All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>
To: ell@lists.01.org
Subject: [PATCH 4/9] tls: Implement l_tls_set_version_range
Date: Thu, 13 Dec 2018 20:57:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181213195746.32144-4-andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181213195746.32144-1-andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 15297 bytes --]

Allow user to set custom min and max TLS version limits, this can be
used to ensure we comply with a specific security profile.
---
 ell/ell.sym       |  1 +
 ell/tls-private.h | 10 ++---
 ell/tls-record.c  | 14 +++----
 ell/tls.c         | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 ell/tls.h         |  8 +++-
 5 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/ell/ell.sym b/ell/ell.sym
index 7d7a5e4..2ff7d30 100644
--- a/ell/ell.sym
+++ b/ell/ell.sym
@@ -417,6 +417,7 @@ global:
 	l_tls_close;
 	l_tls_set_cacert;
 	l_tls_set_auth_data;
+	l_tls_set_version_range;
 	l_tls_alert_to_str;
 	l_tls_set_debug;
 	/* uintset */
diff --git a/ell/tls-private.h b/ell/tls-private.h
index 8e6c277..e2ec014 100644
--- a/ell/tls-private.h
+++ b/ell/tls-private.h
@@ -20,13 +20,8 @@
  *
  */
 
-/* Only TLS 1.2 supported */
-#define TLS_V12		((3 << 8) | 3)
-#define TLS_V11		((3 << 8) | 2)
-#define TLS_V10		((3 << 8) | 1)
-
-#define TLS_VERSION	TLS_V12
-#define TLS_MIN_VERSION	TLS_V10
+#define TLS_MAX_VERSION	L_TLS_V12
+#define TLS_MIN_VERSION	L_TLS_V10
 
 enum tls_cipher_type {
 	TLS_CIPHER_STREAM,
@@ -145,6 +140,7 @@ struct l_tls {
 	l_tls_debug_cb_t debug_handler;
 	l_tls_destroy_cb_t debug_destroy;
 	void *debug_data;
+	uint16_t min_version, max_version;
 
 	struct l_queue *ca_certs;
 	struct l_certchain *cert;
diff --git a/ell/tls-record.c b/ell/tls-record.c
index bffa413..bdab0c4 100644
--- a/ell/tls-record.c
+++ b/ell/tls-record.c
@@ -135,14 +135,14 @@ static void tls_tx_record_plaintext(struct l_tls *tls,
 
 		offset = 0;
 
-		if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12) {
+		if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) {
 			l_getrandom(ciphertext, tls->record_iv_length[1]);
 
 			l_cipher_set_iv(tls->cipher[1], ciphertext,
 					tls->record_iv_length[1]);
 
 			offset = tls->record_iv_length[1];
-		} else if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V11) {
+		} else if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V11) {
 			l_getrandom(iv, tls->record_iv_length[1]);
 
 			l_cipher_encrypt(tls->cipher[1], iv, ciphertext,
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ void tls_tx_record(struct l_tls *tls, enum tls_content_type type,
 				TX_RECORD_TAILROOM];
 	uint8_t *fragment, *plaintext;
 	uint16_t fragment_len;
-	uint16_t version = tls->negotiated_version ?: TLS_MIN_VERSION;
+	uint16_t version = tls->negotiated_version ?: tls->min_version;
 
 	if (type == TLS_CT_ALERT)
 		tls->record_flush = true;
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static bool tls_handle_ciphertext(struct l_tls *tls)
 
 	if ((tls->negotiated_version && tls->negotiated_version != version) ||
 			(!tls->negotiated_version &&
-			 tls->record_buf[1] != 0x03 /* Appending E.1 */)) {
+			 tls->record_buf[1] != 0x03 /* Appendix E.1 */)) {
 		TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 0,
 				"Record version mismatch: %02x", version);
 		return false;
@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ static bool tls_handle_ciphertext(struct l_tls *tls)
 
 	case TLS_CIPHER_BLOCK:
 		i = 0;
-		if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V11)
+		if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V11)
 			i = tls->record_iv_length[0];
 
 		if (fragment_len <= tls->mac_length[0] + i) {
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static bool tls_handle_ciphertext(struct l_tls *tls)
 			return false;
 		}
 
-		if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12) {
+		if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) {
 			if (!l_cipher_set_iv(tls->cipher[0],
 						tls->record_buf + 5,
 						tls->record_iv_length[0])) {
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ static bool tls_handle_ciphertext(struct l_tls *tls)
 						"Setting fragment IV failed");
 				return false;
 			}
-		} else if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V11)
+		} else if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V11)
 			if (!l_cipher_decrypt(tls->cipher[0],
 						tls->record_buf + 5, iv,
 						tls->record_iv_length[0])) {
diff --git a/ell/tls.c b/ell/tls.c
index 8099e76..8abbabd 100644
--- a/ell/tls.c
+++ b/ell/tls.c
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ static bool tls_prf_get_bytes(struct l_tls *tls,
 				const void *seed, size_t seed_len,
 				uint8_t *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12)
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12)
 		return tls12_prf(tls->prf_hmac->l_id, tls->prf_hmac->length,
 					secret, secret_len, label,
 					seed, seed_len, buf, len);
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ static bool tls_change_cipher_spec(struct l_tls *tls, bool txrx,
 			key_offset += 2 * enc->key_length;
 	}
 
-	if (tls->negotiated_version <= TLS_V10 &&
+	if (tls->negotiated_version <= L_TLS_V10 &&
 			tls->cipher_suite[txrx]->encryption &&
 			tls->cipher_suite[txrx]->encryption->cipher_type ==
 			TLS_CIPHER_BLOCK) {
@@ -532,10 +532,24 @@ static bool tls_cipher_suite_is_compatible(struct l_tls *tls,
 {
 	static char error_buf[200];
 	struct l_cert *leaf;
+	uint16_t negotiated = tls->negotiated_version;
 
 	if (suite->encryption &&
 			suite->encryption->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AEAD) {
-		uint16_t negotiated = tls->negotiated_version;
+		if (tls->max_version < L_TLS_V12) {
+			if (error) {
+				*error = error_buf;
+				snprintf(error_buf, sizeof(error_buf),
+						"Cipher suite %s uses an AEAD "
+						"cipher (TLS 1.2+) but "
+						TLS_VER_FMT
+						" is the max version allowed",
+						suite->name,
+						TLS_VER_ARGS(tls->max_version));
+			}
+
+			return false;
+		}
 
 		if (negotiated && negotiated < L_TLS_V12) {
 			if (error) {
@@ -589,10 +603,13 @@ static bool tls_cipher_suite_is_compatible(struct l_tls *tls,
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if ((tls->negotiated_version && tls->negotiated_version < TLS_V12 &&
-			(!l_checksum_is_supported(L_CHECKSUM_MD5, true) ||
-			 !l_checksum_is_supported(L_CHECKSUM_SHA1, true))) ||
-			(tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12 &&
+	if (
+			((tls->max_version < L_TLS_V12 ||
+			  (negotiated && negotiated < L_TLS_V12)) &&
+			 (!l_checksum_is_supported(L_CHECKSUM_MD5, true) ||
+			  !l_checksum_is_supported(L_CHECKSUM_SHA1, true))) ||
+			((tls->min_version >= L_TLS_V12 ||
+			  tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) &&
 			 !l_checksum_is_supported(
 					suite->prf_hmac != L_CHECKSUM_NONE ?
 					suite->prf_hmac : L_CHECKSUM_SHA256,
@@ -664,8 +681,14 @@ static const struct tls_hash_algorithm tls_handshake_hash_data[] = {
 static bool tls_init_handshake_hash(struct l_tls *tls)
 {
 	enum handshake_hash_type hash;
+	bool tls10 = tls->max_version < L_TLS_V12;
 
 	for (hash = 0; hash < __HANDSHAKE_HASH_COUNT; hash++) {
+		/* Skip hash types we already know we won't need */
+		if (tls10 && hash != HANDSHAKE_HASH_SHA1 &&
+				hash != HANDSHAKE_HASH_MD5)
+			continue;
+
 		if (tls->handshake_hash[hash]) {
 			TLS_DEBUG("Handshake hash %s already exists",
 					tls_handshake_hash_data[hash].name);
@@ -820,8 +843,8 @@ static bool tls_send_client_hello(struct l_tls *tls)
 
 	/* Fill in the Client Hello body */
 
-	*ptr++ = (uint8_t) (TLS_VERSION >> 8);
-	*ptr++ = (uint8_t) (TLS_VERSION >> 0);
+	*ptr++ = (uint8_t) (tls->max_version >> 8);
+	*ptr++ = (uint8_t) (tls->max_version >> 0);
 
 	tls_write_random(tls->pending.client_random);
 	memcpy(ptr, tls->pending.client_random, 32);
@@ -843,7 +866,8 @@ static bool tls_send_client_hello(struct l_tls *tls)
 	}
 
 	if (ptr == len_ptr + 2) {
-		TLS_DEBUG("No compatible cipher suites, check kernel config");
+		TLS_DEBUG("No compatible cipher suites, check kernel config, "
+				"certificate's key type and TLS version range");
 		return false;
 	}
 
@@ -1034,7 +1058,7 @@ static bool tls_send_certificate_request(struct l_tls *tls)
 	 * affect both of these steps so revisit which set we're passing
 	 * here.
 	 */
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12) {
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) {
 		signature_hash_ptr = ptr;
 		ptr += 2;
 
@@ -1112,7 +1136,7 @@ static void tls_generate_master_secret(struct l_tls *tls,
 			tls->pending.cipher_suite->mac->mac_length;
 
 	if (tls->pending.cipher_suite->encryption &&
-			tls->negotiated_version <= TLS_V10 &&
+			tls->negotiated_version <= L_TLS_V10 &&
 			tls->pending.cipher_suite->encryption->cipher_type ==
 			TLS_CIPHER_BLOCK)
 		key_block_size += 2 *
@@ -1147,8 +1171,9 @@ static bool tls_send_rsa_client_key_xchg(struct l_tls *tls)
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	pre_master_secret[0] = (uint8_t) (TLS_VERSION >> 8);
-	pre_master_secret[1] = (uint8_t) (TLS_VERSION >> 0);
+	/* Must match the version in tls_send_client_hello */
+	pre_master_secret[0] = (uint8_t) (tls->max_version >> 8);
+	pre_master_secret[1] = (uint8_t) (tls->max_version >> 0);
 	l_getrandom(pre_master_secret + 2, 46);
 
 	if (tls->peer_pubkey_size + 32 > (int) sizeof(buf)) {
@@ -1198,7 +1223,7 @@ static ssize_t tls_rsa_sign(struct l_tls *tls, uint8_t *out, size_t len,
 		return -ENOKEY;
 	}
 
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12) {
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) {
 		const struct tls_hash_algorithm *hash_type =
 			&tls_handshake_hash_data[tls->signature_hash];
 
@@ -1250,7 +1275,7 @@ static bool tls_rsa_verify(struct l_tls *tls, const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
 
 	/* 2 bytes for SignatureAndHashAlgorithm if version >= 1.2 */
 	offset = 2;
-	if (tls->negotiated_version < TLS_V12)
+	if (tls->negotiated_version < L_TLS_V12)
 		offset = 0;
 
 	if (len < offset + 2 ||
@@ -1271,7 +1296,7 @@ static bool tls_rsa_verify(struct l_tls *tls, const uint8_t *in, size_t len,
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12) {
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) {
 		/* Only RSA supported */
 		if (in[1] != 1 /* RSA_sign */) {
 			TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR, 0,
@@ -1392,7 +1417,7 @@ static bool tls_send_certificate_verify(struct l_tls *tls)
 		return false;
 
 	/* Stop maintaining handshake message hashes other than the PRF hash */
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12)
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12)
 		for (i = 0; i < __HANDSHAKE_HASH_COUNT; i++)
 			if (&tls_handshake_hash_data[i] != tls->prf_hmac)
 				tls_drop_handshake_hash(tls, i);
@@ -1417,7 +1442,7 @@ static void tls_send_finished(struct l_tls *tls)
 	uint8_t seed[HANDSHAKE_HASH_MAX_SIZE * 2];
 	size_t seed_len;
 
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12) {
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) {
 		/* Same hash type as that used for the PRF (usually SHA256) */
 		enum handshake_hash_type hash;
 
@@ -1458,7 +1483,7 @@ static bool tls_verify_finished(struct l_tls *tls, const uint8_t *received,
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12) {
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) {
 		enum handshake_hash_type hash;
 
 		for (hash = 0; hash < __HANDSHAKE_HASH_COUNT; hash++)
@@ -1574,18 +1599,18 @@ static void tls_handle_client_hello(struct l_tls *tls,
 	/* Save client_version for Premaster Secret verification */
 	tls->client_version = l_get_be16(buf);
 
-	if (tls->client_version < TLS_MIN_VERSION) {
+	if (tls->client_version < tls->min_version) {
 		TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, 0,
 				"Client version too low: %02x",
 				tls->client_version);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	tls->negotiated_version = TLS_VERSION < tls->client_version ?
-		TLS_VERSION : tls->client_version;
+	tls->negotiated_version = tls->client_version > tls->max_version ?
+		tls->max_version : tls->client_version;
 
 	/* Stop maintaining handshake message hashes other than MD1 and SHA. */
-	if (tls->negotiated_version < TLS_V12)
+	if (tls->negotiated_version < L_TLS_V12)
 		for (i = 0; i < __HANDSHAKE_HASH_COUNT; i++)
 			if (i != HANDSHAKE_HASH_SHA1 && i != HANDSHAKE_HASH_MD5)
 				tls_drop_handshake_hash(tls, i);
@@ -1703,9 +1728,9 @@ static void tls_handle_server_hello(struct l_tls *tls,
 
 	tls->negotiated_version = l_get_be16(buf);
 
-	if (tls->negotiated_version < TLS_MIN_VERSION ||
-			tls->negotiated_version > TLS_VERSION) {
-		TLS_DISCONNECT(tls->negotiated_version < TLS_MIN_VERSION ?
+	if (tls->negotiated_version < tls->min_version ||
+			tls->negotiated_version > tls->max_version) {
+		TLS_DISCONNECT(tls->negotiated_version < tls->min_version ?
 				TLS_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION :
 				TLS_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAM, 0,
 				"Unsupported version %02x",
@@ -1714,7 +1739,7 @@ static void tls_handle_server_hello(struct l_tls *tls,
 	}
 
 	/* Stop maintaining handshake message hashes other than MD1 and SHA. */
-	if (tls->negotiated_version < TLS_V12)
+	if (tls->negotiated_version < L_TLS_V12)
 		for (i = 0; i < __HANDSHAKE_HASH_COUNT; i++)
 			if (i != HANDSHAKE_HASH_SHA1 && i != HANDSHAKE_HASH_MD5)
 				tls_drop_handshake_hash(tls, i);
@@ -1911,7 +1936,7 @@ static void tls_handle_certificate_request(struct l_tls *tls,
 	 * lists for use in tls_send_certificate.
 	 */
 
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12) {
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12) {
 		/*
 		 * This only makes sense as a variable-length field, assume
 		 * there's a typo in RFC5246 7.4.4 here.
@@ -2125,7 +2150,7 @@ static void tls_handle_certificate_verify(struct l_tls *tls,
 		return;
 
 	/* Stop maintaining handshake message hashes other than the PRF hash */
-	if (tls->negotiated_version >= TLS_V12)
+	if (tls->negotiated_version >= L_TLS_V12)
 		for (i = 0; i < __HANDSHAKE_HASH_COUNT; i++)
 			if (&tls_handshake_hash_data[i] != tls->prf_hmac)
 				tls_drop_handshake_hash(tls, i);
@@ -2458,6 +2483,8 @@ LIB_EXPORT struct l_tls *l_tls_new(bool server,
 	tls->ready_handle = ready_handler;
 	tls->disconnected = disconnect_handler;
 	tls->user_data = user_data;
+	tls->min_version = TLS_MIN_VERSION;
+	tls->max_version = TLS_MAX_VERSION;
 
 	tls->signature_hash = HANDSHAKE_HASH_SHA256;
 
@@ -2751,6 +2778,18 @@ LIB_EXPORT bool l_tls_set_auth_data(struct l_tls *tls, const char *cert_path,
 	return true;
 }
 
+LIB_EXPORT void l_tls_set_version_range(struct l_tls *tls,
+					uint16_t min_version,
+					uint16_t max_version)
+{
+	tls->min_version =
+		(min_version && min_version > TLS_MIN_VERSION) ?
+		min_version : TLS_MIN_VERSION;
+	tls->max_version =
+		(max_version && max_version < TLS_MAX_VERSION) ?
+		max_version : TLS_MAX_VERSION;
+}
+
 LIB_EXPORT const char *l_tls_alert_to_str(enum l_tls_alert_desc desc)
 {
 	switch (desc) {
diff --git a/ell/tls.h b/ell/tls.h
index fb33404..5b2f398 100644
--- a/ell/tls.h
+++ b/ell/tls.h
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
+#define L_TLS_V12	((3 << 8) | 3)
+#define L_TLS_V11	((3 << 8) | 2)
+#define L_TLS_V10	((3 << 8) | 1)
+
 struct l_tls;
 
 enum l_tls_alert_desc {
@@ -63,7 +67,6 @@ typedef void (*l_tls_disconnect_cb_t)(enum l_tls_alert_desc reason,
 typedef void (*l_tls_debug_cb_t)(const char *str, void *user_data);
 typedef void (*l_tls_destroy_cb_t)(void *user_data);
 
-
 /*
  * app_data_handler gets called with newly received decrypted data.
  * tx_handler gets called to send TLS payloads off to remote end.
@@ -107,6 +110,9 @@ bool l_tls_set_auth_data(struct l_tls *tls, const char *cert_path,
 				const char *priv_key_path,
 				const char *priv_key_passphrase);
 
+void l_tls_set_version_range(struct l_tls *tls,
+				uint16_t min_version, uint16_t max_version);
+
 const char *l_tls_alert_to_str(enum l_tls_alert_desc desc);
 
 enum l_checksum_type;
-- 
2.19.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-12-13 19:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-12-13 19:57 [PATCH 1/9] tls: Don't send Client Hello in l_tls_new Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-13 19:57 ` [PATCH 2/9] unit: Call l_tls_start in tls tests Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-13 19:57 ` [PATCH 3/9] tls: Add TLS version number printf macros Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-14 15:53   ` Denis Kenzior
2018-12-14 18:48     ` Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-13 19:57 ` Andrew Zaborowski [this message]
2018-12-14 15:55   ` [PATCH 4/9] tls: Implement l_tls_set_version_range Denis Kenzior
2018-12-13 19:57 ` [PATCH 5/9] unit: Test TLS 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2 Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-13 19:57 ` [PATCH 6/9] unit: Move tls_cert_load_file to relevant unit tests Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-14 16:01   ` Denis Kenzior
2018-12-13 19:57 ` [PATCH 7/9] tls, pem: Drop tls_cert_load_file, l_pem_load_certificate Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-13 19:57 ` [PATCH 8/9] tls: Allow user to set custom list of cipher suites Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-14 16:33   ` Denis Kenzior
2018-12-14 19:12     ` Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-14 19:28       ` Denis Kenzior
2018-12-14 19:49         ` Andrew Zaborowski
2018-12-14 19:57           ` Denis Kenzior
2018-12-13 19:57 ` [PATCH 9/9] unit: Test many TLS cipher suite and version combinations Andrew Zaborowski

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20181213195746.32144-4-andrew.zaborowski@intel.com \
    --to=andrew.zaborowski@intel.com \
    --cc=ell@lists.01.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.