_proc_init
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_proc_fin,	cpu_v7_proc_fin
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_reset,		cpu_v7_reset
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_idle,	cpu_v7_do_idle
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_dcache_clean_area, cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm
+#else
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+#endif
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_suspend_size,	cpu_v7_suspend_size
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
+	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
+	define_processor_functions ca15, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PJ4B
 	define_processor_functions pj4b, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
 #endif
@@ -653,7 +704,7 @@ __v7_ca7mp_proc_info:
 __v7_ca12mp_proc_info:
 	.long	0x410fc0d0
 	.long	0xff0ffff0
-	__v7_proc __v7_ca12mp_proc_info, __v7_ca12mp_setup
+	__v7_proc __v7_ca12mp_proc_info, __v7_ca12mp_setup, proc_fns = HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS
 	.size	__v7_ca12mp_proc_info, . - __v7_ca12mp_proc_info
 
 	/*
@@ -663,7 +714,7 @@ __v7_ca12mp_proc_info:
 __v7_ca15mp_proc_info:
 	.long	0x410fc0f0
 	.long	0xff0ffff0
-	__v7_proc __v7_ca15mp_proc_info, __v7_ca15mp_setup
+	__v7_proc __v7_ca15mp_proc_info, __v7_ca15mp_setup, proc_fns = ca15_processor_functions
 	.size	__v7_ca15mp_proc_info, . - __v7_ca15mp_proc_info
 
 	/*
@@ -673,7 +724,7 @@ __v7_ca15mp_proc_info:
 __v7_b15mp_proc_info:
 	.long	0x420f00f0
 	.long	0xff0ffff0
-	__v7_proc __v7_b15mp_proc_info, __v7_b15mp_setup
+	__v7_proc __v7_b15mp_proc_info, __v7_b15mp_setup, proc_fns = ca15_processor_functions
 	.size	__v7_b15mp_proc_info, . - __v7_b15mp_proc_info
 
 	/*
@@ -683,9 +734,25 @@ __v7_b15mp_proc_info:
 __v7_ca17mp_proc_info:
 	.long	0x410fc0e0
 	.long	0xff0ffff0
-	__v7_proc __v7_ca17mp_proc_info, __v7_ca17mp_setup
+	__v7_proc __v7_ca17mp_proc_info, __v7_ca17mp_setup, proc_fns = HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS
 	.size	__v7_ca17mp_proc_info, . - __v7_ca17mp_proc_info
 
+	/* ARM Ltd. Cortex A73 processor */
+	.type	__v7_ca73_proc_info, #object
+__v7_ca73_proc_info:
+	.long	0x410fd090
+	.long	0xff0ffff0
+	__v7_proc __v7_ca73_proc_info, __v7_setup, proc_fns = HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS
+	.size	__v7_ca73_proc_info, . - __v7_ca73_proc_info
+
+	/* ARM Ltd. Cortex A75 processor */
+	.type	__v7_ca75_proc_info, #object
+__v7_ca75_proc_info:
+	.long	0x410fd0a0
+	.long	0xff0ffff0
+	__v7_proc __v7_ca75_proc_info, __v7_setup, proc_fns = HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS
+	.size	__v7_ca75_proc_info, . - __v7_ca75_proc_info
+
 	/*
 	 * Qualcomm Inc. Krait processors.
 	 */
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 07/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit e388b80288aade31135aca23d32eee93dd106795 upstream.

When the branch predictor hardening is enabled, firmware must have set
the IBE bit in the auxiliary control register.  If this bit has not
been set, the Spectre workarounds will not be functional.

Add validation that this bit is set, and print a warning at alert level
if this is not the case.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/mm/Makefile       |  2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Makefile b/arch/arm/mm/Makefile
index e8698241ece9..92d47c8cbbc3 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Makefile
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_MOHAWK)	+= proc-mohawk.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_FEROCEON)	+= proc-feroceon.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6)		+= proc-v6.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V6K)		+= proc-v6.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= proc-v7.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7)		+= proc-v7.o proc-v7-bugs.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7M)		+= proc-v7m.o
 
 AFLAGS_proc-v6.o	:=-Wa,-march=armv6
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e46557db6446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+
+static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
+						  u32 mask, const char *msg)
+{
+	u32 aux_cr;
+
+	asm("mrc p15, 0, %0, c1, c0, 1" : "=r" (aux_cr));
+
+	if ((aux_cr & mask) != mask) {
+		if (!*warned)
+			pr_err("CPU%u: %s", smp_processor_id(), msg);
+		*warned = true;
+	}
+}
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, spectre_warned);
+
+static void check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) &&
+		cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(warned, bit,
+				       "Spectre v2: firmware did not set auxiliary control register IBE bit, system vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
+{
+	check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6));
+}
+
+void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
+{
+	check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0));
+}
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
index bf632d76d392..4e4f794f17ce 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca8_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
 #endif
-	define_processor_functions ca8, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca8, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_ca8_ibe
 
 	@ Cortex-A9 - needs more registers preserved across suspend/resume
 	@ and bpiall switch_mm for hardening
@@ -597,7 +597,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_suspend_size,	cpu_v7_suspend_size
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca15_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
-	define_processor_functions ca15, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca15, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_ca15_ibe
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PJ4B
 	define_processor_functions pj4b, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
 #endif
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 08/24] ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit f5fe12b1eaee220ce62ff9afb8b90929c396595f upstream.

In order to prevent aliasing attacks on the branch predictor,
invalidate the BTB or instruction cache on CPUs that are known to be
affected when taking an abort on a address that is outside of a user
task limit:

Cortex A8, A9, A12, A17, A73, A75: flush BTB.
Cortex A15, Brahma B15: invalidate icache.

If the IBE bit is not set, then there is little point to enabling the
workaround.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h        |  3 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h | 15 ++++++
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                |  3 ++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c         | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S              |  8 ++--
 5 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
index dbdbce1b3a72..b74b174ac9fc 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h
@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
 #define __write_sysreg(v, r, w, c, t)	asm volatile(w " " c : : "r" ((t)(v)))
 #define write_sysreg(v, ...)		__write_sysreg(v, __VA_ARGS__)
 
+#define BPIALL				__ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 6)
+#define ICIALLU				__ACCESS_CP15(c7, 0, c5, 0)
+
 extern unsigned long cr_alignment;	/* defined in entry-armv.S */
 
 static inline unsigned long get_cr(void)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
index a3d61ad984af..1fed41440af9 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/irqflags.h>
 #include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
 
 extern void cpu_init(void);
 
@@ -14,6 +15,20 @@ void soft_restart(unsigned long);
 extern void (*arm_pm_restart)(enum reboot_mode reboot_mode, const char *cmd);
 extern void (*arm_pm_idle)(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+typedef void (*harden_branch_predictor_fn_t)(void);
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
+static inline void harden_branch_predictor(void)
+{
+	harden_branch_predictor_fn_t fn = per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn,
+						  smp_processor_id());
+	if (fn)
+		fn();
+}
+#else
+#define harden_branch_predictor() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
 #define UDBG_UNDEFINED	(1 << 0)
 #define UDBG_SYSCALL	(1 << 1)
 #define UDBG_BADABORT	(1 << 2)
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
index f7861dc83182..5ca207ada852 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/fault.c
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ __do_user_fault(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
 {
 	struct siginfo si;
 
+	if (addr > TASK_SIZE)
+		harden_branch_predictor();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_USER
 	if (((user_debug & UDBG_SEGV) && (sig == SIGSEGV)) ||
 	    ((user_debug & UDBG_BUS)  && (sig == SIGBUS))) {
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
index e46557db6446..85a2e3d6263c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
@@ -2,7 +2,61 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
-static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
+#include <asm/cp15.h>
+#include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/system_misc.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
+
+static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
+{
+	write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
+}
+
+static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
+{
+	write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
+}
+
+static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
+{
+	const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
+	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+	if (per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu))
+		return;
+
+	switch (read_cpuid_part()) {
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A8:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A9:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
+		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+			harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
+		spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
+		break;
+
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
+		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
+		break;
+	}
+	if (spectre_v2_method)
+		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
+			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
+}
+#else
+static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static __maybe_unused bool cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
 						  u32 mask, const char *msg)
 {
 	u32 aux_cr;
@@ -13,24 +67,33 @@ static __maybe_unused void cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(bool *warned,
 		if (!*warned)
 			pr_err("CPU%u: %s", smp_processor_id(), msg);
 		*warned = true;
+		return false;
 	}
+	return true;
 }
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, spectre_warned);
 
-static void check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit)
+static bool check_spectre_auxcr(bool *warned, u32 bit)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) &&
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) &&
 		cpu_v7_check_auxcr_set(warned, bit,
 				       "Spectre v2: firmware did not set auxiliary control register IBE bit, system vulnerable\n");
 }
 
 void cpu_v7_ca8_ibe(void)
 {
-	check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6));
+	if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(6)))
+		cpu_v7_spectre_init();
 }
 
 void cpu_v7_ca15_ibe(void)
 {
-	check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0));
+	if (check_spectre_auxcr(this_cpu_ptr(&spectre_warned), BIT(0)))
+		cpu_v7_spectre_init();
+}
+
+void cpu_v7_bugs_init(void)
+{
+	cpu_v7_spectre_init();
 }
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
index 4e4f794f17ce..2d2e5ae85816 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
@@ -527,8 +527,10 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 
 	__INITDATA
 
+	.weak cpu_v7_bugs_init
+
 	@ define struct processor (see <asm/proc-fns.h> and proc-macros.S)
-	define_processor_functions v7, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions v7, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	@ generic v7 bpiall on context switch
@@ -543,7 +545,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_suspend,	cpu_v7_do_suspend
 	globl_equ	cpu_v7_bpiall_do_resume,	cpu_v7_do_resume
 #endif
-	define_processor_functions v7_bpiall, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions v7_bpiall, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 
 #define HARDENED_BPIALL_PROCESSOR_FUNCTIONS v7_bpiall_processor_functions
 #else
@@ -579,7 +581,7 @@ __v7_setup_stack:
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_switch_mm,	cpu_v7_switch_mm
 #endif
 	globl_equ	cpu_ca9mp_set_pte_ext,	cpu_v7_set_pte_ext
-	define_processor_functions ca9mp, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1
+	define_processor_functions ca9mp, dabort=v7_early_abort, pabort=v7_pabort, suspend=1, bugs=cpu_v7_bugs_init
 #endif
 
 	@ Cortex-A15 - needs iciallu switch_mm for hardening
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.

Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
handling in firmware.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      | 21 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
index 85a2e3d6263c..da25a38e1897 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
@@ -1,14 +1,20 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/psci.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
 
 #include <asm/cp15.h>
 #include <asm/cputype.h>
+#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
 #include <asm/system_misc.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
 
+extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+
 static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
 {
 	write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
@@ -19,6 +25,16 @@ static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
 	write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
 }
 
+static void __maybe_unused call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+
+static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
+{
+	arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
+}
+
 static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 {
 	const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
@@ -45,7 +61,51 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
 		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
 		break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	default:
+		/* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */
+		if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM)
+			break;
+		/* fallthrough */
+		/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: {
+		struct arm_smccc_res res;
+
+		if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
+			break;
+
+		switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+				break;
+			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+				call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
+			break;
+
+		case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
+			arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
+					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
+			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
+				break;
+			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
+				call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
+			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
+			spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
 	}
+#endif
+	}
+
 	if (spectre_v2_method)
 		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
 			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
index 2d2e5ae85816..850c22bca19c 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  *
  *  This is the "shell" of the ARMv7 processor support.
  */
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
@@ -88,6 +89,26 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 	ret	lr
 ENDPROC(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
+	.arch_extension sec
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	smc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
+	.arch_extension virt
+ENTRY(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
+	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	hvc	#0
+	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
+	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
+ENDPROC(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
+#endif
 ENTRY(cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
 	mov	r3, #0
 	mcr	p15, 0, r3, c7, c5, 0		@ ICIALLU
-- 
2.17.1

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Russell King - ARM Linux]

Marc,

Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after
your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg
merge it.

Thanks.

On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:47AM -0500, David Long wrote:
> From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> 
> Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
> Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.
> 
> Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
> handling in firmware.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
> ---
>  arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S      | 21 +++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 81 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> index 85a2e3d6263c..da25a38e1897 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> @@ -1,14 +1,20 @@
>  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
>  #include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/psci.h>
>  #include <linux/smp.h>
>  
>  #include <asm/cp15.h>
>  #include <asm/cputype.h>
> +#include <asm/proc-fns.h>
>  #include <asm/system_misc.h>
>  
>  #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
>  DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
>  
> +extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
> +extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
> +
>  static void harden_branch_predictor_bpiall(void)
>  {
>  	write_sysreg(0, BPIALL);
> @@ -19,6 +25,16 @@ static void harden_branch_predictor_iciallu(void)
>  	write_sysreg(0, ICIALLU);
>  }
>  
> +static void __maybe_unused call_smc_arch_workaround_1(void)
> +{
> +	arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
> +}
> +
> +static void __maybe_unused call_hvc_arch_workaround_1(void)
> +{
> +	arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, NULL);
> +}
> +
>  static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
>  {
>  	const char *spectre_v2_method = NULL;
> @@ -45,7 +61,51 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
>  			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
>  		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
>  		break;
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
> +	default:
> +		/* Other ARM CPUs require no workaround */
> +		if (read_cpuid_implementor() == ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM)
> +			break;
> +		/* fallthrough */
> +		/* Cortex A57/A72 require firmware workaround */
> +	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A57:
> +	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A72: {
> +		struct arm_smccc_res res;
> +
> +		if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
> +			break;
> +
> +		switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
> +		case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
> +			arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
> +					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
> +			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
> +				break;
> +			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
> +				call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
> +			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
> +			spectre_v2_method = "hypervisor";
> +			break;
> +
> +		case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
> +			arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
> +					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
> +			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
> +				break;
> +			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
> +				call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
> +			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
> +			spectre_v2_method = "firmware";
> +			break;
> +
> +		default:
> +			break;
> +		}
>  	}
> +#endif
> +	}
> +
>  	if (spectre_v2_method)
>  		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
>  			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
> diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
> index 2d2e5ae85816..850c22bca19c 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
> +++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
>   *
>   *  This is the "shell" of the ARMv7 processor support.
>   */
> +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
>  #include <linux/init.h>
>  #include <linux/linkage.h>
>  #include <asm/assembler.h>
> @@ -88,6 +89,26 @@ ENTRY(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
>  	ret	lr
>  ENDPROC(cpu_v7_dcache_clean_area)
>  
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_PSCI
> +	.arch_extension sec
> +ENTRY(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
> +	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
> +	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
> +	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
> +	smc	#0
> +	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
> +	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
> +ENDPROC(cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm)
> +	.arch_extension virt
> +ENTRY(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
> +	stmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
> +	movw	r0, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
> +	movt	r0, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
> +	hvc	#0
> +	ldmfd	sp!, {r0 - r3}
> +	b	cpu_v7_switch_mm
> +ENDPROC(cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm)
> +#endif
>  ENTRY(cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
>  	mov	r3, #0
>  	mcr	p15, 0, r3, c7, c5, 0		@ ICIALLU
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

-- 
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line in suburbia: sync at 12.1Mbps down 622kbps up
According to speedtest.net: 11.9Mbps down 500kbps up

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Marc Zyngier]

Russell,

On Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:54:10 +0000,
Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> wrote:
> 
> Marc,
> 
> Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after
> your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg
> merge it.
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:47AM -0500, David Long wrote:
> > From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> > 
> > Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
> > Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.
> > 
> > Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
> > handling in firmware.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> > Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> > Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>

Sure. Feel free to add my

Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely
to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's
"Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests
didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Thanks,

	M.

-- 
Jazz is not dead, it just smell funny.

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[David Long]

On 11/13/18 9:23 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Russell,
> 
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:54:10 +0000,
> Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> wrote:
>>
>> Marc,
>>
>> Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after
>> your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg
>> merge it.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:47AM -0500, David Long wrote:
>>> From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
>>>
>>> Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
>>> Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.
>>>
>>> Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
>>> handling in firmware.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
>>> Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
> 
> Sure. Feel free to add my
> 
> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> 
> I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely
> to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's
> "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests
> didn't show the issues of the initial backport.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> 	M.
> 

I tested the patch set through kernelci and (belatedly) kvm-unit-tests, 
the latter of which revealed the problem in V1 #11/24.  I have to assume 
Florian didn't specifically test kvm, something I myself had originally 
assumed would be covered by kernelci.

I didn't scrub any of the ack/tested/reviewed lines from the original 
patches.  I've always assumed this is the correct way to do this but 
maybe it's not?

-dl

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Marc Zyngier]

On Tue, 13 Nov 2018 15:16:03 +0000,
David Long <dave.long@linaro.org> wrote:
> 
> On 11/13/18 9:23 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> > Russell,
> > 
> > On Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:54:10 +0000,
> > Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> wrote:
> >> 
> >> Marc,
> >> 
> >> Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after
> >> your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg
> >> merge it.
> >> 
> >> Thanks.
> >> 
> >> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:47AM -0500, David Long wrote:
> >>> From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> >>> 
> >>> Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
> >>> Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.
> >>> 
> >>> Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
> >>> handling in firmware.
> >>> 
> >>> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> >>> Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> >>> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
> > 
> > Sure. Feel free to add my
> > 
> > Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> > 
> > I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely
> > to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's
> > "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests
> > didn't show the issues of the initial backport.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > 
> > 	M.
> > 
> 
> I tested the patch set through kernelci and (belatedly)
> kvm-unit-tests, the latter of which revealed the problem in V1 #11/24.
> I have to assume Florian didn't specifically test kvm, something I
> myself had originally assumed would be covered by kernelci.
> 
> I didn't scrub any of the ack/tested/reviewed lines from the original
> patches.  I've always assumed this is the correct way to do this but
> maybe it's not?

Leaving the tags is absolutely fine, they indicate that the original
patch was actually tested.

I'm more worried of potential regressions: we've already found two
problems, and although I cannot spot any other, it is fairly obvious
that there has only been a limited amount of testing. It may not be a
problem, but I'd rather be cautious.

Thanks,

	M.

-- 
Jazz is not dead, it just smell funny.

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Russell King - ARM Linux]

On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 05:36:37PM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On Tue, 13 Nov 2018 15:16:03 +0000,
> David Long <dave.long@linaro.org> wrote:
> > 
> > On 11/13/18 9:23 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> > > Russell,
> > > 
> > > On Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:54:10 +0000,
> > > Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> wrote:
> > >> 
> > >> Marc,
> > >> 
> > >> Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after
> > >> your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg
> > >> merge it.
> > >> 
> > >> Thanks.
> > >> 
> > >> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:47AM -0500, David Long wrote:
> > >>> From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> > >>> 
> > >>> Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
> > >>> Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.
> > >>> 
> > >>> Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
> > >>> handling in firmware.
> > >>> 
> > >>> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> > >>> Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> > >>> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> > >>> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> > >>> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
> > > 
> > > Sure. Feel free to add my
> > > 
> > > Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> > > 
> > > I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely
> > > to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's
> > > "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests
> > > didn't show the issues of the initial backport.
> > > 
> > > Thanks,
> > > 
> > > 	M.
> > > 
> > 
> > I tested the patch set through kernelci and (belatedly)
> > kvm-unit-tests, the latter of which revealed the problem in V1 #11/24.
> > I have to assume Florian didn't specifically test kvm, something I
> > myself had originally assumed would be covered by kernelci.
> > 
> > I didn't scrub any of the ack/tested/reviewed lines from the original
> > patches.  I've always assumed this is the correct way to do this but
> > maybe it's not?
> 
> Leaving the tags is absolutely fine, they indicate that the original
> patch was actually tested.
> 
> I'm more worried of potential regressions: we've already found two
> problems, and although I cannot spot any other, it is fairly obvious
> that there has only been a limited amount of testing. It may not be a
> problem, but I'd rather be cautious.

The biggest problem is getting people to actually test the damn patches,
and not relying on the autobuilders/autobooters to do the work for you.
The autobooters are hopeless when it comes to identifying problems (as
I've now said multiple times since the regressions were first spotted.)

I'm of the opinion that the autobooters actually give _misleading_
results, and have been doing every since they were setup.

They claim that a platform which boots to a shell prompt, but which the
kernel log contains a stack trace is a "pass" result.  When you receive
an email that says that nothing failed, you don't bother going to (eg)
kernelci to read the boot logs, you assume there's no problem.  So the
failures (eg, due to WARN_ON() or worse, an oops that doesn't prevent
reaching a shell prompt) will go unnoticed.

That's exactly what has happened with the big.Little changes.

The ENDPROC() issue is much harder, none of the autobooters cover the
case of running a kernel under KVM afaik.  So that path never gets
executed - it's worse than that, because even if we _did_ have that,
we need to have both an ARM kernel and Thumb2 kernel exercised.  We
really can't rely on "eyes" spotting it, because as has been shown
many times, we have lots of cases where things get missed in review.
The claim that "open source is better because you have many eyes
looking at the source" seems to be provably false.

The same goes for the mess up in vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(),
no one spotted that either, and it was only when some other compiler
issued a warning that it was found.

We keep asking people to test, but I don't think it does any good in
the long run other than delaying patches.  Unfortunately, the point
at which people notice problems is only _after_ the patches have been
merged into mainline and they are effectively forced via that method
to test the merged result.  Again, there's plenty of evidence to this.

For example, I've been posting asking people to test the big.Little
Spectre patches that caused problems last time around.  I get the
impression I'm completely wasting my time, because I'm getting zero
replies on that, not even from the individual who reported the
problem last time around.

I might as well have merged the patches last week and get it over
with, rather than delaying them until Friday.  At least we'll find
any problems quicker that way, because, as I've said above, it
_forces_ people to test.

I'm afraid that our "ask people to test" model just doesn't work
anymore now that we have autobuilders - I guess people end up
thinking that the autobuilders will do the work for them... :(

In summary, what I'm saying is that getting patches tested so we
can have confidence that they are correct is damn hard to nigh on
impossible.

-- 
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
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Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Tony Lindgren]

* Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> [181113 14:23]:
> I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely
> to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's
> "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests
> didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

To make the "Boot-tested-by" tags still valid, I just applied this
whole series on v4.19.136 and gave it a quick boot test on my boards
between C-A8 to C-A15 and they still boot just fine with this
series and show the spectre workaround status on dmesg.

Thanks,

Tony

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Florian Fainelli]

On 11/13/18 6:23 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> Russell,
> 
> On Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:54:10 +0000,
> Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> wrote:
>>
>> Marc,
>>
>> Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after
>> your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg
>> merge it.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:47AM -0500, David Long wrote:
>>> From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
>>>
>>> Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
>>> Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.
>>>
>>> Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
>>> handling in firmware.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
>>> Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
> 
> Sure. Feel free to add my
> 
> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> 
> I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely
> to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's
> "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests
> didn't show the issues of the initial backport.

Correct, I was not testing any KVM path at all, which is why this did
not show up as a problem for me, I am not really well equipped to
perform KVM testing at the moment.
-- 
Florian

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Russell King - ARM Linux]

All,

It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week
since the last message in this thread.

What is happening with these patches?  What about the 4.4-stable
backport as well?  Does anyone care about these anymore?  Do we have
any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?

David - FYI - everything in my Spectre branch is now in mainline as
of 4.20-rc3, and I have nothing further planned for core 32-bit ARM
Spectre workarounds.

On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 10:08:48AM -0800, Florian Fainelli wrote:
> On 11/13/18 6:23 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> > Russell,
> > 
> > On Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:54:10 +0000,
> > Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> wrote:
> >>
> >> Marc,
> >>
> >> Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after
> >> your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg
> >> merge it.
> >>
> >> Thanks.
> >>
> >> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:47AM -0500, David Long wrote:
> >>> From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> >>>
> >>> Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
> >>> Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.
> >>>
> >>> Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
> >>> handling in firmware.
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
> >>> Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> >>> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
> > 
> > Sure. Feel free to add my
> > 
> > Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> > 
> > I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely
> > to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's
> > "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests
> > didn't show the issues of the initial backport.
> 
> Correct, I was not testing any KVM path at all, which is why this did
> not show up as a problem for me, I am not really well equipped to
> perform KVM testing at the moment.
> -- 
> Florian

-- 
RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/
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Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Greg KH]

On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 10:59:44AM +0000, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> All,
> 
> It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week
> since the last message in this thread.
> 
> What is happening with these patches?  What about the 4.4-stable
> backport as well?  Does anyone care about these anymore?  Do we have
> any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?

I can queue these 4.9 patches up after this next release, I was waiting
to see if anyone else had any comments on them.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[David Long]

On 11/20/18 6:15 AM, Greg KH wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 10:59:44AM +0000, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
>> All,
>>
>> It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week
>> since the last message in this thread.
>>
>> What is happening with these patches?  What about the 4.4-stable
>> backport as well?  Does anyone care about these anymore?  Do we have
>> any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?
> 
> I can queue these 4.9 patches up after this next release, I was waiting
> to see if anyone else had any comments on them.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 


FWIW I have since run kvm-unit-tests again, this time with a thumb-2 
host kernel.  It looked OK to me.

-dl

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[Marc Zyngier]

On 20/11/2018 15:30, David Long wrote:
> On 11/20/18 6:15 AM, Greg KH wrote:
>> On Tue, Nov 20, 2018 at 10:59:44AM +0000, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
>>> All,
>>>
>>> It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week
>>> since the last message in this thread.
>>>
>>> What is happening with these patches?  What about the 4.4-stable
>>> backport as well?  Does anyone care about these anymore?  Do we have
>>> any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?
>>
>> I can queue these 4.9 patches up after this next release, I was waiting
>> to see if anyone else had any comments on them.
>>
>> thanks,
>>
>> greg k-h
>>
> 
> 
> FWIW I have since run kvm-unit-tests again, this time with a thumb-2 
> host kernel.  It looked OK to me.

The issue previously reported wasn't with a Thumb-2 host, but with a
Thumb-2 *guest*. I've since verified that this particular case was
correctly working.

	M.
-- 
Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 09/24] ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening

[David Long]

On 11/20/18 5:59 AM, Russell King - ARM Linux wrote:
> All,
> 
> It is now almost two weeks since David posted the patches, and a week
> since the last message in this thread.
> 
> What is happening with these patches?  What about the 4.4-stable
> backport as well?  Does anyone care about these anymore?  Do we have
> any product customers using 32-bit Cortex CPUs anymore?

Please note that the v4.4 patches I sent out do not include the kvm 
changes from the original patch set, therefore they were never affected 
by either of the two issues we've been discussing.  The kvm-unit-tests 
for v4.4 look OK, with or without a thumb-2 host kernel.

> 
> David - FYI - everything in my Spectre branch is now in mainline as
> of 4.20-rc3, and I have nothing further planned for core 32-bit ARM
> Spectre workarounds.
> 
> On Tue, Nov 13, 2018 at 10:08:48AM -0800, Florian Fainelli wrote:
>> On 11/13/18 6:23 AM, Marc Zyngier wrote:
>>> Russell,
>>>
>>> On Mon, 12 Nov 2018 16:54:10 +0000,
>>> Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Marc,
>>>>
>>>> Can you please ack this to say that you are now happy with it after
>>>> your comments on version 1, so we can move forward and have Greg
>>>> merge it.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks.
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:47AM -0500, David Long wrote:
>>>>> From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
>>>>>
>>>>> Commit 10115105cb3aa17b5da1cb726ae8dd5f6854bd93 upstream.
>>>>> Commit 6282e916f774e37845c65d1eae9f8c649004f033 upstream.
>>>>>
>>>>> Add firmware based hardening for cores that require more complex
>>>>> handling in firmware.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
>>>>> Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
>>>>> Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
>>>>> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
>>>
>>> Sure. Feel free to add my
>>>
>>> Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
>>>
>>> I assume someone has tested these patches (I haven't, and I'm unlikely
>>> to do so in the near future as I'm travelling). I'm not sure Tony's
>>> "Boot-tested-by" is still valid, and Florian's earlier set of tests
>>> didn't show the issues of the initial backport.
>>
>> Correct, I was not testing any KVM path at all, which is why this did
>> not show up as a problem for me, I am not really well equipped to
>> perform KVM testing at the moment.
>> -- 
>> Florian
> 

-dl

[PATCH 4.9 V2 10/24] ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit c44f366ea7c85e1be27d08f2f0880f4120698125 upstream.

Warn at error level if the context switching function is not what we
are expecting.  This can happen with big.Little systems, which we
currently do not support.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
index da25a38e1897..5544b82a2e7a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(harden_branch_predictor_fn_t, harden_branch_predictor_fn);
 
+extern void cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
+extern void cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
 extern void cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
 extern void cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm(phys_addr_t pgd_phys, struct mm_struct *mm);
 
@@ -50,6 +52,8 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A73:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A75:
+		if (processor.switch_mm != cpu_v7_bpiall_switch_mm)
+			goto bl_error;
 		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
 			harden_branch_predictor_bpiall;
 		spectre_v2_method = "BPIALL";
@@ -57,6 +61,8 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+		if (processor.switch_mm != cpu_v7_iciallu_switch_mm)
+			goto bl_error;
 		per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
 			harden_branch_predictor_iciallu;
 		spectre_v2_method = "ICIALLU";
@@ -82,6 +88,8 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
 				break;
+			if (processor.switch_mm != cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm && cpu)
+				goto bl_error;
 			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
 				call_hvc_arch_workaround_1;
 			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_hvc_switch_mm;
@@ -93,6 +101,8 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 					  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1, &res);
 			if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
 				break;
+			if (processor.switch_mm != cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm && cpu)
+				goto bl_error;
 			per_cpu(harden_branch_predictor_fn, cpu) =
 				call_smc_arch_workaround_1;
 			processor.switch_mm = cpu_v7_smc_switch_mm;
@@ -109,6 +119,11 @@ static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
 	if (spectre_v2_method)
 		pr_info("CPU%u: Spectre v2: using %s workaround\n",
 			smp_processor_id(), spectre_v2_method);
+	return;
+
+bl_error:
+	pr_err("CPU%u: Spectre v2: incorrect context switching function, system vulnerable\n",
+		cpu);
 }
 #else
 static void cpu_v7_spectre_init(void)
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 11/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17

[David Long]

From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Commit 3f7e8e2e1ebda787f156ce46e3f0a9ce2833fa4f upstream.

In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor,
let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit. This is made complicated
by the fact that we cannot take a branch before invalidating the
BTB.

We only apply this to A12 and A17, which are the only two ARM
cores on which this useful.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h |  2 -
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 17 +++++++-
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S   | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
index 8ef05381984b..24f3ec7c9fbe 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
@@ -61,8 +61,6 @@ struct kvm_vcpu;
 extern char __kvm_hyp_init[];
 extern char __kvm_hyp_init_end[];
 
-extern char __kvm_hyp_vector[];
-
 extern void __kvm_flush_vm_context(void);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_ipa(struct kvm *kvm, phys_addr_t ipa);
 extern void __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid(struct kvm *kvm);
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
index e2f05cedaf97..625edef2a54f 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -248,7 +248,22 @@ static inline int kvm_read_guest_lock(struct kvm *kvm,
 
 static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 {
-	return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
+	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
+	}
+
+#endif
+	default:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector);
+	}
+	}
 }
 
 static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
index 96beb53934c9..58ec002721a1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
@@ -71,6 +71,66 @@ __kvm_hyp_vector:
 	W(b)	hyp_irq
 	W(b)	hyp_fiq
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	.align 5
+__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv:
+	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv
+
+	/*
+	 * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of
+	 * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned.
+	 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset 	  7 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef	  6 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall	  5 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort 4 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort	  3 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* HVC		  2 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ		  1 */
+	W(nop)			/* FIQ		  0 */
+
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6	/* BPIALL */
+	isb
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+	/*
+	 * Yet another silly hack: Use VPIDR as a temp register.
+	 * Thumb2 is really a pain, as SP cannot be used with most
+	 * of the bitwise instructions. The vect_br macro ensures
+	 * things gets cleaned-up.
+	 */
+	mcr	p15, 4, r0, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
+	mov	r0, sp
+	and	r0, r0, #7
+	sub	sp, sp, r0
+	push	{r1, r2}
+	mov	r1, r0
+	mrc	p15, 4, r0, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
+	mrc	p15, 0, r2, c0, c0, 0	/* MIDR  */
+	mcr	p15, 4, r2, c0, c0, 0	/* VPIDR */
+#endif
+
+.macro vect_br val, targ
+ARM(	eor	sp, sp, #\val	)
+ARM(	tst	sp, #7		)
+ARM(	eorne	sp, sp, #\val	)
+
+THUMB(	cmp	r1, #\val	)
+THUMB(	popeq	{r1, r2}	)
+
+	beq	\targ
+.endm
+
+	vect_br	0, hyp_fiq
+	vect_br	1, hyp_irq
+	vect_br	2, hyp_hvc
+	vect_br	3, hyp_dabt
+	vect_br	4, hyp_pabt
+	vect_br	5, hyp_svc
+	vect_br	6, hyp_undef
+	vect_br	7, hyp_reset
+#endif
+
 .macro invalid_vector label, cause
 	.align
 \label:	mov	r0, #\cause
@@ -131,7 +191,14 @@ hyp_hvc:
 	mrceq	p15, 4, r0, c12, c0, 0	@ get HVBAR
 	beq	1f
 
-	push	{lr}
+	/*
+	 * Pushing r2 here is just a way of keeping the stack aligned to
+	 * 8 bytes on any path that can trigger a HYP exception. Here,
+	 * we may well be about to jump into the guest, and the guest
+	 * exit would otherwise be badly decoded by our fancy
+	 * "decode-exception-without-a-branch" code...
+	 */
+	push	{r2, lr}
 
 	mov	lr, r0
 	mov	r0, r1
@@ -141,7 +208,7 @@ hyp_hvc:
 THUMB(	orr	lr, #1)
 	blx	lr			@ Call the HYP function
 
-	pop	{lr}
+	pop	{r2, lr}
 1:	eret
 
 guest_trap:
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 12/24] ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15

[David Long]

From: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>

Commit 0c47ac8cd157727e7a532d665d6fb1b5fd333977 upstream.

In order to avoid aliasing attacks against the branch predictor
on Cortex-A15, let's invalidate the BTB on guest exit, which can
only be done by invalidating the icache (with ACTLR[0] being set).

We use the same hack as for A12/A17 to perform the vector decoding.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h |  5 +++++
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
index 625edef2a54f..3ad2c44f4137 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
 	}
 
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	{
+		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv[];
+		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv);
+	}
 #endif
 	default:
 	{
diff --git a/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
index 58ec002721a1..1bdd03014138 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
@@ -72,6 +72,28 @@ __kvm_hyp_vector:
 	W(b)	hyp_fiq
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	.align 5
+__kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv:
+	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv
+
+	/*
+	 * We encode the exception entry in the bottom 3 bits of
+	 * SP, and we have to guarantee to be 8 bytes aligned.
+	 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Reset 	  7 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Undef	  6 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Syscall	  5 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Prefetch abort 4 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* Data abort	  3 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* HVC		  2 */
+	W(add)	sp, sp, #1	/* IRQ		  1 */
+	W(nop)			/* FIQ		  0 */
+
+	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 0	/* ICIALLU */
+	isb
+
+	b	decode_vectors
+
 	.align 5
 __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv:
 	.global __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv
@@ -92,6 +114,8 @@ __kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv:
 	mcr	p15, 0, r0, c7, c5, 6	/* BPIALL */
 	isb
 
+decode_vectors:
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
 	/*
 	 * Yet another silly hack: Use VPIDR as a temp register.
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 13/24] ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 3c908e16396d130608e831b7fac4b167a2ede6ba upstream.

Include Brahma B15 in the Spectre v2 KVM workarounds.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
index 3ad2c44f4137..d26395754b56 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 		return kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector_bp_inv);
 	}
 
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
 	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
 	{
 		extern char __kvm_hyp_vector_ic_inv[];
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 14/24] ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit b800acfc70d9fb81fbd6df70f2cf5e20f70023d0 upstream.

We want SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to be fast. As fast as possible.
So let's intercept it as early as we can by testing for the
function call number as soon as we've identified a HVC call
coming from the guest.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S b/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
index 1bdd03014138..64d4a39f4b4b 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
  * Foundation, 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA  02110-1301, USA.
  */
 
+#include <linux/arm-smccc.h>
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_arm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ hyp_hvc:
 	lsr     r2, r2, #16
 	and     r2, r2, #0xff
 	cmp     r2, #0
-	bne	guest_trap		@ Guest called HVC
+	bne	guest_hvc_trap		@ Guest called HVC
 
 	/*
 	 * Getting here means host called HVC, we shift parameters and branch
@@ -235,6 +236,20 @@ THUMB(	orr	lr, #1)
 	pop	{r2, lr}
 1:	eret
 
+guest_hvc_trap:
+	movw	r2, #:lower16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	movt	r2, #:upper16:ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	ldr	r0, [sp]		@ Guest's r0
+	teq	r0, r2
+	bne	guest_trap
+	add	sp, sp, #12
+	@ Returns:
+	@ r0 = 0
+	@ r1 = HSR value (perfectly predictable)
+	@ r2 = ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
+	mov	r0, #0
+	eret
+
 guest_trap:
 	load_vcpu r0			@ Load VCPU pointer to r0
 
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 15/24] ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit add5609877c6785cc002c6ed7e008b1d61064439 upstream.

Report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 to KVM guests for affected
CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 14 ++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 0833d8a1dbbb..2fda7e905754 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
+#include <asm/cputype.h>
 #include <asm/kvm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_mmio.h>
@@ -323,8 +324,17 @@ static inline int kvm_arm_vcpu_arch_has_attr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 
 static inline bool kvm_arm_harden_branch_predictor(void)
 {
-	/* No way to detect it yet, pretend it is not there. */
-	return false;
+	switch(read_cpuid_part()) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_BRAHMA_B15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A12:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A15:
+	case ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A17:
+		return true;
+#endif
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
 }
 
 #define KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 16/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit a78d156587931a2c3b354534aa772febf6c9e855 upstream.

Add assembly and C macros for the new CSDB instruction.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h |  8 ++++++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h   | 13 +++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
index 3aed4492c9a7..189f3b42baea 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -445,6 +445,14 @@ THUMB(	orr	\reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT	)
 	.size \name , . - \name
 	.endm
 
+	.macro	csdb
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+	.inst.w	0xf3af8014
+#else
+	.inst	0xe320f014
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 	.macro check_uaccess, addr:req, size:req, limit:req, tmp:req, bad:req
 #ifndef CONFIG_CPU_USE_DOMAINS
 	adds	\tmp, \addr, #\size - 1
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
index f5d698182d50..6f00dac6ad8e 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@
 #define isb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("isb " #option : : : "memory")
 #define dsb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("dsb " #option : : : "memory")
 #define dmb(option) __asm__ __volatile__ ("dmb " #option : : : "memory")
+#ifdef CONFIG_THUMB2_KERNEL
+#define CSDB	".inst.w 0xf3af8014"
+#else
+#define CSDB	".inst	0xe320f014"
+#endif
+#define csdb() __asm__ __volatile__(CSDB : : : "memory")
 #elif defined(CONFIG_CPU_XSC3) || __LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ == 6
 #define isb(x) __asm__ __volatile__ ("mcr p15, 0, %0, c7, c5, 4" \
 				    : : "r" (0) : "memory")
@@ -36,6 +42,13 @@
 #define dmb(x) __asm__ __volatile__ ("" : : : "memory")
 #endif
 
+#ifndef CSDB
+#define CSDB
+#endif
+#ifndef csdb
+#define csdb()
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_HEAVY_MB
 extern void (*soc_mb)(void);
 extern void arm_heavy_mb(void);
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 17/24] ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 1d4238c56f9816ce0f9c8dbe42d7f2ad81cb6613 upstream.

Add an implementation of the array_index_mask_nospec() function for
mitigating Spectre variant 1 throughout the kernel.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
index 6f00dac6ad8e..513e03d138ea 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -75,6 +75,25 @@ extern void arm_heavy_mb(void);
 #define __smp_rmb()	__smp_mb()
 #define __smp_wmb()	dmb(ishst)
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long idx,
+						    unsigned long sz)
+{
+	unsigned long mask;
+
+	asm volatile(
+		"cmp	%1, %2\n"
+	"	sbc	%0, %1, %1\n"
+	CSDB
+	: "=r" (mask)
+	: "r" (idx), "Ir" (sz)
+	: "cc");
+
+	return mask;
+}
+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+#endif
+
 #include <asm-generic/barrier.h>
 
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 18/24] ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 10573ae547c85b2c61417ff1a106cffbfceada35 upstream.

Prevent speculation at the syscall table decoding by clamping the index
used to zero on invalid system call numbers, and using the csdb
speculative barrier.

Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Boot-tested-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Reviewed-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 18 +++++++-----------
 arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index 10c3283d6c19..56be67ecf0fa 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -223,9 +223,7 @@ local_restart:
 	tst	r10, #_TIF_SYSCALL_WORK		@ are we tracing syscalls?
 	bne	__sys_trace
 
-	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
-	badr	lr, ret_fast_syscall		@ return address
-	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
+	invoke_syscall tbl, scno, r10, ret_fast_syscall
 
 	add	r1, sp, #S_OFF
 2:	cmp	scno, #(__ARM_NR_BASE - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE)
@@ -258,14 +256,8 @@ __sys_trace:
 	mov	r1, scno
 	add	r0, sp, #S_OFF
 	bl	syscall_trace_enter
-
-	badr	lr, __sys_trace_return		@ return address
-	mov	scno, r0			@ syscall number (possibly new)
-	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
-	cmp	scno, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
-	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ have to reload r0 - r6
-	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ and update the stack args
-	ldrcc	pc, [tbl, scno, lsl #2]		@ call sys_* routine
+	mov	scno, r0
+	invoke_syscall tbl, scno, r10, __sys_trace_return, reload=1
 	cmp	scno, #-1			@ skip the syscall?
 	bne	2b
 	add	sp, sp, #S_OFF			@ restore stack
@@ -317,6 +309,10 @@ sys_syscall:
 		bic	scno, r0, #__NR_OABI_SYSCALL_BASE
 		cmp	scno, #__NR_syscall - __NR_SYSCALL_BASE
 		cmpne	scno, #NR_syscalls	@ check range
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+		movhs	scno, #0
+		csdb
+#endif
 		stmloia	sp, {r5, r6}		@ shuffle args
 		movlo	r0, r1
 		movlo	r1, r2
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
index e056c9a9aa9d..fa7c6e5c17e7 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S
@@ -377,6 +377,31 @@
 #endif
 	.endm
 
+	.macro	invoke_syscall, table, nr, tmp, ret, reload=0
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	mov	\tmp, \nr
+	cmp	\tmp, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
+	movcs	\tmp, #0
+	csdb
+	badr	lr, \ret			@ return address
+	.if	\reload
+	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ reload r0-r6
+	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ update stack arguments
+	.endif
+	ldrcc	pc, [\table, \tmp, lsl #2]	@ call sys_* routine
+#else
+	cmp	\nr, #NR_syscalls		@ check upper syscall limit
+	badr	lr, \ret			@ return address
+	.if	\reload
+	add	r1, sp, #S_R0 + S_OFF		@ pointer to regs
+	ldmccia	r1, {r0 - r6}			@ reload r0-r6
+	stmccia	sp, {r4, r5}			@ update stack arguments
+	.endif
+	ldrcc	pc, [\table, \nr, lsl #2]	@ call sys_* routine
+#endif
+	.endm
+
 /*
  * These are the registers used in the syscall handler, and allow us to
  * have in theory up to 7 arguments to a function - r0 to r6.
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 19/24] ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user()

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit c32cd419d6650e42b9cdebb83c672ec945e6bd7e upstream.

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure
members in the signal handling path as efficient as possible.  However,
with software PAN and the recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is
reduced as these are no longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around
each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the
access_ok() check for each access.

It becomes much more efficient to use __copy_from_user() instead, so
let's use this for the ARM integer registers.

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
index 7b8f2141427b..a592bc0287f8 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ struct rt_sigframe {
 
 static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigframe __user *sf)
 {
+	struct sigcontext context;
 	struct aux_sigframe __user *aux;
 	sigset_t set;
 	int err;
@@ -149,23 +150,26 @@ static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigframe __user *sf)
 	if (err == 0)
 		set_current_blocked(&set);
 
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r0, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r0, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r1, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r1, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r2, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r2, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r3, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r3, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r4, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r4, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r5, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r5, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r6, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r6, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r7, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r7, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r8, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r8, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r9, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r9, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_r10, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_r10, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_fp, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_fp, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_ip, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_ip, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_sp, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_sp, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_lr, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_lr, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_pc, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_pc, err);
-	__get_user_error(regs->ARM_cpsr, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext.arm_cpsr, err);
+	err |= __copy_from_user(&context, &sf->uc.uc_mcontext, sizeof(context));
+	if (err == 0) {
+		regs->ARM_r0 = context.arm_r0;
+		regs->ARM_r1 = context.arm_r1;
+		regs->ARM_r2 = context.arm_r2;
+		regs->ARM_r3 = context.arm_r3;
+		regs->ARM_r4 = context.arm_r4;
+		regs->ARM_r5 = context.arm_r5;
+		regs->ARM_r6 = context.arm_r6;
+		regs->ARM_r7 = context.arm_r7;
+		regs->ARM_r8 = context.arm_r8;
+		regs->ARM_r9 = context.arm_r9;
+		regs->ARM_r10 = context.arm_r10;
+		regs->ARM_fp = context.arm_fp;
+		regs->ARM_ip = context.arm_ip;
+		regs->ARM_sp = context.arm_sp;
+		regs->ARM_lr = context.arm_lr;
+		regs->ARM_pc = context.arm_pc;
+		regs->ARM_cpsr = context.arm_cpsr;
+	}
 
 	err |= !valid_user_regs(regs);
 
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 20/24] ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 42019fc50dfadb219f9e6ddf4c354f3837057d80 upstream.

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure
members in the signal handling path as efficient as possible.  However,
with software PAN and the recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is
reduced as these are no longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around
each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the
access_ok() check for each access.

Use __copy_from_user() rather than __get_user_err() for individual
members when restoring VFP state.

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h |  4 ++--
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c           | 17 ++++++++---------
 arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c           | 17 +++++++----------
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
index 776757d1604a..57d2ad9c75ca 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h
@@ -126,8 +126,8 @@ struct user_vfp_exc;
 
 extern int vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
 					   struct user_vfp_exc __user *);
-extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *,
-				    struct user_vfp_exc __user *);
+extern int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp *,
+				    struct user_vfp_exc *);
 #endif
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
index a592bc0287f8..6bee5c9b1133 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/signal.c
@@ -107,21 +107,20 @@ static int preserve_vfp_context(struct vfp_sigframe __user *frame)
 	return vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(&frame->ufp, &frame->ufp_exc);
 }
 
-static int restore_vfp_context(struct vfp_sigframe __user *frame)
+static int restore_vfp_context(struct vfp_sigframe __user *auxp)
 {
-	unsigned long magic;
-	unsigned long size;
-	int err = 0;
+	struct vfp_sigframe frame;
+	int err;
 
-	__get_user_error(magic, &frame->magic, err);
-	__get_user_error(size, &frame->size, err);
+	err = __copy_from_user(&frame, (char __user *) auxp, sizeof(frame));
 
 	if (err)
-		return -EFAULT;
-	if (magic != VFP_MAGIC || size != VFP_STORAGE_SIZE)
+		return err;
+
+	if (frame.magic != VFP_MAGIC || frame.size != VFP_STORAGE_SIZE)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return vfp_restore_user_hwstate(&frame->ufp, &frame->ufp_exc);
+	return vfp_restore_user_hwstate(&frame.ufp, &frame.ufp_exc);
 }
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
index 5629d7580973..8e5e97989fda 100644
--- a/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
+++ b/arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c
@@ -597,13 +597,11 @@ int vfp_preserve_user_clear_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 }
 
 /* Sanitise and restore the current VFP state from the provided structures. */
-int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
-			     struct user_vfp_exc __user *ufp_exc)
+int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp *ufp, struct user_vfp_exc *ufp_exc)
 {
 	struct thread_info *thread = current_thread_info();
 	struct vfp_hard_struct *hwstate = &thread->vfpstate.hard;
 	unsigned long fpexc;
-	int err = 0;
 
 	/* Disable VFP to avoid corrupting the new thread state. */
 	vfp_flush_hwstate(thread);
@@ -612,17 +610,16 @@ int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 	 * Copy the floating point registers. There can be unused
 	 * registers see asm/hwcap.h for details.
 	 */
-	err |= __copy_from_user(&hwstate->fpregs, &ufp->fpregs,
-				sizeof(hwstate->fpregs));
+	memcpy(&hwstate->fpregs, &ufp->fpregs, sizeof(hwstate->fpregs));
 	/*
 	 * Copy the status and control register.
 	 */
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpscr, &ufp->fpscr, err);
+	hwstate->fpscr = ufp->fpscr;
 
 	/*
 	 * Sanitise and restore the exception registers.
 	 */
-	__get_user_error(fpexc, &ufp_exc->fpexc, err);
+	fpexc = ufp_exc->fpexc;
 
 	/* Ensure the VFP is enabled. */
 	fpexc |= FPEXC_EN;
@@ -631,10 +628,10 @@ int vfp_restore_user_hwstate(struct user_vfp __user *ufp,
 	fpexc &= ~(FPEXC_EX | FPEXC_FP2V);
 	hwstate->fpexc = fpexc;
 
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpinst, &ufp_exc->fpinst, err);
-	__get_user_error(hwstate->fpinst2, &ufp_exc->fpinst2, err);
+	hwstate->fpinst = ufp_exc->fpinst;
+	hwstate->fpinst2 = ufp_exc->fpinst2;
 
-	return err ? -EFAULT : 0;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 21/24] ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user()

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit 8c8484a1c18e3231648f5ba7cc5ffb7fd70b3ca4 upstream.

__get_user_error() is used as a fast accessor to make copying structure
members as efficient as possible.  However, with software PAN and the
recent Spectre variant 1, the efficiency is reduced as these are no
longer fast accessors.

In the case of software PAN, it has to switch the domain register around
each access, and with Spectre variant 1, it would have to repeat the
access_ok() check for each access.

Rather than using __get_user_error() to copy each semops element member,
copy each semops element in full using __copy_from_user().

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c b/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c
index 5f221acd21ae..640748e27035 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c
@@ -328,9 +328,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int semid,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	err = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < nsops; i++) {
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_num, &tsops->sem_num, err);
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_op,  &tsops->sem_op,  err);
-		__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_flg, &tsops->sem_flg, err);
+		struct oabi_sembuf osb;
+		err |= __copy_from_user(&osb, tsops, sizeof(osb));
+		sops[i].sem_num = osb.sem_num;
+		sops[i].sem_op = osb.sem_op;
+		sops[i].sem_flg = osb.sem_flg;
 		tsops++;
 	}
 	if (timeout) {
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 22/24] ARM: use __inttype() in get_user()

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit d09fbb327d670737ab40fd8bbb0765ae06b8b739 upstream.

Borrow the x86 implementation of __inttype() to use in get_user() to
select an integer type suitable to temporarily hold the result value.
This is necessary to avoid propagating the volatile nature of the
result argument, which can cause the following warning:

lib/iov_iter.c:413:5: warning: optimization may eliminate reads and/or writes to register variables [-Wvolatile-register-var]

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index b7e0125c0bbf..4a61f36c7397 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -114,6 +114,13 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 		: "cc"); \
 	flag; })
 
+/*
+ * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into
+ * that type, or otherwise unsigned long long.
+ */
+#define __inttype(x) \
+	__typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL))
+
 /*
  * Single-value transfer routines.  They automatically use the right
  * size if we just have the right pointer type.  Note that the functions
@@ -183,7 +190,7 @@ extern int __get_user_64t_4(void *);
 	({								\
 		unsigned long __limit = current_thread_info()->addr_limit - 1; \
 		register const typeof(*(p)) __user *__p asm("r0") = (p);\
-		register typeof(x) __r2 asm("r2");			\
+		register __inttype(x) __r2 asm("r2");			\
 		register unsigned long __l asm("r1") = __limit;		\
 		register int __e asm("r0");				\
 		unsigned int __ua_flags = uaccess_save_and_enable();	\
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 23/24] ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user()

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit b1cd0a14806321721aae45f5446ed83a3647c914 upstream.

Fixing __get_user() for spectre variant 1 is not sane: we would have to
add address space bounds checking in order to validate that the location
should be accessed, and then zero the address if found to be invalid.

Since __get_user() is supposed to avoid the bounds check, and this is
exactly what get_user() does, there's no point having two different
implementations that are doing the same thing.  So, when the Spectre
workarounds are required, make __get_user() an alias of get_user().

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 17 +++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 4a61f36c7397..7b17460127fd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -280,6 +280,16 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 #define user_addr_max() \
 	(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS) ? ~0UL : get_fs())
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+/*
+ * When mitigating Spectre variant 1, it is not worth fixing the non-
+ * verifying accessors, because we need to add verification of the
+ * address space there.  Force these to use the standard get_user()
+ * version instead.
+ */
+#define __get_user(x, ptr) get_user(x, ptr)
+#else
+
 /*
  * The "__xxx" versions of the user access functions do not verify the
  * address space - it must have been done previously with a separate
@@ -296,12 +306,6 @@ static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 	__gu_err;							\
 })
 
-#define __get_user_error(x, ptr, err)					\
-({									\
-	__get_user_err((x), (ptr), err);				\
-	(void) 0;							\
-})
-
 #define __get_user_err(x, ptr, err)					\
 do {									\
 	unsigned long __gu_addr = (unsigned long)(ptr);			\
@@ -361,6 +365,7 @@ do {									\
 
 #define __get_user_asm_word(x, addr, err)			\
 	__get_user_asm(x, addr, err, ldr)
+#endif
 
 
 #define __put_user_switch(x, ptr, __err, __fn)				\
-- 
2.17.1

[PATCH 4.9 V2 24/24] ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses

[David Long]

From: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>

Commit a3c0f84765bb429ba0fd23de1c57b5e1591c9389 upstream.

Spectre variant 1 attacks are about this sequence of pseudo-code:

	index = load(user-manipulated pointer);
	access(base + index * stride);

In order for the cache side-channel to work, the access() must me made
to memory which userspace can detect whether cache lines have been
loaded.  On 32-bit ARM, this must be either user accessible memory, or
a kernel mapping of that same user accessible memory.

The problem occurs when the load() speculatively loads privileged data,
and the subsequent access() is made to user accessible memory.

Any load() which makes use of a user-maniplated pointer is a potential
problem if the data it has loaded is used in a subsequent access.  This
also applies for the access() if the data loaded by that access is used
by a subsequent access.

Harden the get_user() accessors against Spectre attacks by forcing out
of bounds addresses to a NULL pointer.  This prevents get_user() being
used as the load() step above.  As a side effect, put_user() will also
be affected even though it isn't implicated.

Also harden copy_from_user() by redoing the bounds check within the
arm_copy_from_user() code, and NULLing the pointer if out of bounds.

Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David A. Long <dave.long@linaro.org>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S    | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
index 189f3b42baea..e616f61f859d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h
@@ -458,6 +458,10 @@ THUMB(	orr	\reg , \reg , #PSR_T_BIT	)
 	adds	\tmp, \addr, #\size - 1
 	sbcccs	\tmp, \tmp, \limit
 	bcs	\bad
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	movcs	\addr, #0
+	csdb
+#endif
 #endif
 	.endm
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
index 7a4b06049001..a826df3d3814 100644
--- a/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
+++ b/arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S
@@ -90,6 +90,15 @@
 	.text
 
 ENTRY(arm_copy_from_user)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE
+	get_thread_info r3
+	ldr	r3, [r3, #TI_ADDR_LIMIT]
+	adds	ip, r1, r2	@ ip=addr+size
+	sub	r3, r3, #1	@ addr_limit - 1
+	cmpcc	ip, r3		@ if (addr+size > addr_limit - 1)
+	movcs	r1, #0		@ addr = NULL
+	csdb
+#endif
 
 #include "copy_template.S"
 
-- 
2.17.1

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches

[Russell King - ARM Linux]

I wonder whether those who spotted the errors last time around are going
to make any comments on this revised series, or whether we're going to
just sit around looking at each other in silence expecting each other to
do something.

If I go through them again, I'm pretty sure I'll find nothing.

On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:38AM -0500, David Long wrote:
> From: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
> 
> V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
> Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.
> 
> Changes in V2:
> 1) Fixed bad merge in #11/24 in hyp-entry.S.
> 2) Incorporated upstream patch to earlier patch where wrong ENDPROC call
>    was done in hypervisor code in proc-v7.S.
> 
> Marc Zyngier (2):
>   ARM: KVM: invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17
>   ARM: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15
> 
> Russell King (22):
>   ARM: add more CPU part numbers for Cortex and Brahma B15 CPUs
>   ARM: bugs: prepare processor bug infrastructure
>   ARM: bugs: hook processor bug checking into SMP and suspend paths
>   ARM: bugs: add support for per-processor bug checking
>   ARM: spectre: add Kconfig symbol for CPUs vulnerable to Spectre
>   ARM: spectre-v2: harden branch predictor on context switches
>   ARM: spectre-v2: add Cortex A8 and A15 validation of the IBE bit
>   ARM: spectre-v2: harden user aborts in kernel space
>   ARM: spectre-v2: add firmware based hardening
>   ARM: spectre-v2: warn about incorrect context switching functions
>   ARM: spectre-v2: KVM: invalidate icache on guest exit for Brahma B15
>   ARM: KVM: Add SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 fast handling
>   ARM: KVM: report support for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1
>   ARM: spectre-v1: add speculation barrier (csdb) macros
>   ARM: spectre-v1: add array_index_mask_nospec() implementation
>   ARM: spectre-v1: fix syscall entry
>   ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_from_user()
>   ARM: vfp: use __copy_from_user() when restoring VFP state
>   ARM: oabi-compat: copy semops using __copy_from_user()
>   ARM: use __inttype() in get_user()
>   ARM: spectre-v1: use get_user() for __get_user()
>   ARM: spectre-v1: mitigate user accesses
> 
>  arch/arm/include/asm/assembler.h   |  12 ++
>  arch/arm/include/asm/barrier.h     |  32 ++++++
>  arch/arm/include/asm/bugs.h        |   6 +-
>  arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h        |   3 +
>  arch/arm/include/asm/cputype.h     |   8 ++
>  arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h     |   2 -
>  arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  14 ++-
>  arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h     |  23 +++-
>  arch/arm/include/asm/proc-fns.h    |   4 +
>  arch/arm/include/asm/system_misc.h |  15 +++
>  arch/arm/include/asm/thread_info.h |   4 +-
>  arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h     |  26 +++--
>  arch/arm/kernel/Makefile           |   1 +
>  arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c             |  18 +++
>  arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S     |  18 ++-
>  arch/arm/kernel/entry-header.S     |  25 +++++
>  arch/arm/kernel/signal.c           |  55 ++++-----
>  arch/arm/kernel/smp.c              |   4 +
>  arch/arm/kernel/suspend.c          |   2 +
>  arch/arm/kernel/sys_oabi-compat.c  |   8 +-
>  arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S       | 112 ++++++++++++++++++-
>  arch/arm/lib/copy_from_user.S      |   9 ++
>  arch/arm/mm/Kconfig                |  23 ++++
>  arch/arm/mm/Makefile               |   2 +-
>  arch/arm/mm/fault.c                |   3 +
>  arch/arm/mm/proc-macros.S          |   3 +-
>  arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S       |   6 -
>  arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c         | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S              | 154 +++++++++++++++++++------
>  arch/arm/vfp/vfpmodule.c           |  17 ++-
>  30 files changed, 674 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 arch/arm/kernel/bugs.c
>  create mode 100644 arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-bugs.c
> 
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

-- 
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Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches

[Greg KH]

On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:38AM -0500, David Long wrote:
> From: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
> 
> V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
> Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.

All now queued up, thanks!

Note, the emails went out with a bit of a mess in the patch headers,
I've fixed them up by hand in the patch queue, so don't worry, the
correct authorship will be attributed properly.

thanks,

greg k-h

Re: [PATCH 4.9 V2 00/24] V4.9 backport of 32-bit arm spectre patches

[David Long]

On 11/21/18 1:27 PM, Greg KH wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 11:43:38AM -0500, David Long wrote:
>> From: "David A. Long" <dave.long@linaro.org>
>>
>> V4.9 backport of spectre patches from Russell M. King's spectre branch.
>> Patches not yet in upstream are excluded.
> 
> All now queued up, thanks!
> 

Thanks much.

> Note, the emails went out with a bit of a mess in the patch headers,
> I've fixed them up by hand in the patch queue, so don't worry, the
> correct authorship will be attributed properly.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

-dl